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ABSTRACT

First published on January 1, 1822, The Charleston Mercury
aspired to provide Charlestonians with a broad coverage of the general
and cultural side of the news.

In proclaiming his political neutrality

the editor, William Morford, charged that political parties served
"selfish ends."

Branding the influence of such "factions" as per

nicious, he endorsed a policy of "harmony and coalition."
This approach did not satisfy Morford's readers.

Subscrip

tions declined and after eighteen months the editor sold the paper to
Henry Laurens Pinckney.

An attorney and a politician, Pinckney was

a member of the legislature:

Reversing Morford's policy of political

restraint, he placed the Mercury squarely behind Calhoun.
During Pinckney's eight years as editor, the paper became a
primary spokesman for the Vice President.

Advocating nullification,

it followed Calhoun in his retreat from nationalism.

This approach

proved more popular and brought about an increase in both circulation
and advertising.

By 1830, the Mercury was widely read inside and

outside the borders of South Carolina.
In 1832 John Allan Stuart replaced Pinckney as editor.
Another attomey-politician,
the legislature.

Stuart, like Pinckney, was a member of

Along with his brother-in-law, Robert Barnwell

Rhett, Stuart was also a follower of Calhoun.

Under Stuart's direc

tion the Mercury became the Calhoun-inspired champion of slavery and

iv

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

a strong advocate of southern political unity.
Calhoun's influence on the Mercury increased steadily during
Stuart's years as editor.

When Calhoun sought the presidency in 1844,

the Mercury served as the principal spokesman for the campaign.

Only

a few months later, however, the Senator and the paper parted company.
As an important financial backer of Stuart, Rhett exerted a
strong force on the M e r c u r y .

Since he was a follower of Calhoun, his

connection with Stuart initially strengthened the Senator's influence.
But in 1844 Rhett lost faith in Calhoun's manner of promoting southern
unity.

Despairing of the South's willingness to act in concert,

Rhett proposed that South Carolina act independently.
resulred in a break with Calhoun.

This decision

Aware that "no public man in

[South Carolina had] ever pitted himself in direct hostility to Cal
houn who [had] not fallen for it," the Mercury nevertheless followed
Rhett.
When Calhoun crushed Rhett's effort, the Mercury accepted the
consequences of its action.

Stuart resigned as editor and Rhett be

gan the long process of rebuilding his political prospects.

John

Milton Clapp became the new editor of the Me r c u r y .
Clapp, a professional journalist, was confronted with a
difficult situation.

Since the Rhett family had retained its finan

cial interest in the paper, Clapp was pro-Rhett.

Accustomed to

thinking of the Mercury as the organ of Calhoun, his readers were
dissatisfied with this situation.

Hampered, then, by the results

of a political rupture, Clapp was left to edit a paper without a
mission.

The resulting decline in subscriptions is indicative of

his plight.
V
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Clapp was relieved of his dilemma when John E. Carew bought
the paper and became editor on February 1, 1845.

An attorney and also

a member of the legislature, Carew restored the paper to its former
position in the Calhoun camp.

Under Carew the Mercury established a

national reputation for faithfully representing the views of the great
Carolinian.
Repenting of its former disposition to favor separate state
action, the paper endorsed Calhoun's manner of promoting unity.

It

advocated cooperation with other southern states and hailed the
Nashville Convention as the long awaited vindication of Calhoun's
position.

This return to the orthodox South Carolina stance was

popular with readers.

It resulted in an expanded subscription list

and a generous increase in advertising.

vi

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

INTRODUCTION

Ante-bellum politicians viewed the newspaper as the primary
vehicle for conveying their ideas to the general public.

This cir

cumstance is especially discernible in South Carolina between 1820
and 1850.

In an effort to build support for his program of southern

unity, John C. Calhoun utilized a variety of papers to spread his
views throughout both the state and the South.

The Pendleton Messen

g e r , the Columbia South Carolinian, the Washington (D.C.) Telegraph,
and the Washington (D.C.) Spectator periodically served in this ca
pacity.

But the Charleston Mercury furnishes the best example of a

political newspaper.

For more than twenty years it was published for

little reason other than to provide Calhoun with steady and enthusi
astic support.
From the journalists's point of view, the Mercury was a charac
teristic southern newspaper.

Neither larger nor smaller than its com

petitors, it was available at the same subscription rate.

Unlike the

New Orleans Picayune to whose direction the Mercury's last editor suc
ceeded,^ the Charleston paper was responsible for no spectacular in
novations in the world of journalism nor was it distinguished by su
perior newsgathering.

^Fayette Copeland, Kendall of the Picayune (Norman, 1943),
20-41; Laura A. White, Robert Barnwell Rhett; Father of Secession
(New York, 1931), 242.

1
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2
In line with conventional practice, the Mercury *s front page
was given over to advertising.

Advertisements extended onto other

pages as well, completely filling the back sheet and, after 1832, fre
quently accounting for as much as seventy-five per cent of the paper's
space.

Presumably an indication of the popularity of the Mercury's po

sition on nullification, this increase in advertising amounted to about
twenty-five per cent of the pre-1832 total.
Describing the affairs of Charleston's declining port, columns
like "Marine News" appealed to local merchants.

There were the usual

quotations on the stocks of local banks and on those of the Bank of the
United States.

The Courier presented a more thorough picture of com

mercial conditions, however, and other journals offered more to those
interested in cultural matters.
The Mercury's real significance was confined to the field of
politics.

Even in this area readers could find no more complete cover

age than that provided by other city papers.

Only in the Mercury, how

ever, could they be sure of finding views approved by the state's lead
ers.

Faithfully following South Carolina's young politicians of the

Era of Good Feeling in their movement from optimistic nationalism to
defensive sectionalism, the Mercur, was a strong voice in Calhoun's
long drive to unite the South.

The Senator's ideas found their most

complete expression in this paper.

During the greater part of its

career the Mercury served as the quasi-official organ of South Carolina
politics.
This analysis is not intended to imply that the Charleston
journal was a mediocre paper.

Ably and at times brilliantly edited,

the Mercury maintained a balanced news coverage.

Throughout most of
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3
its life, however, the paper was dominated by the will of either John
C. Calhoun or Robert Barnwell Rhett.

Much of this dissertation, there-

^
fore, is devoted to an analysis of the positions of Calhoun and Rhett
and their effects on South Carolina politics.%
Between 1828 and 1350 the Mprco.ry wove the twin themes of op
position to the tariff and defense of slavery into a contrapuntal song
of southern rights and federal oppression.

In more recent times, how

ever, scholars have emphasized the importance of slavery as the chief
motivation for South Carolina's disaffection, even when it was offi
cially directed at the tariff as in the 18 2 0 's.

Although the influ

ence of slavery has been cited before,^ it has taken recent scholar
ship to define the cause of the turbulent unease which so early gripped
the Palmetto State.

In 1789 when the very first tariff was being con

sidered, South Carolina's Senator Pierce Butler predicted "a dissolu
tion of the Union . . .

as sure as God was in the firmament," if pro

tectionism became government policy.

There were many other South Caro

lina objections to tariff proposals.

But more recurrent was the

^William L. King, The Newspaper Press of Charleston South Caro
lina (Charleston, 1872), 147-57.
The prevalence of either Calhoun's
or Rhett's influence upon the Mercury makes the paper's subscription
list into an effective political thermometer. Usually behind the Cour
ier in sales, the Mercury equalled its competitor's circulation of
5,000 in 1850 when Calhoun's stand on southern unity commanded its
greatest support.
Subscriptions fell off after 1851, however, when the
Rhett Family bought into the paper.
Under Rhett's influence the Mercury
waged an unpopular battle against the rising appeal of nationalism in
South Carolina.
By 1860 there were only 550 subscriptions on the Mer
cury 's list (Granville T. Prior,"The Charleston Mercury," Ph.D. Disser
tation, Harvard University, 1946, 457; Allan Nevins,
The Emergence of
Lincoln [2 vols.; 1950], 323).
^David F. Houston, A Critical Study of Nullification in South
Carolina (Cambridge, 1896), 48-52; Frederic Bancroft, Calhoun and the
South Carolina Nullification Movement (Baltimore, 1928),19-20, 115.
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problem of slavery and, in particular, insurrection.

In the 1 7 9 0 's

Senator William Smith warned his colleagues against any thought of em
ancipation.

It "would never be submitted to by the Southern States

without a civil war," he said.

At the same time John Rutledge told the

House of Representatives that Southerners believed the North to be
aiming at emancipation.^
More ominous were the rumors of servile insurrection.

During

the same decade, even as the state served as a refuge for those— black
and white— fleeing Haiti, there were recurring rumors of revolts being
inspired by the black emigres.

In a letter to the governor of South

Carolina, Thomas Jefferson spoke of a plot to incite a Negro insurrec
tion in Charleston.

And in 1793 the New York Journal and Patriotic

Register reported that Charleston's blacks were "insolent in so much
that the citizens are alarmed, and the militia keep constant guard.

It

is said," the editor concluded, "that the St. Domingan Negroes have sown
the seeds of revolt.
Neither the rumors nor the concern abated with the turn of the
century.

The opposite seems rather to have been the case.

While there

was initially a good deal of skepticism as to the threat imposed by the
Denmark Vesey affair,^ the overall result of it was a heightening of
tension.

During the three other disturbances between 1820 and nullifi

cation, Carolinians became convinced that there was a connection between

^Steven A. Channing, Crisis of Fear (New York, 1970), 54.
5lbid. ; quoted in ibid.
^Marina Wikramanayake, "The Free Negro in Ante-Bellum South
Carolina," Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1966, 188,
193.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

5
the rising antislavery movement at the North and unrest within the
state.

The problem was further compounded by the Carolinians' linger

ing doubts about the institution of slavery itself.

Questioning the

suitability of slavery in a republic of free men, many Carolinians
could bring themselves to defend it only as a necessary evil.

Un

nerved by this situation, they deprecated slavery as a topic for pub
lic discussion and vented their spleen on the tariff.^
In the process of this dispute, however, South Carolina did not
lose sight of the real cause of her trauma.

Viewing the tariff as an

indirect attack on slavery, Carolinians charged that it would destroy
the institution by making a plantation economy unprofitable.

Al

though the abolition of slavery would solve one problem, it would make
for a worse one in the form of an undisciplined plural society.

Caro

linians convinced themselves, therefore, that slavery was a beneficial
institution after all.

Tightening their control over the blacks, they

worried less about insurrection.®
This solution made for an even greater trauma.

Nowhere else

in the world was the enthusiasm for a slave economy growing as in the
southern states of the American union.

Although editorial thunder in

defense of the institution sometimes obscured the Southerners' aware
ness of their isolation, they were conscious of it nonetheless.

In

1845 Robert Barnwell Rhett received a mournful letter from his kins
man Robert Woodward Rhett observing that "Our institutions are doomed

^William W. Freehling, Prelude to Civil War The Nullification
Controversy in South Carolina, 1816-1836 (New York,1965), 64, 65, 76,
77, 173-74.
®Ibid.
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and the southern civilization must go out in blood."

He had despaired

of the South's power to repel the abolitionist attack.^
Fourteen years later a Columbia correspondent of the Mercury
seemed to feel that the South was at last awakening to the immediacy
of her peril.

Urging support for a trans-Appalachian railroad, he re

minded his readers that the South Carolina Lowcountry was heavily popu
lated by slaves.

In the event of secession they would constitute a

built-in guerilla force.

The railroad would reenforce the besieged

plantations and towns of the area with "great hives of the white popu
lation" from beyond the m o u n t a i n s . A n d in 1861, after secession had
come and the Mercury's dream of the southern nation was realized, a
Lowcountry gentleman stood on Charleston's battery to watch the affray
with the Star of the West.

As he left the crowd assembled there, he

encountered a friend who did not like the Mercury's ideas.
all this end, the friend was asked. " . . .

How would

Don't you know," answered

James L. Petigru, "that the whole world is against slavery?

So if the

South is to fight for that, rest assured, it is lost, never mind which
side wins."-'-^
It was in this setting that the Mercury was established by
Edmund Morford.

Intending to produce a newspaper which would give

Charleston a heavy diet of cultural affairs, Morford abhorred

^Quoted in Channing, Crisis, 55.
^^Mer c u r y , Dec. 7, 1859.
H A b n e y R. Childs, ed.. Rice Planter and Sportsman The Recollec
tions of J. Motte Alston, 1821 to 1901 (Columbia, 1953), 129.
Unless
Alston's memory failed him, the crowd must have been disappointed.
The action took place off Morris Island and virtually nothing could
have been seen from the battery.
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political factions and approached the whole subject of politics with
a dignified restraint.

The first editor's tenure was brief, however,

and his influence on the paper so ephemeral that one scholar actually
refers to Henry Laurens Pinckney as its f o u n d e r . P i n c k n e y ,

the

second editor, aligned the Mercury with Calhoun and ultimately stamped
it in the image of the southern defender.

Under Pinckney's influence

the paper became obsessed with the defense of slavery, a preoccupa
tion which it retained until its demise after the War for Southern
Independence.
Initial rivals of the Mercury included the City Gazette and
Commercial Advertiser, the Southern Patriot and Commercial Adver
tiser, and the Courier.

A morning p aper, the Gazette was in finan

cial decline during the decade of the twenties and did not long sur
vive to contest the field with the Mercury.

Until its absorption by

the Courier, however, it served as an active political commentator
and literary critic.

The Patriot, an evening sheet, emphasized com

mercial and financial questions and devoted less attention to cul
tural matters.

Advertising itself as a state rights journal, it

lasted until 1848.

The Mercury's real competition was the Courier.

Also a morning paper, the Courier strove to be "a commercial and
business journal, and rather a medium of general intelligence and
literature than a political o r g a n . D e s p i t e

its occasional dis

position to priggishness, the Courier was the only one of the original
competitors to survive the Mercury.

l^Daniel Walker Hollis, South Carolina College (Columbia, 1951),
41.
1Q

King, Newspaper Press, 103.
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The Mercury was Charleston's only newspaper that defended the
Nullification Ordinance and it was much reviled for so doing.

With

the times so uncertain and the ever-present subject of the "peculiar
institution" of such intensive concern, some Carolinians doubtless
wondered at the journal's unilateral action.

Finding only a partial

explanation in factional politics, commercial interests, and constitu
tional scruples, the historian must look further to discover that the
Mercury's role was that of a pioneer and sentinel: pioneer of southern
nationality and sentinel of the plantation slave economy.

Undisturbed

by the knowledge that the fate of both pioneer and sentinel is to stand
alone, the Mercury proudly proclaimed its mission in the motto immedi
ately under its title: Vindice nullo sponte sua sine lege fides rectumque colentur, the free and unsupported defender of good faith and
right.
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CHAPTER I

THE FIRST LESSON

John Caldwell Calhoun appeared first and last in the national
capital at a time of crisis.

Twelve years before the founding of the

Charleston M ercury, an institution with which his story is interwoven,
the Abbeville-Laurens-Newberry District elected h i m to the House of
Representatives.

Supporting war with England, Calhoun had easily de

feated his anti-war Federalist opponent. General John A. Elmore.

In

December of 1811 the twenty-nine year old upcountry Carolinian took his
seat in the twelfth congress.

Within a month, he was appointed to the

important Committee on Foreign Relations, and shortly thereafter b e 
came its chairman.!
Calhoun's rapid rise in the House was partly due to the favor
able impression he had made on the Speaker.

Kentucky was also pro-war

country, and in the mid-term elections of 1810 had sent Henry Clay to
Congress, where he represented the case for war with considerable suc
cess.

Unlike Calhoun, Clay had previously served in the Senate, and

was elected Speaker in this, his first, term in the House.

Calhoun

^Gerald M. Capers, John C. Calhoun; Opportunist (Gainesville,
1960), 24, 29.
General Elmore was a Revolutionary War veteran and the
father of Franklin Elmore who migrated to the Lowcountry and became a
close friend of Robert Barnwell Rhett.
He also became a Calhoun sup
porter and succeeded to Calhoun's Senate seat in 1850 (David Duncan
Wallace, South Carolina A Short History 1520-1948 [Columbia, 1961],368)
^Margaret L. Coit, John C. Calhoun, American Portrait (Boston,
1950), 70-72, 81.
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did not disappoint the Speaker in his role of committee chairman.
was his performance unobserved in other quarters.

Nor

No less a figure

than the British minister was of the opinion that the "younger Depu
ties" from South Carolina "were very decided on the propriety of go
ing to w a r in order to protect the Commerce of the C o u n t r y . H e was
right.

On June 3, 1812— the fourth birthday of a sometime Kentuckian

named Jefferson Davis— Calhoun presented his committee’s recommenda
tion for war.

The declaration came fifteen days later.^

This course did not meet with approval from all members of the
Congress.

John Randolph of Roanoke had long heaped opprobrium upon

the heads of those who advocated war.

Deriding Henry Clay as the

"Western Star," Randolph dismissed Calhoun as the presumptuous son of
an unlettered Irish immigrant making "haughty assumptions of equality
with the older m e m b e r s . R a n d o l p h was thirty-eight.

He had, how

ever, been in Congress continuously since his first election in 1799.^
Randolph would have an influence on Calhoun, the Mercury, and
South Carolina but it was destined to be deferred.

He was gavelled

into silence by Clay and, in 1813 temporarily left the Congress.

In

June of that year, however, the equally anti-war Daniel Webster

^Margaret Kinard Latimer, "South Carolina— A Protagonist of
the War of 1812," American Historical Review, LXI, No. 4 (July, 1956),
914, 923, hereinafter cited as A H R ; Alice Noble Waring, ed., "Letters
of John C. Calhoun to Patrick Noble, 1812-1837," Journal of Southern
History, XVI, No. 1 (Feb., 1950), 65, 66, hereinafter cited as J S H .
^Coit, Calhoun, 81.
5 lbid., 72, 74.
^Dumas Malone, e d . , Dictionary of American Biography (22
vols.; New York, 1935), XV, 364, hereinafter cited as DAB.
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Introduced a set of resolutions into the House, calling upon the gov
ernment to explain the events leading up to this war that was not
going well.

The resolutions were productive of much sharp debate,

the administration was embarrassed, and the careers of Calhoun, Clay,
and Webster had crossed.^
Washington— where all this took place— did not look much like
a capital city in Lhuse anxious early years of the republic.

"No

houses are building," one observer said, "those already built are not
finished and many are falling rapidly to decay."
thought, looked like "some antique ruin."

The whole place, he

The chamber in which the

House debates took place gave, however, a very different impression.
Inspired by the architects of classical republics, its Corinthian
columns and crimson draperies furnished a sumptuous background for the
plum coats, powdered wigs, and knee breeches of the late Federal period.
Along with the action in the chamber, the decor tended to obscure the
fact that only a few thousand people lived in this unkempt and muddy
place.

But during the summer adjournment of 1814 the British destroyed

Washington’s public buildings.

On September 2 the National Intelli

gencer predicted that Washington would never "again be the seat of
government."8
Yet the city was rebuilt, and it remained as capital of the
confident young republic.

By the time of Calhoun's last battle and

^Ibid., XIX, 587. Webster had been elected by Massachusetts
in November 1812, when he was thirty years old.
8coit, Calhoun, 71.
The observer was William Dunlap, actor,
playwright, theatrical manager, painter, and historian (Malone, e d . ,
D A B , V, 516-18); National Intelligencer, quoted in Coit, Calhoun, 93.
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the Mercury's first open call for secession, little remained to re
mind one of the scars of 1814.
concerned the Congress in 1850.

It was scars on the body politic that
The issue was sectionalism against

nationalism as it had been those thirty-seven years before.

And

Calhoun, Clay and Webster— who had first wrestled with this problem in
the session of 1813— would do so for the last time in 1850.

In those

earlier years of the republic's second war, Calhoun and Clay had rep
resented the majority interest, wnile Daniel Webster spoke for an out
numbered New England.

Long before the triumvirate's last encounter,

however, the alignment had shifted, and it was Calhoun who now stood
for the minority.

His speech of March 4, 1850, summarized his efforts

of twenty years to defend this new minority, the plantation South.
Calhoun was not the first to see his section threatened by
the ebbing tide of change.

Many years before— when South Carolina

was still part of the British Empire— Josiah Quincy, a visitor from
discontented New England, had heard a gentleman of colonial Charles
ton express distrust of Massachusetts in particular and northern
colonies in general.

If Carolinians ever renounced allegiance to

their sovereign, this "hot, flaming, sensible Tory," had said, they
could expect governors from Massachusetts to replace those appointed
from London.9

The stir over Missouri, " . . .

like a fireball in the

night, awakened, and filled" Thomas Jefferson "with terror."

He

considered it, he said, "at once as the knell of the U n i o n . T h e

^Quoted in Mrs. St. Julien Ravenel, Charleston The Place and
the People (New York, 1906), 181-82.
^^Thomas Jefferson to John Holmes, April 22, 1820, in Philip
S. Foner, e d . , basic Writings of Thomas Jefferson (New York, 1944),
767.
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same issue alerted John Quincy Adams, an aspiring nationalist poli
tician from another region.

Confiding his doubts to his diary, Adams

wrote, "I take it for granted that the present question is a mere
preamble— a title page to a great tragic volume.
During the session of 1831-1832 the Virginia legislature de
bated the future of slavery, the institution which was rapidly be
coming the catalyst in Adams's "tragic volume."

A legislator from

one of the Old Dominion's western counties— in urging his fellow
assemblymen to grapple for a solution through emancipation— warned
that otherwise slavery would someday "provide the rest of the country
with a crusade 'in the name of liberty but with the purpose of plun
der'

...

in which the South would be held up '. . . a s

the common

enemies of men w h o m it will be a duty to overthrow and a justice to
despoil.'"

The same assembly read a copy of Garrison's new Liberator

and joined Virginia's governor in deploring the propositions of that
new sheet.
Legislative action in the direction of manumission might or
might not have restored to Virginia the leadership she had enjoyed in
earlier times.

In any event, Jefferson's mantle had fallen onto dif

ferent shoulders by 1832, and destiny was directed from other quarters.
One of these was South Carolina where the electorate were exercised
over two issues.

Already annoyed with the tariff, the Charleston

llcharles Francis Adams, ed.. Memoirs of John Quincy Adams
Compiling Portions of His Diary from 1798 to 1848 (12 vols., Phila
delphia, 1875), IV, 502.
l^ciifford Dowdey, The Land They Fought For (Garden City,
1955), 22.
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Mercury reacted with alarm to the establishment of The Liberator.
Abolitionism raised issues "compared with which all other oppressions
1 0

are favors and all other insults acts of kindness,"
editor proclaimed.

the indignant

He had already warned that this subject could rend

"the Union to atoms.
It had not always been so with the Mercury.

Charleston's fourth

daily newspaper, the Charleston Mercury and Morning Advertiser, first
went to press on New Year's Day 1822.15

Like the city's other news

papers, it consisted of four pages printed in small, clear type.

Edi

torials and news were confined to the first inside page; the rest of
the paper consisted of advertisements and matters of cultural interest,
commonly called "miscellany."

Carolinians received the Mercury six

days a week.l^
Edmund Morford, the founding editor, was graduated from The
College of New Jersey with the class of 1 7 9 7 .

He came to Charleston

a few years later, where by 1805 he owned a successful and— for the
time— good bookstore, described by one writer as "the great literary
centre of the city."

18

Morford supplemented his income from the

l^The Charleston Mercury, Jan. 19, Apr. 7, 1832.
l^ibid. , Apr. 24, 1830.
^^The Charleston Mercury and Morning Advertiser, Jan. 1, 1822.
l^The editor thought the "miscellany" one of his paper's most
important departments.
In addition to providing pleasure for the
reader, it preserved "many brilliant specimens of genius" for pos
terity, he said (Ibid.).
17princeton Alumni Records
"Mercury," 6.

(unpublished), quoted in Prior,

l^King, Newspaper P r ess, 101.
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bookshop by ventures in publishing "pirated" editions of English
works, and in 1809 he became what appears to have been the senior
partner in the firm that published Charleston’s second oldest daily,
the Courier.

His stint here was a short one.

Morford was a Federalist,

and having set the editorial course in this direction found it advan
tageous to retire to his bookshop in 1813.19

Federalism was in decline

in Charleston.
A rising interest in civic affairs, a continued interest in
politics, and some financial support, sent him— nine years later— back to
journalism.

His new paper, the Mercury, he said, would fill a much

needed news and cultural gap in the city since the existing press de
voted too much attention to commercial affairs.

Without neglecting

the merchant the Mercury would cover the "other matters of equal in
terest w hich [form] such a varied picture of the concerns of society
as may be useful and acceptable to all."

Despite Morford’s high

promises, there was little difference between his new paper and her
rivals.

The Mercury did, to be sure, deemphasize federal matters for

a greater attention to state politics

and foreign affairs.

But com

mercial news accounted for around ten per cent of the paper’s space,
the amount customary in Charleston’s older papers.

Nor did Morford’s

Mercury devote more space to cultural matters than did its rivals,
the Gazette, Courier, and Southern Patriot. I n

fact, the Courier’s

editor dismissed the paper of his former senior associate as a

^^Advertisements in Courier 1805-1809; King, Newspaper P r e s s ,
101-102; Courier, Sept. 7, 1824.
^^Mercury, Jan. 1, 1822-June 1, 1823.
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"bantling" and charged that Morford was motivated by a "malignant
hope" to supplant the Courier, "by the fruits of which he so prof
ited. "21
Nevertheless, the "bantling" prospered, at least for a time.
Morford did not return the Courier insults in kind; instead he de
plored the "Personal abuse, open scurrility, coarse imputations of
the grossest nature, directed
felt

against individuals

. . . ." that he

was too prevalent in the world of the fourth estate.22

tended this moderation into the political arena as well.

He ex

In his first

issue Morford editorially disapproved of the injection of the slavery
debate into politics, with a caution not even then characteristic of
the Charleston press.

His reluctant replies to the fulminations of a

New York editor, who was displeased by the punishments following the
attempted Negro insurrection of 1822, were also reserved.

The

Mercury had:
purposely abstained from noticing any of the remarks
made in some of the Northern journals upon the late
necessary decrees of justice. . . .
It did not ap
pear necessary to exhibit any strictures upon the
cold and unfeeling jests that have been sported in a
manner that indicates a callousness of heart both to
the culprits who fell under the laws and the society
for whose benefit these laws were enacted. We were
willing that the authors of such jibes should enjoy
them in undisturbed satisfaction.23
Otherwise, Morford's Mercury was silent on the subject of anti
slavery.

There was no profit in returning attack for attack, the

21Çourier, Sept. 7, 1824.
22Mercury, July 15, 1822.
23ibid., Jan. 1, 1822, Aug. 15, 1822.
The January editorial
was written in reference to the Missouri Compromise.
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editor said.

The offense, in turn, would only become more

violent.

Morford was no less displeased by those signs pointing to a
revival of the political parties of earlier times.

He urged the

varying persuasions to unite in support of President Monroe, and so
preserve "the present era of harmony and coalition."

Denouncing po

litical parties as "factions" which "strike directly at the vitals of
a state . . . corrupt the credulous and sharpen the passions and
abilities of the bad to a pernicious acuteness," the editor pledged
the Mercury to "independent American ground."

Morford had no use for

the machinations of politicians, those "selfish ends, which [could]
never be obtained but by public

misfortune.

"^5

Morford's policy of political neutrality did not make for

24ibid., Aug. 15, 1822.
Richard C. Wade— who views the whole
Denmark Vesey affair as no more than "loose talk by aggrieved and
embittered men" concludes that Charleston's newspapers "imposed a
nearly perfect blackout on the details of the episode throughout the
summer, confining themselves to a simple recording of sentences and
executions" (Richard C. Wade, "The Vesey Plot: A Reconsideration,"
J S H , XXX, No. 2 [May 1964], 149, 160).
Freehling partially explains this policy by asserting that
Carolinians regarded slavery as a "necessary" evil until after the
nullification crisis.
This being the case, nothing but commotion
was likely to result from public discussion of the issue.
Editors,
consequently, broached the topic with both reluctance and restraint.
Not until after 1833 was slavery much mentioned by the South Carolina
press (Freehling, Prelude, 82-83).
Still, Morford was more restrained than were his rivals:
The Courier not only sharply reminded a northern critic that thirteen
Negroes were "BURNT ALIVE for insurrectionary efforts" in New York
City during 1741, but also explained to a Britisher that slavery
made southern whites value their liberty more than would otherwise
be the case (Courier, Jan. 10, Aug. 12, 1822).
For a full study of the significance of the Vesey revolt in
South Carolina history, see John Lofton, Insurrection in South Caro
lina The Turbulent World of Denmark Vesey (Yellow Springs, 1964).
Z^Me r c u r y , Jan. 1, 1822.
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good reading in South Carolina.

The death during the early twenties

of the Federalist Party resulted in a mass movement of Americans into
the Republican fold.

This migration produced factional divisions among

the Republicans, divisions accompanied by sectional cleavages that were
to make and change the parties of the future.

In the resulting con

fusion the electorate turned to politically oriented editors for guid
ance.
Since the situation in South Carolina was no less fluid than
the national one, the role of the state's newspapers assumed a new im
portance.

According to the somewhat prejudiced Courier, Morford was

not equipped for this role and his policy made for a decline in Mer
cury

subscriptions.

26

while due allowance must be made for the Cour-

ier's somewhat warped vision, it is a fact that Morford sold his
interest in the Mercury at the end of a year and a half— to make way
for a politician, Henry Laurens Pinckney.
It might be said that Pinckney was born into politics.

The

grandson of Henry Laurens, he was also the son of Charles Pinckney,
veteran of the Constitutional Convention, the South Carolina General
Assembly, and sometime minister to Madrid.

The new editor was the

first honor graduate in the class of 1812 at the South Carolina Col
lege and the brother-in-law of Robert Y. Hayne, in whose office he
studied law.

He was elected to the General Assembly in 1816, re

elected in 1820, and by 1823 was Chairman of the House Ways and Means

26çourier, Sept. 7, 1824.
The Mercury sold for ten dollars
a year, the same rate maintained by Charleston's other papers.
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Committee and an eloquent spokesman for the Calhoun party.^7
Pinckney wasted no time in reversing Morford's policy of
political restraint.

His first editorial, on June 11, 1823, firmly

endorsed Calhoun for president.

Pinckney's competitors were quick to

take satirical note of this change in

course.

The Gazette, which

favored Crawford, and the independent

Courier (whose editor per

sonally favored Adams) soon came to dismiss the Mercury as the organ
of the Calhoun " J u n t o . T h e

outspoken editor of the Courier went so

far as to declare that only the financial support of the Calhoun party
had saved his rival's paper from collapse.
so confident of the Calhoun Influence

29

The Gazette's editor was

that he wrote off the Mercury as

the platform for "a combination of . . . apostate republicans

. . .

Mabel L. Webber, "The Thomas Pinckney Family of South Caro
lina," South Carolina Historical and Geneological Magazine, XXXIX
(Jan. 1938), 35, hereinafter cited as SCHM; Malone, ed., D A B , XIV,
617; King, Newspaper P ress, 148; E. L. Green, A History of the Univ
ersity of South Carolina (Columbia, 1916), 432; Hollis, South Caro
lina College, 41; Mercury, Feb. 4, 1863.
ZScazette, Aug. 29, Sept. 1, 1823; June 22, 23, 24, July 12,
15, Aug. 30, Sept. 6, 29, Oct. 1, 5, 11, 12, 15, 26, 27, 1824; Mar.
19, July 26, 28, Aug. 1, 8, 11, 15, 20, 24, 26, Sept. 1, 2, 3, 10, 11,
15, 19, 20, 30, Oct. 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 10, 14, 1828; Mar. 20, July 29,
31, Aug. 19, 24, 25, 26, 28, 30, Sept. 2, 4, 5, 1829; Aug. 3, 5, 24,
Sept. 24, 28, 1830; July 13, 21, 1831; Courier, Aug. 26, 30, Sept. 4,
6, 7, 1824; June 13, 1826; Sept. 8, 1827; Aug. 5, 30, Sept. 22, Oct.
6, 10, 11, 13, 14, 16, 1828; Jan.10, 1829; July 2, Aug. 3, Sept. 24,
Oct. 14, 18, 1830; Sept. 5, 1831; Aug. 29, 30, Sept. 3, 1832.
29courier, Sept. 7, 1824. Morford's Mercury "sustained a
very precarious and rickety existence of some months, and was .
..
about to descend, loaded with debts to the tomb of all the Capulets,"
the vindictive editor, Aaron S. Millington reported.
It was only when
"the Junto who now control its destinies . . . stepped in with the
means that . . . infused new life and energy into it," that the
Mercury's survival was ensured.
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blind partisans of CALHOUN, McDUFFIE, HAMILTON, &c, of hungry expec
tants of office, deluded or wicked men who would sacrifice on the altar
of interest, their dearest rights.

. .

The Mercury *s new editor also reversed his predecessor's policy
of ignoring such blasts from competitors.

The paper was his "own ex

clusive property," he said, but went on to admit with pride his associ
ation with the Calhoun faction.

That faction, then locked in battle

for control of South Carolina politics, had good reason to want a party
paper in Charleston, whose legislative delegation frequently cast the
deciding vote in the General Assembly.
The association evidently benefitted both party and paper.
Pinckney steadily increased his subscription lists, especially so after
1827, when the Mercury endorsed nullification.

A tri-weekly country

edition— containing "all the general intelligence of the daily paper"
was established in 1823.

This edition, Pinckney said, was widely read

not only in every district of South Carolina but in Georgia, Tennessee,
and North Carolina as well.

According to the standards of the time,

the paper did indeed enjoy a generous circulation.
3D

32

Ga z ette, July 26, 1828.

^^Mercury, May 12, 1824; May 2, June 12, 1826; Freehling,
P r e l u d e , 101-106.
The fight was between the nationalists of the Cal
houn school and the states rights followers of William H. Crawford.
See also Charles M. Wiltse, John C. Calhoun; Nationalist, 1782-1828
(Indianapolis, 1944), 213, 255, 256, hereinafter cited as Wiltse,
Calhoun Nationalist.
^M e r c u r y , Oct. 7, 1823; Dec. 31, 1824.
While no concrete evi
dence is available for this assertion, it is likely that the Mercury
exceeded both the Gazette and Patriot in circulation and closely
rivalled the Courier. The Gazette frequently changed hands during
these years, which probably indicates circulation trouble.
On July 25,
1833, the Courier announced its purchase of the Gazette.
In so
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Other changes accompanied Pinckney's assumption of command as
well.

Advertising increased by more than fifty per cent during the

years 1823 to 1832, an indication of the paper’s growing popularity.
Most especially, more and more attention was devoted to politics, at
the expense of "miscellany" and cultural affairs.33

And in 1825 the

name was shortened to the simpler Charleston Mercury.

While Pinckney

was making his paper into a political journal, he did not ignore the
economic foundation of South Carolina.

The economy of the state would

do much to set her political course and Pinckney was much interested in
crop reports and the proceedings of agricultural societies.

The de

pressed cotton price contributed to his rising concern with the
issues of both slavery and the tariff; a concern which early indicated
the connection between economy and sectional politics.
Increasing preoccupation with politics did not mean, at least
during his early years, a radical sectional approach.
nationalist and his newspaper mirrored this view.

Pinckney was a

It also improved

its coverage of political news, state, local, and— to some extent—
foreign.

News from the statehouse came daily by coach from his "cor

respondent," instead of from Columbia extracts as formerly.
took twenty-eight hours.

The trip

National news continued to be copied from

politically conscious a community as Charleston it is also likely that
the neutral Patriot did not attract a large set of readers.
In any
event, most of the Mercury's thrusts were directed at the Courier and
vice versa.
Pinckney boasted of his paper's increased circulation on
July 1, 1830 and again on January 4 and July 25, 1832: which increase
he was convinced vindicated his stand on nullification.
Still, he did
nothing to challenge the Courier's assertion of April 20 and May 5,
1826, that it had "more at stake in the community." Nor did he con
tradict that paper's confident report of January 1, 1833, that its
circulation was "more extensive . . . than ever before. . . . "
The
Mercury was, presumably, in second place.
33^ercury, Jan. 1823-Dec. 1832, passim.
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Washington papers but after 1827 only from those with whom Pinckney
was in political agreement.
this coverage.

Letters from correspondents supplemented

An indication of the declining state of Charleston’s

interoceanic commerce, European news came principally by way of New
York; it took the form of extracts from foreign sheets.

The Mercury

depended for its Latin American news upon a correspondent in Havana;
it sympathized with the rebels, compared Boliver with Washington, and
predicted the eventual independence of Cuba.^^
In the light of later developments, Pinckney's approach to his
first presidential election is ironic in the extreme.

The Mercury de

nounced those who would inject sectional interests in the campaign of
1824 and came out in favor of "great national principles of policy"
which would strengthen defense, cherish the army and navy and military
academy, foster internal improvements, develop and expand the national
resources and maintain a "high and enviable character abroad.

..."

He even favored "promoting our manufactures as far as they can be pro
moted without impairing the essential interests of agriculture and
commerce.

..."

John C. Calhoun personified these virtues to Pinckney.

The "States Rights'' faction he characterized as "the most dangerous
party which has ever risen in the republic.

..."

Crawford, the can

didate of that faction, was roundly denounced and did not represent
even South Carolina's second Choice, Pinckney said.

He refrained from

34ibid., May 16, 21, 23, 1825; Apr. 9, Dec. 25, 1827; July 22,
Sept. 14, 16, 1829.
The United States Telegraph— whose editor. Duff
Green, came in for much praise by the Mercury— was Pinckney’s chief
Washington source.
The Boston Bulletin accused Pinckney of flatter
ing the Telegraph so as to get its support for Calhoun (ibid., Mar. 8,
13, 14, Nov. 14, 1827; Oct. 17, Nov. 10, 1829; Feb. 9, 11, Apr. 7, 20,
26, 1830; Apr. 28, 1831).
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attacking the other candidates and as Calhoun's chances evaporated,
the Mercury began to praise Jackson, a man of "high and varied endow
ments" and also "a native of the South."
and Adams.

Yet Pinckney also liked Clay

In October of 1824 the Mercury selected Adams for South

Carolina's second choice; Jackson was her first.
When Jackson did not win a majority of electoral votes in the
general election, the Mercury rejoiced that he led, nonetheless.
was even happier that Crawford's star was in decline.

It

Adams, Pinckney

said, was blameless for the irregular rumors circling about his head;
but if the "Hero of New Orleans" were denied the presidency, it would
be "an absolute usurpation of the rights and privileges of the people."
The successful machinations of Clay he reviled as a defrauding of "de
sires of whole states."

With Adams elected as a result. Clay became

Secretary of State by "boldly overleaping" the spirit of the Consti
tution.

But the Charleston editor could hardly approve the tasteless

proposal, that "ebullition of popular frenzy" to hang Clay in effigy.
His fate in 1828, the Mercury said, would be comeuppance enough.
In its treatment of the new President, the Mercury was much
gentler.

Pinckney strongly endorsed Adams's Inaugural and urged sup

port for his administration "as long as his policies" were "for the
general good."

His failure to attack the President's position on in

ternal improvements may be interpreted as a cautious endorsement of a

^^Mercury, Jan. 6, June 11, Oct. 27, 28, 1824.
36lbid., Dec. 26, 1824; Jan. 6, 20, 21, Feb. 3, 8, 17, Mar. 9,
6, 11, Apr. 9, 28, May 9, 30, 1825.
Calhoun, too, was looking to
1828 for the "example" to be "corrected" (Wiltse, Calhoun Nationalist, 313-14).
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project his paper had strongly supported only a year before.

Pinckney

also defended Adams's policy in the Georgia Indian lands case.

When the

President declined summarily to dispossess the CheroVees— and in spite
of the ominous warning from a correspondent not to join in "the common
clamor" against a sister state whose "confidence and friendship" South
Carolina might one day need— Pinckney observed:
The true question is not whether the federal government
can put down a state by force of arms, but whether a
state can violate at pleasure the provisions of a
treaty.
Georgia, and not the federal government is the
aggressor in this case. . . . And if the federal govern
ment had not the power to enforce its laws, or to prevent
their violation by a State, its weaknesses would probably
witness many a renewal of the scenes that occurred under
the old confederation.37
Strange words in light of the future!
mood.

But not for the paper's present

The Mercury was still a nationalist organ.

While Calhoun was

even then reconsidering his position on internal improvements,
had not yet condemned the concept.
h i m for their Indian problem.

The Georgians,

he

furthermore, blamed

As Secretary of War in Monroe's cabinet,

Calhoun had favored a policy of civilizing the Indians even while he
urged their removal beyond the Mississippi.

Georgia's Cherokees had

responded well to civilization and now declined to be moved.

They were

supported in their determination by title— in the form of a treaty— to
their lands, a title which they refused to sell.

Georgia was much ex

ercised over this matter, and her vexation was threatening to take the
form of force if the federal authority did not vacate both title and

^^Mercury, May 12, 22, 1824; Mar. 11, Apr. 28, May 9, 30,
Aug. 20, 22, 1825.
^^Calhoun to Hon. Robert S. Garnett, July 3, 1824, cited in
Houston, Nullification, 60-63.
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Indians.
A detached Pinckney urged the Georgians to be calm.

Their

governor should sacrifice his preferences "upon the altar of his
country."40

Considering the Mercury *s developing position on the sub

ject of the tariff, this advice was not the sort that Pinckney could
afford to give.

For while the editor was so carefully advising the

Georgians on the nature of the Constitution, forces in South Carolina
were moving to confront him with the same situation at home.
The forces were both personal and economic.

The personal ones

revolved about Judge and sometime Senator William Smith.

Like Vir

ginia's Quids, Judge Smith was determined to save the Constitution
from the nationalist Jeffersonians.

Elected to the Senate in 1816,

he was soon much offended by Calhoun's nationalism and perhaps by the
much younger Secretary of War's failure to defer to his opinions.

In

any event, by 1818, he had resolved to retire the dangerous young
nationalist from politics.

Almost coincidental with Smith's taking

umbrage, was the development of a breach between Calhoun and Crawford.
Crawford's festering hatred for the Secretary of War was of equal in
tensity— if not of the same origin— as Smith's.
represented the state rights persuasion.

Like Smith, Crawford

Not unnaturally, the two

became allies with a common purpose to destroy C a l h o u n . W h i l e

they

39wiltse, Calhoun Nationalist, 293-96.
The Savannah Republican
actually alleged that Calhoun had written a Mercury editorial defend
ing the government's policy.
The Mercury denied this charge but
allowed that it was flattered by it (Mercury, May 22, 1824).
^^Merc u r y , Aug. 17, 1825.
4^Freehling, Prelude, 97-104; Wiltse, Calhoun Nationalist,
179.
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were finally unsuccessful, they were at least partially responsible
for much tactical maneuvering on Calhoun's part.
Crawford was of little aid to Smith in his attempts to erode
Calhoun's South Carolina foundation.

Carolinians, especially those

from the Lowcountry, tended to regard Crawford as somewhat uncouth as
well as misguided.

They preferred to follow national-minded men like

Langdon Cheves, William Lowndes, Robert Y. Hayne, or James Hamilton,
Jr.; all allies of Calhoun.

Smith's South Carolina allies, however,

were likewise men to be reckoned with.

Dr. Thomas Cooper, William C.

Preston, and Stephen D. Miller supported his strict construction views
faithfully, but made little headway before 1825.

By that time the

battle had raged for nine years, during which circumstances had
changed.
The Smith faction received a serious setback in 1822 when
Smith himself was defeated for re-election by Robert Y. Hayne.

But

the past and future Senator and forevermore Judge, was not done in.
His district soon sent h i m to the General Assembly, from which spot
he renewed the war.

His goal was unchanged: Calhoun must be de

stroyed and, incidentally,

Crawford elected President of the United

States.
Any number of political forces had combined, by 1824, to wear
away the nationalism worn so proudly in South Carolina during the
years immediately following the War of 1812.

The alert sounded by

42preehling, Prelude, 101-104.
4 3lbid., 104; White, Rhett, 11; Joseph Hobson Harrison, Jr.,
"Martin Van Buren and His Southern Supporters," J S H , XXII, No. 4
(Nov. 1956), 440.
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the Missouri debates turned into an alarm three years later when
Denmark Vesey aroused the "deep fears" of planters, especially in the
Lowcountry.

Then in 1824 the legislature of Ohio proposed a gradual

form of compensated emancipation that was soon endorsed by eight other
northern governments.

Clearly it took a broad constructionist, which

is to say a nationalist, view of the Constitution to envision such a
development.

Cotton prices were on the way down and to make matters

worse, the tariff was raised in 1824.

Even Calhoun's nationalist

faction was having second thoughts.
It was a situation ready made for Smith.

His ally Thomas

Cooper published Consolidation, a pamphlet in which he prepared the
assembly for the dangers inherent in nationalism; and in which he
especially denounced the tariff and internal improvements.

If Con

gress could tax one section for the benefit of another, and if it
could appropriate money for whatever purpose it saw fit, then it
could do as Ohio said and abolish slavery.

In the same vein, Stephen

D. Miller introduced resolutions into the upper chamber which de
clared that Congress had constitutional authority neither to levy a
protective tariff nor effect internal improvements.

The resolutions

passed in December, soon after the assembly met, only to be defeated
in the House.

But in 1825 Judge Smith introduced the same resolu

tions into the House, and this time they passed both House and Senate.
The Calhoun forces fought them valiantly but to no avail.

Thus in

44Freehling, Prelude, 106-116.
Carolina planters felt that
cotton must bring 20c a pound for planting it to be profitable.
It was selling at 13ç by October, 1825 (Latimer, "Protagonist,"
A H R , LXI, No. 4, 925; Freehling, Prelude, 117).
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the "revolution of 1825" the assembly had decided for Judge Smith.
The storm signals were up and in 1826 Smith went back to the Senate.^5
The Mercury's editor was a member of the House, and according
to subsequent assertions by his critics, opposed the offensive resolu
tions.

46

His address to a South Carolina College audience during the

legislative session certainly indicates that his sentiments would have
led in that direction.

"No doubt," he said, "exists in any reflecting

mind of the perfect adequacy of the general government to establish a
system of national works for the common advantage of the Union."4?
M ercury, however, did not commit itself.

The

Its editorial column simply

reported that the action "whether . . . right or wrong" was taken
"honestly and conscientiously."4®
But Pinckney's reluctance to condemn the tariff as uncon
stitutional did not make him a supporter of protection.

During the

debates on the Bill of 1824 the Mercury w ished all the protection that
manufacturing wanted so long as it did not impair "the essential in
terests of agriculture and commerce."
noted, would do just that.

The bill before Congress, he

The South must then resist "an unequal and

oppressive tax . . . imposed upon one portion of our people."
gested a boycott of Northern goods as a possible remedy.

He sug

On March 24

45preehling, Prelude , 117-18; White, Rhett , 11; Mercury, Dec. 15,
1825.

4^Gazette, Sept. 2, 30, Oct. 2, 4, 7, 14, 1828; Sept. 4, 1829;
Courier, Aug. 30, 1832.
47 h . L. Pinckney, An Oration Delivered in the Chapel of the
South Carolina College, before the Clariosophic Society Incorporate
and the Inhabitants of Columbia . . . on the 5th December, 1825 . . .
(Charleston, 1826), 24-25.
4% e r c u r y , Apr. 6, 1826.
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he indicated that Calhoun and Smith men were as one bn at least that
single subject.

An oppressive tariff policy would make "the property

of the South . . . utterly valueless," and might even spark an attack
upon slavery.

"Is it not possible," he asked, "that when the value of

our black population shall be ruined, these same charitable manufacturers
may devise a scheme either for their immediate purchase or gradual eman
cipation?"^^
It was probably inevitable that Pinckney's regard for President
Adams would be of short duration.

The issues of sectional interests had

made for a bitter fight in the election of 1824.

It would take more than

fervent venerations of the Union to resolve the problems they exposed.
It is even possible that "Adams took office with the foundations for dis
union" already "in p l a c e . I n

any event the twin issues of slavery

and the tariff ultimately destroyed Pinckney's tolerance for the Adams
administration.
Pinckney's discourse on slavery commenced before Adams took
office and was not diminished by his departure.
a necessary institution.

Slavery, he said, was

Indeed, it provided a better life than that

available to New England factory hands ; and it was endorsed by the Holy
Scriptures.

The South would tolerate no "interference in any manner or

for any purpose . . .

by the General Government" with this institution.

He opposed colonization schemes and saw in the "ominous" appointment of

AQ

^Ibid. , Jan. 6, Feb. 18, 19, Mar. 20, 26, 1824; Feb. 3, 17,
Mar. 9, 11, Apr. 9, 28, May 9, 30, 1825.
50paul C. Nagel, "The Election of 1824: A Reconsideration Based
on Newspaper Opinion," J S H , XXVI, No. 3 (August, 1960), 316, 329.
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the antislavery Rufus King as Minister to the Court of St. James
a disturbing trend in the new administration.^^
The M e r c u r y 's mild remonstrance gave way to an all-out and un
relenting attack w h e n Adams supported the Panama Conference.

In so

doing, the President had endangered "the peace and safety of the
Southern States," the Mercury said.

This conference proposed to con

sider "the rights of Africans in this hemisphere" and contemplated es
tablishing diplomatic relations with Haiti.

One of the American dele

gates to the proposed assembly was "notoriously and violently hostile"
to slavery.

It was a "hazardous foreign enterprise"; furthermore, it

ran the risk of war, violated "all the maxims of Washington" and
brought down disgrace upon all those who endorsed it.^^
Pinckney's rival, the Courier. A d a m s

That included

had incurred the wrath of a

determined foe whose opposition he acknowledged— on at least one oc
casion— as"malignant attacks."^4
No sooner had the debate on Bolivar's congress ended than the
Mercury commenced to campaign for Jackson.

The "superior merit and

incorruptible patriotism" of Andrew Jackson stood in stark contrast to
the "impure and disgraceful coalition" with which it now associated Adams.

^ ^Mercury. July 17, Aug. 9, 1823; Apr. 21, May 5, June 16,
1825; Nov. 11, 1826.
5 2lbid., Mar. 14, 23, 31, Apr. 4, 5, 7, May 1, 2, 4, Aug. 6,
Nov. 11, 1826.
Calhoun opposed the Panama Conference (Wiltse, Cal
houn Nationalist, 324).
The "hostile" delegate was John Sargeant.
^ ^Courier, Mar. 15, 16, 22, 27, Apr. 3-8, May 1, 5, 1826.
The
Courier's editor felt that Adams's course would foster U. S. commerce,
promote inter-American unity and protect the western hemisphere against
invasion (ibid.).
A d a m s , e d . , M e moirs, VII, 40.
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Pinckney reviled Adams for "bartering" government office;^^ he saw an
unrepublican move in the direction of foppery when the White House pro
cured a billiard table, and instead of being South Carolina's second
choice, Adams could now only claim support "utterly too insignificant
to mention" in the state.

The President's annual message to Congress

in 1826 was deficient, his conduct on internal and external affairs un
satisfactory.

Adams's supporters among the press were after Calhoun's

head— they hoped to isolate him from Jackson.

A House committee in

vestigating Calhoun's administration of the War Department was part and
parcel of the plot.

Labelling the investigation as an unprincipled at

tempt to advance the cause of the unworthy Clay, Pinckney called down
"Shame, eternal shame upon such proceedings.

. . ."56

when the

pro-Adams National Journal, "the principal organ of an unpopular and
sinking dynasty," noted these attacks and called Pinckney (among other
things) "an apologist of dullness," the fiery Charleston editor re
ferred to its "excessive intemperance of language.

^^Mercury, July 15, 1826.
Pinckney had originally blamed only
Clay for the "corrupt bargain" (ibid.. Feb. 3, 17, Mar. 9, Apr. 9,
1825).
It can hardly be insignificant that Calhoun's Washington organ,
the Telegraph, gave new life to the "corrupt bargain" charge during
June, 1826 (Wiltse, Calhoun Nationalist, 343).
^^M ercury, Aug. 29, 1826; Jan. 13, 15, 1827.
The House com
mittee was investigating the Mix Contract.
During Calhoun's stay at
the war office, Elijah Mix had contracted to supply stone for the con
struction of Fortress Monroe and Fort Calhoun,
part of the defense sys
tem for Norfolk and the capital.
Mix's financial arrangements with his
brother-in-law, the Chief Clerk of the War Department, were open to ques
tion. While Pinckney was right as to the motive of those questioning the
transaction, Calhoun requested the investigation and was not blamed in
the report (Wiltse, Calhoun Nationalist, 203-05, 344-46).
5 ^Mercury, Oct. 3, 1826.
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The Mercury was more certain of its repugnance to Adams than of
its admiration for Jackson.

Although Jackson was declared to be legiti

mate of birth, fit for office and incorruptible, throughout 1827 the
paper presumed to say little about his political beliefs.

But that

year's revival of the tariff debate intensified this somewhat unde
fined preference for the Tennessean.

The administration had become

clearly unconstitutional in its tariff position, it had exceeded the
bounds of reason in supporting internal improvements, and as far as
Georgia's Indian lands were concerned, Adams seemed possessed of a
"determination to murder the citizens of Georgia."

Pinckney had modi

fied his position on all three issues, most decidedly in the case of
Georgia.

And Andrew Jackson was now the "last sole hope" of South

Carolina— short of nullification— an issue upon which Pinckney's view
was also destined to

change.

^8

The Mercury's new posture did not escape comment from its main
competition, the Courier.

Noting that Pinckney's paper tended to fol

low rather than mold opinion in South Carolina, that hostile sheet com
pared it to "the weather-glass."

In an apt— if satirical analysis—

the Courier observed that the Mercury was "fearfully agitated by the
changes in the atmosphere."^9

Since 1825— when he had opposed the

assembly's action in declaring the tariff unconstitutional— Pinckney

5 8lbid., Mar. 8, April 9, May 15, June 1, July 7, 10, 12,
Aug. 4, 9, 15, 17, 18, 20, Sept. 4, 25, Dec. 1, 5, 12, 17, 1827;
Apr. 15, June 27, July 25, Aug. 6, 13, 15, 30, Sept. 16, 30, Oct. 17,
31, 1828.
The Mercury questioned Adams's nationalism for the first
time in 1827.
Its articles in praise of Jackson ran throughout 1827
and 1828.
^9çourier, June 20, 1827.
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had come to the conclusion that the majority of Carolinians disagreed
with him.

He accordingly decided to modify his p o s i t i o n . N o r was

he alone in so concluding.

Calhoun's views were undergoing a similar

transition during this period— a circumstance not lost upon the Mer
cury.
Tlie Vice President's complex motives for altering his politi
cal stance included national as well as local considerations.

While

he took no public stand on the outcome of the election of 1824, his
private comment was that "a few ambitious men with a view to their
own interest" had set "the voices and power of the people . . .

at

naught."

Nor was he indefinite as to the identity of the ambitious

victors.

Clay had made the President, he said, and "against the voice

of his constitutents."^^

More alarming was the Kentuckian's eleva

tion to Secretary of State, which appointment left no doubt as to his
ultimate object— the presidency.

Since Calhoun also aspired to the

latter post, he must oppose Clay, and with him, the administration.
Still, he was willing to support those moves of the adminis
tration of which he genuinely approved.

(The Mercury's early regard

The Smith Resolutions of 1825 had been originally intro
duced by Stephen D. Miller in 1824, when they passed the Senate only
to be tabled in the House.
The vote in 1825 (73 to 28 in the House
and 29 to 14 in the Senate) still revealed considerable division
(Freehling, Prelude, 117-18).
It would require almost two years for
Pinckney to accept this result as the majority sentiment of the state.
By 1827, however, his paper was reporting numerous public meetings
within South Carolina expressing support for the Smith Resolutions.
This evidently convinced him that South Carolina had changed her mind.
He altered his position accordingly (Mercury, 1827, passim). For an
analysis of the general change in South Carolina politics during the
ten years prior to nullification see Freehling, Prelude, 89-176.
Glcalhoun to General Joseph G. Swift, Mar. 10, 1825, quoted
in Wiltse, Calhoun Nationalist, 313-14.
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for President Adams evidently indicates that Calhoun was not yet ready
to advertise his doubts about the new President.

62

)

The Vice President

did not approve of the Panama Congress and when his not inconsiderable
influence helped to retard this project, it became evident that the
President would not work with a sometime ally.

A series of bitter ex

changes between the administration party and Calhoun resulted.

Faced

thus with political isolation, Calhoun offered— in June of 1826— to co
operate with Jackson.

The offer was quickly accepted.

The new alliance did not mean that the South Carolinian had
abandoned his hopes of the presidency.

By associating himself with

Jackson, Calhoun gained the favor of Clay's strongest rival.

Jackson

had committed himself, furthermore, to a single presidential term.^^
This arrangement would fit handsomely into the Vice President's time
table by putting him in line to succeed Jackson in 1832.

Unfortunately

for Calhoun, the plans of another rising politician would figure into
these calculations.
The Crawford party, with Martin Van Buren in their ranks, had
also gone over to Jackson.

Since Van Buren shared Calhoun's ambition

to sit in the presidential chair, this move resulted in an intrafactional rivalry.

Second only to Jackson in national prestige, Cal

houn would have to be eliminated if Van Buren were to arrive at his

G^See above, 22-23.
G^Calhoun to Andrew Jackson, June 4, 1826; Jackson to Calhoun
July 26, 1826, John Spencer Basset, ed., Jackson Correspondence (7 vols.;
Washington, 192F-35), III, 304-308; William Smith to Stephen D. Miller,
Jan. 13, 1827, Chestnut-Manning-Miller Collection, South Carolina His
torical Society, hereinafter cited as Chestnut Manning-Miller-Collection.
^^Wiltse, Calhoun Nationalist, 337.
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destination at the appointed time.

By December of 1826 the wily New

Yorker had laid plans to read Calhoun out of the party.

In that the

Vice President had supported internal improvements, he was to be
charged with treason to strict construction.^^
The interest of the new coalition, however, led Van Buren to
postpone the break with his rival.

The association of elements so di

verse— Jackson, Calhoun, and Crawford men— was bound to be unstable;
indeed, the allies seemed often as suspicious of each other as of the
Adams-Clay men.

At least partially for this reason, then, Calhoun's

early support of Jackson was reserved in tone,^^ a reservation re
flected in the Mercury's editorial policy.
But bald political rivalries with their origins in conflict
ing presidential ambitions do not fully explain the Vice President's
metamorphosis during the decade of the 1820's.

The rising opposition

w i t h i n South Carolina to the confident postwar policies of national
development through government subsidy required him to re-examine his
position.

South Carolina had never shared Calhoun's firm support of

the tariff of 1816,^® and by 1820 the state's delegation was in strong

The recently completed Erie Canal left Van Buren's home state
in a mood distinctly hostile to rival transport projects.
This circum
stance coincided nicely with the rising devotion to strict construc
tion in the South Atlantic States (ibid. , 347-48; Van Buren to B. F.
Butler, Dec. 12, 1826, quoted in Wiltse, Calhoun Nationalist, 347).
^^Wiltse, Calhoun Nationalist, 346-51.
^^See above, 32; James C. Curtis, The Fox At Bay Martin Van
Buren and the Presidency 1837-1841 (Lexington. 1970), 23, 30-32, 34-35,
hereinafter cited as Curtis, Fox At B a y .
^®The South Carolina delegation voted for it by a narrow four to
three margin (Freehling, Prelude, 96).
Roundly denounced by some of his
constituents for his position, Calhoun was accused of having betrayed
his state for the Presidency (Houston, Nullification, 5).
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opposition to any increase in import duties.

According to Pinckney’s

M e r c u r y . Calhoun was himself opposed to the proposal at that time.^^
While h e recorded no comment on the considerable increase in 1824, his
South Carolina followers voted to a man against i t , and the Mercury was
strong in its opposition.

There is little reason to infer that its

stand did not represent the then Secretary of War's view.^O

Calhoun

still believed the tariff to be constitutional, however.
In any event, Calhoun was having serious second thoughts by
1827.

In February he cast the deciding Senate vote against the Woolens

Bill.

During the summer of that year a tariff convention of formidable

proportions assembled at Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.

The one hundred

delegates from thirteen states made demands for protection that were
no less modest than the size of their

a s s e m b l y .

Writing to his

favorite brother-in-law, James Edward Calhoun, the Vice President re
ferred to the "great geographical interests" of the Union assembling
in array "against one another."
to be unconstitutional.

Still he did not declare protection

But he viewed it as a "highly dangerous"

power, subject to being "perverted to purposes most unjust and oppres
sive."

Committing James Edward to silence, the Vice President ventured

to hope that the South "would not be provoked to step beyond strict

-?2

constitutional remedies."'

^^Mer c u r y , Feb. 19, 1824.
^*^Wiltse, Calhoun Nationalist, 284-91.
Capers views the 1824
action as an outright desertion of Calhoun by his followers (Capers,
Opportunist, 103-104).
71wiltse, Calhoun Nationalist, 195-96.
72calhoun to James Edward Calhoun, Aug. 27, 1827, J. Franklin
Jameson, ed.. The Correspondence of John C. Calhoun (Washington, 1900)
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Then there was the matter of slavery.

In 1816, when he voted

for the tariff, Calhoun regretted that the "odious traffic" of the
slave trade had lingered until only eight years before.

Being a

Southerner, he was partially responsible and accepted "a large part
of the disgrace" for it.73

Calhoun was disquieted by the Missouri con

troversy, but used his influence to negotiate acceptance of the con
gressional compromise by Monroe’s cabinet.

This performance irritated

a Virginian whose ideas would come to have a considerable influence on
Calhoun's own.

Inveighing against the role played by Carolinians in

the Missouri settlement, John Randolph wrote that ". . . Mr. Lowndes
. . . and some other would-be Leaders
compromise."

. . . are the true fathers of the

Denouncing their effort in behalf of the compromise

Randolph charged that, "The Slaveholding interest has been sacrificed
by Southern and Western men from slave-holding S t a t e s . "^4

Before many

years passed, Calhoun would regret not having heeded this warning.
So far was Calhoun from sharing this sentiment at the time, however,
that he could agree with John Quincy Adams that slavery was morally
indefensible.

He only contended that it could not be abolished in

the South because of economic and social consequences.

As the two

walked home together from the very cabinet meeting that had endorsed

250-51, hereinafter cited as Jameson, ed., Calhoun Correspondence.
See also Wiltse, Calhoun Nationalist, 356, and Capers, Calhoun Op
portunist. 107.
73Houston, Nullification, 13.
^^Randolph to Henry Middleton Rutledge, March 20, 1820,
quoted in Russell Kirk, Randolph of Roanoke (Chicago, 1951), 119.
^^Ibid., 120; Houston, Nullification, 13.
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the Compromise, Calhoun in effect told the New Englander that slavery
was an unfortunate necessity.
During the fall of 1820 Secretary of War Calhoun made a tour
of the northern states.

His trip convinced him that there was no

threat— immediate or impending— to slavery.
as to his view of attacks on the institution.

Even so, he left no doubt
"Should emancipation

be attempted it must, and will be resisted at all costs," he said.
"Nothing would lead more directly to disunion with all of its horrors."^7
Four years later, in 1824, the Secretary of War was called upon
to comment on the proposed internal improvements bill.

Congress, he

thought, was authorized by the Constitution to build roads and canals,
a power that he thought must be used
agree.

judiciously.

78

Randolph

did

not

"If Congress possesses the power to do what is proposed in this

bill . . . they may emancipate every slave in the United States.

..."

he said. Continuing with his warning, this clairvoyant harbinger of the
doomed went on to advise :
. . . if ever the time shall arrive . . . that a co
alition of knavery and fanaticism shall, for any pur
pose be got up on this floor, I ask [the] gentleman
. . . to look well to what they are now doing— to
the colossal power with which they are now arming this
government.
The power to do what I allude to is, I
aver, more honestly inferable from the war-making power
than the power we are now about to exercise.
Let them
look forward to the time when such a question shall
arise.79

7^Adams, Diary, V, 10. Freehling says this was the view of
most Carolinians at the time (see above, f.n. 24).
77calhoun to Charles Tait, Oct. 26, 1820, quoted in Wiltse,
Calhoun Nationalist, 219.
78ibid.

, 287.

79Annals of Congress, Debates and Proceedings, Eighteenth Con
gress, First Session (Washington. 1789-1824)> 1308.
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It has been suggested that Randolph was ultimately responsible for
guiding Calhoun— whom he despised— into the state rights fold.®®
Regardless of who or what inspired the change, by 1826 the
vitriolic Virginian of intensifying sectionalism and the circumspect
Carolinian of declining nationalism shared a position for the first
time.

From the Vice President's chair, Calhoun quietly lent his sup

port to those who opposed American participation in the Panama Con
f e r e n c e . 81

And in a speech which Calhoun's friend Langdon Cheves

would quote twenty-four years later at the Nashville Convention, Ran
dolph outlined the dangers inherent in the cooperation between slaveholding planters and abolition-minded revolutionaries,

Emancipation

in Spanish America threatened Anglo-American masters, he said.
revolutionaries menaced Cuba.

Once they had substituted their own brand

of disruption for Spanish authority
with servile insurrection.

The

there, they would threaten the South

In combination with the growing British

abolition movement, they constituted a danger that must be met at once.
"Sir," he cautioned;
I know there are gentlemen . . . who think this unhappy
question— for such it is— of negro slavery . . . should
never be brought into public notice. . . . With every
due respect for the gentlemen who think so, I differ
from them. . , . Sir,
it .. . cannot be hid . . . it
. . . must be treated
. . . [and] not tampered with by
quacks who never saw the disease or the patient . . .
it must . . . [be] let alone. . . .82

80Henry Adams, John Randolph (Boston, 1882), 291; Kirk, Ran
dolph , 60; Coit, Calhoun, 171.
81wiltse, Calhoun Nationalist, 324.

82

Register of Debates in Congress, Nineteenth Congress, First
Session (Washington, 1825-1837), 117-18.
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It was also Randolph’s words that provided the theme for a
pamphlet which Calhoun approvingly read in the autumn of 1827.

Robert

J. Turnbull's, The Crisis, a part of which first appeared in the Mer
cury , recorded the bitter Virginian's admonition for the future.
"There is nothing but power that can restrain power."

Only a few

months later Calhoun began to transcribe privately this sentiment into
a workable political formula, The South Carolina Exposition and Protest.
Caught between his reputation as a nationalist and his interest
as a South Carolinian, the Vice President determined that only the
power of a united South could contain the might of the general govern
ment.

He concluded that South Carolina must convince the other slave-

holding states of the soundness of this Virginian-inspired creed.

The

Palmetto State must first settle the political quarrels by which she had
been divided during the past decade, however.
among the first to lea m

the new lesson.

The Mercury's editor was

Writing to Governor Stephen

D. Miller, a sometime ally of Judge Smith, Pinckney committed himself:
to the promotion of . . . the true interests of the
Southern States and of So Carolina [,] in particular
to keeping the State united at home and respected
abroad. . . .84
Accompanied by the Mercury, Calhoun and South Carolina were in full
retreat from nationalism.

83Wiltse, Calhoun Nationalist, 355-56, 379.
able" is used here to describe Calhoun's intention.

The term "work

84pinckney to Miller, Aug. 32, 1828, Chestnut-Manning-Miller
Collection.
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CHAPTER II

THE FIRST BATTLE

South Carolina's retreat from nationalism was an ordered one
and was preceded by some years of political skirmishes, battles and oc
casional withdrawals.^

But not until 1827 did the nationalists recon

sider their position and— having done so— give ground.
The full story of the war is told in the Mercury's pages.
Editor Pinckney was no less opposed to the forces threatening the
South Carolina economy and society than were his bitterest political
enemies.

He and they differed only in how to effect the remedy.

But

as the autumn of 1827 gave way to the winter of 1828 the retreating
nationalists— with Pinckney in their ranks— fell reluctantly back on
the state rights position.

Accompanied in their retreat by the Vice

President, the disillusioned nationalists prepared for a new war.

Still

carrying the standard for Calhoun the Mercury awaited the announcement
of his new strategy.
Meanwhile, those twin threats, slavery and the tariff, seldom
escaped the attention of Pinckney.

He had opposed the tariff of 1824

during the debates prior to its passage, and— once it became law—
coupled his acceptance of it with the warning that any further increases
in the duty threatened "ruinous consequences."

The steady decline in

^See above, 23-28.
41
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cotton prices

2

with their consequent effect on overall property values

did nothing to moderate his view of import exactions.

A change in the

nature of Charleston’s declining seaborne commerce only added to the
problem.

Pivoting more and more around New York, it furnished another

indication of a sick economy.

Thus, when three years later the move to

raise duties again commenced, Pinckney looked with little confidence
toward the future of the southern states, "taxed," as they were "for the
benefit of others."

This "gloomy and alarming prospect" could only be

averted, he said, by responding to the "oppressors with a correspond
ing . . . firmness."
The rise at the North of an antislavery sentiment increased the
uneasy editor’s worries.

Plans to provide federal aid to the Coloni

zation Society did nothing to conceal the "ulterior and insidious ob
ject at which the Society" aimed.

He had already concluded to pub

lish no more communications on this subject, "calculated" as it was
"to do no good in a community like ours."

Even more to be feared was

the appearance in Chareleston of abolitionist propaganda and the es
tablishment (in Boston) of the Liberator.
spoke of the Union’s being endangered.

For the first time Pinckney

"Men might deliberate about the

Tariff," he said, ". . . and other matters" but upon the subject of
slavery there was "one unanimous feeling," and an attack upon it would
cause the southern states to "burst their bonds, and . . . cast off
a government which could thus mediate their destruction.

. .

^Alfred Glaze Smith, Jr., Economic Readjustment of An Old
Cotton State (Columbia, 1958), 220-21.
^Mercury, Feb. 18, Mar. 20, 26, 1824; June 8, 1826; Feb. 1,
June 4, 8, 23, Oct. 6, 9, Dec. 21, 1827; June 15, 30, Aug. 5, 1828;
July 30, Oct. 20, 1829; Apr. 24, 28, May 8, June 17, 18, 1830;
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But for the slavery dispute, the Mercury's (and South Carolina’s)
opposition to the tariff might not have reached such proportions.^
Even so, Pinckney bade farewell to his nationalism with re
luctance.

Although the Woolens Bill of 1827 was indeed "unwise and

pernicious," he did not question its constitutionality.

Although he

endorsed Dr. Thomas Cooper's speech of July 2 in Columbia (in which
Cooper warned that it was time for South Carolina to "calculate the
value of the Union"), Pinckney made little reference to that remark.
He said that Cooper merely meant that any further "oppressions might
cause the South to reconsider the usefulness of the national conven
tion. " According to Pinckney, Cooper actually favored moderate duties.
So did the majority of Carolinians, and with them, the Mercury.
there is a difference," Pinckney said, " . . .

"But

between that degree of

protection, which while it aided manufactures, did not materially
injure any other interest, and that now claimed . . . which can only
be granted at the hazard of destroying the agriculture and commerce
of the South."

Other than to express his faith in "STATE SOVEREIGNTY

AND CONFEDERATED UNION," Pinckney said no more about the tariff until
December.

In that month the General Assembly resolved that both pro

tective tariff and internal improvements projects were unconstitutional.
This time Pinckney endorsed the position of his fellow lawmakers, and—
retaining still some of his nationalism— warned that while such laws
might only endanger the South in 1827, in the long run they threatened

Sept. 23, 24, Oct. 3, 1831; Jan. 19, April 7, 1832.
^Houston, Nullification, 47-49; Freehling, Prelude, 81.
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the whole sweep of the Union with governmental usurpations.^
Pinckney's surprising defense of Dr. Cooper's speech— "the
treasonable doctrines lately broached at Columbia," according to the
Courier— provoked a savage exchange between himself and the pro-admin
istration Millington.

Accused of upholding "monopoly," defending "the

proceedings of the Hartford Convention" and of blatant disloyalty to
South Carolina, the Courier's editor was so incensed at the "frequent
paltry insinuations and statements" of his rival that "his sense of
personal dignity . . . compelled" him to "give HENRY L. PINCKNEY dis
tinctly to understand" that those who "impeached" the "motives" and
maligned the "character" of the Courier's editor should be prepared
to "afford personal satisfaction" for their rashness.

Millington then

dismissed Pinckney by concluding that the only "uniformity of
Mr. HENRY L. PINCKNEY's character" was in his ability to evade the
truth.

Although Pinckney did not return the challenge, the wordy war

continued with scurrility unabated.^

"The age of miracles has not

ceased; the Charleston M ercury, the mouthpiece of the Calhoun school,
has become

u l t r a - r a d i c a l ,

one Pinckney detractor charged.

^Me r c u r y , Feb. 12, 15, 19, 29; Mar. 6, 8, Apr. 16, May 15,
24, June 1, Sept. 4, Oct. 6, 9, 11, Nov. 21, Dec. 21, 1827.
The
Moolens Bill was defeated in the Senate by the vote of the Vice Presi
dent.
In urging the rejection of similar measures in the next Con
gress the Mercury began to attack them on constitutional grounds.
Cooper, the President of South Carolina College and the "arch
radical in the uplands," was as important as Judge Smith— to whose
faction he belonged— in converting Carolinians to strict construction
(Freehling, Prelude, 128-130; Hollis, S.C.College, 74-76).
^Mercury, Sept. 4, 5, 6, 14, 1827; Courier, Sept. 6, 8, 13,
15, 1827.
^Quoted in Mhite, Rhett, 12; Mhile its source is not clearly
indicated, it speaks in the language of the Courier.
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During August and September of 1827 the Mercury had published
a number of essays entitled "The Crisis."

Their author, "Brutus,"

(Robert Turnbull) attacked the nationalist positions of Calhoun and
Jackson and "gave the world the first formulation of the nullification
doctrine."8

The United States Telegraph regretted their publication,

and Pinckney himself considered their "tone and temper" too vehement
0

and ultimately discontinued publishing them.
nullification.

He had not yet endorsed

Pinckney also opposed efforts to hold a southern con

vention which would consider action against the tariff.
he dismissed as being "of doubtful character."

This proposal

The southern opposi

tion had so far been constitutional, he wrote; it should be kept that
way.

The editor did not favor appeasement, however.

"...

The next

annual meeting of the manufacturers at Washington," the Congress, was
likely to bring trouble, he warned.

When the tariff of 1828 estab

lished the accuracy of Pinckney's prediction, the Mercury denounced it
as "pernicious" and declared it to be unconstitutional— along with the
internal improvements bill of the same year.

Pinckney opened the columns

% e r c u r y , Aug. 17, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 28, 29, 30, 31,
Sept. 4, 5, 6, 7, 12, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 27, 28, 29, 1928.
Numbers
21 and 22 (Sept. 21-22) bore the signature of "Philo-Brutus" while 23
through 25 (Sept. 27-29) were signed by "Curtis." The depictive quota
tion is from Houston, Nullification, 72.
9Thirty-three essays appeared in the pamphlet form of The
Crisis; Thirty-three Essays on the Usurpations of the Federal Govern
m e n t , by Brutus (Charleston, 1827).
The Mercury published only twentyfive.
The author of the rejected issues claimed that Pinckney acted
because they contradicted the views of the Jackson party.
Pinckney,
however, said they were refused because they dealt with colonization
(Mercury, Oct. 6, 9, 1827; see above, 43).
If, as Wiltse says, Cal
houn approved the pamphlet form, his opinion was unknown to Pinckney
during the serialization, except as the Telegraph may have represented
it (see above, 41).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

46
of his paper to general proposals for redress, and— from time to
time— expressed his own opinion.

Holding the establishment of southern

manufacturing plants to be "impractical" and a boycott of northern goods
"tantamount to submission," the editor concluded that such proposals
would punish the South more than the North.
civilization," said

P i n c k n e y .

10

"Non-consumption is non

He evidently did not like homespun.

Then there was the remedy proposed in The Crisis.

Without edi

torial comment this time, the Mercury published an explanation of nulli
fication which announced that the time had come "to take our stand
under . . . the Constitution of the land, and if necessary to die in
the ditch."

Robert Barnwell Rhett addressed a "large and respectable

meeting at Walterboro where he urged non-compliance with the offen
sive tariff and called upon the governor to summon the assembly or
call a convention to consider the situation.
gathering for urging 'such open resistance.'"

Pinckney hailed the
It was part and parcel

of the duties of "a Sovereign and Independent State."

The Mercury

had, finally, endorsed nullification— at least in p r i n c i p l e . H
In the meantime the state's representation at Washington was
deliberating as to what its future course should be.

Excepting only

Senator Smith— whose aversion for Calhoun had not abated— the South
South Carolina delegation met at Senator Hayne's home following the
enactment of the "Bill of abominations."

They concluded, after much

argument, to return home at the end of the session where they would

lOMercury, June 3, July 4, 22, 1827; May 20, 29, 30, June 28,
July 3, 4, 7, 8, 11, 12, 16, 17, 25, 30, Aug. 12, 13, 15, 18, 19,
Sept. 3, Dec. 10, 1828.
lljbid. , June 18, July 3, 1828; White, Rhett, 14, 15; Freehling,
Prelude, 148.
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discourage public meetings and any public statements with regard to
the tariff.

It was the collective opinion of the delegation— most of

whom belonged to "the Calhoun party"— that no radical moves should
jeopardize Jackson’s election.

The Adams administration was committed

to protection and must be repudiated in the forthcoming general elec
tion.

Then if Jackson— whose tariff position was at least open to

question— did not produce a solution satisfactory to South Carolina,
the state would act.

How, they had not decided.

This policy was followed, though not without some difficulty.
The governor declined either to summon the General Assembly into
special session or call a convention.

Rhett and his followers were

dissuaded from further outbursts, and the Mercury was careful to follow

1^

the party line.^^'

It is likely that Pinckney had considered that he was

doing this all along.
Calhoun also came home when Congress adjourned.

From Pendle

ton during the turbulent summer of 1828, he wrote to Andrew Jackson
to emphasize that only genuine tariff reform would quiet the South.
Calhoun, however, was more certain of the need for reform than of the
likelihood of its coming about.

In addition, he was disturbed by the

l^wiitse, Calhoun Nationalist, 372-74.
^ % h i te,Rhett, 15, 16.
The returning delegation found excite
ment throughout South Carolina, but especially in the Lowcountry.
Oratorical fireworks characterized July fourth celebrations and during
the summer there were numerous bald denunciations of the tariff.
By
autumn things had quieted, however.
One feature of the plea for calm.
White says, was that the Mercury "was jerked sharply into line" (White,
Rhett, 16). Considering the commotion within the state and the delayed
announcement of Calhoun-approved strategy, it is more likely that
Pinckney simply did not know the party line. Wiltse says that Calhoun
himself "was no clearer than the others as to what action should
ultimately be taken (Wiltse, Calhoun Nationalist, 378).
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talk of disunion in South Carolina.

So— while state politicians

streamed in and out of the place soon to be called Fort Hill— he
codified the doctrine of nullification.

It was to be used only if

necessary as the alternative for congressional initiative in effect
ing tariff reform.
In October one of Calhoun's summer visitors gave some indica
tion of what had been discussed at Pendleton.

With Jackson's election

assured, James Hamilton, Jr., made a speech on the twenty-eighth to
his constituents.

Like Rhett's audience of but a few months before,

they were assembled at Walterboro where they heard him deliver the
first authorized version of the new policy.
tion.

It was to be nullifica

And when the General Assembly met in November, William C.

Preston— once a Crawford man— was ready to submit the South Carolina
Exposition and Protest for its consideration.

Although it was not

generally known, Calhoun had written it during the preceding five
months.

14

They had been active months for the Mercury.

Although Pinckney had endorsed nullification in principle on
June 18, he commenced to qualify his endorsement only a few days later.
It is likely that someone informed h i m of the party line.
tion did not mean disunion, he assured his readers.
pro-Jackson men abhorred such a prospect.

Nullifica

He and all other

It meant, rather, that the

tariff was unconstitutional, that southern rights had been destroyed,
and that the endangered union "must be saved"— by repealing the tar
iff.

Pinckney had not retreated from his theoretical position, however.

14preehling, Prelude, 149; Wiltse, Calhoun Nationalist, 37586. Wiltse gives the date of Hamilton's speech as October 21, one
week earlier.
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Throughout the summer of 1828 his paper championed the doctrine that
"the legislature not only possesses the right, but
terfere.

..."

[the] duty to in

It was up to the state and the South "generally" to

decide whether the

tariff was of a concern sufficient to require such

action.

to restrain the general government had to lie some

The right

where; it could not be in the Congress,
of the trouble.

The Supreme Court

since that body was the source

did not possess the necessary power,

for it derived itsauthority from the Constitution.

Because the

Con

stitution was a creation of the states, it was from the states that
limitation must be imposed.

Pinckney was uncertain as to how this

should be done and observed "that it is best to leave the decision as
to means to the legislature."

The Mercury had passed another milestone.

No more would the Columbia Telescope command the ramparts of
state rights in South Carolina.

Pinckney's paper, the mouthpiece of

the conservative "Calhoun school" had displaced it.^-

Nor were there

any more lapses in communication with the rest of the "Junto."

Pinck

ney campaigned faithfully for Jackson, on w h o m he said "all the hopes
of Carolina hang."

"To h im the people look emphatically as their last

sole hope," short of nullification.

And although Pinckney probably

voted for the Exposition and did cause it to be printed, he neither
commented on it nor contemplated any immediate action by the state.

l% e r c u r y , July 4, 17, 22, Aug. 27, 29, Nov. 1, 1828.
The
Telescope, described by one Mercury contributor as the strongest state
rights paper in the South, condemned the Walterboro proposals and
favored non-consumption instead (ibid., July 4, 9, 1928).
^^Ibid., June 27, Aug. 6, 30, Sept. 16, Dec. 23, 1828.
Mercury campaigned for Jackson from Aug. 1 through Oct. 17.
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The policy was that South Carolina would wait for Jackson to prove him
self.

This time the Mercury understood it.
The rest of Charleston's press did not share the Mercury's dog

matic view of the situation.

The Patriot condemned the tariff but

thought the Walterboro declarations intemperate and premature.

It

favored a national mercantile convention and took no position at all on
the election.

The Gazette opposed the tariff on economic grounds but had

no reservations as to its constitutionality, while the Courier actually
condoned the protective system.
Adams.

Both the Gazette and Courier supported

Their indignant editorials on the Mercury's position fairly

blazed with malediction of the "Mercury or Disunion Junto," and had
nothing good to say about the Walterboro proceedings.

Adams's unpopu

larity in South Carolina caused them to place more emphasis on the danger
to the Union than on the prospects of his re-election.

Jackson's alleged

friends in the state were a threat to the "INTEGRITY OF THE UNION,"
thundered both Gazette and Courier.

Echoing the Courier's earlier

charge that Pinckney was but "a political weathercock whose opposition
. . . shifted with every popular breeze," the Gazette reminded him of
the days when he was rather more nationalistic in outlook.^
The alarm of the excited administration papers was hardly
justified either by sentiment in the state or the Mercury's position.
As yet there was no organized nullification party and certainly no
group advocating disunion.

South Carolina was just beginning to

^ ^Patriot, Feb. 19, 21, Apr. 11, 22, July 22, 24, Aug. 5, 11,
13, 14, 15, 20, 21, 29, Sept. 15, 17, 26, 29, Oct. 3, 1828; Gazette,
June 19, July 2, 19, 26, 28, Aug. 1, 8, 11, 20, 23, 26, Sept. 1, 2, 3,
11, 15, 19, 20, 30, Oct. 1-20, 1828; Courier. July 14, 25, Aug. 30,
Sept. 22, Oct. 6, 10, 11, 13-17, 1828.
The Patriot was basically a state
rights paper.
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contemplate going beyond the resolution state.
Mercury still showed traces of nationalism.

Even Pinckney's

If it spoke of the pos

sibility of disunion it did not advocate it, and its endorsement of
nullification was no more than abstract.

Taking the position that

Jackson’s election would relieve the South from danger, Pinckney con
tended that this result would also remove the issue of disunion from
politics.

"If any individual can preserve the Union" and "compose the

agitated waves which threaten to engulf us, he is the man," reasoned the
confident editor.
Jackson's margin of victory in the nation was no greater than
that of his legislative slate in South Carolina.

With considerable

satisfaction the Mercury announced that Pinckney was re-elected as
Charleston sent only Jackson men to the statehouse.

Even when Jackson

glared over his glass at Calhoun to toast the permanence of the Union,
the Mercury retained its confidence in the "Hero of New Orleans."
"When the President . . . says that the Union must be preserved, it
follows necessarily that he refers to the mode of preservation pointed
out by Mr. Jefferson."

To the optimistic editor this method operated

"by the exercise of the sovereignty of the states

..."

and amounted

to nullification:
The President's toast puts an end to whatever little
doubt may have heretofore existed as to his feelings
or opinions in relation to the momentous question now
at issue between the federal government and the whole
Southern section of the Union.19

M e r c u r y , June 27, 1828; J. Johnston to Stephen D. Miller,
Aug. 20, H.L.Pinckney to Miller, Aug. 23, Thomas Harrison to Miller,
Sept. 6, Committee of Invitation to Miller, Sept. 10, James A. Black
to Miller, Sept. 15, 1828, Chestnut-Manning-Miller Collection.
l^Mer c u r y , Oct. 17, 31, Nov. 18, 1828; Apr. 24, 27, May 6, 1830;
Freehling, P relude, 192.
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When Jackson said nothing about the tariff in his annual mes
sage of 1829, the Mercury saw no danger.

Defending the administration

when it was criticized for the spoils system, Pinckney also endorsed
Jackson's foreign policy, especially on the matter of West Indian trade.
The Maysville Road Veto marked "a new epoch in the political history"
and proved Jackson’s opposition to internal improvements.

The Presi

d en t ’s position on Georgia Indian removals was sound, and ultimately
the Mercury applauded his opposition to the Bank of the United States,
an institution it had once considered most beneficial.

Indeed, through

out the first two years of the General’s government, the Mercury
thought of h i m as one "who would regard the preservation of the Union
as the polar star of his conduct, and discarding local or sectional
feeling, be governed only by equal justice to all the great interests
of the

n a t i o n . " 2 0

But the Mercury had changed its mind before.

It

had once liked John Quincy Adams.
Admiration for Jackson did not mean that Pinckney's sheet
had abandoned the crusade against the tariff.
never long absent from the Mercury's pages.

This "holy cause" was
Even during the early

months of Jackson’s administration— when the South Carolina press
was relatively silent on the tariff— Pinckney's paper promised a con
tinual fight for "constitutional rights," and warned that the time
might still come for the South to "either throw off their chains by
a united and decisive effort, or have them rivetted about their necks"
0*1

forever.

Pinckney favored another appeal to Congress but expected

^^Mercury, July 20, Aug. 15, Sept. 20, 30, Dec. 14, 1829;
July 26, 1830.
Zllbid., June 18-Dec. 31, 1829.
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little relief from it.2%

By 1830 he felt that nullification was the

only hope; "that no recourse is left to Carolina but the prompt and
efficient employment of Constitutional measures of redress.
Congressional expressions of sympathy for the aims of the
Colonization Society intensified further his distrust of that body.
But while Congress was unreliable, the Webster-Hayne debate benefitted
the Southern cause.

Newspaper reports of the issues at stake enlight

ened the previously uninformed northern masses and the common interest
of South and West became more apparent.

Editors and politicians from

the North and West defended the "Carolina Doctrines."

Support from

Woodbury of New Hampshire and Benton of Missouri inspired Pinckney
to see an "arising of the influence of State Rights principles . . .
not only in the West, but in the East."

Now, if the South but re

mained strong, relief would be found through time honored nullifica
tion.

Jefferson had advocated it, while Georgia and Massachusetts

had practiced it.^^
So, in March of 1830, the Mercury began to call for nullifica
tion— as the only remedy both peaceful and constitutional.

It would

preserve the union, and Jackson’s toast had indicated his sympathy.
At this point— and this one only— did Pinckney’s press appear to be
disturbed by just the nagging shadow of a doubt.

If the President’s

meaning had been misinterpreted in Charleston, there was still no

22lbid. , Aug. 4, 1829.
23lbid., Jan. 13, Feb. 16, Mar. 23, Apr. 15, May 3, 8, 29, 31,
Aug. 4, Nov. 13, 1830.
24lbid., Mar. 4, 15, 17, 23, Apr. 15, 24, May 1, June 17,
Aug. 4, 1830.
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cause for alarm, counselled the Mercury.

. . I t would be a matter

of very little consequence to know that he was against us . . . the
liberties of the South no more depend upon the nod of the Executive
than they do upon the unprincipled usurpations of the majority in Con
gress."

And if Jackson tried force, which he surely would not do,

such "a flame" would be ignited as could "never be extinguished but
by the dissolution of the Union.

. .

Admitting that nullification could be accomplished merely by
action of the legislature, Pinckney was reluctant to endorse this
method.

Then in August— on the eve of the fall elections— he concluded

that the "prevailing, indeed the almost unanimous determination of the
people, is that a Convention shall be called.
Once again the Mercury was marching considerably in advance
of Charleston's other papers.

The Patriot agreed that a state could

"stand on her sovereignty," but only by seceding from the Union.

The

protective system was harmful to the South but did not yet demand that
she adopt a separate course.

The Patriot's editor proposed that a

stitutional amendment be adopted instead.

con

This would require approval

by three-fourths of the states for any measure denounced by the re
maining one-fourth.

As an alternative he favored a general convention

of the southern states.

There were, he said, seven million Northerners

and Westerners who agreed with the South on the evils of protection.^7

25l b i d ., May 6, 1830.
26ib i d . . May 1, Aug. 5, 1830.
27patriot. June 26, 28, 29, July 2, 17, 23, 27, Aug. 2, 1830.
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Pinckney was unimpressed; h e spoke of the editor’s "long prosing essays
which nobody reads."^8
The Courier also disagreed, but for other reasons.

The "book

learning" of the Patriot’s editor left the Courier’s editor singularly
unimpressed.

The latter cited Senator Livingston of Louisiana, "a

veteran of the JEFFERSON school," who said that the tariff was per
fectly constitutional.

Nullification would lead inevitably to "re

sistance and b l o o d s h e d . "29

Pinckney called the Courier’s editor dis

loyal to the South and inconsistent as well.

He h a d reportedly sup

ported the Hartford Convention, Pinckney charged.

One of the Mercury’s

correspondents spoke of "The Boston Courier published in Charleston."^0
The Gazette’s new editor, William Gilmore Simms, regretted the
injustices perpetrated against the South, believed in "the reserved
rights of the States," and said that majority rule had its drawbacks.
But he still urged "patience and forbearance to the last point . . . "
and did not endorse nullification.

When Pinckney characterized his

reasoning as "scurrilous," Simms— not to be outdone— heaped an impres
sive opprobrium upon the former’s head.

"The refined editor of the

Charleston Mercury . . . whose Journal for the last four years has been
the common sewer for the passing off of all the blackguardism of the
State and City," had, h e said, only used his position to enslave the
Mercury to purposes of party.

^^Mercury, Oct.

That "chameleon of public life," he

7, 1830.

29Courier, Sept. 4, 1828; May 14, Aug. 3, 1830.
The Courier also
observed that there was no general southern support for nullification
and that South Carolina would, consequently, stand alone.
8PMercury, Mar. 27, June 17, July 1, 29, Aug.

2, 1830.
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indignantly labelled Pinckney's paper.31

The Patriot. Courier, and

Gazette all supported the "Union Ticket" in the fall elections.32
Those elections served to indicate the respective strength in
South Carolina of the nullifier and unionist factions.
test, the Unionists w o n in Charleston.
defeated for re-election.

In a close con

Intendant (mayor) Pinckney was

The unionist slate won control of all munici

pal offices and also elected eleven of sixteen state representatives.
It w ould seem that nullification was defeated— at least in the city.
Pinckney was returned to the General Assembly, however, where on
November 27, 1830, he was elected Speaker of the lower house.

Further

more, the Nullifiers had done better outside Charleston, and in Decem
ber a majority of the assembly voted to call a convention.

Since they

were unable to muster a two-thirds vote for this action, they adopted
a series of anti-tariff resolutions instead.

Two of these resolu

tions endorsed nullification.33
This development encouraged the Mercury and convinced it that
South Carolina would act when just a few more members of the General
Assembly lost faith in the Congress.

Bending every journalistic effort

3^Gazette. Jan. 5, Feb. 10, 17, June 9, 16, 28, July 31,
Aug. 3-5, 1830.

32patriot, Aug. 30, 1830.
33Mercury, Sept. 8, 1830; Freehling, Prelude, 201-13.
Freeh
ling says as the electioneering progressed the Nullifiers beat a "stra
tegic retreat" for two reasons.
Certain defeat awaited the party that
clearly called for nullification.
But the other reason involved some
thing even more basic.
A clear cut choice between policies could cre
ate "popular parties" and threaten the gentry's control of the state.
The Charleston city election of 1829 had clearly illustrated such a
danger.
By obscuring issues in the general election, the gentlemen
candidates could reserve the final decision to themselves— once they
got to the legislature.
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to enlighten these doubtful solons, Pinckney interpreted the refusal
of the national House of Representatives to effect tariff reductions
in 1831 as the "proclamation of political vassalage to the South."
Reluctant Carolinians now had no choice but to "either support the
state or go over to the enemy.
grimness of the situation.

..."

Economic matters aggravated the

Great Britain was contemplating an increase

in duties on raw cotton, he warned, in obvious retaliation for the tar
iff.

Some results were already apparent.

As northern prosperity in

creased "nothing but embarrassment deterioration and decay . . . "
overtook "the plantation states."

"They have no . . . acts of Con

gress authorizing them legally to plunder and oppress their neigh
bors— no millions upon millions annually poured in amongst them from
the coffers of the nation."

As a result, population was declining,

roads and canals were not being built, wages were low, property was
depreciated, and foreign commerce was destroyed.

Particularly in

South Carolina the picture was one of "gloom, dissatisfaction, and
despon d e n c e .

"34

Pinckney's rhetoric, if exaggerated, was persuasive.

It soon took on overtones critical of his former hero, Andrew Jackson.
Viewed in retrospect, the Mercury's anti-Jackson position
evolved with a gradual reluctance not unlike the transition in Pinck
ney's political views from nationalism to sectionalism.

In 1830

Pinckney had condemned any discussion of Calhoun or Van Buren for
President; Jackson, he hoped, would run again.

Only a year later, how

ever, he was determined to devote little of his paper's space to the
General's cause.

South Carolina had neglected "her own rights and

34Mercury, Feb. 5, 9, 17, Mar. 31, Apr. 1, 9, 1831.
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interests" in the last election so as to vindicate "the great prin
ciple of popular sovereignty"; it would not happen again.

Until the

Constitution was restored to its "original purity" his paper had no
time for personal campaigns.

Jackson, in particular should contrib

ute to constitutional purification by vetoing "the monstrous acts" al
most certain to be passed by the Congress, acts which adversely af
fected the "liberties and properties and even . . . lives" of Carolini
ans.

In return he could expect Pinckney's support.

Otherwise, the

Mercury would not "turn aside from matters of such vital import, for
the mere pleasure of engaging in a party conflict."3^
Pinckney's doubts as to Jackson's intentions had intensified by
1831.

Although the Jackson-Calhoun quarrel was only "a private affair,"

it was still disturbing.

Van Buren was the villain, the Mercury

charged; if he alienated the Vice President he would have to suffer the
consequences.

The general policy of the administration was still

thought to be sound.

Jackson's opposition to that "dangerous federal

engine," the bank, merited special commendation.

But on June 14, 1831,

Jackson wrote a letter to the Union Party in Charleston.

Complimenting

the supporters of that faction, the President commented unfavorably on
those whose unwise political conduct damaged the national interest.

He

could only be referring to those who until May had styled themselves
the "State Rights and Jackson" Party.

Reacting with "surprise and in

dignation," the state rights faction filled the Mercury's pages with
evidence of a growing concern soon to become outrage.

35Ibid., July 8, 1829; Apr. 13, July 26, Dec. 15, 1830; Apr. 16,
June 9, 1831; Feb. 8, May 28, 1832.
3 6 i b i d ..

Feb. 3, 12, 19, 24, Mar. 11, Apr. 16, July 7, 9, 12,

Aug. 2, 26, 1831.
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Contributors to Pinckney's paper viewed the President's now
clarified position with alarm; Jackson was evidently contemplating
coercion.

The Mercury itself merely took note of these "chilling

realities" and was loath to credit them.
however, before the summer ended.

Its doubts were dispelled,

In August the outraged editor re

ferred to Jackson's "late unauthorized, undignified, and bitter par
tisan denunciation" of the "State Rights and Free Trade party of the
South."

And earlier in the same article, he allowed that "the Rubi

con is passed."

Pinckney approved of that, if of nothing else.

The

threat of federal coercion "has done and will do more," he said, "to
produce unanimity upon the great question of resistance to aggression
than anything, perhaps which could have been devised."
Van Buren for the whole ugly business.

He blamed

37

Throughout 1831 Pinckney had called for nullification as the
only "legitimate . . . patriotic, constitutional" solution for the
problems of the plantation country.
he said.

It was not a radical approach,

Again he cited the past; the Virginia and Kentucky Resolu

tions, Georgia's defiance in the matter of the Indians, Pennsyl
vania's disobedience in the 01mstead Case, and Alabama's recent re
fusal to charter a branch of the Bank of the United States.
were all real precedents for similar action.

These

So was the annulment

of the Embargo Act by Connecticut and Massachusetts, and so for that
matter, was the Hartford Convention.
that body, however.

Pinckney did not approve of

In wartime "a patriot should side with his

3 7lbid., Feb. 8, 10, July 22, Aug. 2, 10, 1831.
The "State
Rights and Jackson" party had reflected a growing concern with the
President's policies by changing its name to the "State Rights and
Free Trade" party (ibid., Jun3 21, 1831).
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country right or wrong," he said.

Inspired thus by the past and

justified by federal oppressions, nullification would be "a calm and
deliberate movement."^8
Local sentiment seemed to be moving with the vigorous editor.
In the fall of 1831 he was elected Intendant again and reported that
the State Rights party was in control throughout the state.
to an early call for a convention.

He looked

The legislature, however, preferred

to wait for the outcome of an impending congressional compromise.

An

October anti-tariff convention in Philadelphia had condemned protec
tion.

Although it skirted the constitutional issue, Carolininans

(who had sent delegates) were still encouraged by its action.

They

were even more optimistic after Jackson recommended reduction in his
December

address to Congress.

Like his mentor Calhoun, Pinckney was

skeptical of an acceptable result.
...

"There is," he said, "but one way

by which a favorable issue can be produced.

assemble in convention while the struggle . . .
gress."

. . .

Let the people

is going on in Con

Still he was willing to give mild support to the delaying ac

tion.

". . . The cup of forbearance is not yet quite exhausted," he

said.

But the South would only accept a duty that taxed "all imports

indiscriminately and moderately, say 10 per cent," and South Carolina
would nullify anything short of this.

In the process she could con

tribute to the permanence of the Union, for nullification was a unionsaving measure.

The Union party’s proposal that a southern convention

be called was not only impractical but separatist in its tendencies.
It caused men to think of a Southern Confederacy and so carried "in

38lbid., Jan. 21, 28, 29, Feb. 4, June 7, 8, 10, 18-23, 1831.
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its bosom the seeds of disunion."

South Carolina wanted no separate

nation, only justice in the present one.

The editor rejected "the

wretched right of secession" along with "any other dangerous experiOQ

ment."

Who then could doubt that nullification was the wise course?
Pinckney's predictions as to the outcome of the congressional

debate proved to be correct.

The new tariff bill furnished another

evidence of the "usurpation" and "oppression" to which the determined
editor had referred.

Excepting those on coarse woolens, the only re

ductions it effected were of a non-protective nature.

"To say that

this is compromise and conciliation is an insolent mockery.

. ."he

charged, adding the warning that its endorsement by Charleston's other
papers was an ill-considered attempt "to reconcile the people
to that odious act of federal oppression."

Congress had, moreover,

founded a whole "system of injustice and oppression" on the tariff.
The plans for internal improvements, aid to the Colonization Society,
pensions for Revolutionary W a r soldiers and distribution, all depended
on the tariff for revenue.

"It is the fruitful source from which all

these corruptions have issued.

. . .

Let the Southern states then . .

conquer that and the whole system falls to the ground.

Nullify . . .

and the South will be redeemed from bondage.
The Mercury had correctly gauged the mood of South Carolina.
James J. Hamilton, Jr., now governor, was as displeased with the new

^^Freehling, Prelude, 246, 247; Charles M. Wiltse, John C .
Calhoun Nullifier, 1829-1839 (Indianapolis, 1949), 123-25, hereinafter
cited as Wiltse, Calhoun Nullifier; Mercury, Mar. 11, Apr. 13, May 28,
Aug. 6, 18, 26, Sept. 7, 14, Nov. 2, 23, 1831; Jan. 4, 21, Feb. 27,
Mar. 1, Apr. 5, 6, 30, May 3, 4, 5, 8, 9-11, 14, June 1, Sept. 9, 29,
1832.
^^Mercury. May 3, 1832.
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tariff as was Pinckney.

This iniquitous bill did challenge the hateful

protective system but still left it "fixed as fate," Hamilton said.^^
Renouncing "further procrastination and delay," the Mercury commenced
in March to besiege its readers with appeals for nullification.
a remedy would be constitutional, peaceful, and effective.

Such

Importuning

those w h o shared his view to launch a continuous campaign for nullifica
tion, Pinckney stressed the role of Jefferson, "the father of the re
publican party of '93— the patriot who saved the Constitution then and
whose principles alone can save it

. . . now."

To those who might still

doubt that Jefferson's role in nullification clearly established the
constitutionality of the doctrine, Pinckney appealed on other grounds.
"...

Who ever heard," he asked reassuringly, "of a State's deriving

a right from the Federal Constitution?

The States have delegated power

to the Federal Government but they certainly can derive none from it.
All power not delegated is reserved.
This being the case, there could be no issue of treason in
volved in the process of state interposition.

Treason was clearly

defined by the Constitution; it consisted of "levying war against the
United States" or giving "aid and comfort" to the enemy, and South
Carolina was guilty of neither offense.

Then, as if to admit that

people in high places outside the state might not agree with this con
tention, Pinckney asserted

that the controversy was purely a state

matter.

have tobe brought in South Carolina courts.

Any charges would

Major L. Wilson, "Liberty and Union: An Analysis of Three
Concepts Involved in the Nullification Controversy," J S H , XXXIII,
No. 3 (August, 1967), 332.
4 % e r c u r y , Jan. 6, Mar. 7, 8, 21, 22, Apr. 16, 30, 1832.
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Neither native-born nor "adopted" citizens need have any fears of
being convicted there.

With a final assurance to the fainthearted

that there was no danger of military

coercion, the editor concluded

his appeal for nullification.^^
There remained but one issue, the effectiveness of inter
position.

The action should be proclaimed by an authoritative agency,

preferably a convention called by two-thirds vote of the General
Assembly.

Since the Unionists controlled the current body, Pinckney

favored postponing the

attempt until after the October

Until that time he was

content to campaign.

elections.

This proposal was good enough for the electorate.

44

In the

autumn of 1832 Pinckney was re-elected Intendant of Charleston and
Nullifiers won the other municipal offices as well.

The Mercury's

editor also went back to the statehouse where he was again chosen
to be Speaker of the House of Representatives.
was little different from that in Charleston.

The result elsewhere
The former "State

Rights and Jackson" party, having triumphed on "the great question
of Liberty and Slavery," was in the necessary legislative majority.
It was virtually a foregone conclusion that when Governor Hamilton
summoned his new assembly into special session it would vote to call
a convention of the sort so long advocated by

Pinckney.

45

The action

of this special session established the political wisdom of the editor.

43lbid., Mar. 24, July 17, Aug. 13, 17, 22, Oct. 1, 2, 3, 4,
5, 1832.
Both Unionists and Nullifiers coveted the support of
Charleston's immigrants (Mercury, Courier, Sept-Oct. 11, 1832).
44Mercury, Mar. 8, Apr. 30, 1832.
45lbid.

, Sept. 5, Oct. 10-13, 15, 26, 27, 1832,
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The legislature called for the election of a sovereign convention,
and on November 24, 1832, the convention adopted "An Ordinance to
Nullify certain acts of the Congress of the United States, purport
ing to be laws laying duties and imposts on the importation of for
eign commodities.46
Armed then by precedent and secure in the knowledge that the
general government was incapable of doing harm to the state, the
Mercury hailed the long awaited convention action.

Pinckney also ex

pressed his confidence that South Carolina’s Unionists would give
nullification their support.

But if they did not, the crusader warned,

they would "be crushed by the blow which must be struck at
The Mercury had won its first battle.

tyranny."

4^

It had also undergone a change

of command.
On the last day of October 1832— almost a month before the
adoption of the much presaged nullification ordinance— Pinckney wrote
a "Farewell" to his subscribers and was succeeded by editor John Allan
Stuart.

Pinckney gave no reason for this move but it was presumably

dictated by the pressure of politics.

Pinckney was the Intendant of

Charleston and also Speaker of the South Carolina House of Representa
tives.

In addition, he was planning to stand for a seat in the na

tional House of Representatives.
In September of 1833 Pinckney was elected without formal op
position to Charleston’s seat in the lower house of Congress.

If his

46uenry Steele Commager, ed.. Documents of American History
(2 vols.. New York, 1963), I, 261; Wallace, Short History of South
Carolina, 400.
47Mercury, Nov. 29, 1832.
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stay at the Mercury had been short, it had been significant.

Less

than a decade of Pinckney's leadership molded the paper in the image
of nationalism, pronounced with a southern, indeed with a Charleston
accent— a stamp that it retained to the end of its days.

And Pinckney

was passing on the editorship to a man like himself, "a gentleman . . .
thoroughly devoted to the rights and interests of the

S o u t h .

"^8

The new editor was John Allan Stuart, like Pinckney, from
a prominent South Carolina family and like the first editor, Morford,
a graduate of Princeton.

He was an attorney, a leader of the State

Rights faction, and a brother-in-law of Robert Barnwell Rhett.

He had

served three years as editor of the Beaufort Gazette and one year at
the h el m of the State Rights and Free Trade Evening Post of Charleston,
and thus brought editorial experience with him to the M e r c u r y .

Not

surprisingly, both the Gazette and Evening Post were supporters of
nullification.

Ibid. , Oct. 31, 1832.
There was no organized opposition
to the Nullifiers in either Charleston's municipal or national
elections in 1832.
Close upon election time, however, an "inde
pendent" ticket appeared.
Composed mostly of Unionists, it was
reviled by the Mercury as a demoniac plot directed from Washington.
As the election returns came in, the Mercury gleefully reported the
swamping of all "independent" candidates (ibid., Aug. 23, Sept. 2,
3, 4, 5, 1833).
49princeton Alumni Records, cited in Prior, "Mercury," 255;
White, R hett, 15, 18, 22; King, Newspaper P ress, 69-70; B. R. Stuart,
Magnolia Cemetery . . . with . . . a Notice of John Allan Stuart
(Charleston, 1896), 67.
The Evening Post was established in 1831 by James Hamilton,
J r . , after he had clashed with Pinckney over both personal and party
issues.
Since Stuart and Hamilton were friends, it is likely that
the latter was instrumental in Pinckney's retirement from the Mer
cury (Virginia Louise Glenn, "James Hamilton, Jr. of South Caro
lina: A Biography," Ph.D. Dissertation, University of North Caro
lina, 1954, 158-59).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

66
Stuart became editor at a time wh e n technology was changing
the character of the paper.

His journal received news reports more

quickly than had the Mercury of Morford and Pinckney.

Despite the

roundabout route via New York, fast sailing ships and steam packets
often brought the story of Europe to Charleston in less than a month's
time.

The best overland transport from New York took three and one-

half days but this swift pace was unpredictable, if not uncertain.
"Western Mails" came in by the South Carolina Railroad from Augusta.
The Mercury received her first telegraph report in 1844; it brought
the latest news of the Democratic convention then sitting in Balti
more.

Stuart employed more reporting correspondents than his pre

decessors had done, and they tended to report the news more and
editorialize l e s s .
The paper received regular reports from Washington and New
York, along with frequent ones from such scattered places as Key
West, Boston, Havana, and New Orleans.

Special reporters were hired

to cover political and commercial conventions.

By 1837 Stuart's paper

had built up the biggest subscription list of any journal in South
Carolina, a list which included subscribers from as far away as Ohio.
Politics had much to do with this increase in the paper's popularity.
The state rights and anti-Jackson tenor of Mercury articles brought
support from both in and out of state.

Conversely, her support of

Van Buren in a time of rising Whiggery combined with divisions in
South Carolina's Democratic party to cut circulation and lead to finan
cial difficulties.

Even so, the paper appears to have retained the
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subscription lead in the interior of the state.
If there were fewer editorials in the post-Pinckney Mercury—
and if they were more gracefully formed— they lost none of their
vigor under S t u a r t . N o r were they any different in political perference.

Nowhere is this more evident than in the continuing battle

for nullification.

In his very first editorial, Stuart pledged his

devotion to "Carolinian and Southern sèntiment" and urged his readers
to center their full attention on the nullification issue and to ig
nore "the pitiful by-play of the Presidential contest."

His paper

faithfully followed that policy; it mentioned the election only once
more and then but to announce Jackson’s victory.

The election of

delegates to the impending convention accounted for most of his po
litical reports.
for nullification.

Stuart also reviewed the constitutional arguments
Reminding his subscribers that their "paramount

allegiance" was to the state, the new editor held that federal ob
ligations did not exist for a citizen, "except so far as his state
has contracted for him."

And if the state in exercise of her sover

eignity misinterpreted the federal compact, her decision nonetheless

^^Mercury, 1839-1855, passim. In particular see issues for
Oct. 3, Dec. 6, 20, 24, 1832; Jan. 4, Feb. 9, 23, 25, May 21, July 4,
Sept. 23, 1834; Mar. 10, 1835; June 1, 1836; Jan. 6, 31, Feb. 1, 1837;
Dec. 20, 1838; Jan. 3, 1838; June 1, 3, 1841; Jan. 10, 13, 1842: Jan. 2,
1843; May 31-June 3, Sept. 3, 1844.
In the issue for Jan. 3, 1844, the
Mercury's New York correspondent stated that the Charleston journal
was the first out of town paper to maintain a reporter in that city.
His Newsletters included a general report of social and cultural life
as well as political news.
See also John Allan Stuart to Robert
Barnwell Rhett, Jan. 9, 1843, Nov. 11, 1844, Robert Barnwell Rhett
Collection, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Caro
lina, hereinafter cited as Rhett Collection.
Slgtuart, Magnolia Cemetery, 51; King, Newspaper Press, 151.
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bound all who resided within her borders. "Every

man is bound . . .

to fight for his country, though he deem that she has wantonly and
unjustly declared war," wrote Stuart.
When the adoption of the nullification ordinance made the
issue "immediate and direct between South Carolina and Usurpation,
Charleston's unionist press thundered in outraged dissent.
denounced "the mad edict of a despotic m a j o r i t y . T h e

The Courier

Gazette raged

at "the most flagrant and outrageous usurpations that were ever heard
of in any c o u n t r y . T h e

Patriot attacked the oath of obedience (a

reflection of Stuart's reasoning) attached

to the ordinance, calling

it a "mockery of justice" and "a violation of the liberty of con
science."^^

They all disliked Governor Hamilton's recommendation that

the legislature organize a homeguard of 12,000 men.

It was, the

seething Gazette said, a contumelious reproach; a proclamation so
insolent as to "harmonize with the acknowledged attributes of an
Eastern despot, haughtily addressing his s l a v e s . T h e

Patriot and

Courier detected a conspicuous inconsistency in the nullificationist
camp; it had promised the state a "peaceful remedy.

^ ^Mercury, Oct. 3, Nov. 1, 2, 10, 13, 14, 15, 16, 1832.
The
convention in which Stuart was so interested was the Nullification
Convention.
S ^Ibid.. Nov. 29, 1832.
5 4çourier, Nov. 29, Dec. 5, 7, 1832.
^ ^Gazette, Nov. 26, 29, 1832.
S Gpatriot, Nov. 24, 27, 28, Dec. 7, 1832.
^ ^Gazette, Nov. 30, Dec. 1, 1832.
^^Courier, Nov. 30, 1832; Patriot, Nov.

30, 1832.
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But the Mercury was seldom worsted in a war of w o r d s .

Stuart

rejoiced at the adoption of the ordinance and defended the governor.
Hamilton's action, he said, was merely a defensive precaution, and prob
ably an unnecessary one.

It was desirable, nonetheless.

Jackson's

first message on the subject, if not altogether to Stuart's liking,
seemed to bear out his confident predictions of a limited federal re
action.

But on December 10 the President issued a proclamation, the

forceful nationalism of which was all too clear to Stuart.

South Caro

lina's "vain provisions! ineffectual restrictions!" and "vile pro
fanation of oaths !" would not be tolerated by a government which hoped
that "the Great Ruler of Nations" had chosen it "as the only means of
attaining the high destinies to which we may reasonably aspire."

The

pious nature of its closing sentences did nothing to moderate the tone
of the Mercury's indignant response.

This obnoxious "manifesto" was

the edict of a "dictator," a "usurper" of the style of Caesar, Crom
well, and Bonaparte, but of an "inferior spirit."

Evil aides "behind

the dictator's throne," including one "juggling miscreant" named Van
Buren, bore much of the blame for such an outrageous proceeding.

It

would excite "no other feelings than those of defiance and scorn" in
the breast of "every free man worthy of the name" and nothing could
be "better calculated to confirm the resistance of South Carolina.
Intensifying his earlier appeals for support outside the state,
Stuart was no more disturbed by dissenting declarations from the Vir
ginia, Georgia, and Alabama legislatures than by official silence from

5% e r c u r y . Dec. 1, 5, 10, 12, 17, 19, 20, 21, 28, 1832.
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other southern states.

Reports of public meetings and from editors

seemed to offset these apparent setbacks.
sential anyway.

State unity was more es

Rejoicing that the majority of Carolinians stood be

hind the "cause," the Mercury noted rising militia enrollments which
exceeded "the whole number of votes polled for the State Rights Ticket
at the triumphant election . . . of . . . last fall."

Supporters of

South Carolina's Union party stood accused of betraying "their country"
and of fomenting "violence and civil war" for partisan political ad
vantage.

Heaping opprobrium upon the heads of the Courier, Patriot,

and Gazette, Stuart labelled them "creatures" of the "Administration"
with w h o m the whole threat of a military confrontation had been ar
ranged.

But while its verbal attack continued unabated, developments

outside South Carolina caused the Mercury to favor, at least tempo
rarily, a policy of restraint.

There were proposals in Congress to

modify the tariff, and the Virginia legislature was moving for com
promise.

Even Jackson manifested signs of constitutionalism when, on

January 16, 1833, he asked Congress for additional powers with which
he proposed to subdue South Carolina.

This, Stuart said, at least was

a departure from the arbitrary procedure of the proclamation.

And

five days later, on January 21, his newspaper moved to defer the en
forcement of nullification.^^
The adoption of Clay's compromise tariff bill seemed to es
tablish the wisdom of this watchful waiting.

Although Stuart ob

jected to even the compromise measure (the reduction was too gradual

GOlbid., No. 14, Dec. 4, 6, 11, 12, 13, 14, 17-21, 28, 1832;
Jan. 3, 4, 5, 7, 9, 14, 15, 17, 21, 23, 31, Feb. 2, 5-9, 14, 16,
Mar. 4, 6, 1833.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

71
and the final duty too h i g h ) , he hailed it as a triumph of "the good
old cause."

He also viewed it as a partial surrender of the protective

principle.His

Unionist rival, the Patriot, was completely disgusted

by this point of view.
editor.

"The Mercury is incorrigible," sighed the rival

"We shall have to give up that print in d e s p a i r . B u t

Stuart

had more important enemies upon w h o m to vent his spleen than the editor
of the Patriot.

On the same day that Clay's bill passed the Congress,

that body gave the President authority to enforce the revenue laws in
nullifying states.
The Mercury's mood of moderate satisfaction with the tariff
compromise did not include the Force Bill.

From the first introduc

tion of that measure the editor spoke of it with a loathing undis
guised.

This "Bill of Blood" threatened "the very existence of these

states as States";

the Force Bill would determine "whether the func

tionaries at Washington are to be a limited agency or despotic rulers,
..."

Stuart charged.

.

Proposing the creation of an "unconstitutional

tyranny" its adoption would be reason enough for South Carolina to
leave the u n i o n . T h e Mercury had sounded First Call.
For a time its editor tended to mute this extreme position.
During just a few days in March it seemed to him that the slightly dis
guised joint passage of the tariff compromise and Force Bill made the
latter no more than an "ebullition of spleen."

It is possible that his

brother-in-law, Robert Barnwell Ehett, was even then influencing Mercury

Gl l b i d ., Jan. 14, 16, 29, Feb. 2, 19, 20, 22, Mar. 5, 1833.
^ ^Patriot, July 25, 1833.
^^Mercury, Mar. 5, 1833.
G^lbid., Jan. 21, 25, 28, 29, Feb. 26, 28, 1833.
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policy, for only four days later the paper reverted to her original
position.

Because of the Force Bill, South Carolina had no "honorable

obligations" to accept the tariff compromise.
destroyed "the character of the compromise."

Indeed the Force Bill
But since the Conven

tion nullified the Force Bill even as it authorized the collection of
the modified tariff, Stuart accepted and defended the action.

It was

a pale defense; the Mercury would have preferred a "more qualified"
endorsement of the new law.^^

Exhausted, perhaps by the vigorous

battle, the paper then took "a tolerably long vacation from political
essays."66
In an effort to strengthen the State Rights party in the fall
elections, the summer issues of 1833 were given over to reviewing the
controversy with Washington.

Proving the effectiveness of this cam

paign, the Nullifiers swept the city offices, Henry Laurens Pinckney
went to Congress, and a Mercury-endorsed man took his seat in the
General Assembly.

Similar results in the Upcountry put the Nullifiers

in good position for the fierce domestic fight left in the wake of the
w a r with Washington.6?
The Nullification Ordinance had required that all state

G^ i bid., Mar. 5, 11, 19, Apr. 10, 1833. While Rhett, a dele
gate to the convention, reluctantly agreed to repeal the ordinance,
he saw no "cause for congratulation and triumph" in the action.
Nor
would he endorse a proposal to express South Carolina's "ardent attach
ment to the Union" (White, R hett, 26-28.
Stuart did not take kindly
to suggestions that Rhett had any influence over the paper.
Mercury,
June 29, Aug. 27, 1838).
6&Mercury, May 25, 1833.
The "vacation" may have been a tacti
cal disengagement dictated by unease within the state.
6 ^Ibld., June 4, 19, July 4, 13, 20, Aug. 23, Sept. 2-5, 1833.
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office-holders swear paramount allegiance to South Carolina.

When the

convention repealed the ordinance, this oath was also rescinded.

But

the bitter opposition of the Nullifiers to the Force Bill merged with
their suspicion of the Unionists to revive the question of allegiance.
Renewing their support for an oath similar to the one required by the
ordinance, the Nullifiers ran headlong into vigorous Unionist opposition.
After much wrangling the convention compromised the issue by reviving
the oath but leaving its phrasing to the judgment of the naxt legis
lature.

Quickly defining their positions, the Courier and Patriot de

nounced the proposed oath with almost as much venom as the Mercury had
attacked the Force Bill.

Predictably, the Mercury supported the oath.^®

By late November, however, Stuart had changed his mind.

Urging

that the oath be discarded lest the Unionists cry "persecution," he
reasoned that the Unionist party would be weakened without this issue.
Rejecting Stuart’s advice, the General Assembly passed a bill which re
quired an immediate oath of militia officers and drafted a constitutional
amendment requiring one for civil officials.

Purposefully vague in its

phrasing, the oath provided "that I will be faithful and true allegi
ance bear to the State of South Carolina; and that I will support and
maintain . . . the laws and constitution of this state and the United
States.

..."

The ambiguous nature of this pledge was meant to re

assure the Unionists.

But the Mercury, renouncing its brief caution,

said what the oath left unsaid;
It does not define, but requires allegiance:— and

G8patriot, Mar. 9, 11, 21, 1833; Courier, Apr. 9-20, 1833;
Mercury, Mar. 11-13, 15, 20, Apr. 11, 13, 19, 22, 24, 1833.
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that is enough.
The minority . . . may quibble
and shape its interpretation to their desires;
but the rest of the State know . . . that simple
allegiance means paramount duty to the State.
The opposition press agreed, as did their readers the Unionists.

The

Patriot and Courier, seething with denunciations, rivaled the Mercury's
record for censuring oppressions.^®

It was "a measure of odious tyranny,"

said the Courier, "inconsistent . . . with federal obligations."^^

In

protest Unionists held local meetings and scheduled a party convention
for Greenville.
The Mercury was moved to prove its sense of humor by such do
ings.

Laughing at the local meetings, the editor was especially amused

by the "Fee Faw Fum Convention" in Greenville.

It was curious to see

defiance in a group so ready to submit to overbearing fédérais, said
Stuart.

Dismissing the whole affair as a move on the part of the ad

ministration to obscure its blunders, Stuart was less amused when dis
affected Unionists brought suit to test the oath before the Court of
Appeals.72

This body consisted of two Unionists and one Nullifier.^^

The editor declared that the Court, being a subordinate agency of the
state, could not rule upon actions of the sovereign convention.
it ruled anyway, Stuart's mirth vanished altogether.

^^Mercury, Nov.

When

By a two to one

23, 26, Dec. 9, 1833.

7®Courier, Patriot, Jan. - May, 1834, passim.
^^Courier, Jan.

27, 1834.

7% e r c u r y , Feb.

24, Apr. 2-5, 29, May 7,

12, 1834.

7^The Unionist judges were Joseph Johnson and J. B. O'Neall.
William Harper was the Nullifier (Freehling, Prelude, 317).
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decision, the '"subservient agency of Federal usurpation" concluded that
the convention had exceeded its powers.

It had been called merely to

determine the fate of the Nullification Ordinance; new oaths were a
matter for constitutional amendment.

The Patriot's and Courier's

satisfaction with this ruling was exceeded by the Mercury's disgust.
Urging that the next General Assembly move to reform the judiciary,
Stuart declared that such action would prevent any more judges from
betraying"their country.
The Mercury spent the summer campaigning for a proper assembly,
one which would foil "all the efforts of the Union Party, of Union
Conventions and Union Judges."

Stuart called for men who would defeat

"consolidation," and destroy "federal usurpation" along with Jackson's
arbitrary u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m . S t a n d i n g firmly for "Union, liberty
and Equal R i g h t s t h e

Courier threw its weight behind the

Unionists.

After a campaign characterized by vicious insult and threats of re
bellion in the mountains, the Nullifiers won decisively in the city,
carried the local legislative delegation and sent Pinckney back to
Congress.
Results were little different elsewhere.

State Rights men

received a two-thirds majority in the Assembly where they promptly
passed the amendment authorizing an oath of allegiance to the state.^7

7^Courier, June 4, 1834; Patriot, June 4, 5, 1834; Mercury,
June 5, 12, 13, 1834.
7^Mercury, June 5, 24, Aug. 11, 12, 21, Sept. 9, 11, Oct. 1, 10,
11, 1834.
7^Courier, Oct. 13, 1834.
77ibid., Sept. 3, Oct. 16, 1834; Jan. 1, 1835; Mercury, Sept. 1,
3, 7, 9, Oct. 6, 15, 30, 1834.
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Moving to prevent another clash with the Unionists, the victorious
Nullifiers declared, however, that the oath meant only "the allegiance
which every citizen owes to the state consistently with the Constitu
tion of the United States."

As a further concession to the outnumbered

but vocal Unionists, the assembly dropped Stuart's proposed treason bill.^®
By this time both Nullifiers and Unionists were beginning to un
derstand that political division was a luxury that South Carolina could
not afford.

Speaking for Lowcountry Unionism, the Courier accepted the

olive branch preferred b y the General Assembly.

Then as Calhoun moved

to re-establish unity by taking personal command of state politics, the
Mercury joined its rival to hail the return of political peace.

Although

Stuart shared the Courier's wish for "quiet and repose," he doubtless ex
pected little of either in the years ahead.

Privy to the counsels of

state leaders, the editor knew that his real enemy lay outside South
Carolina and that the battle, "far from being over," had only just be
gun.

^M e r c u r y , Dec. 6-18, 1834.
The apparent ease with which the
General Assembly resolved this crisis is deceptive.
The long battle over
nullification h ad left South Carolina bitterly divided.
During the con
frontation with the general government, the Nullifiers' position had been
threatened not only by Jackson from without but by a Unionist military
force (some 8,000 strong) from within the state.
Clay's compromise bill
eased them out of a very tight spot.
It was primarily this "treason" at
home that caused the Nullifiers strongly to support the test oath.
But
the Upcountry Unionists who had accounted for most of the military force
during the actual crisis, would have nothing to do with such an oath.
Threatening an armed uprising they caused James L. Petigru to predict a
"border war" in response to the passage of the bill.
His unease was
shared by the Mercury w h e n it spoke of "butcherly preparations" in the
Upcountry.
This resurrected crisis caused the Nullifiers to divide into
a radical and a conservative wing; it was the latter who worked with the
more peacefully inclined Lowcountry Unionists to effect the second comrpromise in December (Mercury, May 21, 22, 30, June 2, 3, 6, 7, 1834;
Freehling, P r e lude, 278, 279, 312-322).
Courier, Dec. 11, 1832; Mercury, Dec. 11, 1834; Coit,
Calhoun, 258.
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CHAPTER III

THE ONE GREAT CAUSE

In the light of after events it is hard to believe
how calm and confident those thirty years were.
The great questions of the day were vehemently dis
cussed in Congress and in the State legislatures,
but the people at large never dreamed of the dis
ruption of the Union, still less of the possibility
of war.
Many of the Union men had, after the nulli
fication compromise, been sent to Congress or ap
pointed to office at home, and the result was har
mony .^
So reads the reminiscence of one of the Mercury's readers.

Harriott

Horry Rutledge Ravenel, "a great lady of the Old South" and greatgrand-daughter of Eliza Lucas, grew up very happily during those years
from 1830 to 1860.

Like the Mercury's editor, Mrs. Ravenel stood for

and with all those who defended ante-bellum Carolina Orthodoxy.
It is not insignificant that in 1832, the year of Mrs. Rav
enel 's birth, her great-aunt published a political catechism in de
fense of State Rights later described by the younger woman as "a
wonderfully clear and forcible exposition of that f a i t h . B u t
own main interests were other than political.

her

In combination with her

^Ravenel, Charles ton, 458.
^Malone, ed., D A B , XV, 395; Ravenel, Charleston, 320-23.
3Ravenel, Charleston, 320; Maria Henrietta Pinckney, The Quin
tessence of Long Speeches— Arranged as a Political Catechism By A L a d y ,
For Her God-Daughter (Charleston, 1830).
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youth, those interests prevented her from seeing the critical under
currents that made for the resolution of the extreme positions to which
she refers— a resolution that was sometimes more apparent than real.
Neither could she note the analysis of the situation in 1833 of a
fellow Carolinian, the retiring Vice President of the United States.
"The struggle, far from being over," he wrote after the convention ses
sion, "has just commenced."^
The death of Robert Turnbull in April, 1833, gave Calhoun the
opportunity of making this view public. Turnbull's passing "in the
strength of his manhood . . . was a shock to all," said Mrs. Ravenel.
Some months after his "immense" funeral,5 the Nullifiers invited Cal
houn to be the principal speaker at a memorial service for this author
of The Crisis.

Coming from Fort Hill, Calhoun spoke first on the

morning of November 22.

Since the scene for this address was St.

Phillip's churchyard, it would have been inappropriate for the speaker
to deal too frankly with political issues.

The ubiquitous subject of

politics was reserved for a second speech delivered on that evening in
a more secular arena.

There Calhoun told a large and enthusiastic audi

ence that nullification had lowered the tariff but had also produced
the Force Bill.

". . . Under the fostering encouragement of that

Bill," he said, "Emancipation Societies had sprung up like mushrooms.""
With a united voice the South must "plainly announce to their Northern
brethren that either the bill or the political connexion must yield.

^Quoted in Coit, Calhoun, 258.
^Ravenel, Charleston, 457.
^Mercury, Nov. 25, 27, 1833; Freehling, Prelude, 325-26,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

79
Calhoun had neither given up on the Union nor was he identi
fying the Force Bill as the main enemy.

The enemy was clearly the

Abolitionists and they must be stopped, he told his audience.

He now

felt that a southern convention offered the best chance to destroy the
Abolitionists and along with them the Force Bill.

Other Carolinians

such as Thomas Cooper viewed a convention as the forerunner of seces
sion but Calhoun thought it the best means of assuring the permanence
of the Union.

In a call that he would sound repeatedly, Calhoun told

the agitated Charlestonians that South Carolina and the whole of the
South must put aside all domestic divisions and stand united in the
face of an aggressive enemy.
however.

His appeal went temporarily unheeded,

Carolinians were still embroiled in the test oath contro

versy, and most other Southerners were tired of hearing about South
Carolina.

In one sense a still partially divided state elected to go

it alone again.

While Calhoun maneuvered his forces to heal the scars

left by the nullification fight, a new crusade was launched.

This time

the campaign would be a public and frank defense of slavery, one de
signed not only to destroy Abolitionists abroad but to convert whatever
Carolinians who still wondered about the justice of the institution.^
The Mercury had already launched the new crusade.

During the

summer and fall of 1833, it gave as one of its defenses for nullifica
tion the necessity of protecting the "peculiar institution."

By

^Freehling, Prelude, 325-26; Charles M. Wiltse, John C . Cal
houn Sectionalist, 1840-1850 (New York, 1951), 51-59, hereinafter
cited as Wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist. Whatever of Mrs. Ravenel's
"harmony" existed in the post-nullification decade was largely the re
sult of Calhoun's effort to heal the breach between Nullifiers and
Unionists.
By 1842 his strategy had generally succeeded and, at least
on the subject of slavery. South Carolina stood as one in the face of
all comers (See below, I V).
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comparison with the tariff, slavery was "not a question of freedom,
but of existence," wrote one contributor.

The Mercury reported for

mer editor Pinckney's speech of July fourth in which he warned that
abolitionism was spreading at the North and that the South must prepare
her defense against it.

Already on record with his defense, Stuart

took second place to none in maintaining it.

Contending that slavery—

far from being evil— was a positive good, the editor insisted that it
made for the superiority of southern civilization.

Carrying the cam

paign into 1834, Stuart reminded his readers of labor unrest at the
North and of the unsettling troubles caused by emancipation in the
British West Indies.

Southerners must countenance no "Northern in

termeddling" with their own institution "whatever," he cautioned.
It was not enough that reformers at the North "disclaim the idea of
immediate abolition.

. . .

They must," Stuart said, "abandon all idea

of abolition and cease to agitate the subject at all.

..."

Inter

ference with slavery by private persons would require "summary and
exemplary punishment," while any such action on the part of the general
government "would cause the dissolution of the Union."

It is not sur

prising that the Mercury reported on Calhoun's address with favor.®
Nor is it surprising that this Lowcountry voice of Calhoun
again led the Charleston press in blazing new paths.

The Patriot and

Courier, hastening to declare their firm support of all things Southern,
nonetheless felt that Pinckney's speech "cruelly slandered" the North

®Mercury, Mar. 4, 26, May 8, 16, 31, June 22, July 3, 6, 11,
21, 22, 30, 31, Aug. 1, Sept. 17, 22, 27, Oct. 21, Nov. 6, 12, 13,
Dec. 11, 1833; July 21, 31, Aug. 22, 1834; Henry L. Pinckney, An Ora
tion delivered . . . Before the State Rights and Free Trade Party . .
on the 4th of July, 1833 (Charleston, 1833).
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with deliberate misrepresentations.

More dangerous, however, was

his "unnecessary agitation of exciting topics."

There were still those

who feared domestic commotion from an open discussion of slavery.

But

if the Mercury contemptuously dismissed the Courier as being incon
sistent and rejected the Patriot's "slanderous and pompous" charges,
even it was obliged to declare for caution.

"Enough has been done to

put the people on their guard, and to continue the discussion may do
evil," said the editor.

The South must and would "speak by action . . .

not by words."9
There were other matters for the Mercury to dispute with its
rivals during 1834.

The heated controversy raging over the test oath

provoked the usual exchanges of insults and bald denunciations between
e

d

i

t

o

r

s

.

gut the fight over how and to wh o m Carolinians should pledge

their faith was overshadowed by events in the summer of 1835.

These

events not only restored the slavery issue to editorial columns, they
produced a virtual unanimity of opinion among Charleston's newspaper
presses.

Thus the crusade to unite in defense of slavery gained force.
On July 29, 1835, the northern mails— swollen with "incendiary

publications" dispatched by the American Antislavery Society of New
York— arrived in Charleston.

Alfred Huger, the Charleston postmaster

(and a Unionist) was confronted with a situation pressing in its im
mediacy.

He described it to Samuel L. Gouveneur, the New York post

master;

^Patriot. July 5, 18, 19, 20, 31, 1833; Courier. July 16, 24,
25, 26, Aug. 3, 5, 6, 8, 10, 1833; M e r c u r y . July 6, 25, 31, Aug. 5,
7, 1833.

10See above, 72-76.
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The most respectable men of all gather'd about our
doors and windows and in a little time I was for
mally summoned to give up the incendiary publica
tions , . . and at the same [time] told with very
little ceremony that they would be taken from me,
if I did not.
The purpose of his letter was to request Gouveneur to segregate future
southbound mail according to content, labeling all bags containing
abolitionist tracts as " S u s p i c i o u s . M e a n w h i l e , Huger had sent an
urgent letter to the Postmaster General requesting instructions as to
the disposition of the offending tracts.

His concern was anything

but premature since the City Guard had already dispersed a mob out
side the postoffice.

Huger's letter was hardly processed, however,

before a "few gentlemen" moved under cover of darkness into the build
ing and confiscated the source of all the excitement.
burned before a large crowd on the next

The tracts were

e v e n i n g .

Fairly blazing with outrage the Mercury condemned the distribu
tion of these "seditious pamphlets."

Although Stuart agreed with Rob

ert Y. Hayne and others of the gentry, Nullifier and Unionist, that the
mob's action was premature, his mood can in no way be described as
cautious.

Even though "the sensible and educated" people of the North

condemned the "demented abolitionists," they too looked to the suppres
sion of slavery.

But abolition could be secured only by "overwhelming

force" and "at the sacrifice of millions of lives of Southern and
Northern white men."

If "our professed friends at the North" would

llpreehling. Prelude, 340; Frank Otto Gatell, ed., "Post
master Huger and the Incendiary Publications," S.C.H.M., LXIV, No. 4
(Oct., 1963), 194-95.
^^Freehling, Prelude, 340-41.
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not destroy "this Hell b o m monster," raged the M ercury, Southerners
themselves must take "decided . . . action" to convince Northerners
of their responsibility.

Stuart reported approvingly of Abolitionists

coming to violent ends in Aiken and Orangeburg and warned that all such
folk "among us" would "meet the fate of Pirates, Spies and Outlaws as
certainly as they merit it."

It was apparent that as between popular

passions and abolitionism, Stuart feared more from the latter.

So

enthusiastic in their general agreement were the Courier and Patriot
that Stuart proposed to make them "honorary members of the State
Rights Party, or active members

...

if they prefer it."^^

By August 1, three days after the arrival of the tracts and two
days after their destruction. Charleston was still in turmoil.

The

"undivided population . . . Nullifiers and Union men, Jackson . . .
and Clay men. Van Buren . . . and White, men who differ on all other
points" agreed that the mails should not be used to promote insurrec
tion.

The harassed Postmaster said that he would do all in his power

to prevent further excesses but that it would be impossible "to re
strain the universal indignation that pervaded all classes.

..."

In a public emergency meeting attended by an "ample representation
of the property, respectability and intelligence of

Charleston,

^% e r c u r y , July 27, 29, 30, 31, Aug. 4, 5, 10, 11, 19, 21, 25,
26, 31, Sept. 1, 2, 4, 9, 12, 14, 15, 21, 23, 24, 28, Oct. 1, 6, 7,
13, 14, 20, Nov. 3, Dec. 1, 24, 1835; Courier, Aug. 12, 13, 14, 15, 20,
22, Sept. 28, 1835; Patriot, July 29, Aug. 11, 13, Sept. 5, 8, 22,
Nov. 19, 1835.
For the first time the Courier and Patriot joined the
Mercury in threatening disunion.
l^Alfred Huger to Samuel L. Gouveneur, Aug. 1, 1835, quoted in
Gatell, "Postmaster Huger," S.C.H.M., LXIV., No. 4 (Oct., 1963), 19596; Patriot, Aug. 4, 1835; Courier, Aug. 4-6, 1835.
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the city council appointed a special committee and invested it with
the extraordinary power of ruling the horrified and furious city.

This

committee met incoming steamboats and escorted the mails to the postoffice.

It assured the public that no abolitionist tracts would be de

livered and kept watch and ward over the black population, slave and
free.

Strangers entering the city found themselves regarded with vigi

lant suspicions, and mobs roamed the streets ready to inflict their own
particular brand of justice at a moment's notice.

For one week this

extraordinary committee presided over by Robert Y. Hayne ruled the
city while an unhappy Huger urged that:
the question of slavery be decided elsewhere than
in the P.O. where the Post-Master himself is a
Slave holder, and cannot believe it sinful without
convicting his own soul and his own ancestors for
five generations.
Relief was not long in coming.

Gouveneur, in New York, was

no stranger to the problems of slavery— his wife was a Virginian.

He

resolved to forward no more of the objectionable pamphlets until the
Postmaster General could be heard from.l^

Acting with dispatch, that

official, with Jackson's approval, authorized Huger to suppress such
of the mails as might incite insurrection.

Thus reassured by the quick

action of the Post Office Department, Charleston gradually settled into
a somewhat uneasy calm.

Hayne's committee restored the authority of

15preehling, Prelude, 341; Huger to Gouveneur, Aug. 8, 1835,
quoted in Gatell, "Postmaster Huger," S. C. Magazine, LXIV, No. 4
(Oct. 1963), 198.
l^Gouveneur to Huger, Aug. 8, 1835, quoted in Gatell, "Post
master Huger," S.C.H.M., LXIV, No. 4 (Oct., 1963), 199.
Gouveneur
marked his letter private and asked Huger not to make its contents
public knowledge.
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the city council, but vigilante groups continued to assist in the
maintenance of all that was right and proper until late fall.

Letters

reflecting great anxiety poured steadily into the Mercury's offices
from August through December.

The concern of the paper's contribu

tors may have sometimes been influenced by the knowledge that the Post
master General was not legally empowered to authorize censorship of the
mail.

Because he was not, the issue came up in the next session of

Congress.
In his annual message Jackson denounced antislavery tracts as
"unconstitutional and wicked" and called upon Congress to prohibit
"the circulation in the Southern States through the mail, of incen
diary publications intended to instigate the slaves to insurrection.
Calhoun was quick to speak in opposition to the President's proposal.
Praising Jackson for his stand against the hated propaganda, Calhoun
warned that Jackson's proposal would devolve too much power on Con
gress.

If Congress could decide what mails are incendiary and thus

"prohibit their circulation," it could also "determine what are not
incendiary, and . . . enforce their circulation."

A bill of the sort

proposed by Jackson to control the Abolitionists would "virtually . . .
clothe Congress with the power to abolish slavery."

Calhoun proposed

instead that the states be authorized to censor the mails.

When both

proposals were defeated, neither South Carolina nor the Mercury was

l^Freehling, Prelude, 341-42; Mercury, Aug.-Dec. 1835, passim.
^^James D. Richardson, A Compilation of the Messages and Papers
of the Presidents, 1798-1902 (11 vols; Washington, 1897-1909), II,
1394-95.
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reassured by the result.
Especially irritating to most antislavery men, abolitionist or
otherwise, was the "peculiar institution's" presence in the nation's
capital.

For some years before the dispute over mail, various anti

slavery groups had been petitioning Congress to abolish both the trade
and the institution in Washington.

The petitions were invariably re

ferred to committee and forgotten.

By 1836 this was no longer satis

factory to Calhoun whose strategy, as outlined three years before in
Charleston, called for the Abolitionists to be met head-on.

Denoun

cing the petitions as a "gross, false, and malicious slander" of the
southern states, the Carolinian demanded their outright rejection.

In

the vigorous debate that followed, the Senate managed ultimately to
solve the problem by avoiding the issue.

Thereafter when reception

of an abolitionist petition was proposed to the upper chamber,
proposal was regularly tabled.

the

If this solution did not entirely

satisfy Calhoun, it was considerably more to his liking than was the
decision reached by the House on this question.
Speaking for the Calhoun forces in the lower house, James H.
Hammond denounced the petitions presented to that body and called for
their rejection.

While Calhoun was making his battle in the Senate,

the House debated Hammond's proposal for over six weeks.

Calhoun's

old rival. Vice President Martin Van Buren, grew daily more concerned
at the impasse lest his followers be obliged to take one or the other

19

Richard K. Cralle, e d . , Works of John C. Calhoun (6 vols.;
New York, 1854-1857) V, 196-97; Wiltse, Calhoun Nullifier, 273-77;
Freehling, Prelude, 346-48.
^^Wiltse, Calhoun Nullifier, 278-80.
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of the extreme positions.

A development of that sort could easily

damage his chances for victory in the forthcoming presidential con
test.

Looking for a compromise that would cut across sectional lines

and break that solid southern phalanx now basic to Calhoun strategy.
Van Buren sought to resolve the dispute.

In what was surely one of the

most ironic developments in ante-bellum South Carolina politics, it
was a Calhoun man— indeed, a former Mercury editor— who accomplished
this feat.
On February 4, 1836, Henry Laurens Pinckney, who had first
committed the Mercury to Calhoun, proposed that "all memorials . . .
praying for abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia . . .
be referred to a select committee.

..."

This committee should be

instructed that Congress had no "authority to interfere in any way with
the Institution of Slavery in any States of the Confederacy and ought
not to interfere with Slavery in the District..

. ."

Not only was

Pinckney compromising on the rejection of petitions, but his resolu
tion also implied that Congress was empowered to abolish slavery in the
capital.

The fact that it questioned the wisdom of any such contingency

was of little comfort to Pinckney's South Carolina associates who were
as surprised as they were d i s p l e a s e d .
Shaken by Pinckney's apparent perfidy, the Calhoun forces re
covered sufficiently to try to effect a change in the errant Congress
man's course.

The extent of their failure was only too clear when in

May the House adopted the following Pinckney proposals : That Congress

ZlReglster of Debates, 24 Cong., 1 Sess., 2482-83; Wiltse,
Calhoun Nullifier, 280-83.
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had no power over slavery in the states; that it would be unwise for
Congress to interfere with slavery in the District; and that all peti
tions relating to slavery or to its abolition should be immediately and
finally tabled.

In the course of one of the many debates that pre

ceded Pinckney’s pyrrhic victory, Hammond coldly notified his col
league of the extent of his treachery :
We deny the power of this House to act upon the subject
at all, and desire to exclude it entirely and forever
from these walls.
My colleague calls upon you to legis
late upon it . . . and I believe the adoption of the
gentleman's plan of settling this controvery will give
[the Union] one of the most fatal blows it has ever re
ceived.
For I assure this House that a Union based upon
the principles of that resolution cannot stand. We can
not give up rights and consent to hold property at your
will.22
The admission that Congress could emancipate slaves in the District of
Columbia meant to South Carolina that the same body could someday do
so elsewhere.

Pinckney had given up the Constitution to "repose . . .

all upon the tender mercies of [the] House.

..."

Hammond might easily have spoken for the whole state.

Since

the postoffice incident of the previous summer, Calhoun's attempts
to reunify the state had proceeded apace.

South Carolina now presented

a solid front, at least to the outside world; in 1836 that front was
turned upon Pinckney.

Shocked and angered, the overwhelming majority

of Carolinians joined James Hamilton, Jr., in assuming that Pinckney
had been seized by "religious fanaticism."

Thomas Cooper wrote venom

ously to Hammond saying that Pinckney's action resulted from his being

22Register of Debates, 224 Cong., 1 Sess., 2495-97; Wiltse,
Calhoun Nullifier, 284.
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tempted by the "immense patronage" used by those in power "upon men
ready to sell themselves."

Hammond said that Pinckney "betrayed us"

and reported that another Carolinian referred to him as "that D...nd
traitor Pinckney."
was over.

All were agreed that Pinckney's political career

Only the belief that his future should be left in the hands

of his constituents saved Pinckney from being denounced at public meet
ings throughout the state.

Occasionally, however, there was a Unionist—

unregenerate still in his loathing for Calhoun— who managed to defend
the former editor.23
The Charleston Mercury, whose allegiance was still where Pinck
ney had first placed it, displayed no less displeasure with its former
editor than did its readers.

Numerous contributors filed lengthy com

plaints of Pinckney's course while the paper itself said that Calhoun's
solution was the correct one for the problem.

Commending the Senator's

proposal to reject the "insolent petitions" outright, the Mercury held
it to be the only proper "Southern ground."

Pinckney had proposed

tabling because "he dreaded the Northern clamor and was afraid of
those w ho would falsely assert that the right of petition was violated,"
said his former paper.

As Calhoun had said in the Senate, the Mercury

clearly understood that a legislative body had as much right to reject
as to accept a petition.

The mere presentation of the memorial "con

summated the exercise of the right of petition," a right that was not

^ % a m i l t o n to Hammond, Feb. 10, 1836, Hayne to William C.
Preston, Feb. 18, 1836, J. H. Adams to Hammond, Mar. 29, 1836, all
quoted in Wiltse, Calhoun Nullifier, 285; Wiltse, Calhoun Nullifier,
284-86; Elizabeth Merritt, James Henry Hammond (Baltimore, 1923), 3738. Pinckney's motive is unclear but he did act in concert with Van
Buren's strategists in the House (Wiltse, Calhoun Nullifier, 283).
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affected by the petition’s acceptance or rejection.

A man of

Pinckney's stripe had neither "firmness or courage enough to rep
resent the South," concluded the Mercury.
The Mercury correctly observed that political results would
follow Pinckney's action.

Through conceding on the District of

Columbia, Pinckney had allowed Van Buren "to retain his antislavery
supporters by dodging the constitutional question."

The repulsive

resolution was either a tacit admission that Congress could emancipate
the District's slaves or "a paltry artifice" that evaded the issue.
Calhoun's speech in Charleston during the autumn of 1833 had auth
orized neither approach, the loyal editor perhaps remembered.

Nor

did the editor give his predecessor credit for having said that Con
gress could not interfere with slavery in the states.

Even the Abol-

oc
itionists admitted that.
Pinckney's "lengthened windings" and "voluminous appeals" in
defense of his conduct merely increased the Mercury's irritation.

Con

tending that his was the only solution that could be adopted, Pinckney
pointed with pride to the majority with which his proposals passed the
House."

". . . A majority purchased by weak and treacherous conces

sions" that ". . . was worse than a thousand vote defeats," the Mer
cury retorted.

"Mr. Pinckney first broke our phalanx," to commence "a

recreant retreat," said the editor.

But most ominous of all, Stuart

^M e r c u r y , Peb. 14, 22, Sept. 6,7, 1836; Wiltse, Calhoun Nulli
fier, 280; Capers, Calhoun: Opportunist, 183.
Calhoun contended that
the right of petition consisted only of the right of presenting a peti
tion.
If the prayer of the petitioners was unconstitutional, it could
be refused on that ground without damage to the right to present.
^^Mercury, Feb. 14, 15, 23, Mar. 3, 16, May 25, 1836.
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charged his predecessor with disloyalty to Calhoun.

With this remark

the fate of Charleston’s "misrepresentative In Congress" was sealed
and the Mercury read Pinckney out of the State Rights party.

On Oc

tober 4, 1836, the paper quoted the Columbia Telescope to prove that
Henry Laurens Pinckney was no less unpopular In the Upcountry than
William Lloyd Garrison.
The peculiar Institution made for equally peculiar alliances
In the fall elections.

Hugh Swlnton LeGare the Unionist candidate who

only three years before had "prayed that . . . the Union party would
. . . swear that [the Test Oath] should never be enforced but at the
point of the bayonet"— received the reluctant endorsement of the
State Rights party.

He was "safe" on slavery, the Mercury reported.

Pinckney, retaining much of his popularity with the "mechanics,"
ran on "the Independent Republican" ticket.

According to the Mercury,

his narrow defeat at the hands of LeGare was the state’s "rebuke" to
the "late Representative for deserting It."^^
Never one to forget an adversary, the Mercury again condemned
Pinckney when the petitions appeared In the next Congress.

Nor did It

neglect that "eccentric old showman, John Q. Adams," whose friends
seemed "resolved to . . . experiment on their prediction that the
South could not be kicked out of the Union.

Z^Ibld.. Feb. 14, 22, Mar. 3, 4, 16, Apr. 8, 15, May 12, 21, 25,
Aug. 26, 29, Sept. 1, 2, 6, 7, 12, 16, 20, 24, 26, Oct. 1, 5, 7, 10, 18,
1836.
Pinckney’s stand was frequently discussed In the paper from Feb
ruary through October, 1836.
2 7lbld.. Sept. 22, 24, 26, 29, Oct. 1, 3, 5-7, 12-15, 18, 1836;
LeGare to Isaac E. Holmes, Apr. 8, 1833 In Mary S. Legare, ed.. Writ
ings of Hugh Swlnton LeGare. . . . (2 vols.; Charleston, 1846), I,
207-15.
^% e r c u r y , Jan. 2, 4, 16, 20, 23, 28, Feb. 4, 13-15, 20, 1837.
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Slavery was a subject that colored the Mercury’s view of
foreign as well as domestic affairs.

Bringing wo r d of Santa Anna's

defeat in Texas, "Glorious News" reminded Stuart that Texas, independent
or part of the American Union, was populated by slaveholders who would
"insure the stability of Southern institutions."

The editor was un

certain as to which course Texans should follow.

Both they and the

South might be better off with a Texas "untramelled by Northern con
nexions."

Stuart did advocate prompt recognition of the new nation,

however, and denounced Jackson for delaying action.29
The "high handed proceedings of the British authorities" in
emancipating slaves from American coasting vessels forced by heavy
weather into Bermuda and Nassau channelled more of the editor's atten
tion to slavery.

These "outrages on American property" furnished "much

more legitimate grounds of war" than the five million dollars claimed
from France for damages to American shipping before the War of 1812.
Denouncing Jackson's "menacing language" to France, Stuart said that
war with France over the spoilation claims would be "one of the great
est calamities to which the country could possibly be exposed."

Dis

ruption of the European trade, certain to follow with a war, would aid
northern manufacturers "at Southern expense.

29 Ibi d ., No. 12, 1835; May 2, 18, June 1, Nov. 30, Dec. 3, 20,
22, 29,1836.
Stuart urged Americans to volunteer "quietly and pri
vately to the standard of State Rights in Texas." Public demonstrations
to raise troops would, he felt, compromise American neutrality (ibid.,
Nov. 12, 1835).
^^ I b i d ., Mar. 19, June 18, Oct. 18, Dec. 13, 17, 1834; Jan. 21,
22, Mar. 2, 9, 13, 16, 17, Apr. 9, June 3, 16, July 18, 23, Nov. 18,
26, Dec. 16, 1835; Jan. 1, 12, 13, 14, 25, 26, 29, Feb. 3, 11, 15, 20,
22, Mar. 1, 2, 1836.
Calhoun opposed war with France for the same
reasons.
Nor should it be forgotten that he and Clay were allies from
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The Mercury's loyalty to slavery did not prevent its attack
ing slaveholders.

Georgia and Alabama got little sympathy from Stuart

in their dispute with the general government over Indian lands.

Jab

bing at Georgia's governor, the paper accused him of quieting the dis
pute "at the very . . . time during the late crisis . . .
fair field for the North against Carolina nullification."

to leave a
Since Jack

son did not "consider the Judiciary a part of his government" Georgians
could evidently nullify when Carolinians could not.^l
The slaveholder Jackson came under almost constant attack.

De

claring that although the Mercury opposed the Bank of the United States
on constitutional grounds, Stuart held that Jackson's removal of the
government's deposits from the bank was both high-handed and ruinous. The
administration proposed to substitute a "stock jobbing monopoly" for
the recently destroyed "manufacturing monopoly."

Van Buren's Wall

Street friends would especially profit from ". . . the same robbery
to which the minority States were subjected by the American system through
the medium of duties on their imports," which would "now . . .

be ef

fected by placing the whole currency of the Union at the mercy of a
faction and its tools.

..."

Charging that nothing good would come

from "pet" banks, the editor predicted that the "whole mercantile commur
nity of the Union" would suffer.

Cotton prices would fall and the

government itself would suffer a drastic reduction in revenue.

There

1833-1837 (Wiltse, Calhoun Nullifier, 251-53; Capers, Calhoun : Oppor
tunist, 169-88).
Stuart even praised Clay for his part in the War of
1812, the Missouri Compromise, and the Tariff Compromise of 1833.
^^Mercury, July 2, Oct. 2, 3, 11, 14, 16, 17, 19, 28, 30,
Nov. 8, 12, 15, Dec. 2, 1833; Jan. 11, Nov. 28, 1834.
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was evidently no limit to "the monstrous stretch of power which the
executive had perpetuated."^^
The removal of those deposits created an inflationary con
dition that even the administration desired to halt.

A result of

revenue from the tariff and the sale of public lands, the government
surplus, was expected to reach $30,000,000 by 1836.

Aware of the

danger inherent in entrusting this much money to the banks of po
litical favorites, Jackson's followers wished to deplete this surplus.
For once Jackson and Calhoun found themselves in agreement; the money
must be dispersed.

32lbid., Sept. 25, 30, Oct. 3, 5, 8, 14, 21, Nov. 2, 4,
Dec. 2, 1833; Jan. 1, 4, 8, 11, 13, 14, 15, Feb. 10, 12, 22, Mar. 3,
4, Apr. 2, 1834.
Stuart was right in his contention that the de
posit banks would be pets of the administration.
There were three
general selections of banks made prior to the termination of this
policy in 1836.
The first round of choices consisted of seven
northeastern banks, five of which were "friendly" to the adminis
tration.
The second selections were overwhelmingly pro-Jackson while
the third group chosen was geographically determined, its politics
being mixed.
Amos Kendall who was responsible for the choices, said
that "those which are in hands politically friendly will be pre
ferred" (Frank Otto Gatell, "Spoils of the Bank War: Political Bias
in the Selection of Pet Banks," A H R , LXX, No. 1 (Oct., 1964), 35-38.
Stuart's reasoning on executive patronage is another evi
dence of Calhoun's influence on the Mercury. The Senator feared that
spoilsmen in politics would delude the electorate and control elec
tions through patronage.
Democracy, he thought, could not survive
this.
By 1835 he was convinced that Jackson's use of executive
patronage was turning democracy into dictatorship (William W.
Freehling, "Spoilsmen and Interests in the Thought and Career of
John C. Calhoun," Journal of American History, LIT, No. 1 (June,
1965), 25-26, 36, hereinafter cited as J A H . Capers says that on
"most occasions" Calhoun's language was as extreme as "his logic"
on this subject.
Calhoun "never conceived that such rottenness,
such corruption, such abominable violations of trust could . . .
exist. . . .
It exceeded," he told the Senate, "anything in the
history of the rottenest ages of the Roman Empire" (Capers, Calhoun
Opportunist, 172-73).
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Strict construction did not permit outright distribution
of the surplus to the states.

Calhoun proposed to amend the Con

stitution to allow for just such a solution, but the Van Buren fac
tion of the Jackson party would not agree to this.

Aware that southern

and western senators planned to use the federal windfall to finance
trans-Appalachian railroads. Van Buren feared that his political base
in New York would suffer.

If these plans materialized. New York would

lose the monopoly of western transport provided by the Erie Canal.

The

President stood with Van Buren lest the chances for electing his handpicked successor in 1836 be damaged.

But the movement to dispose of

the surplus was too strong for even the administration to resist.

After

much of the usual heated debate and the defeat of numerous alternative
proposals, Calhoun's bill to permit distribution in the form of a loan
to the states was enacted.

The measure enjoyed sc much bipartisan sup

port that Calhoun observed "a complete disorganization of parties for
the present."

Jackson reluctantly signed the measure in 1836.33

Although officially a loan, the transfer of federal money to
the states was called a deposit, but actually amounted to a gift.

Clay

had repeatedly introduced similar measures since 1830, one of which had

3 % i l t s e , Calhoun Nullifier, 263-67.
Calhoun's primary moti
vation to distribute the surplus was certainly the restriction of
executive patronage.
He was, however, strongly of the opinion that
Charleston must become the eastern terminus of a trans-Appalachian
railroad.
This would serve the dual purpose of reviving the de
clining port and tying western prosperity to the South's.
The latter
development would strengthen his defense of the South in Congress by
adding western allies.
In 1836 Robert Y. Hayne attended a railway
convention in Knoxville where the delegates studied proposed routes
across the mountains.
They said that a railroad would make it cheaper
for goods to be imported through Charleston than through New York
(Magdalen Eichert, "John C. Calhoun's Land Policy of Cession," S .C.H.M. ,
LV, No. 4 [Oct., 1954], 198).
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actually passed in 1833 only to be vetoed by Jackson.

Congressman

Pinckney, the Mercury's editor when the first such bill was intro
duced, had not liked the measure and had said so.
sition had not changed by 1836.

Pinckney's po

His attacks on Calhoun's bill pro

voked a strong response from his former paper.
Answering Pinckney argument for argument, the Mercury said that
Calhoun's method of handling excess federal monies would restrain the
growing executive patronage by depriving the President of his "bribery
fund."

Despite the general understanding that the loan would never be

repaid, Stuart defended the Distribution Bill as a loan and denounced
those, namely Pinckney, who called it a "gratuitous donation" to the
states.
The Mercury's editor did not credit arguments that distribution
would cause a depletion of the government's funds and so inspire de
mands to raise the tariff.

The Compromise of 1830 had settled that

issue; furthermore, the excess tariff schedules were responsible for
the surplus.

It was also preferable for the states to profit from

their own contributions rather than see them go into the coffers of
"pet" banks and "favored speculators."
But the most important reason given for the Mercury's support
of the measure was that it prevented "immensely extended patronage and
increased powers" of the executive and so of the general government.
Stuart suggested this matter of patronage as the probable reason for
what he described as the lack of sincerity among Jackson men in their
divided support of distribution.

They voted for it, he said, only b e 

cause they feared to fight "a measure so manifestly due the people."
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Pinckney’s own opposition to the "Deposit Bill” was but further proof
of his abandonment of state rights.
Stuart’s paper made no pretense of impartiality where Jackson
was concerned.

Admitting a tendency to "take an impression against

the President, on the first blush of every controversy in which he is a
party," Stuart charged Jackson with having betrayed his native state.
The Mercury’s enmity extended to issues great and small, including the
rumor that Jackson’s likeness would adorn the figurehead of USS Con
stitution.

"The menials of the President have always placed him be

fore the Constitution," said the Mercury, and none should be surprised
that they would do so again.

If, as was rumored. Harvard College wished

to confer an honorary degree on Jackson there was ample precedent for
such action.

Rabelais’s donkey had received such a distinction long

ago, and a horse had b een made Consul in Rome.
Stuart was especially fond of smearing the "menials," "cooks,"
and "scullions" of Jackson’s "Kitchen Cabinet," employed as they were
in "a system of pickpocket tactics
the meridian of Botany Bay."

[of government] calculated only for

Holding the autocracy of the President
OC

to be comparable only to that of the "Czar of All the Russias,"

the

Mercury w as encouraged by the outcome of several state elections.

34Mercury, Jan. 29, Feb. 20, 1830; Feb. 19, 22, 1831; July 9,
1832; June 30, Aug. 29, Sept. 2, 9, 10, 16, 17, 19, 20, 24, Oct. 1,
4. 1836.
Cla y ’s proposal called for the revenue from the public lands
to be distributed among the states in the form of an outright grant.
35ibid. , July 4, Aug. 5, Oct. 21, 29, 1833; Feb. 3, 12,
Mar.
7, 10, Apr. 1, 23, 25, May 1, 2, 10, 15, 17, 20, July 7,
Oct.
20, Nov. 4, 6, 11, 1834; Jan. 14, 16, 17, 19, Mar. 26, June
1835.
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The power of "the dynasty" of "King Numbers" appeared to be waning.
Congressional setbacks, in particular the Senate censure of Jackson's
banking practices, reinforced this feeling.

Most encouraging of all was

the defection of two Jackson supporters of long standing, John Bell
and Hugh Lawson White of Tennessee.
Van Buren, "child of his

[Jackson's] adoption" and "heir ap

parent," might even be defeated.

But Stuart could not support Henry

Clay.

It was one thing to praise Clay for his opposition to the Mer

cury's enemies but quite another to help make h i m P r e s i d e n t . C l a y ' s
American System and his support of majority rule were as dangerous to
the Mercury as "the creeping meanness of the Great Republican party"
or Andrew Jackson.

Nor should it be forgotten that Calhoun's forces

were with rather than of the Whigs.

Calhoun's strategy was to main

tain the alliance until the State Rights party was strong enough to
stand alone.

He was practicing the balance of power.

rally on us," he said, "but we

rally

"Others may

on nothing but our doctrine.

. . .

Better . . . for us, that those in power should remain there against
our consent, than that we shall put others there, who do not agree with
us, with our consent."^7
Perhaps the Mercury did not clearly understand the strategy.
In any event, the paper's dislike for Van Buren constrained it to pro
pose an unauthorized alternative to his election.

In 1835 the editor

36see above, 92, n. 30.
^^Mercury, Oct. 29, Nov. 2, 4, 5, 21, 26, 1833; Feb. 3, Apr. 1,
23, 25, May 1, 2, 10, 15, 17, 20, July 7, Oct. 20, Nov. 4, 6, 11,
1834; Jan. 14, 16, 17, 19, Mar. 26, June 3, 1835; Capers, Calhoun:
Opportunist, 178-81.
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saw a chance to restore the Constitution to "its original simplicity
and purity" by electing Judge Hugh Lawson White of Tennessee to the
presidency.
Jackson man.

Like so many of Stuart's readers, White was a former
A slaveholder, he was inclined to "strict construction,"

was sound on the tariff, and was opposed to internal improvements.

Even

more important. White was on record in opposition to "any interference
on the part of Congress with the question of slavery in any form or
shape whatsoever."
South's support.

This alone, the Mercury said, entitled him to the
Dismissing Van Buren as "an avowed abolitionist in

principle," Stuart said that South Carolina need not endorse White's
past record.

In spite of White's having voted for the Force Bill,

Carolina support for him now would intensify the "war against the cor
rupting despotism of patronage and against the head and front of all
O
corruption in the person of Martin Van Buren.
For once the Mercury's call stirred little response.
Charleston's opposition press was largely silent.

Even

From time to time

the Courier sniped at the Mercury's proposal and even occasionally
published something in favor of Van Buren.

The leaders of the State

Rights party, including Governor McDuffie and Robert Y. Hayne, like
wise opposed much agitation of the question.
understand that his idea was unsuitable.
to "refrain from pressing the matter."
own support of White's candidacy.

This may have made Stuart

In any event he concluded
Still, he did not conceal his

Only after Van Buren's victory be

came a certainty did Stuart endorse the Calhoun-approved decision of

^^Mercury, Oct. 29, 30, Nov. 1, 2, 4, 5, 21, 26, 1833;
Apr. 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 20, 21, 22, 23, 25, 27, 30, May 18, 19,
June 18, 20, Oct. 17, 1835; Jan. 16, Feb. 2, July 23, 1836.
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the General Assembly to cast South Carolina’s vote for W. P. Mangum of
North Carolina, an "orthodox Southern State Rights M a n . W h e t h e r
Stuart misunderstood the approved State Rights course, deliberately
violated orders, or simply exercised the degree of editorial maneuv
ering room tolerated by the political power structure, it ultimately
became clear that his course was running counter to the approved one.
At that point he acknowledged his error and fell into line.
Van Buren’s mentor did not pass from the presidency without a
parting blast from Stuart.

In March of 1837 the Mercury castigated

Jackson’s pocket veto of the bill repealing the specie circular as a
defeat for "the hopes

of the business

measure, as the means

of partial relief from the present artificial

and unnecessary pressure
vulsion" of the panic
and currency program.

on the money

of 1837 was but

community, who looked to that

market."

The predictable "con

the result of Jackson’s banking

With each mail bringing new reports of bank and

business failures, Stuart transferred his attack to the new President.
Van Buren was doing nothing to correct the situation, the Mercury
charged.

His decision to call Congress into emergency session was

assailed as a scheme to aid some of the "Pet" banks.

Predicting that

the President’s message to Congress would be "nothing . . . but a recom
mendation to . . . think very profoundly on matters and things in
■3Q

Patriot, 1833-1836, passim; Courier, Sept. 11, 14, 16, 1833;
Apr. 14, 1835; 1836, passim; Mercury, May 18, June 1, 20, 23, Nov. 10,
1835; Nov. 3, 16, Dec. 14, 1836.
True to his word to "refrain from
pressing the matter," Stuart had little to say on the subject in 1836.
Pinckney's resolutions took up much of his space at that time (See
above, 89-91 ) and may have reminded him— in the unlikely event that
he needed reminding— of the need for party unity.
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general," Stuart cautioned his readers to expect no help from Jackson Ts successor. 40
When the President’s address appeared, Stuart was curiously
mild in his reaction.

He did not think that the sub-treasury plan

proposed by Van Buren was practical but he did not condemn it out
right.

Moreover, he was unusually kind in his references to Van

Buren.

This was in an editorial in September 13, 1837.

He intimated

that in the next issue he would propose a plan preferable to the sub
treasury.

But on the following day the Mercury came out in defense

of Van Buren's measure.

This support became enthusiastic after Cal

houn endorsed the bill in the Senate.
The opposition press did not miss an opportunity to charge
Stuart with following his leader.

Stiffly denying their reports,

the editor replied that he had studied the sub-treasury proposal
throughout the summer; he and his associate had conversed frequently
with "gentlemen in this city" and had concluded "weeks before" that
no other proposal " to which w e could give preference over SubTreasury" was likely to be put forth.

Furthermore, the Mercury's

position "was determined" before it "knew Mr. Calhoun's position . . .
the first communication . . . from him on the subject" having been "a
copy of his speech in the Senate, franked to the editors of the Charles
ton Mercury."

Whatever strength the argument had vanished as Stuart

(or his associate) continued with an apparent contradiction, "We

^^Mercury, Apr. 6, 15, 29, May 1, 4, 5, 10, 12, 15, 23, 26,
June 2, 3, 15, July 22, 28, Aug. 30, 31, 1837.
41lbid., Sept. 12, 13, 14, 20, Oct. 2, 4, 1837.
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certainly knew his position before and so did the whole people of the
nation.

It struck us with no surprise.

..."

The agile editor con

cluded by stating that it was merely an attentive reading of Van
Buren's message that convinced him of the soundness of sub-treasury.^^'
Whatever the case, the convert's defense of the Independent
Treasury system

echoed Calhoun's arguments.

The proposed measure

would "break up the centralization of the money Power," said the Mer
cury .

It would deprive the President of "a great and unconstitutional

patronage" and, since neither speculators nor office-holders could
profit thereby, it would also prevent the accumulation of a dangerous
surplus.

The North would then abhor a surplus as much as the "for

gotten provinces" of the South did already.

In such a circumstance

the South would be safe from further tariff exactions.

South Carolina

would do well to follow Calhoun and not become "the dupe and victim of
Northern Shylocks of the Stock-jobbing, money changing, Anti-Texas,
Nullifier hating. Abolition loving Whigs."
Contending that the currency would be uniform and sound under
an independent treasury, the Mercury said that there would no longer be
"one currency for the Government and another for the people" as there
was with a "national Bank."

Charges that Stuart had abandoned his

principles to become a Van Buren supporter did not deter him from
pressing this issue.

The Mercury would not spurn a measure which

4 2ibid., Jan. 5, July 21, 1838.
Stuart's brother-in-law,
Robert Barnwell Rhett, first took his seat in the House of Representa
tives during this session, where his conversion was equally startling.
His biographer views his shift and Stuart's as a response to Calhoun's
direction (White, Rhett, 34).
It is not clear from the editorials
cited in 1838 whether they were written by Stuart or his associate
editor, John Milton Clapp.
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"proffers justice and the Constitution" merely because its authors
had "sinned and usurped."

The paper, like Calhoun and the Whigs, would

be "with them though not of them."

The "Divorce Bill," as the Mercury

often referred to sub-treasury, was after all a "Southern," indeed a
"State Rights" measure.
The debate over sub-treasury developed into a long and bitter
fight.

Extending beyond both the years and subject of the original dis

pute, its repercussions in South Carolina helped to define once and for
all the exact nature of Calhoun’s and South Carolina's alliance with
the Whigs.

It marked, in fact, the end of that coalition and thus

served as another milestone in the career of Senator Calhoun and his
faithful ally, the Mercury.
The controversy over sub-treasury stemmed from the special
session of 1837 when it seemed to Calhoun that his strategy of the
balance of power was about to mature.

Since the division in Congress

between Whigs and Democrats was so nearly even, neither side could carry
the day without support from Calhoun's State Rights force.
battle of the session took place over the economy.

The initial

The Whigs naturally

looked to a restoration of the national bank as a recovery measure; the
Van Buren Democrats just as naturally opposed restoration.

The latter

group had decided to present a measure providing for a complete

4 % e r c u r y , Sept. 14, 20, Oct. 4, 6, 7, 11, 12, 16, 21, 31,
Nov. 18, 20, 23, 24, 27, 1837; Jan. 5, Feb. 15, 22, 24, Mar. 6, 12,
June 7, 9, 30, July 2, 10, 17, 19, 20, 21, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28,
Aug. 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 14, 15, 16, 17, 24, 28, Sept. 6, 18, 19, 20,
26, 27, 29, 1838.
The M ercury's warning to follow Calhoun was
directed at, among others. Charleston Congressman Hugh Swinton LeGare, elected with the paper's support.
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separation between the banking and treasury s y s t e m s . I n deter
mining what his position should be, Calhoun was motivated by several
factors.

He had authored the bill creating the Second Bank of the

United States and did not question the government's constitutional
authority to create a bank in 1837 any more than he had questioned it
originally.

He did feel, however, that the bank had used its power

to favor northern over southern commerce.

The economic ills result

ing from the clash between Jackson and the bank had evidently con
vinced him, furthermore, that a separation between banking and the
treasury was desirable.

At any rate he had concluded by the late

summer of 1837 to support just such a separation.
But the issue of sub-treasury or national bank was merely the
vehicle by which Calhoun's strategy of the balance of power rode to
victory.

Calhoun's policy was b o m out of the tariff dispute of

1832-33 during which time he and Henry Clay had combined forces to
fight Jackson.

Continuing their association to fight Jackson's finan

cial policy, they had strengthened it by the addition of Daniel Web
ster.
party.

To the general public this coalition represented a new political
The Revolutionary War names of Whig and Tory were revived by

partisans of this alliance to indicate those who stood for liberty as
opposed to the defenders of proscriptive executive power.

Duff Green's

Telegraph used the term Whig to describe the Nullifiers in March of
1832.

Clay soon favored it as the label for all those combined against

The administration's proposal was on the order of one first
proposed by a Calhoun ally, the Virginian State Righter William Fitzhugh Gordan, in 1834.
The Jackson forces opposed it at that time
(Wiltse, Calhoun Nullifier, 229-29).
45lbid., 42, 208, 209, 349-50.
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Jackson.

The Staco Rights forces in Virginia adopted Whig in the winter

of 1834; the "Whigs" appeared in the New York City elections of that
spring and by summer the term was in general use.

To the general pub

lic this term meant that Calhoun, Clay, and Webster stood united
against Jackson.
For Calhoun it meant something else.

He made it clear that he

and his followers were merely cooperating with those of Clay and Web
ster in the interest of curbing the "usurpations" of Jackson.

They

represented "a small independent party" which although it abhorred the
practices of the administration also "differed with the opposition in
principle & policy."

His forces would be absorbed by neither.

They

would, rather, maintain their own unity and support whomever nationally
most nearly approximated their standard.

This was the strategy of the

solid southern front which he felt would force the national parties to
accommodate the South on slavery.

Calhoun knew that there was little

chance that Clay and Webster, the true Whigs, could be depended upon.
Their support of measures which would foster the interests of business
and the Northeast required a broad concentration of powers in Washing
ton that represented a direct threat to slavery.

Calhoun’s alliance

with the Whigs was nothing more than a political convenience to destroy
Jackson.

Even as he was dissolving the coalition, he said, "We dis

agreed on almost all points except resistance to Executive usurpa
tion. "4?

4^Ibid. , 209, 213-18, 230.
Calhoun preferred to be known
simply as a Nullifier (ibid., 231).
4 ^Congressional Globe, Twenty-sixth Congress, First Session
(Washington, 1835-1873), 51-52; Calhoun to Anna Maria Calhoun, Sept. 8,
1837, Jameson ed., Calhoun Correspondence, 378-79; Capers, Calhoun:
Opportunist, 186.
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His own former party offered much more hope for reform, and
by 1837 he was convinced that it showed distinct signs of returning to
its pre-Jackson constitutional course.

Writing to James Edward Cal

houn, the Senator said:
[Van Buren] has been forced by his situation and the
terror of Jackson to play directly into our hands and
I am determined that he shall not escape from us. . . .
I have taken ny stand.
I go against the chartering of
a United States bank . . . or any other bank.
I go in
a word for a complete separation from the whole concern.
Calhoun realized that he would meet opposition in South Carolina but he
was prepared
of his

to deal with it.

stand and intolerant of

Like the Mercury, Calhoun was confident
those who opposed it.^^

On September 18, 1837, the Carolinian made his Senate speech
endorsing the Independent Treasury bill.

The administration acquiesced

in his insistence upon certain amendments and then retired into the
background to watch while Calhoun became the de facto leader of its
forces, at least on this financial matter.

Openly confident of success,

Calhoun wrote that the "union of the political and money power" was in
full retreat.

Provided the State Rights party held "true to . . . its

principles," this flight would "unite

and liberate the South."

The

Carolinian was ending his alliance with the Whigs to cast his lot once
more with Van Buren.

This latest maneuver was rewarded with success when

on October 24, 1837, the sub-treasury bill passed the Senate.

^®Calhoun to James Edward Calhoun, Sept. 7, 1837, Jameson, ed..
Calhoun Correspondence, 377-78; Wiltse, Calhoun Nullifier, 351.
^^Wiltse, Calhoun Nullifier, 355-56; Calhoun to J. R. Mat
Sept. 27, 1837, quoted in ibid., 355; Curtis, Fox at Bay, 103-04.
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The opposition from South Carolina was not long in showing
itself.

Senator William Campbell Preston, who h a d followed Calhoun

into the Whig camp, took his party seriously and remained firmly with
the Clay anti-sub-treasury forces.

In the House only Calhoun’s kins

man Francis Pickens and the freshman Congressman Robert Barnwell Rhett
supported sub-treasury.

Calhoun carefully noted those of his own state

who were with him and against him.
table the sub-treasury measure.

Those who were against helped to

The special session— but not the

battle— ended two days later.^0
Calhoun then turned his attention to South Carolina where the
M e r c u r y , virtually unassisted, was praising the merits of sub-treasury.
It was also warning the delinquents in the state to repent and follow
Calhoun.

Some of these men were Unionists who would oppose the Cal

houn-endorsed measure out of pure habit.
tion within the Calhoun ranks as well.

But there was critical opposi
George McDuffie, Robert Y.

Hayne, James Hamilton, Jr., and others were in revolt.

Many Cal-

hounites were against sub-treasury on principle but more were shocked
that they should be called upon to endorse the program of the man whom

^^Wiltse, Calhoun Nullifier, 355-56; Preston to H. M. (il
legible), Jan. 11, Dec. 25, 1837; Mar. 21, Apr. 2, 1838, William
Campbell Preston Papers, South Caroliniana Library, University of
South Carolina, hereinafter cited as Preston Papers; Curtis, Fox
at B a y , 109.
Only a handful of southern Whigs followed Calhoun out of the
party.
It has been suggested that Calhoun and a small number of his
followers were alone among the southern Whigs when it came to regard
ing state rights as a primary issue.
Like northern Whigs, southern
members of the party supposedly divided over economic issues (Charles
Grier Sellers, Jr., "Who were the Southern Whigs," A H R , LIX, No. 2
[Jan., 1954], 339,346).
If this thesis is acceptable for the South as
a whole, Calhoun's state furnishes an interesting exception to the
pattern.
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they had been taught to despise ten years previously.
Reminding his uncertain constituents of how his strategy had
worked in the past, Calhoun asserted that the State Rights party had
destroyed the protective system through nullification.

Then it had

worked with the National Republicans turned Whigs to overthrow execu
tive tyranny.

Although the coalition had been successful, its con

tinuation would only restore the initial evil.

The invigorated Whigs

favored protection, consolidation, and centralization; their support
of a national bank was only the first step in the direction of op
pression.

Moreover, since Van Buren's administration had shown itself

receptive to State Rights principles, it was time to change sides.
Indicating its hearty agreement, the General Assembly received Cal
houn with enthusiasm in December.

At this session a coalition master

minded by Robert Barnwell Rhett's brothers Albert and James, and firmly
supported by the editorials of their brother-in-law in the Mercury, per
suaded the Assembly to endorse the sub-treasury bill by an overwhelming
majority.

Calhoun had received a vote of confidence.

Some others

would have done well to note it.51
Resumption of the battle in the regular session of Congress
was delayed by the presentation of new abolition petitions and, in
the Senate, an antislavery resolution from the Vermont legislature.
After a fierce fight the House re-enacted the gag rule and the Senate
resorted to the usual tabling.

In the heated discussion that followed

the action of the upper chamber, Calhoun condemned the action as

Wiltse, Calhoun Nullifier, 358-61; Calhoun to Armistead
Burt, Feb. 15, 1837, Armistead Burt Papers, Perkins Library, Duke
University, hereinafter cited as Burt Papers.
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inadequate and proposed a set of resolutions purporting to represent
the southern position on the subject.
were adopted.

With minor modification they

They restated the compact theory of the Constitution,

condemned attempts to meddle with "domestic institutions" of any
state, identified slavery as one of the inviolate institutions, com
mitted the general government to resist any attempt to interfere with
it, and held that any move to abolish slavery in the District of
Columbia would "create serious alarm and just apprehension" in the
South.

The resolutions did not resolve the controversy but they did

serve as the occasion for the administration to prove its position on
state rights by supporting them.
Carolinian.

Only one development disturbed the

Senator Preston had "acted with Clay throughout" to

moderate the language of the resolutions; Calhoun made note of this
"ungenerous and unpatriotik [sic] opposition."

Asserting that he had

h o m e Preston’s conduct "with perfect patience," Calhoun declared his
"colleague" to be "totally alienated without an act of mine to justify
it."
Whigs.

By his action Preston had confirmed his decision to stay with the
The policy of unity in South Carolina, the foundation upon which

Calhoun planned to build his solid southern front, did not allow for
CO

such behavior.

52wiltse, Calhoun Nullifier, 369-73; Calhoun to Burt, Jan. 24,
1838, Burt Papers; Ernest M. Lander, Jr., "The Calhoun-Preston Feud,
1836-1842," SC H M , LIX, No. 1 (Jan., 1958), 29.
Calhoun’s fifth reso
lution— on slavery in the District— had originally declared that any
effort to abolish the institution there would be "a direct and danger
ous attack" on slavery everywhere.
Clay led in modifying this state
ment.
Calhoun also offered a sixth resolution condemning any at
tempt to restrict the addition of new slaveholding territory to the
Union.
Preston succeeded in having this proposal tabled since he
planned to present a resolution on the annexation of Texas which
covered the same ground, he said.
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Having disposed of the matter of slavery for the time being,
the Senate passed to a reconsideration of the nation's chaotic cur
rency system.

Calhoun, armed with proof of the administration's sound

ness by its position on his resolutions, returned to press the case for
sub-treasury.

Again the debate was spirited and this time it lasted

from February second through March twenty-sixph.
mained in the enemy camp the whole time.

Senator Preston re

On March 26 a version of

the bill, so emasculated by amendments as to be unacceptable to Calhoun,
passed the Senate.

In the House, however, there was still a chance for

passage of an acceptable measure.

Campaigning vigorously for votes in

this body, Calhoun was supported by a special session of the South
Carolina General Assembly.

Here Albert and James Rhett, ably assisted

by the Mercury, again secured a resolution that not only endorsed the
Independent Treasury bill, but also announced that any public servant
who opposed it was on a "course injurious to the welfare and property
of the State.
The action preserved neither the bill nor South Carolina unity.
Preston's opposition remained steady and when on June 25, 1838, sub
treasury was defeated in the House, South Carolina Congressmen Waddy
Thompson, Robert B. Campbell, and Hugh Swinton LeGare voted with the
victorious negative.

Returning immediately to South Carolina Calhoun

proposed to purge the deserters.

Since Preston would not be up for

election, Calhoun would content himself with having the rebel Senator
neutralized.

But Campbell, Thompson, and LeGare could expect a fatal

53wiltse, Calhoun Nationalist, 377-386; White, Rhett , 41-42;
Calhoun to Burt, Apr. 19, 1838, Burt Papers.
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opposition in the forthcoming fall

contests.

54

The attacks of the Calhounites on Preston prevented that de
serter from aiding those who had voted with h i m on sub-treasury.

In

fourth of July orations throughout the state h e was called an "alien
by birth"— he had been b o m in Virginia— and an associate of Clay’s
"dirty gang."

He was bluntly told to repent or perish.

When Calhoun

was invited to a barbecue in Preston's honor, he declined in writing.
Those arranging the affair must agree with Preston's course in ConCC

gress, Calhoun said acidly.
Calhoun's plan to purge his enemies from Congress was only
partially successful.

Curiously enough, Waddy Thompson, who was from

Calhoun's own district, w on a smashing victory.

He was probably aided

by his assertion that despite his opposition to sub-treasury he was an
administration man whose regard for Calhoun was unbounded.
from the Pee Dee and less important to Calhoun, also won.

Campbell,
But of

supreme importance to both Calhoun and the Mercury was the defeat of
the Charleston defector, Hugh Swinton LeGare, who disliked Calhoun
personally.

LeGare, in fact, had snubbed Calhoun on the very steps of

the nation's capitol during the last Congress.

This insolent Charles

tonian would not be on hand to repeat the insult in 1838.

His defeat

in the fall elections caused ext ame rejoicing in the Mercury's office.

Wiltse, Calhoun Nationalist, 391. "Thompson acts quite as bad
as his friend Preston," said Calhoun (Calhoun to Burt, Jan. 24, 1838,
Burt Papers).
^^Lander, "Calhoun Preston Feud," S C H M , LIX, No. 1, 39; Wiltse,
Calhoun Nullifier, 319-92.
^^Lander, "Calhoun Preston Feud," S C H M , LIX, No. 1, 32; Wiltse,
Calhoun Nullifier, 363; Mercury, Oct. 11, 15, 24, 25, Dec. 18, 1838;
Calhoun to Burt, Nov. 17, 1838, Burt Papers.
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Once Stuart's Mercury got its signals straight, it gave un
wavering support to sub-treasurey and the new political h aven of
state rights; it was, moreover, an enthusiastic and confident support.
Not discouraged whe n Van Buren's— or rather Calhoun's— measure failed
to pass the special session of Congress, the Mercury optimistically
noted that all attempts to re-establish the Bank of the United States
were likewise unsuccessful.

Stuart expected success for sub-treasury

during the forthcoming regular session.

Happily reporting that the

General Assembly's resolution, for which his paper had campaigned, was
an endorsement of Calhoun's position, the editor trumpeted that " . . .
never was a great public measure so unanimously popular in South Caro
lina and the South.
Subsequent defeat of the "Southern measure" in the regular
congressional session transferred the Mercury's attention to the fall
elections in which it hoped "the people" would evidence better judg
ment than had their representatives.

Whigs were damned in Stuart's

columns, the national bank vilified and the Independent Treasury ex
tolled.

While the Ehetts rallied the General Assembly to more favor

able resolutions, Stuart's paper reflected a rising faith in Van
Buren's administration.

It made short shrift of the Courier's charge

of inconsistency; his journal, Stuart said, was still defending state
rights.

The Courier's argument for a national bank was "as pretty a

piece of fowl's flesh as ever strutted on a dung-hill."

Hugh Swinton

Legate had voted against "the Divorce" so he should be defeated.

^ ^Mercury, Nov. 4, 14, 16, 17, 18, 20, 23, 24, 29, Dec. 1,
4, 14, 17, 18, 20, 23, 1837.
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he was defeated and IJhiggery showed a general setback in South Caro
lina, Stuart's faith in the wisdom of "the people" was vindicated.
Perhaps his confidence in their steadfastness allowed his attention to
shift from the treasury proposals into other channels; at any rate,
the next few months of the Mercury contained only occasional refer
ences to sub-treasury.

And when the measure did pass in 1840, Stuart

bade happy farewell to the "long struggle of four years between the
people and the money power.

..."

In this "Second Declaration of

Independence," the "will of the people has become law."^^
The Mercury's conviction that
should pass was bound up with another

the Independent Treasury bill
and still more momentous issue;

"it would strengthen the defense of slavery."

If the apostles of

consolidation ever established "their money power . . . the 'right
of petition' will very soon turn into
Stuart solemnly warned.

the right of dictation,"

With its renewed

spate of abolitionist

petitions, the congressional session of 1837-1838 sounded the tocsin
for Stuart.

His brother-in-law was right; the South must convene and

resolve that slavery in the District must be guaranteed by the Constitution or the Union was at an end.

59

Viewing the rising whirlwind

S Slbid., June 5, 7, 9, 26, 29, 30, July 21, 23, 24, 25, 26,
27, 28, Aug. 1, 2, 4, 6, 7, 10, 16, Sept. 6, 13, 17, 18, 19, 26, 27,
Oct. 8, 9, 11, 15, 24, 25, Nov. 6, 19, Dec. 18, 1838; July 10, 15,
Aug. 19, Oct. 17, 18, 19, Nov. 19, 1839; Jan. 30, Feb. 1, Mar. 11,
19, July 4, 7, 1840.
Courier. July 16, 18, 20, 23, 25, 26, 27, 28,
31, Aug. 2, 1838.
Stuart praised the Patriot for its 1837 endorsesement of sub-treasury (Mercury, Nov. 4, 1837; Patriot, Sept. 8, 9,
11, 14, 21, 27, 30, 1837).
S^The idea for
Calhoun's strategy for
Senator Benjamin Swift
the legislature of his
abolish slavery in the

a southern convention had long been a part of
unifying the South.
On December 19, 1837,
of Vermont presented a set of resolutions from
state which affirmed the power of Congress to
District of Columbia and outlaw the interstate
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Stuart urged the South to defend herself:
Why, if we must have war, let us have it in bloody
earnest.
Union— peace— on the terms of being de
nounced as monsters whenever the call of that Union
bring us together!! Better the line that divides us
be drawn with fire . . . than that we should stand in
perpetual fear of this armed neutrality, this masked
hatred. . . .
We must have a Convention of the
whole South, and exact the atonement or create the
security. . . . What!
Congress an emanation from
the Sovereign States dare to entertain discussion
whether they shall begin the work of confiscating
$800,000,000 worth of private property, rooting
up the widest and most vital connections of so
ciety, blotting out . . . the very existence of
twelve states, and we . . . are thus madly to dream
of peace and forbearance and the "blessed union"!
But there was no response to his rhetoric.

With helpless resignation

the frustrated editor decried the "Gag Resolutions" presented by Patton
of Virginia to the House; they were only "an evasion" of the issue even
though they did omit Pinckney's "equivocal surrender" concerning the

slave trade.
They also protested the annexation of Texas as well
as the admission of any more slave states.
Calhoun decided to call
a convention of the southern states.
"I think the sooner the issue
is made the better for us and the country," he said.
". . . A
Southern Convention at the earliest period that the South can be
brought [to] act Is indespensible." Only through southern unity,
he felt, would the abolitionist agitation be put down and only by
silencing the Abolitionists could the Union be saved.
The South
was especially sensitive to all proposals to affect slavery in the
District; such proposals were regarded as the opening wedge in a
broad campaign to dislodge slavery everywhere.
Rhett was an en
thusiastic supporter of the convention idea; it is to this support
that the Mercury is referring (Wiltse, Calhoun Nullifier, 370; White,
Rhett, 37-38).
But to many the convention idea was regarded as a
radical move that threatened the Union. Others did not see the
danger as the pressing force that it represented to Calhoun.
Nothing
came of the convention proposal.
Instead, Southerners supported
another gag rule in the House— Rhett refused to vote on the measure
and the Patton Resolutions were adopted.
Calhoun, unsatisfied by the
Senate's decision to table the unacceptable communications to that
body, then proposed his own set of resolutions which were adopted with
modifications (See above,
109 ).
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District.^®
In the next Congress, matters took a sudden turn for the
better.

The Twenty-first Rule, sponsored by Charles G. Atherton, a

New Hampshire Democrat, adopted by the 1838 session of the House was
much more acceptable.

Even though the "Atherton Resolutions" also

provided for tabling rather than outright rejection of the despised
abolition petitions, they were forthright in their denunciation of
unconstitutional congressional interference with slavery in the
Districts or the states.

Holding them to be "equivalent to a down

right rejection of the petitions," the Mercury reasoned that the
South need ask for no more.

Stuart's satisfaction was increased

because the "Atherton Resolutions" seemed to have the administration's
approval.

No longer need the "sly Martin's" position on the critical

issue be distrusted.

Even the Whigs seemed to be coming around;

Henry Clay began to "set himself right" by offering a petition
against emancipation in the District.

Calhoun's strategy had worked,

at least for the time being.

^^Mercury, Dec. 21, 22, 23, 25, 27, 28, 29, 1837; Jan. 1, 3,
5, 6, 8, 9, 16, 30, Feb. 8, 9, 10, 17, 19, 21, 22, Mar. 2, 3, 1838.
Even South Carolina was languid in its response to the call for a
convention.
Only one meeting in the state— and that in Rhett's own
district of Beaufort— was held to endorse the proposal.
This was
in response to an address to his constituents sent to them sub
sequent to the action in Washington (White, Rhett, 38-40).
^^Mercury, Mar. 9, 14, 22, May 3, 1837; Jan. 1, 4, 9, Feb. 9,
10, 17, Mar. 2, Nov. 7, 17, Dec. 14, 15, 17, 1838; Feb. 7, 11, 12,
13, 14, 15, 16, 18, Mar. 11, 1839.
In early 1838 the Mercury com
menced to castigate the Whigs for their abolitionist leanings at the
North.
" . . . Their brotherly love and political identity" was borne
out by such things as the Whig-Abolitionist alliance in the New York
elections of 1838 (ibid., Jan. 1, 9, Mar. 3, Nov. 7, 12, 13, 14, 16,
19, 22, 23, 29, Dec. 17, 1838).
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Stuart’s defense of slavery required that he maintain an
interest in foreign affairs.
in his paper.

Texas figured with special prominence

In 1837 the Mercury strongly endorsed the General

Assembly's resolution urging annexation as soon as it could be "ef
fected on fair and reasonable terms."

Abolitionists opposed annexa

tion for fear it would increase southern influence in national coun
cils.

Caustically observing "that the condition upon which we are

permitted to remain in the Union is that w e should continue the weaker
party," the editor distrusted "the mercy of [his] Northern brethren.
His attention frequently returned to Britain's seizures of
American slaves.

The decision to compensate only for those taken prior

to the British Emancipation Act seemed to him "a denial of the right
of the people of the South to hold slaves and defend them . . . against
foreign encroachment."

The danger that Northern and British Abol

itionists might someday join hands in a "formal alliance” brought forth
yet another warning to those disturbers of the peace and order of South
Carolina.

In language that Calhoun used only with reluctance but that

others employed with ready defiance, the Mercury soberly informed the
enemy that " . . .

the malignant warfare under the mask of brotherhood

must cease" or the "unmeaning name of fellow citizens be abolished be
tween us."

Piously continuing that nothing could be expected of Great

Britain, Stuart accused the British of regularly overthrowing "justice,
law,

[and] good faith, when [they stood] opposed to [Britain's] lust

for power— a lust b o m from and nourished by her ruling passion, the

G^Ibid., Aug. 28, Sept. 6, Dec. 19, 21, 22, 23, 27, 29, 1837;
Jan. 24, 1838.
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love of money."

The administration could be trusted to defend southern

interests but all Whigs were suspect as usual.

For his part in failing

to support Calhoun's "Bermuda Resolutions," William Campbell Preston
was accused of "treason to his state.
Administration reliability notwithstanding, Stuart noted that
Van Buren's message of 1830 neglected the British high seas attacks
on slavery for "the infinitely insignificant question in comparison,
of the Maine boundary."

Although South Carolina would honor the call

for war— if it came over the small boundary matter— the North owed a
similar support to the South's grievance.

The misguided Whigs received

their usual share of denunciation; Stuart was now supporting Van
Buren's re-election.

The Whigs had compared the Canadian uprising of

1837 to the Texas Revolution, an obvious absurdity.

Whereas the Texans

had fought against "the tyranny of bigotry and barbarism," the "fac
tion" of rebels in Canada, "in opposition to the progress of civili
zation and freedom," was mounting an insurrection against "an en
lightened and liberal government."

The Caroline, a gun-runner of

6 3lbid. , Apr. 9, 11, June 11, July 12, 1839; Mar. 2, 4, 23,
28, Apr. 23, May 1, 19, 23, June 2, 15, 1840.
When in 1835 the Ameri
can coasting vessel Enterprise was forced by heavy weather into Fort
Hamilton, Bermuda, the British emancipated her slave cargo and re
fused to pay for it.
The slaves were free by virtue of touching free
British soil, the authorities said.
In response Calhoun committed
the Senate to the proposition that international law discredited this
position.
The nationality of a cargo is determined by the flag under
which it sails, Calhoun said.
This being the case. Enterprise was
American "soil." Nor did Calhoun fail to ask how a nation that pro
fessed so much opposition to slavery could make for such appalling
conditions in India and Ireland.
This British inconsistency was a
favorite subject among Southerners, including Mercury editors, who
never tired of accusing the British of the most blatant hypocrisy
(Charles M. Wiltse, John C. Calhoun Sectionalist, 1840-1850 [New
York, 1951] 63-64.
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American registry, was illegally aiding the rebels and had gotten
only her just deserts.

There was no need for unpleasantness between

Great Britain and the United States over the

ma t t e r .

^4

In July of 1838— with some caution— the Mercury endorsed Van
Buren for re-election.

This early move was apparently inspired by

administration Congressmen who combined advocacy of sub-treasury with
censure of those who would interfere with slavery, such interference
being called unconstitutional.

Should this "truly Southern policy"

remain constant, it would become "the duty of every Southern man and
state to vote for Martin Van Buren in preference to Henry Clay."^^
The impetuous editor had reckoned too much on his own accord, how
ever, and received a reproof for his action.
Calhoun had been careful to attach the same reservations to
his alliance with Van Buren's party that he had maintained during the
days of the Whig coalition.

The forces of Van Buren were aware of

this and had thus far met the Carolinian's conditions.

But Calhoun

had no illusions about politics, the nature of which could change over
night.

He had learned to be cautious; moreover, he expected the same

quality of his followers.

In a letter to Robert Barnwell Rhett,

Calhoun urged h i m to put Stuart "on his guard"; the Mercury was
"leaning a little too much" toward Van Buren.
everything in politics

". . . [P]osition is

. . . and as we are volunteers and not

G^ibid., Dec. 21, 1837; Jan. 3, 6, 9, 10, 18, 19, Feb. 5, 1838;
Mar. 4, 9, 13, 16, Apr. 3, 6, 20, 1839; Mar. 2, July 3, 1840.
Rhett's
influence was evidently a factor in Mercury policy by this time. He had
called for a Congressional investigation of the Caroline affair and was
opposed to war over the matter.
65lbid., July 25, 1838.
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mercenaries looking to a cause and not pay it is to us all import
ant," said Calhoun.

The Senator also had some advice for Ehett:

It seems to me that our true course is to occupy the
old and independent ground on which we have stood for
so many years holding our principles and policy above
the Presidential election and giving a cordial support
to the administration just as far as they support them
without further commitment of identification.
By retaining a position independent of either party, the Senator ex
pected to gain support from additional quarters without losing friends
among the anti-Van Buren forces:
If w e commit ourselves in advance the danger is that
they will shape their course to gain the support of other
interests and w e may thus be betrayed. . . .
In this
connection I must say I object to the name of democrat
as applied to our party . . . the word . . . means those
who favor a government of the absolute numerical majority
to which I am utterly opposed and the prevalence of which
would destroy the S o u t h . ° 6
Calhoun's admonition did not go unheeded; independent publisher or
not, Stuart modified his position so as to accord with Orthodoxy.
While the tone of Mercury editorials remained decidedly
anti-Whig and pro-Van Buren "in his present position" the chastened
editor asserted that "watching for the safety of all that is worth
watching" was his policy.

The President's practice of economy

in government, his opposition to internal improvements and tariff
increases combined with his payment of the fourth installment
of the Distribution Act to convince Stuart that Van Buren was truly
a follower of "Jeffersonian policy."

Then in February, 1840, the

GGcalhoun to Ehett, Sept. 13, 1838, Jameson, ed., Calhoun
Correspondence, 399-400.
There is a manuscript copy of this letter
in the Ehett Papers, South Caroliniana Library, University of South
Carolina, hereinafter cited as Ehett Papers.
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Mercury again called for a Van Buren victory.

In all likelihood Stuart

had made the proper soundings this time, for in May the Charleston
State Rights party took the same stand.

The Courier's charge that the

rival Mercury was inconsistent in favoring a supporter of both Jack
son's Proclamation and the Force Bill bothered Stuart not at all.

Van

Buren's three-year devotion to state rights had offset his former un
satisfactory record.

And the agile Mercury had never minded incon

sistency.67
The Charleston guardian of state rights did not really approve
of either of the "president-making" parties but it found little to
criticize in Van Buren's performance.
well.

Stuart had learned his lesson

A part of that lesson was evidently that Calhoun's analysis of

the character of Whiggery was sound.

That they were stained by the

"American System" and the Bank was no surprise to those who had fol
lowed the career of Clay and Webster.
Whigs.

It was even so with all other

Reminding its readers of the characteristic unsoundness of the

Whig party, the Mercury charged it with having "taken fanaticism . . .
to [its] bosom" and "pledged [itself] . . .
as the price of abolition votes."

to hunt us with blood hounds

Clay's decline after his proslavery

resolutions of 1839 was significant proof of the folly of pandering to
the wishes of Abolitionists.

The nomination of William Henry Harrison

who had manifested a "wholly unpardonable hostility" on "the great
question" of slavery impressed the Mercury as the final proof of Whig

67Mercury. Dec. 3, 1838; Feb. 7, 11, Mar. 31, May 23, 24, 25,
Aug. 20, 23, 1839; Jan. 16, Feb. 24, 26, May 9, 21, June 22, 23,
July 4, 1840; Courier, Apr. 22, June 18, 24, 27, 1840; Calhoun to
Burt, Aug. 8, Nov. 2, 1840, Burt Papers.
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treachery.68
Harrison’s proud Virginia ancestry would do him little good
in South Carolina where subsequently even Robert E. Lee would meet
with criticism.

Senator Preston had already been questioned by Caro

linians for his Virginia birth.

During the campaign of 1840 he would

be castigated for supporting Harrison, the man who had voted incor
rectly on Missouri, who had once been a member of an abolitionist
society, and was currently evasive in his views of the peculiar insti
tution.

Preston, the South Carolina press said, was consorting with

Abolitionists.

At the "noisy and vulgar display" that made for a

Preston-Thompson barbecue in Greenville, Preston was said to have
given a poor speech as he "not infrequently took his glass of gin
water."

The Virginiar-bom resident Carolina Whig would live to re

gret his abandonment of the Virginian-Carolinian school of government.
It was Randolph and Calhoun who moved Preston's electorate, not Clay
and Harrison.69
None saw this more clearly than the Mercury.

If Harrison's

record was not distinct enough to Carolinians, they should note that
some Abolitionists were deserting the Liberty party to support him.

Jan.

6 8Mercurv. June 23, 28, 29, July 4,
6, Nov. 17, 1838; June 2, 1840.

17, 20, Aug.

2, 7, 1837;

69lbid. . May 9, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 26, 28, June 4, 8, 16, 17,
18, 20, July 2, 4, 8, Sept. 5, 10, 15, 29, Oct.3, 5, 13, Nov.
2, 4,
1840; Lander, "Calhoun-Preston Feud," SCHM, LIX, No. 1, 31, 34, 35.
When the Mercury w as reminded of Harrison's southern birth it de
nounced him as "a Southern man with Northern principles" (Mercury,
May 12, 15, 16, June 4, 16, 1840); Calhoun to Burt, Aug. 8, 1840,
Burt Papers.
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Harrison, the "humbug . . . hero" of wh o m the "real glory . . . was
that . . . with 1,200 men [he] did not get wholly defeated by 400
Indians," was "a man of straw."
"old Federalists . . .

The crusading Mercury warned against

in the pliant wiggling sleekness of modern

Whiggery" who were allied with an "agitating system of fanatics,"
and shuddered to remember "the abominations of the Adams Administra
tion."

Heeding the Mercury's bidding. South Carolina renounced the

Whigs; even the Courier and Patriot supported Van Buren.
entire state the Whigs carried only one district.

In the

The delighted

Mercury responded by hailing the final healing of nullification wounds
and rejoicing at South Carolina's unanimous "devotion to the one great
cause.

^OMercury, June 6, 22, 1838; Feb. 5, May 24, 25, Nov. 15, 19,
29, Dec. 11, 14, 1839; Jan. 10, Feb. 3, 12, 14, 17, 18, 19, 29, Mar. 2,
7, 10, 13, 14, 18, 20, 26, Apr. 1, 3, 4, 16, May
25, 9,11,12,13,
15, 16, 26, 28, June 4, 8, 10, 16, 17, 18, 20, 25, 27, July 2, 4, 8,
11, 17, 27, Aug. 10, Sept. 4, 5, 10, 11, 15, 29, Oct. 3, 5, 13, 28,
Nov. 2, 4, Dec. 8, 9, 11, 1840; Courier, Jan. 6, 8, 11,
15, 21, 27,
Feb. 24, Mar. 9, 12, Apr. 22, May 7, 12, June 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15,
29, 30, 1840.
The Patriot was vigorous in its support of Van Buren;
the Courier— who did not view him as antislavery— less so. The Caro
lina district carried by the Whigs was Waddy Thompson's— and Cal
houn's— own of Greenville-Pendleton (Lander, "Calhoun Preston Feud,"
AHR, No. 1, 35).
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CHAPTER IV

HIGH TIDE

It was the plan of some in South Carolina that "devotion to
the one great cause" should pave the way for Calhoun's election to the
presidency in 1844.

In order to reap so great a dividend from Ortho

dox y ’s post-nullification strategy, however, the policy would have to
be perfected; southern unity, in short, must be strengthened.

With

this goal in mind the Calhounites proposed to obliterate the last re
maining in-state differences between the State Rights and Free Trade
party and the State Rights and Union party.

As their names suggest,

the dispute between the two groups was over method of remedy rather
than nature of evil.

LeGare was no less opposed to high tariffs than

was Hayne; nor did anyone in South Carolina admit to opposing slavery.
The State Rights and Union men simply limited their political protest
to the ballot box and so excluded nullification as a weapon.^
Much had been done to heal the old wounds when in 1838 the
Mercury first endorsed Van Buren.

Nullifiers had helped to elect a

Unionist to Congress two years before because the Nullifier then
sitting there had adopted an unsanctipned method in defense of slavery.
Then in 1838 Unionists helped a Nullifier to defeat the Unionist in
cumbent because the latter had not followed orders on sub-treasury.

^Wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist, 51; White, Rhett, 55.
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It is hardly necessary to say that Calhoun was the source of defln-

2
ition for correctness in both cases.
While much progress had been made, it was clear to Calhoun
that the whole healing process could be undone if the state split
again into factions— as it showed a tendency to do— in response to the
increasing abolitionist attacks on slavery.

In order to avert so seri

ous a setback, he decided to intensify the drive for a final recon
ciliation between Unionists and Nullifiers.

The Nullifiers would sup

port a Unionist for governor in 1840.3
The task of carrying out this policy was assigned to the RhettElmore machine, a rising force in South Carolina politics.

The prin

cipals in the "junto" were Congressman Robert Barnwell Ehett, a Cal
houn lieutenant who sometimes showed a disturbing tendency to inde
pendence, his brothers Benjamin, Albert, James, and Edmund, and Frank
lin H. Elmore.

Elmore, himself a former Congressman, was president of

the Bank of the State of South Carolina; Benjamin Rhett was a director
in the bank; Albert— whose wife was Elmore’s sister— was the most in
fluential member of the General Assembly, while James and Edmund were
serving their apprenticeship for position.

Finally, John Allan Stuart,

brother-in-law to the Rhetts and editor of the Mercury, was the man who
made public the conclusions of the machine.
When the candidate was agreed upon, the Charleston Mercury

^Wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist, 51; see above,89 ; Calhoun to
Burt, Dec. 24, 1838, Burt Papers.
3wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist, 51; Stuart to Calhoun, Oct. 11,
1841, John C. Calhoun Papers, Clemson University, hereinafter cited
as Calhoun Papers.
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nominated Unionist Colonel John P. Richardson as the State Rights
choice for governor in 1840.

Because of the paper's vigorous cam

paign for Richardson the whole unification drive came to be called
"The Mercury Movement."

After a rather embarrassing setback— in the

form of a rebellion in the Calhoun ranks— Richardson's election was
assured and the "undivided front" prevailed in South

C a r o l i n a . 4

The unanimity of the "undivided front" was short-lived, at
least in the press.

While the Courier supported proposals for a

national bank along with other Whig measures, the Patriot praised
President Harrison's Inaugural as "sound and republican."

The Mer

cury, meanwhile, denounced their "wooing of the rising luminary" and
proclaimed itself to be "the only Democratic State Rights paper in
the city."

Stuart had no brief for the party of "coon skins, squirrel

^Wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist, 52-53; White, Rhett, 55-56; Mer
cury, Jan. 10, Feb. 12, 14, 17,18,19, Mar. 10, 18, Sept. 12, Dec. 8,
10, 11, 1840; James M. Walker to S. W. Trotti, Apr. 12, 1840, James M.
Hammond Papers, Library of Congress, microfilm copy in South Caroliniana
Library, University of South Carolina, hereinafter cited as Hammond
Papers.
The rebellion resulted when Calhoun's cousin, Francis Pickens,
annoyed with the Rhetts, easily persuaded James H. Hammond to run for
governor.
Representing Richardson as the Rhett candidate, Pickens
assured Hammond that he would be Calhoun's choice.
This move threat
ened to disrupt the still somewhat fragile state unity until Calhoun—
after having explained the strategy to Nullifier Hammond and having
unsuccessfully attempted to persuade h im to withdraw his candidacy—
assured his defeat. The Mercury was unfriendly to Hammond's campaign
(Francis Pickens to Hammond, Dec. 15, 1839, James M. Walker to Hammond,
Apr. 8, 20, Hammond to Ker Boyce, Apr. 10, George McDuffie to Hammond,
Apr. 19, Hammond to Walker, Apr. 23, Pickens to Hammond, June 22, S.
W. Trotti to Hammond, July 6, 1840, Hammond Papers;
James J. Hamilton,
Jr. to Hammond Apr. 5, 1850, James Hamilton Jr. Papers, Southern His
torical Collection, University of North Carolina Library, hereinafter
cited as Hamilton Papers; Hammond to Mrs. Hammond, Nov. 27, Dec. 21,
1840, James Henry Hammond Collection, Southern Historical Collection,
University of North Carolina Library, hereinafter cited as Hammond
Collection).
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tails, log cabins, gourds and pumpkins.
The Patriot ignored Stuart's barrage, but the Courier was
editorially incensed.

Conveying his umbrage to his readers, the

Courier editor convicted "the mere echo" of Calhoun, with its con
suming greed for "State loaves and fishes," of a "weathercock pro
pensity to change."

The two editors followed with an exchange of

maledictions in the process of which Stuart charged his rival with
"openly boasting" of plans to "throw the State into the arms of
Harrisonism.
In language reminiscent of its finest rantings against Jack
son, the Mercury then mounted a strong attack upon the new adminis
tration.

Charging that the "Federalists . . . fought for spoil, not

for principle," Stuart accused the Whigs of putting "forth a system
of measures at war with all State Rights" and "the prosperity and
safety of the South."

Aided by Preston and company, this party pro

posed to strengthen the general government by re-establishing the
bank, re-enacting the protective tariff, securing the assumption of
state debts, and arranging for the distribution of monies received
from the sale of public lands.

The "studied . . . non-committalism"

of the Presidential Inaugural, moreover, convinced Stuart that Har
rison would sign anything Congress passed.

Such "surrender to

^Mercury, Dec. 21, 1840; Feb. 15, 1841; Patriot, Jan. 28,
Feb. 10, Mar. 6, 9, 26, Apr. 13, June 4, 1841; Courier, Nov. 24,
1840; Feb. 17, Mar. 9, 24, 26, Apr. 12, 14, 16, June 5, 7, 1841.
^Courier. Feb. 16, 24, Mar. 2, 6, 10, 24, 26, Apr. 12, 13,
16, 17, 19, 20, 1841; Mercury, Feb. 17, 25, Mar. 1, 20. 26, Apr. 13,
14, 17, 1841.
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majority rule" was "full of danger.
No happier when Harrison's premature death put the Virginian
Tyler in the presidential chair, the Mercury offered "neither . . .
opposition nor . . . support" to the new President until it saw "what
he would be about"; Stuart had little faith in any man who campaigned
for high office on the Whig ticket.

Deploring Tyler's proposal to re

peal the Independent treasury, the editor warned that such action would
pave the way for re-establishing a government bank.

The states should

resist this move by forbidding branches of the bank to be established
within their borders.

In addition to the bank's being unwise, unneces

sary, and unpopular, it was also unconstitutional, Stuart concluded.
Viewing a central fiscal agency as a thinly disguised bank,
Stuart warned that the cost of establishing a "Fiscal Bank" would
fabricate an excuse to raise the tariff and serve as "the Keystone"
of a system to plunder the South.

In order to dramatize their op

position to these Whig moves. Charleston Demcorats sponsored a mass
meeting at which both Calhoun and Stuart spoke.

This "genuine turnout

of the people," destroyed the chances of the few local Whigs, "men of
Northern sympathies and Northern interests," said the Mercury.

Here

was the party line again; under the approving eyes of Calhoun, the

^Mercury, Jan. 5, 13, 20, 30, Feb. 1, 18, Mar. 5, 6, 9, 10,
16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 24, 26, 31, Apr. 1, May 12, 27, 28, 1841.
The
Mercury explained Van Buren's defeat as "the result of speculation
. . . sprung from . . . Bank Rottenness and profligacy." This had
enabled the Whigs to w i n the northern masses with unworthy appeals,
said the editor.
Repudiating democracy again, the Mercury approvingly
noted that South Carolina had preserved her honor by remaining loyal
to the "fundamental doctrines of the republican school" (ibid.,
Nov. 16, 17, Dec. 21, 1840; Jan. 26, 1841, see above, 121-22).
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meeting condemned distribution, tariffs, and the bank.®
The meeting and the Mercury triggered another newspaper battle.
Castigated by Stuart as "the organ of a foreign and hostile influence,"
the outraged Courier wrathfully announced itself "as entirely Caro
linian" as the M ercury, proclaimed its independence of "John Crisis
Calhoun" and dismissed the Mercury as "the ally and champion of North
ern Democracy."

The President, after all, was a Southerner; indeed,

h e was a Virginian.

But then so was "The Hon. William Circumstance

Preston," as the Mercury called him.^
News of Tyler's bank bill vetoes distressed the Courier as
much as it delighted the Mercury.

Stuart reported the first veto as

"an act of deliverance . . . from the domination of the conspiracy and
avarice of profligate ambition."

In his second message, however, the

President seemed to leave the door open to compromise with bank men,
the Mercury warned.

Distribution after all, was still very much alive,

and very dangerous.

Aside from its being unconstitutional, it would

also reinvigorate high tariff men.

The South would pay out ten times

in taxes the amount distributed; this measure was just another way "to
make the plantation States pay the piper."

At a time when foreign af

fairs were unsettled, it was foolish to divert money from the "legiti
mate and patriotic purpose" of national defense to "the money changers

®Ibid..
Jan. 4, 12, 13, 15, 19, Feb. 10, 13, 15, 23, Apr. 2, 7,
12, 13, 14, 15,
16, 20, 29, May 1, 6, 21, 25, 27, 28, 29, 31, June 2,
4, 5, 8, 9, 10,
11, 12, 15, 23, July 10, 13, 19, Aug. 18, Sept. 1, 8,
1841.
Calhoun's "instructions" to the General Assembly directed that
distribution be condemned and that South Carolina refuse to accept any
money from the act (Wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist, 59).
9 Courier, Apr. 21, 22, 23, May 19, 28, 29, June 2, 4, 11, 25,
28, 30, July 5, 9, 10, 17, 28, 30, Aug. 4, 1841; Mercury, June 3, 11,
1841.
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of the nation . . . menacing us with Insolent threats."

When distri

bution became law In 1841, the Mercury characterized It as "one of the
worst measures that ever emanated from a body of men acknowledging
responsibility . . .

Laughing at Senator Preston's failure to vote

on the Issue, Stuart urged South Carolina to refuse her share of the
monies.

Again he knew whereof he spoke; the legislature voted un

animously to reject whatever amount was allotted to South Carolina.
Then In 1842 the Whigs raised the tariff.
this possibility throughout the previous year.

Stuart had discussed

Fearing that southern

planters of tobacco and sugar contemplated "a grand scheme of log
rolling" with Northern manufacturers, the editor warned that an alli
ance so Ill-considered could only work to the advantage of the latter.
Planters needed to extend overseas trade while manufacturers stood
only for restricting It.

The selfish policy of the latter group pro

tected products of one-tenth of the nation at the expense of the rest.
Criticizing the grasping restrictions Imposed by manufacturers, the
Mercury contended that the tariff damaged foreign markets for Ameri
can exports which were primarily agricultural.

The tariff of 1842—

the "black tariff" James H. Hammond called it— was "more oppressive
than ever before."

A death struggle between Congress and the states

had begun, Stuart said, and he predicted that the South would be tricked

^^Mercury, Jan. 29, Feb. 2, Mar. 5, Apr. 8, May 27, June 25,
28, July 5, 10, 14, 15, Aug. 3, 5, 10, 11, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21, 25,
26, 27, Sept. 1, 4, 9, 10, 13, 14, 15, 18, Oct. 1, 4, 7, 8, 14, 19,
21, 22, 23, 25, Nov. 6, 8, 18, 20, 22, 24, 25, Dec. 2, 15, 20, 1841;
Jan. 17, 1842; Courier, Aug. 20, 21, Sept. 1, 30, Oct. 5, 1841.
Stuart Initially said that South Carolina should accept her "pittance"
from distribution.
Calhoun's sentiment to the contrary was not with
out significance In his change of mind (see above, 128, n. 8).
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by no more compromises.

For months he berated the new law which in

its effect bore no "fruit, not utterly poisonous
Stuart continued to judge Anglo-American disputes in the light
of their effect upon slavery.

The editor saw no cause for war in the

Caroline affray, even— when through the arrest of Alexander McLeod—
the issue of State rights became involved.

The luckless McLeod, a

Canadian deputy and thus a British subject, was arrested on the New
York side of the Anglo-American border and charged with having helped
to destroy Caroline.

Since one American had been killed in the process

of the vessel's destruction, McLeod was indicted for murder and held
for trial by a New York court.

Conviction of the charge of murder

carried with it the distinct possibility that the Canadian would be
executed.

Such an event. Her Majesty's Government said quite un

equivocally, would mean war.
McLeod was acquitted.

Fortunately for all concerned, however,

Although the state rights disposition of the

Mercury required it to uphold the jurisdiction of the New York court,
Stuart felt that McLeod's acquittal represented the wise

course.

^2

Stuart was likewise not much interested in the dispute with
Great Britain over Oregon.

Oregon, like Maine, was inconsequential

in comparison with the outstanding troubles with Britain over slavery,
he said.

Those vessels off Africa which wore the American ensign

^^Mercury, Jan. 7, 8, 26, Feb. 5, 6, 15, 16, Apr. 7, June 12,
Aug. 13, 15, 15, 19, Sept. 14, Oct. 29, 1841; Jan. 26, 27, Feb. 10,
Mar. 22, Apr. 6, 15, May 10, 23, June 24, 28, 29, 30, July 4, 14, 15,
23, 25, Aug. 9, 10, 13, 31, Sept. 2, 1842.
IZlbid., Jan. 5, 11, 26, Feb. 10, 22, Mar. 10, 16, 23, Apr. 3,
9, 26, May 11, June 9, 10, 18, 30, July 20, Aug. 2, Sept. 13, 28,
Oct. 18, Nov. 23, 1841; Mar. 5, Apr. 9, 1842; Wiltse, Calhoun Section
alist, 65-67.
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and were suspected by Britain of being slavers should not be subject
to the British request for permission to board and search them.

The

editor called for Americans to realize that such authority would
menace the "whole commerce of the country with Africa" more than it
would damage southern property.

Indeed, it portended destruction of

the principle of freedom of the seas.

When a New York paper asserted

that America had the sympathy of the world in the Maine boundary dis
pute but was universally condemned for all controversies arising out
of slavery, the Mercury was unimpressed.

The question of the freedom

of the seas was more important than the clearance of title to a
country in which no one lived.

Then there was the "far more mo

mentous question" of the Creole, a direct "aggression upon southern
rights and property."

13

Creole was another American coasting vessel which engaged in
the interstate slave trade and ran afoul of the abolition-minded
British.

During the process of her transit from Norfolk to New Or

leans, Creole's cargo of slaves mutinied, killing a white passenger
in the course of their action.

The mutineers then put into Nassau

where the British hanged the murderers but freed and gave asylum to
the remaining slaves.

For once Stuart was "clear for fighting."

If

only the American Supreme Court had not upheld a similar action on the
part of American Abolitionists, this country could press the point
with honor.

Stuart was displeased when the Webster-Ashburton Treaty

did not satisfactorily resolve the Creole controversy, although he did

^% e r c u r y , Dec. 4, 5, 1840; Mar. 23, June 10, 1841; Mar. 18,
23, Apr. 9, July 14, 23, Aug. 2, 12, 20, 30, 1842; Jan. 30, Feb. 2,
7, Apr. 26, July 26, 1843.
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note with apparent approval the British e n v o y ’s pledge against future
"officious interference" by colonial officials.
by the treaty settlement involving vessels off

He was also satisfied
Africa.

14

The Texas question was even more important to Stuart.

No

longer so sure by 1840 that annexation would be best for the Texans,
the Mercury reported a sometime Texan's view that independence might
save the young nation from filling "the pockets of Northern manufactur
ers and abolitionists."
was Stuart’s policy.

Firm friendship for the "advancing state"

His preference for peaceful settlement of dis

putes extended to the matter of Texas.

Despite his sympathy for

fellow Southerners, Stuart did not believe that Mexican military
threats justified American intervention.

The United States should do

nothing, he said, to damage the chances for a peaceful settlement of
their own dispute with Mexico.

Consequently, the Mercury joined Cal

houn to endorse Secretary of State W e b ster’s policy of neutrality.

^Wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist, 69-70; Mercury, Mar. 23, Aug.30,
1842.
Stuart’s reference to the Supreme Court concerns the Amistad, a
Spanish schooner whose slave cargo mutinied and put into a Connecticut
port.
The Supreme Court upheld the lower courts in Connecticut in their
refusal to return the mutineers to bondage (Mercury, Sept. 2, 3, 11, 12,
Oct. 1, 1849; Jan. 22, 23, Mar. 4, 1840; Mar. 16, 24, 1841).
Stuart would have been much happier had he known how much trouble
the British negotiator got from the Americans over Creole. Tyler was
"disposed to be obstinate on the subject," Lord Ashburton said.
Ash
burton informed his superiors that he was "satisfying the Southern people
as well as " he was able.
"îty great plague was the Creole," he lam
ented (Wilber Devereux Jones, "The Influence of Slavery on the WebsterAshburton Negotiations," J S H , XXII, No. 1 (Feb., 1956), 49, 52.
The Webster-Ashburton Treaty provided for the United States to
maintain a naval squadron off Africa.
It would be this squadron’s
job to search any vessel wearing American colors, which was suspected
of being a slaver (Jones, "Webster-Ashburton Negotiations," J S H , XXII,
53-58).
Calhoun supported the Webster-Ashburton Treaty.
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By 1843, however, Stuart’s view of the situation was losing
some of its detachment.

Britain’s abolitionist designs on Texas had

made immediate annexation the only way to "repel the dangerous inter
vention of Europe in the affairs of this Continent," he said.
"peace of the Union" was threatened.

The

Unrealistic in their preoccupa

tion with the Oregon issue. Northerners were "inflamed by the danger
of England encircling us by getting possession of the remote territory
of Oregon."

Their reasoning could hardly be more specious.

Deluding

themselves with make-believe dangers from non-existent British threats
to that distant place, the North was blind to the obvious menace in
Texas.

The Mercury saw the British presence there as encirclement

"hard and fast in our settled country and on the course of our great
est commerce.

. . ."

Cuba be taken lightly.

Nor could the design of British Abolitionists on
Texas and Cuba were "slave States and Angli

cizing them would be the triumph of Abolition.
Generally speaking, Stuart left the evidence of Britain's
ulterior motives to communications and extracts from other news
sources.

He expended his energies in demolishing those who opposed

the Mercury's latest program for Texas.

By the fall of 1843 the editor

was convinced that annexation was the only honorable solution to this
question.

The curiously strict-constructionist argument of Daniel

Webster that the Constitution permitted on such extension of the Ameri
can domain impressed the Jeffersonian state rights editor as drivel.

^^Mercury, Aug. 1, 1840; Apr. 26, June 23, Dec. 3, 1841; Jan. 25,
26, Feb. 18, Mar. 8, 22, 23, 24, 25, 28, 30, Apr. 1, 29, May 12, 13, 14,
16, July 20, 1842; June 17, Oct. 13, 28, Nov. 21, 29, 1843.
The senti
ment that through independence Texans might save themselves from north
ern exactions was that of James W. Simmons, a Charlestonian who spent
some time in Texas.
The Mercury quoted it on February 10, 1842.
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Expansion of the national border to include Texas was "perfectly con
stitutional, expedient and just," said the Mercury.

Defending Presi

dent Tyler for his decision to press for annexation, the editor dis
missed the charges that Tyler had manufactured the Texas issue to pro
mote his presidential ambitions.

When the Abolitionists carped that

Texas would allow "the slave population to expand," the Mercury ob
served with satisfaction that slave labor was more advantageous than
free labor.

The full opposition to annexation was, in fact, "palpably

an Abolitionist move— slavery is— the only argument urged with any zeal
by Northern papers," Stuart said.
Texas today,"

"We have given much space to . . .

the editor reported on April 5, 1844.

greatest topic of the time."

"But it is the

And indeed it was— at least in South

Carolina.
Texas was a timely topic all over the South by 1844.

This

timeliness was at least partially the result of the interest in Texas
displayed by European governments.

The first evidence of this interest

occurred in London in the summer of 1842.
At that time Duff Green and General James Hamilton, two Cal
houn partisans of long standing, were in Europe.
assignment for President Tyler.

Green was on special

General Hamilton who, like many Caro

linians , had emigrated to Texas, had only recently been replaced as the
Texan representative to London and Paris.

In London they learned of a

startling announcement made to the House of Commons by Sir Robert Peel,
the Prime Minister.

They immediately conveyed their displeasure at

IGlbid., Nov. 21, 1843; Mar. 20, 21, 25, Apr. 5, 10, 18, 19,
30, May 12, 13, 16, 18, 21, 27, 29, June 7, 12, 19, 20, 24, 26, 28,
July 19, Dec. 17, 1844.
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Peel's statement to colleagues in the slave states.

17

Peel had told the Commons that Her Majesty's possessions in
the West Indies could no longer compete with products of lands in
which slave labor was employed.

Whatever satisfaction the slavehold-

ing South might have gained from Sir Robert's apparent endorsement of
Stuart's argument that slave labor was superior to free labor, was des
troyed by the minister's next statement.

In consequence of this situ

ation, Peel continued. Her Majesty's Government had concluded that pro
motion of manumission everywhere in the Western Hemisphere must be its
policy.

An intensive effort to effect abolition in Texas, where one

of two tactics could be employed, would inaugurate the new program.
Britain could ensure the emancipation of Texas's slaves either by
restoration of that province to Mexico or by extending the protection
of Her Majesty's Government to the Texas Republic.

If the latter

course were adopted, the British reformers must be prepared to under
write a compensated emancipation.^^
The American reaction, at least in the South, was swift and
direct.

John Randolph of Roanoke had long since predicted the alli

ance between British and American Abolitionists; now that prediction

l^Wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist, 150-51.
Hamilton was a fre
quent contributor to the Mercury on the subject of Texas during 1844.
Having previously broken with Calhoun over the question of sub
treasury, Hamilton was virtually without political influence in South
Carolina,
A series of financial reverses combined with the rupture
with Calhoun to convince the former Nullifier to go to Texas.
Chastened perhaps by his fate, Hamilton made peace with Calhoun in
1844 and worked with him on Texas (Glenn, "James Hamilton, Jr.,"
260-67; Hamilton to Calhoun, Sept. 19, 1843, Hamilton Papers).
^ % i l t s e , Calhoun Sectionalist, 150-51; Justin H. Smith,
The Annexation of Texas (New York, 1941), 84-86.
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seemed to be verging on reality.

Holding that the United States must

immediately annex Texas if it hoped to contain Britain's abolition
ist-inspired expansions, Southerners of such divergent belief as
Andrew Jackson and John Tyler joined to support annexation.
can Abolitionists, quite predictably, did not.

Ameri

John Quincy Adams

allied himself with twelve other abolition-minded Congressmen to
proclaim the addition of Texas to the United States to be tantamount
to dissolution of the Union.
One year later, in the summer of 1843, the British Foreign
Minister assured a delegation from the World Convention of Abolition
ists that Her Majesty's Government would "employ all legitimate means"
to effect abolition in Texas.

When Ashbel Smith, who had replaced

Hamilton as Texas's envoy, asked for an explanation of these remarks,
he was not reassured by Lord Aberdeen's restatement of his announce
ment to the Abolitionists.

In informing his government of this de

velopment, Smith felt that Great Britain's conception of the impor
tance of emancipation in Texas was that it would precipitate the same
action in the United States.

British motives were twofold, he said.

They were philanthropic in that Englishmen conceived of slavery as an
immoral institution and economic in that the peculiar institution des
troyed the competitiveness of Britain's own tropical products of free
labor.

There was yet another area in which abolition in America would

aid the British economy.

Smith said that Great Britain thought that

southern cotton supported both shipping and manufacturing in the United
States.

Without slavery the cotton crop would decline precipitately

^^Wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist, 152; Kirk, Randolph, 123-24.
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and would take with it northern competitors of Great Britain.

Little

wonder that the Mercury felt encircled.
The Texan envoy was a native New Englander who had made his
way to Texas by way of a residency in North Carolina where he had
edited a nullification paper.

Not unnaturally, he was acquainted

with Calhoun's strategy in defense of slavery, and he wrote the South
Carolinian an account of these unsettling developments in London.

Cal

houn forwarded the letter to Abel P. Upshur who had recently succeeded
Webster as Secretary of State.

Concluding that Texas must be annexed,

Upshur found himself in agreement with both Calhoun and Tyler.

And

by the fall of 1843 the administration had begun to work for the
adoption of annexation as a conscious policy.
The whole of South Carolina seemed to catch fire over annexa
tion in 1844.

In Upcountry and Lowcountry public meetings resolved

that Texas must become American; some gatherings proposed disunion as
the alternative.

Almost seven hundred people packed a Charleston thea

ter to decide for immediate action "of vital importance to our country."
Since Stuart was out of town, John Milton Clapp, the Mercury's
ate editor,

represented the paper.

associ

Pinckney, the former editor,

was also there and so was Jacob Cardozo, editor of the Patriot.

Both

Pinckney and Cardozo loudly voiced their agreement with the assembly's

20wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist, 153.
Zllbid., 153-55. Wiltse says that Calhoun had "nothing to do"
with Tyler's decision to annex Texas and that he only gave his opinion
when it was requested.
Since, however, his information came from the
same general sources as did theirs, he and they arrived at parallel
conclusions at about the same time (ibid., 155-56).
The Mercury's
course coincided with Calhoun's.
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decision to press for annexation.

Even the absent Courier *s chief

indicated a tepid agreement if annexation could be effected without
war, disunion, or nullification.

It was not, after all, "a vital

question," at least not to the Courier.

Demonstrating his undiluted

contempt for the cautious. Whig-tainted, rival Courier's position,
Clapp railed that the Courier "could be expected to throw up like a
buzzard every day.

..."

advised his own readers to

Continuing in the same tasteless vein, he
exercise caution and "stand from under!"

The Mercury *s store of vitriol was not diminished by Stuart's absence.

23
The threats of the Abolitionists to slavery were not limited,

however, to the Texas question.

New York's delay in surrendering

slave "kidnappers" to Virginia furnished another of the malignant
abolitionist attacks on the South.

The Prigg case in Pennsylvania

brought the Abolitionists into "direct legal conflict with the Union."
Pennsylvania had enacted a statute to hinder recovery of fugitives

^ M e r c u r y , May 8, 11, 14,
associate editor in 1837.
He was
1843 due to Stuart's bad health.
endorsed annexation (Patriot, May

15, 18, June 4, 1844.
Clapp became
especially active on the paper after
Cardozo, the Patriot editor, strongly
6, 8, 11, 13, 14, 16, 1844).

^% e r c u r y , Apr. 21, May 8, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 18, 25, 27, 28,
30, June 4, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 17, 24, 25, 27, 28, 29, July 1, 2,
1844; Courier, June 26, 28, 29, July 1, 1844.
Former Senator Pres
ton said that South Carolina's reaction on the Texas issue was a
directed one.
"The public mind is not heated on the subject in this
state nor can the newspapers inflame it," h e wrote, "but orders have
been received for public meetings, etc. which may succeed" (Preston
to John J. Crittenden, May 4, 1844, quoted in White, Rhett, 71, n.l5).
While due allowance must be made for Preston's Whiggery, he was prob
ably right in his analysis.
Calhoun was Secretary of State at the
time of Preston's comment and had launched an intensive drive for
annexation.
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and it took the Supreme Court to invalidate it.

The Prigg contro

versy only made Virginia’s and South Carolina's Inspection Laws more
necessary to protect southern property from Yankee thieves, said
Clapp.

Northern Fanatacism threatened even the churches.

Lament

ing the division of "one of the most powerful of the Christian sects,"
the Methodist Church, into "a Southern and a Northern Religion," the
Mercury viewed this "most ominous and decisive event of our times" as
another result of "the ruthless intrusion of abolition."

The message

was plain enough to be understood on all sides :
If the clergy whose business is peace and good will
cannot tolerate each other of the same sect, what
will become of the politicians whose vocation is
strife and dissencion [sic]?
To this outspoken editor the answer was clear; the Methodist division
was "the first dissolution of the Union.

^^Mercury, Jan. 16, 20, Feb. 5, 6, Mar. 22, 25, 29, 30, Apr. 1,
Dec. 16, 18, 1841; Jan. 20, Mar. 7, Apr. 18, 30, May 3, Dec. 30, 31,
1842; Jan. 5, 10, 11, 1843; June 14, 20, 1844.
The editor’s analysis
of the significance of the Methodist division was more accurate per
haps than he realized.
Evangelical Protestantism at the North, no
longer content with the strict spiritual and religious realm, was
becoming "a pragmatic, activistic force for social" reform.
This
aggressive force held emancipation to be an important step in the
coming of the millenium (Anne C. Loveland, "Evangelicalism and ’Im
mediate Emancipation’ in American Anti-Slavery Thought," J S H , XXXII,
No. 2 [May, 1966], 172-88),
This intolerant crusade ran headlong into
southern Methodists.
Methodism in the South had substituted concern
for the black m a n ’s soul for its former interest in emancipation.
So
effective where southern Methodists in reaching the slave that by 1826
of all Georgia Methodists 40 per cent were black.
Three years later
the South Carolina planter, Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, asked for
Methodist preachers for his slaves.
And he told the Agricultural
Society of South Carolina that religion could take the place of em
ancipation.
At the time of the schism the southern Methodists’ only
defense for slavery was that they saw no other way to regulate race
relations.
They denied being a pro-slavery church (Lewis M. Purifoy,
"The Southern Methodist Church and the Pro-slavery Argument," J S H ,
XXXII, No. 3 [Aug., 1966], 326-328; Donald G. Mathews, "The Metho
dist Mission to the Slaves, 1829-1844," J A H , LI, No. 4 [March, 1965],
615-31),
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The "Gag Resolutions," which had been repealed temporarily
in 1841, were finally repealed in 1844.

Fulminating at the "treach

erous surrender of Southern rights," the editor was not surprised at
the first action, "the proof, the Damning Proof!" as it was, of the
unreliability of Whigs.

He felt betrayed, however, when "in the

second day of the session," the Democratic Congress of 1844 struck
down the resolutions.

It "will doubtless give comfort to the souls

of our Union loving friends," said the satirical editor.
was conquered, and conquered by their Northern allies."

The "South
Those same

"Northern Allies" likewise prevented the Democratic Congress from
righting the wrongs of the tariff.

Had not the Democrats of New York

assembled in convention in 1843 to endorse "a tariff founded on
revenue principles"?

The Mercury declared them to be "heart and hand

with Mr. Clay and the Whig party" and it wrote them into opposition.
While Stuart's paper faithfully related the chilling threats
to slavery, it also looked ahead to the presidential election of 1844.
The tariff would be of momentous concern in this election, the Mer
cury said; thus the candidate must be a follower of "those great funda
mental doctrines of the republican school."

If the Democrats would only

select the right man, they would have no trouble in overthrowing the
"wasteful and oppressive system" of the hopelessly divided Whigs.

Al

though throughout 1841 Stuart counselled that any discussion of likely
candidates was premature, privately he favored Calhoun.

During the

summer of 1842, the Mercury began to probe for the sentiments of other

^^Mercury, Jan. 20, Mr. 2, 4, June 11, 14, 16, 17, 19, 24,
1841; Mar. 1, 2, 4, Dec. 7, 14, 18, 1844; Jan. 7, 1845.
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states by cautiously advancing Calhoun's qualifications.

Stuart

took care lest a strong stand by South Carolina alienate northern
Democrats and he vowed not "to make the choice of a candidate a cause
for contention and ill blood."

The Mercury would support any sound

candidate who was fairly chosen.
So circumspect a policy was hardly characteristic of the Mer
cury.

The stakes, however, were high; so for more than a year the

editor warily approached his goal— the nomination of Calhoun for the
presidency.

Explaining his caution to the senior Senator, Stuart

reported:
. . . all agree that for this state to move now in
a nomination would be ruinous.
It would be as bad
as to effect as if the nomination came from your
self or your immediate family.
For such is the
relation in which abroad the State and yourself
are regarded; and such in fact is the feeling of
our State— a feeling which no local division or
internal State quarrel can impair.^6
In the process of its prudent campaign, the Mercury went so
far as to declare itself an orthodox party sheet, even if the Demo
crats chose to tap someone else for the high office.

By late autumn

of 1842 indications were that this policy had served its purpose.
November 28, 1842, the Mercury abandoned its reserve.

On

Hoisting at its

masthead the banner of "Free Trade, Low Duties, No Debt, Separation
from Banks, Economy, Retrenchment and Strict Adherence to the Consti
tution," Stuart's paper declared these ideas to be the political prin
ciples of "John C. Calhoun."

The action was taken only after careful

consultation with Calhoun, Rhett, and others of the party leaders

26Mercury, Jan. 16, Mr. 19, Sept. 24, 1841; June 22, July 2,
Aug. 15, Sept. 2, 10, Oct. 1, 14, Nov. 8, 10, 12, 14, 1842; Stuart
to Calhoun, Oct. 11, Nov. 19, 1841, Calhoun Papers.
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in South Carolina.

Calhoun was "the man best qualified by character

and position" for the nation’s highest office, the Mercury proclaimed.
Acting to express its quick agreement, the General Assembly nominated
Calhoun for the presidency in December 1842.

Two months later the

Carolinian received the formal endorsement of his faithful ally, the
Mercury.

FOR PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES --- JOHN C. CALHOUN,
SUBJECT TO THE DECISION OF A DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION
appeared at the paper’s masthead where it remained until January 27,
1844.

Meanwhile the Carolinian had resigned from the Senate in order

to avoid becoming involved in needless

controversy.

27

During the months of the Mercury’s discreet, then open, cam
paign for Calhoun, the association between leader and paper was closer
than it had ever been.
this coalition.

It was, in fact, high tide for the forces of

Throughout the campaign the Mercury’s strategy was

directly determined by Calhoun’s planning force, of which Stuart was
a part.

The idea of Calhoun's again trying for the presidency had

appeared as early as 1848, the Democratic p a r t y ’s return to ortho
doxy on slavery and the tariff being responsible for it.

In 1841

Calhoun himself concluded to allow his friends to bid for the nomina
tion on his behalf, and Robert Barnwell Ehett commenced to organize

^M e r c u r y . Nov. 28, Dec. 19, 1842; Jan. 2, Feb. 8, 1843; Cal
houn to Hammond, Nov. 27, 1842, Jameson, ed., Calhoun Correspondence,
519-22.
Calhoun regarded the Mercury’s role in the forthcoming
campaign as an important one.
Referring to the announcement of his
candidacy, the retiring Senator said "Much will depend on the notice
that . . . the Mercury may take of it" (Calhoun to Hammond, Nov. 27,
1842, Jameson, e d . , Calhoun Correspondence, 519).
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the Senator's forces in South Carolina for the task.

Others like

Colonel Elmore, president of the state bank, Dixon H. Lewis, El
more's brother-in-law who was also an influential Congressman from
Alabama, and Robert M. T. Hunter of Virginia, lately Speaker of the
House of Representatives, contributed to Calhoun's chances by con
tacting favorably disposed politicians in other states.
The plan of the Calhoun backers called for South Carolina to
play a quiet role lest she frighten away support from other parts of
the country.

With this in mind, it was decided that Calhoun's formal

nomination would be made by a legislature other than South Carolina's.
Unfortunately for this plan, the effort of the Calhounites to placate
South Carolina Unionists did not prove wholly successful; Governor
Richardson relayed details of the nomination strategy to Van Buren's
confidant, Joel Poinsett, and the machinations of the Van Buren mach
ine may be supposed to have foiled the Calhoun intentions.^9

In any

George R. McFarlane to R. B. Rhett, June 6, 1841, Richard
son to Rhett, May 17, 1842, E. J. (illegible) to Elizabeth Rhett,
July 8, 1842, R. M. T. Hunter to R. B. Rhett, Sept. 26, 1842, Wm. A.
Elmore to Rhett, Nov. 10, 1842, Rhett Collection; Wiltse, Calhoun
Sectionalist, 89-90; Capers, Calhoun; Opportunist, 203-05; White,
R h e t t , 57; Matthew A. Fitzsimmons, "Calhoun's Bid for the Presidency,
1841-1844," MVHR, XXXVIII, No. 1 (June, 1951), 45; Calhoun to Ham
mond, Sept. 24, 1841, Jameson, ed., Calhoun Correspondence, 489-93.
Wiltse says that Calhoun undoubtedly indicated the tone he
wanted the Charleston Mercury . . . to take" (Wiltse, Calhoun Sec
tionalist, 89; see also Calhoun to A. Rhett, Sept. 27, 1843, Rhett
Collection).
29prancis Pickens to Calhoun, Oct. 12, 1841,
Charles S.
Boucher and Robert P. Brooks, ed.. Correspondence Addressed to Cal
houn (Washington, 1940), 163-64, hereinafter cited as Boucher, ed.,
Correspondence to Calhoun; Stuart to Calhoun, Nov. 19, 1841, Cal
houn Papers; F. H. Elmore to R. B. Rhett, Jan. 11, 1843, Stuart to
Rhett, Jan. 9, 11, 1843, Rhett Collection; Wiltse, Calhoun Section
alist, 89-92.
The original intention of the Calhoun party was for
the Georgia legislature to nominate the Carolinian.
South Carolina
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event it was left to the General Assembly of South Carolina to make
the nomination.30
There was one serious obstacle in the way of victory for the
Carolinian.

Political trends indicated a Democratic victory in 1844;

if Calhoun could secure the nomination, he was virtually assured of
election.

But the manner of selecting delegates to the Democratic

convention would have the distinct effect of favoring Van Buren.

Cus

tomarily, delegates were chosen by majority vote of state conventions;
they were also pledged to vote by the unit rule which gave the entire
state delegation to one man.

As matters stood in 1843, Van Buren

was then expected to respond by endorsing the action of her sister
state.
Calhoun informed Governor Richardson of the plan and— as
noted above— Richardson relayed the information to Poinsett.
Poin
sett, in turn, told Van Buren.
This development indicated that South
Carolina Unionists were not yet thoroughly reconciled to Calhoun's
leadership.
Wiltse feels that the Van Buren camp may have destroyed
Calhoun's chances for success in Georgia (Wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist, 91; see also R. Beale to Calhoun, Sept. 15, 1842, James Auchincloss to Calhoun, Sept. 20, 22, Oct. 1, 1842, Dixon H. Lewis to
Calhoun, Nov. 2, 1842, Boucher, e d . , Correspondence to Calhoun,
172-74, 179).
3ÛThe General Assembly had a busy time of it in 1842. Not
only did Calhoun have to be replaced but so also did Preston who had
resigned for reasons quite different from those of the senior Senator
(Wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist, 89-92; White, Rhett, 57-58).
Preston,
by remaining firmly in the Whig camp w hen Calhoun signalled a return
to the Democrats brought the full wrath of the Calhoun forces down
on his head.
He was so completely defeated in the process that by
1842 Pierce Butler, once his friend, called h im the "deadest" man in
Congress.
Preston was not even denounced at the July fourth gather
ings in 1842 (Lander, "Calhoun-Preston Feud," SCHM, LIX, No. 1, 3637).
Then there was the gubernatorial election.
George McDuffie,
the Nullifier and Daniel Huger, a Unionist, were sent to the Senate.
Rhett who had expected Huger's seat was sacrificed in a further at
tempt to placate the Unionists and thus assure unity in South Caro
lina.
Rhett incorrectly blamed Pickens for this development, con
tributing thereby to a subsequent rift in the Calhoun camp. Hammond
became governor.
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could command small majorities in enough states to deny Calhoun the
nomination.

Consequently the Carolinian's forces proposed a change in

electoral procedure, but in the process impaled themselves on the horns
of a dilemma.
Free-trade sentiment was strong in the northern commercial
cities; delegates from Boston, New York, and Philadelphia who were
not bound by a unit rule could prevent a protectionist from being
nominated.

Barring complications, such a situation would be favor

able to Calhoun.
South.

His planners counted on being able to carry the

There was also some contention as to when the nomination con

vention should meet.

Van Buren wished to call the convention for

November but the Calhounites favored a date in the late spring.

By

that time the Congressional session would have ended and Van Buren's
forces in Congress would have been forced to take a position on the
recently enacted Whig t a r i f f . 32
On January 25, 1843, the Mercury published an "Appeal to
the Democratic Party on the Principles of a National Convention for
the Nomination of President and Vice-President of the United States."
Its author was Rhett.

Circulated also in pamphlet form, this docu

ment contended— quite curiously for both Calhoun and the Mercury—
that the Constitution meant for the President to be elected not by

31wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist, 109-10; White, Rhett, 60-61.
32wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist, 109-10; White, Rhett, 61.
Calhoun's position on the date of the convention was dic
tated by some of his radical partisans at the South.
They would
agree to support no one whose followers did not vote to repeal the
tariff of 1842.
By scheduling the convention after the Congres
sional session, they could determine Van Buren's tariff stance
(Wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist, 109).
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the states but by the people.

The presidency was a popular office

which represented every American, Rhett said.

Reminding his readers

that Andrew Jackson had once proposed a constitutional amendment that
would authorize the President's being directly elected by the people,
Rhett concluded that the aged Tennessean had been right.

Adoption by

the Democratic party of the district system would accomplish this pur
pose.

Suggesting that congressional districts should choose their own

representatives to the nominating convention, Rhett contended that
these representatives should be able to vote as individuals rather than
being bound by the then existing unit rule.

This system would make the

selection of the nominee truly an exercise of the will of the people.
Robert Barnwell Rhett had declared himself to be in favor of
democracy, the Mercury's age-old enemy of majority rule.

But if the

editor choked upon receipt of the "Appeal," there was not even a hint
of disapproval in the paper.

Defending the "Appeal" on both prac

tical and ideological grounds, the Mercury said that the district sys
tem as advocated by Rhett provided the best means for destroying Van
Buren's machine.

Delegates should be elected by Congressional dis

tricts and should also vote as individuals.

The unit rule was de

nounced as undemocratic; it should be discarded,said the Mercury.
Rhett's method was not only more democratic but it also protected the
right of the minority from abuse by the larger and more populous
states.

Rhett to Orestes Brownson, Jan. 19, 1843, Rhett Papers; L.
C. Manning to Rhett, Jan. 26, 1843, R. Bates to Rhett, Jan. 26, 1843,
F. A. Howard to Rhett, Feb. 4, 1843, Rhett Collection; Mercury, Jan.
25, Feb. 10, 11, Mar. 7, 15, 16, 25, 28, 30, Apr. 3, 4, 7, 12, 17, 20,
27, May 3, 18, 20, 23, June 5, July 19, 20, 26, 27, Aug. 1, 3, 5, 8,
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It was seldom that this journal of South Carolina gentlemen
took a stand in defense of popular government; indeed, it had never
happened before.

But the Mercury spoke in just such a manner in 1843.

Nor was response in South Carolina long in manifesting itself.

Mass

meetings endorsed Rhett's proposal while a state convention recommended
it to other states.

Calhoun himself, however, had some trouble

swallowing all its implications and was obliged to equivocate on
the issues raised by the "Appeal" on more than one occasion.

When

the question of whether this method was consistent with state rights
was raised, a Mercury correspondent provided the answer.

The whole

question of the selection of delegates as well as of the date of the
convention should be left to the states, he said.

Calhoun grate

fully accepted his reasoning.
Not unnaturally, the Van Buren camp was as quick to oppose
this proposal of the Calhounites as it was to question the extent of

15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 26, 28, 29, Sept. 1, 2, 4, 6, 7,
12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 26, 28, 29, Oct. 6, 9, 28, 1843; Jan. 1, 29, 30,
1844 (The Mercury's reasoning on minority protection ran counter to
Rhett’s explanation of the district system but followed Calhoun's
argument in behalf of the proposed change, see below, n. 34); Wiltse,
Calhoun Sectionalist, 110, White, Rhett, 60-61.
^^White, Rhett, 63; Mercury,July 19, Aug. 17, 28, 1843.
Cal
houn's explanation of the district system sometimes ran directly con
trary to Rhett's.
Under the current convention system, Calhoun said,
the most populous states controlled the election of the president.
Since they already determined the make-up of the House of Represen
tatives, they had, by the convention system, destroyed the balance
in government.
The district plan, Calhoun continued, would restore
the balance by increasing the power of the less populous areas.
Yet
Rhett had based his argument on the will of the majority.
A frus
trated Rhett admitted that the explanations did not "reach the
popular mind" (White, Rhett, 63).
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South Carolina's conversion to democracy.

But the advantage was with

Van Buren since it was Calhoun who was proposing the change.

Van

Buren's own position on the date of the convention was not so ad
vantageous.

If the convention were delayed, he would lose support

in one or another sections of the country, regardless of the po
sition his followers took in Congress.

Naturally, then, he favored

an early meeting of the convention, one which would precede the con
gressional session.

In an effort to distract public attention from his

predicament, Van Buren charged Calhoun's forces with insincerity to
the Democracy.

Contending tht the Calhounites would only support

the party if Calhoun were the candidate, Van Buren's followers called
upon Calhoun himself for an answer.

The Carolinian replied that he did

not doubt the loyalty of his friends to the party.

They would abide by

the decision of any convention that was "fairly called and fairly con
stituted that would allow ample time for the full development of pub
lic opinion and would represent fully, equally, and fairly, the voice
of the majority of the people."

The Mercury dutifully added this

qualified pledge to its banner, the ensign of the campaign.
Once the Mercury declared its formal endorsement of Calhoun's
candidacy on February 8, 1843, it devoted more of its space to attacks
upon Van Buren than to praise of the Senator.

Calhoun's virtues were

too well known in South Carolina to require much comment.

While Van

Buren was personally acceptable to the Lfercury, his friends were sus
pected of hostility to the South.
on both slavery and the tariff.

They were, in fact, often unsound
If Van Buren's own opposition to "the

^^Wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist, 110; Mercury, Feb. 8, July 26,
1843.
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injustice and inequality" of protection was obvious, it was also
equivocal in that it rested "not upon the rock of the Constitution
but upon the faithless and capricious sands of policy and expediency."
This might well make him vulnerable to unsound party factions, the
editor feared.

Never much troubled by charges of inconsistency, the

Mercury now called it "miserable childish folly" to blame the 1840 de
feat— as it had done at that time— on the deceit of the despised Whigs.
Now blaming the defeat on Van Buren's "own want of manliness and eleva
tion in statesmanship," the Mercury asserted that never "in the hearts
of the people," could he awaken any enthusiastic support.
Calhoun, on the other hand, would be supported by all the
Democrats of 1840 in addition to the many Southerners who did not and
would not vote for Van Buren.

Mass meetings for the Carolinian in

New York City indicated more support for Calhoun even there than for
Van Buren.

"...

Indications

[were] thronging in from all quarters.

South, North, East and West, that . . . the people," were "insisting
. . . to be led by the only man upon whom every Democrat in the Union
can rally with enthusiastic confidence.

..."

Throughout 1843 this

official voice of the candidate proclaimed that it was John C. Cal
houn, "the man for the crisis.

^^Mercury, Jan. 19, 23, 27, 28, Feb. 16, 17, 23, Apr. 3, 8,
17, 18, 20, 24, 25, May 1, 2, 8, 9, 10, 17, 18, 19, 20, July 4, Aug.
2, 9, 17, Sept. 4, 12, 13, 14, 20, Oct. 3, 5, 15, 16, 26, Nov. 10,
16, 1843.
The editor noted with some unease that Van Buren's friends
were attacking Calhoun's views on slavery.
Still, the Mercury felt
that the country wanted no more wavering candidates and would support
a "cast iron" m a n like Calhoun (i b i d ., Feb. 17, Apr. 8, 1843).
37%bid., Jan. 2, 6, 23, 24, Feb. 7, 17, Mar. 13, 20, 25, Apr.
18, 19, 24, 25, 28, May 3, June 1, 9, 10, 17, Aug. 2, 10, 30, Sept. 2,
8, 11, 12, 13, 15, 23, 27, 28, Oct. 2, 4, 14, 16, Nov. 27, 28, 28,
1843.
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The Mercury's prediction was more optimistic than credible.
During the spring of 1843 the Virginia state convention declined to
follow Rhett's proposal for selecting delegates to the national nomi
nating convention.

In what was an even greater victory for the Van

Buren group, Virginia also decided that "any individual, however em
inent," who did not support the nominee of the national convention in
the general election was no longer a Democrat.

New York, Tennessee,

and Missouri followed the example of the Old Dominion in rejecting the
Rhett proposals.
tions, however.

The Calhoun forces did win on one of their conten
The nominating convention would meet in the spring.

This was an empty victory as matters stood by October, 1843.

With

Van Buren triumphant in four important states, Calhoun had no chance to
w i n the nomination from a regularly constituted Democratic convention.
On December 21, 1843, the former Senator, acknowledging that
Van Buren men would control the Democratic Convention, witlidrew his
name from consideration by that body.

It was a conditional withdrawal;

he could not, he was careful to say, permit his name to go before a con
vention so constituted.

Putting these sentiments into the form of a

letter, Calhoun sent one copy to the South Carolina Central Committee
in Charleston and another to the state’s senators in Washington.

After

having consulted the committee, the Mercury concluded that the terms
on

of the letter should be honored.

^ % i l t s e , Calhoun Sectionalist, 134-36; White, Rhett, 63;
Capers, Calhoun; Opportunist, 206-07.
New York acted to retain the con
vention procedure in September.
^^Wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist, 147-48; White, Rhett, 65-67;
Capers, Calhoun; Opportunist, 207-08; Mercury, Jan. 27, Feb. 15,
Aug. 30, 1844.
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The issue of January 27, 1844, was conspicuous by the ab
sence of Calhoun's banner at its masthead.

Two days later, in an

editorial that endorsed the sometime Senator's creed as "the ground
of our support of h i m and . . . the condition of our assent to the
election of any man to the Presidency," the Mercury officially an
nounced Calhoun's withdrawal as a candidate.

Calhoun's supporters

from outside the state faithfully followed suit and hauled down
their colors also.

Neither they nor the Mercury realized that the

intentions of the complex Carolinian had been misread.
Calhoun was not pleased by the Mercury's action and hastily
wrote acting editor Clapp with instructions to correct his misinter
pretation.

He had intended only to withdraw his candidacy for the

Democratic nomination, Calhoun informed the wayward editor.

He might

yet run for the presidency as an independent.
For some time Calhoun's supporters had discussed this pos
sibility.

A candidacy uncommitted to either of the national tickets

might deny both regular candidates a majority and throw the election
into the House of Representatives.

This proposal did not command

the support of the whole Calhoun party, however.

Rhett, who still

had his hopes in the Democratic party— where Calhoun had placed them—
joined Elmore to oppose such a move.

The Congressman expected Van

Buren to be defeated in the forthcoming election and the Democrats

^^Wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist, 134; R. M. T. Hunter to
Calhoun, Feb. 6, 1844, Jameson, ed., Calhoun Correspondence, II,
927-31.
Hunter's letter was written to explain why Virginia
assumed that Calhoun was no longer a candidate.
"Such seemed to
be the position of the Mercury," he said, "which seemed to us the
true position." See also Hunter to R. E. Rhett, Feb., 1966, Rhett
Collection.
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to nominate Calhoun in 1848.

While Rhett’s view carried with the

Central Committee— and the Mercury— it still left the Calhounites
divided among themselves.
Rhett.

Calhoun lent his support to those opposing

Led by Francis Pickens this group urged the Committee to re

verse itself partially.

In response to this pressure, the Committee

agreed that South Carolina would boycott the Democratic Convention,
preserving thereby the opportunity to support Calhoun at a later
date.41
The Mercury supported the new policy and so did Rhett.

There

was an impression about, however, that the Calhoun connection with the
paper was flowing more and more through the channel prescribed by
Robert Barnwell Rhett.

Nor was this a wholly unfounded assumption,

although its full significance would not be apparent until after the
election.

For the time being the Mercury was as regular as ever in

its support of the Calhoun version of South Carolina Orthodoxy.

Cal

houn was no stronger in his condemnation of the Baltimore convention
than was the Mercury♦

" [Ijrreconciliably opposed" to that body,

editor Clapp approved the decision of the South Carolina Central Com
mittee to send no delegates and asserted that the Mercury would

4^White, Rhett, 65-67; Pickens to Calhoun, Mar. 3, 1844, Ham
mond to Calhoun, May 10, 1844, Jameson, e d . , Calhoun Correspondence,
II, 933-34, 953-54; Mercury, Feb. 15, Aug. 30, 1844.
Clapp, still
acting for Stuart, accompanied the Mercury announcement of Calhoun's
withdrawal as a candidate with a letter from Calhoun to the Com
mittee.
It gave Calhoun's reasons "for withholding his name as a
candidate for the Presidency from the Convention." The letter was
ambiguous in its wording and was, as Calhoun's reaction indicated, in
tended to leave h i m with room for maneuver.
Clapp acted for Stuart
during most of this period. He was assisted by Albert Rhett until
the latter's death in the fall of 1843 (Albert Rhett to Calhoun, Sept.
5, 12, 15, 18, 19, 24, 25, 1843, Calhoun to Albert Rhett, Sept. 27,
1843, Calhoun Papers; Wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist, 144).
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support the Democratic nominee only if he endorsed "the principles
which w e hold above party."

Van Buren's friends did not meet this

standard; they looked daily more dangerous on the tariff issue.
The Texas issue brought forth new Mercury doubts as to the
candidates.

Van Buren himself opposed annexation and was largely re

sponsible, the Mercury believed, for defeat of the annexation treaty.
Although Tyler was guiltless of the Whig's unworthy charges, he could
hardly be admitted into "full communion" with the Democracy.

His

economic cooperation with the Whigs was not forgotten and should not
b e forgiven, the editor reminded his readers.
yond the Mercury's consideration.

However

Regular Whigs were be

Van Buren's future course

might wander, he could do no more than bring himself "down to the level
of the Whigs in treachery and turpitude."^3
The hopes of those favoring an independent candidacy for Cal
houn were destined to be titillated just once more.

On February 28,

1844, Secretary of State Abel P. Upshur was killed by an explosion
in USS Princeton, the Navy's proudest,newest battleship.

One week

later President Tyler nominated Calhoun to fill Upshur's position;
Calhoun, the President believed, would succeed in annexing Texas.
a time the hopes of Calhoun's supporters revived.

For

Van Buren and Clay

4 2Mercury, Jan. 29, 30, Feb. 2, 29, Mar. 1, 2, 12, 19, Apr. 25,
30, May 1, 2, 6, 8, 9, 10, 1844.
4 3lbid., Aug. 20, Sept. 11, 13, 15, 16, 18, 21, Oct. 22, Dec.
16, 1841; Mar. 11, July 4, 19, Aug. 13, Nov. 25, Dec. 12, 1842; Feb.
16, Apr. 8, June 14, 19, 22, 29, July 1, 10, 24, Aug. 4, 9, Sept. 4,
Dec. 9, 1843; Jan. 4, 26, 29, Feb. 2, 29, Mar. 12, 20, Apr. 25, 30,
May 1, 2, 6, 27, 29, June 11, Aug. 24, 1844.
The Mercury denounced
Clay's position on Texas with even more vigor than it put into its
attacks on Van Buren (ibid., Apr. 30, May 1, 27, 29, 1844).
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h a d both come out in opposition to annexation; a stand for it by Cal
houn might revive his candidacy.

The nomination was confirmed by the

Senate and Calhoun accepted the post.

Proceeding to the capital by way

of Charleston, the new secretary boarded ship there for the remainder
of the journey.

As the vessel in which he was embarked steamed across

the harbor, a revenue cutter, USS Van B u r e n , pulled alongside and its
crew gave three cheers for Calhoun.

The Mercury thought this was a

goodj omen. 44
But Calhoun's campaign was beyond the aid of omens.

Calhoun

concentrated on the problems of being Secretary of State and watched
the major parties.

When Van Buren defected on the Texas question,

Jackson urged James K. Polk of Tennessee to try for the nomination.
In a compromise decision this other Tennessean was selected and Calhoun
concluded to support the p a r t y . ^5
For the first time just the shadow of a doubt crept into the
faces of those readers of the Mercury who were accustomed to finding
the views of the great Carolinian reflected in its pages.

The Mercury

had not really deserted the cause but it did not speak of Polk's capa
bility with that assurance party counsels would have preferred.

The

initial news of Polk's nomination did excite a brief confidence in the

Sîiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist, 159-65; Fitzsimmons, "Calhoun's
Bid for the Presidency," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XXXVIII,
No. 1, 52-60, hereinafter cited as M V H R ; Mercury, Mar. 28, 1844.
^ % i l t s e , Calhoun Sectionalist, 165, 172-86; Capers, Calhoun ;
Opportunist, 208.
Laura White implies that Calhoun might still have
had a chance for the nomination had South Carolina attended the Demo
cratic convention.
Van Buren's position on Texas provided the op
portunity.
Differences in Calhoun's own camp had left it unorgan
ized, however, and it was Polk who profited from the new situation
(White, Rhett, 66).
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Democracy, however.

Polk would "unite the strength and rouse the

spirit of the country," Clapp told his readers.

He also believed that

the Democratic candidate would also receive "the hearty support of the
state."

But Clapp soon became suspicious of Polk’s tariff stance.

More and more, the Mercury saw appearances of his having "gone over
to the enemy."

Polk's position looked like that of all those others

who approved "the present Black Tariff of 1842."

Although Polk was

sound on slavery, stood for annexation, and was preferable generally
to Clay, the Democratic candidate received only lukewarm support from
the Mercury.

For once the paper was not speaking for Calhoun.

Party

leaders in the state talked with confidence of both the Democratic
platform and nominee.
Merc u r y .

Popular support likewise exceeded that of the

Clay, for his part, stirred little interest in South Caro

lina even after he paid a visit to Charleston.

Speaking of the

strgnge crowd of curiosity-seekers that turned out for him, the Mer
cury contrasted it with the spontaneity of those who always came to hear
Calhoun.

There was no press endorsement of Clay, not even from the

Courier.46

Clearly unexcited about the forthcoming election, the

Mercury for a time played the role of champion without a cause.

Feb. 5,
25, 29,
25, 26.
Oct. 1,
Apr. 5,

46Mercury, Dec. 1, 2, 11, 14, 28, 29, 1843; Jan. 4, 9, 31,
6, 7, 12, Mr. 1, 20, Apr. 2, 4, 8, 9, 11, 12, 16, 22, 23,
May 1, 28, 30, June 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 13, 19, July 17, 19, 22,
27, 29, 31, Aug. 1, 5, 7, 20, 21, 24, Sept. 17, 18, 23, 26,
5, 17, 18, 30, Nov. 12, 18, 1844; Courier, Jan. 27, 29,
June 3, 26, July 10, Nov. 12, 1844; Patriot, Aug. 19, 1844.
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CHAPTER V

IMPATIENT PRODIGAL

The Mercury’s curious apathy toward the election of 1844
signified political uncertainty.

Calhoun, the architect of South

Carolina Orthodoxy, had decreed that his state should throw her full
weight behind the Democratic candidate’s bid for the presidency.
the Mercury could only damn that candidate with faint praise.

Yet

P o l k ’s

election, the unenthusiastic editor said, was preferable to that of
the Whig, Henry Clay.^

Clapp’s tepid response to Calhoun’s direc

tive was startling and unexpected; so equivocal an endorsement was—
for the Mercury— no endorsement at all.

The hitherto loyal journal

was clearly ignoring at least the spirit of party orders, an action
that implied a declaration of editorial independence.

The result

ing dissolution of a long-term alliance loomed as a distinct pos
sibility.
The question of Po l k ’s fitness or unfitness for high office
was hardly sufficient to destroy an alliance that had endured for
greater crises in times past.

For more than twenty years, agile

Mercury editors had trimmed their sails to fit the winds of Cal
houn strategy; indeed, they had willingly made their paper into the
enthusiastic "house organ"^ of Calhoun.

Henry Laurens Pinckney

^Mercury, Aug. 1, 7, Sept. 3, 1844.
^The term "house organ" is from Wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist,
190.
156

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

157
inaugurated the policy in 1823 when he wrote the Mercury endorse
ment of Calhoun's first attempt at the presidential nomination.
Pinckney retreated from nationalism with Calhoun; he followed, then
doubted, and finally condemned Jackson with Calhoun.

And the Mercury

was among the most loyal of those who supported nullification.^
John Allan Stuart's editorial loyalty to Calhoun exceeded
even that of his predecessor Pinckney's.

It was Stuart who com

mitted the Mercury to support Calhoun's post-nullification strategy
of an aggressive southern resistance to outside attacks on the South's
slave-oriented agrarianism.

From time to time Stuart had misunder

stood tactical deployments in pursuit of the strategic goal; he had
even thought as he evidently presumed Calhoun to be thinking.
the orthodox editor was never guilty of independence.

But

Careful to

avoid any action that could be interpreted as disloyal, Stuart could
be blamed for nothing more than impetuosity.^
Stuart's own support of Calhoun's policy was made firmer by
Robert Barnwell Rhett's adherence to the senior Senator's party.

The

result of his intellect and of his power over South Carolina Ortho
doxy, Calhoun's influence on the Mercury was less direct than Rhett's.
As Stuart's brother-in-law, Rhett was a member of the family of the
paper; he exercised thereby a tie not to be taken lightly in South
Carolina.5

Since Rhett considered Calhoun to be his "political

3See above, 45-64.
^Mercury, Sept. 12, 13, 14, 20, Oct. 2, 4, 1837; Jan. 5,
July 21, 25, 1838; see above, m .
^Rhett was also financially involved in the Mercury. The ex
tent of his investment is unclear, nor is it certain that it existed
from the beginning of Stuart's editorship; see below, 184, n.l, 223.
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father," however, there was little reason for Mercury readers even
to be aware of Rhett’s position.

When the Congressman’s own ideas

ran contrary to those of Calhoun, the influence of the latter pre
vailed with both Rhett and the Mercury.^
After 1837, when he made his entry into national politics,
Rhett served as the Mercury’s most direct liaison with Calhoun, and
was an increasingly important contact.
h o u n ’s estimation.
extremism.

Rhett rose steadily in Cal

His only weakness was an earlier tendency toward

He had once talked of disunion.

After five years in

Washington, however, R h ett’s disposition to be radical had abated
somewhat.

When it did assert itself, it took the form of nullifica

tion as outlined by Calhoun.

By 1842 Stuart’s brother-in-law enjoyed

enough of the Senator’s confidence to become a
campaign for the presidency.

manager of Calhoun’s

Rhett also acted as editor for the

presidential aspirant’s Washington organ, the Spectator.^

The oc

cupancy of positions of such import is indicative of Calhoun’s high
regard for Rhett's ideas as well as for his judgment.

Both the im

portance and the intimacy of the Mercury’s association with the

^Rhett was probably the source of Stuart’s sometime impetu
osity.
It is certain that Calhoun either thought so or expected
Rhett to restrain Stuart. When in 1838, for example, the paper fol
lowed Calhoun from the Whigs back to the Democrats, Stuart exceeded
Calhoun's desires in praising the Mercury’s new allies.
Rhett, who
was likewise too enthusiastic, received a letter of admonition from
Calhoun.
The Senator criticised Rhett's action and advised h i m to
restrain the Mercury as well (Calhoun to Rhett, Sept. 13, 1838,
Jameson, ed., Calhoun Correspondence, 399-400; see above, 118-19.
^F. H. Elmore to F. Byrdsall, Sept. 9, 1843, Rhett Collection;
Rhett to Calhoun, Oct. 3, 13, 1842; Aug. 26, Sept. 21, Oct. 6, 7, 16,
Nov. n.d., Dec. 2, 3, 8, 1843, Calhoun Papers; White, Rhett, 63-64;
Wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist, 143-44.
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guiding force of South Carolina politics were increased thereby.
Clearly then Rhett played an ever larger role in interpreting the
Mer c u r y 's traditional allegiance to Calhoun.
When it became apparent in the fall of 1843 that Calhoun
could not be nominated by the Democrats, it was Rhett who counselled
caution.

He argued against an independent campaign for Calhoun with

the latter's own logic.

By remaining within the ranks of the Demo

cratic party, the South would yet see the restoration of the Com
promise of 1833.

Van Buren, furthermore, could not win the election

and the Democrats would turn to Calhoun in 1848.®
Calhoun's advisers were not unanimous in endorsing this ap
proach.

The recent candidate's own support for it was unenthusiastic

and reluctant.

In the long run it was Rhett's position that pre

vailed, however, and Calhoun himself belatedly endorsed it.

But as

the campaign progressed, the blight of political doubt, verging per
haps on distrust, cast its shadow over the intimacy between Calhoun
and Rhett.9

The shadow was a long one and in combination with other

political developments would have its effect on the future course of
the Mercury.
With Calhoun's withdrawal as a candidate for the Democratic

^White, Rhett) 64-66; see above, 151-52.
^ Ibid., 61, 64-66; Wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist, 109. White
indicates that Francis Pickens was involved in the gradually develop
ing coolness between Calhoun and Rhett.
Pickens held Rhett respon
sible for Pickens' own failure to be elected Speaker of the House of
Representatives in 1839.
White also feels that Pickens was jealous
of the special favor with which his kinsman Calhoun regarded Rhett.
Pickens was violently opposed to the Rhett-Elmore machine which urged
loyalty to the party in 1844 and by the spring of 1844 Calhoun's
kinsman appears to have displaced Rhett as principal adviser to Cal
houn (White, Rhett, 46, 56, 57, 58, 65-67).
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nomination, the scene of the political affray was transferred to
Washington.

The Calhoun forces had w o n a part of their battle over

the nominating convention; it would be convened in May as they had
wished.

Thus delayed, the convention would give the Democrats in Con

gress a chance to prove the sincerity of their pledge to reform the
tariff.

They would also be afforded the opportunity to prove their

continued reliability on the subject of slavery.

Expecting the Ab

olitionists to present the usual petitions to abolish the peculiar
institution in Washington and restrict it elsewhere, Calhoun's fol
lowing demanded further assurance that the Van Buren men would re
m ain faithful to the "gag rule."

If the Van Buren camp failed to

meet the test of acceptability on either the tariff or slavery, the
New Yorker would presumably lose the nomination.

The Calhounites

also planned to unite all those House Democrats who were either op
posed to or lukewarm in their support for Van Buren.

Aided by the

Whigs they would then organize the House around Calhoun men.

In the

disorder resulting from such a defeat, the Van Buren machine could
well fail to maintain control of the forthcoming convention and
Calhoun might yet win the nomination.^®
The session got off to a most unpromising start.

Due par

tially to division within the Calhoun ranks. Van Buren's forces swept
away all opposition to win every House office.

Once the House was

called to order, John Quincy Adams offered a set of resolutions from
the Massachusetts legislature which proposed to abolish the threefifths compromise.

Slaves, the resolution contended, should not be

^^White, Rhett, 63-65; Wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist, 109-10.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

161
counted for apportionment purposes.

With the support of Van Buren

Democrats, the resolutions were referred to committee.

The Van

Burenites had actually initiated the objectionable resolutions since
they controlled the Massachusetts legislature.

Hard on the heels of

this disturbing news came the report that the House Committee on
Rules— with the affirmative vote of two Van Buren Democrats— pro
posed to eliminate all barriers to the discussion of slavery.

The

unpromising start was evolving into an unsatisfactory pe r f o r m a n c e . H
On the recommendation of the rules committee, for two months
the House postponed a decision.
the gag rule.

Then on February 28 it voted to retain

Despite the fact that the Democrats were present in a

large majority, this motion was carried by only one vote.

There seemed

to be no doubting that Van Buren Democrats were proving themselves un
reliable by reneging on their pledges.

Far from being routed, the New

Yorker's forces were dominating the session.

In spite of the "re

sistless stream of eloquence" that Rhett "poured out" in opposition,
two internal improvements bills also passed the House.

The Lowcountry-

man's confidence in the Democracy was shaken, perhaps mortally.
There was also the matter of the tariff.

Rhett and others

among the Calhounites had urged that their remaining within the Demo
cratic party offered the best assurance of a tariff for revenue only.
Van Buren men would be obliged to pay this price for Calhoun's support.
Reluctantly agreeing to this approach, Calhoun had admonished that

l^White,

Rhett, 64-65; Wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist, 172-73.

l% e r c u r y , Feb. 21, Apr. 17, 18, 22, 1844; Wiltse, Calhoun
Sectionalist, 172-73; White, Rhett, 68-69.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

162
"Nothing ought to be taken but performance."

As Rhett accepted

Calhoun’s advice, he expected that his mentor's patience would be
rewarded by a low tariff.
In late February, 1844, the Chairman of the House Ways and
Means Committee, James I. McKay of North Carolina, showed the Demo
cratic party’s tariff proposal to Rhett.

Already alarmed by the fight

over the rules, the latter was incensed by the bill.

He conveyed his

reaction to Calhoun, predicting that the bill would "be the grave of
the free trade cause forever."

Warning that ". . . a protective

tariff . . . made by the Whigs, and only modified by the Democrats,"
would be construed as a surrender of the free trade principle by
both parties,

he asked for Calhoun’s advice on how to proceed.

Cal

houn agreed with Rhett and so informed Senator McDuffie, who had en
dorsed the McKay bill.

McDuffie’s protesting reply goes far to ex

plain some of the origins of Calhoun’s reservations about Rhett.
Assuring the recent presidential candidate that, excepting Rhett
"and perhaps Holmes," the whole South Carolina delegation disagreed
with Calhoun "as to the propriety of supporting" the McKay bill, the
irate McDuffie first delivered himself of a diatribe on Rhett:
And frankness requires me to say . . . that I now
regret as I have long done that you have made such
a man as Rhett your confidential adviser. You could
not have selected a worse. . . .
He is vain, self
conceited, impracticable and selfish in the extreme,
and by his ridiculous ambition to lead and dictate
in everything, has rendered himself odious in Con
gress and in the State.
I know of no man who is
injuring you so much.
Everything he does in Con
gress and writes in the Spectator is ascribed to

^ % h i t e , Rhett, 68; Calhoun to R. M. T. Hunter, Feb. 1,
1844, Jameson, e d . , Calhoun Correspondence, 563.
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you. . . .
I think the Spectator should
be stopped.14
In the meantime, without awaiting the advice he had requested
from the mentor from who m he would soon part, Rhett demanded a better
tariff measure of Van Buren.

The price of the New Yorker's refusal

would be disruption of the party, Rhett threatened.
fused, nonetheless.

Van Buren re

And McDuffie was correct in his analysis of the

South Carolina delegation; Rhett was in an isolated, if articulate,
position.

Fortunately for the divided Calhoun following, their leader

was appointed to Tyler's cabinet.

The appointment was confirmed by

the Senate and accepted by the former Senator.

On March 29, 1844,

the new Secretary of State arrived in Washington where he not only
undertook his new duties but resumed command of his bickering fol
lowers .15
Determining that the main energy of his party be reserved
for the forthcoming vote on Texas, Calhoun directed that the McKay
bill be supported as the best available compromise.

Rhett obeyed

orders and "in a brilliant speech" proclaimed to the House that the
McKay bill must be accepted as the first installment in payment of
the Democratic party's tariff pledge.

While Calhoun completed the

Texas treaty, Rhett urged its support in the Spectator.

In phrases

the Mercury would echo, he said the issue was Texas or disunion.1^

l^Rhett to Calhoun, Feb. 21, Mar. 5, 7, 1844, Calhoun Papers;
McDuffie to Calhoun, Mar. 10, 1844, Boucher, ed.. Correspondence to
Calhoun, 214-15; F. H. Elmore to Rhett, Feb. 24, 1844, Rhett Collec
tion; White, Rhett, 69-70.
^^White, R hett, 70; Wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist, 163-65.
^^White, Rhett, 71; see above, IV.
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Van Buren's rejection of annexation followed by a widespread
revolt against his candidacy made for the next development in the un
winding of this significant session.

Carolinians denied that they

were responsible for the revolt against Van Buren, but his furious
supporters rejected their protestations and voted to table even the
controversial McKay bill.

An even more vigorous battle followed over

T e x a s , accompanied by the usual calls for a southern convention should
annexation fail.^^

When exactly that fate befell this proposal of the

frustrated Calhounites, Rhett's faith in the Democracy was shattered.
The party which he had supported since 1838 because of its defense
of those two goals of the South, free trade and slavery, had deserted
its program; Rhett now proposed to desert it.
Robert Barnwell Rhett had been an apt pupil of Calhoun as
his conduct would soon indicate.

He reasoned that the South was

aroused as never before; she would at last unite on the question of
Texas.

Gathering the South Carolina delegation, Rhett proposed to

submit an address to the people of South Carolina similar in content
to the one of 1832.

There was no other solution, he said.

If the

South could not force the Democratic party to live up to its obliga
tions before the election, new and more vigorous pressure must be
applied.

Calhoun should not be bothered since he was a member of

the government "with which it was proposed to bring South Carolina

^^White, Rhett, 70-71; The southern convention proposals were
the result of Calhoun's strategy to unite the South.
There was more
response to the calls over Texas than there had been over any other
issue. Polk's candidacy and the Democratic platform plant on Texas
convinced Calhoun that this was not the time to act outside the party.
Consequently, he deprecated further talk of convention activity.
He
feared it might endanger Polk's election.
See also R. W. Barnwell
to Rhett, May 5, Robert D. Owen to Rhett, July 1, 1844, Rhett Collec
tion.
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Into conflict."

He might have added that the action he was proposing

was inspired by an earlier move of the current Secretary of State.

The

delegation agreed with Rhett's plan, but Senator Huger insisted that
Calhoun be informed of their intentions.^®
Accepting Huger's condition. South Carolina's representatives
invited Calhoun to meet with them.

There was little reason to expect

his view to differ from theirs; as recently as 1842 he had talked of
state action on the tariff and it was Calhoun who both attached and
maintained the condition of performance to South Carolina's allegiance to
the Democracy.

The Secretary accepted the invitation and surprised the

delegation with his reaction to their proposal.

Polk represented the

best hope for Texas annexation, an all-important goal, Calhoun said.
No radical action must jeopardize victory for the Tennessean.

Cal

houn's disapproval of Rhett's proposal was as final as it was sur
prising.

That ended the matter, or so it was thought.
When the congressional session ended on June 17, Rhett did not

join the South Carolina delegation in its return home.

This was a

small matter; he had been in the state during May and his political
base was secure.

Of far greater consequence was his decision to act

independently of the delegation's acceptance of Calhoun's direction.
Rhett concluded instead to inform his constituents of his own impression
of their proper political course.

He viewed the situation in exactly

the same way he had before Calhoun convinced the delegation to remain

^®White, Rhett, 72; Wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist, 187-88.
^^White, Rhett, 72-73; Wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist, 187-88.
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with the party.

The ironic wheel had "come full circle."

Only a

few months earlier it was Rhett who urged Calhoun to leave his hopes
with the Democrats; Calhoun was now returning the advice.

For the

first time Rhett ignored Calhoun's counsel to proceed in spite of
rather than with his "political father."
Having made his difficult decision, Rhett prepared an address
to his constituents.

It recited the dangers confronting the South from

the action of the previous session of Congress.

The matter of the tar

iff demanded immediate rectification, Rhett said.
warned that unless Congress moved she would do so.

South Carolina had
The state must now

prove herself to be as good as her word— and she must do it alone.

A

convention should be called— this would "place the State in an attitude
of Sovereignty"— for the following April.

By that time the election

would be over and so would another session of Congress.

If by then

events had moved to mollify southern fears, the convention could ad
journ without action.

Rhett wrote from Washington, and the Mercury

published his address without comment on June 27.
also distributed in pamphlet form.

21

His proposal was

There was no mistaking the im

plication of it all; Calhoun had been defied.
In July, Rhett returned to South Carolina where the conse
quences of his action were dividing the party.

Toasts on July 4,

one of which hailed Rhett as "the invincible sentinel on the Watch
Tower of Liberty," rang with defiance.

Party leaders, initially

inclined to ignore Rhett's revolt, were obliged instead to enter the

20white, Rhett, 72-73.
2^Mercury, June 27, 1844; White, Rhett, 73.
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fray.

As the Courier castigated "disunionism" Whigs gleefully en

dorsed Calhoun's position in an effort to embarrass Democrats.
Rhett's manifesto was received with especial enthusiasm by
his Bluffton constituents.

They gave a dinner in his honor on July 31.

His "thrilling eloquence" on that occasion served to launch the "Bluffton Movement."

Throughout the district Rhett was welcomed by audi

ences who heard h i m promise "a glorious triumph" in return for re
sistance to Yankee oppression.

The Calhoun men had their hands full.^2

Throughout it all the Mercury was strangely silent.

Becalmed

in an eerie political sea that promised to become stormy without
notice, the editor must have agonized as to which course he must take.
Would the Mercury continue to steer by Calhoun's star or come about to
guide on a rebelling satellite?

The uncertain editor's decision would

be the most significant for the Mercury since 1823.

Similar dilemmas

had confronted others in the state during the Mercury's twenty years
of unwavering loyalty to Calhoun.

South Carolina politics was dotted

with the wrecks of the careers of those who had made the wrong choice.
The fate of William Smith, Henry Laurens Pinckney, William Campbell
Preston, and James J. Hamilton, Jr., furnished eloquent evidence of
the importance of the Mercury's inevitable decision.
not unaware of his predicament.

The editor was

"In all times past," said the Mer

cury on September 3, 1844, almost a month after its awesome decision
had been made, "no public man in this state has ever pitted himself
in direct hostility to Calhoun who has not fallen for it."^^

^^White, Rhett, 73-74; Mercury, July 15, 1844; Courier, June 27,
29, July 12, 1844.
^% e r c u r y , Sept. 3, 1844.
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The M ercury's initial indecision was aggravated by the ab
sence of Stuart.

Clapp was doubtless reluctant to commit the journal

o n so momentous an issue without consulting his associate.

He did make

rather sympathetic references to the campagin of Stuart's brother-inlaw as he inveighed against "those fatal influences
fast . . . eating out" the Union's foundation.

. . . that are

Clapp also endorsed

the correctness of the principle of state action, "Calhoun's great
conservative remedy . . . in an extreme case," he took care to call it.
But h e was resigned to await the results of the general election when
"the storm of party conflict" would have spent its "fury."

The Mer

cury's readers were not a little confused by all this caution.

"Hamp-

dem" inquired as to the necessity of bearing "the wrongs and the in
sults, the plunder and the degradation."
demanded to know " . . .
for answer."

The insistent contributor

what is the remedy" in a "tone that call[ed]

"Where is the Mercury?" cried "Cato!"

has its voice faltered."

"Never until now

Gradually Clapp edged toward Rhett.

On the

first of August he observed that "But one influence— the interposition
of this State" had ever brought down the tariff.

Still, he said,

state action should be the resort only when "all moderate means should
be exhausted."

And Clapp could not determine whether that had yet been

done.
Stuart's return removed Clapp from the horns of his dilemma.
On August 7 the Mercury resoundingly sided with Rhett.

Reviewing

24 l bid., July 10, 15, 16, 18, 20, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 29, 30,
Aug. 1, 1844.
Laura White's conclusion that Clapp at first "had only
deprecating comment on Rhett's action" (White, R h ett, 73) does not
hold up under analysis.
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at length the evils of the tariff and abolitionism,

the paper con

cluded that "We must make the fight on the outer wall of the tariff
...

if we would defend successfully our slaveholding institutions."

The proceedings of the Bluffton dinner followed on the day after this
manifesto.

It was that affair that enlivened Rhett's call into a vig

orous campaign for state action.

Rhett was praised at dinners else

where and in the Mercury's pages.

His followers rejoiced to be called

the "Bluffton Boys" while Rhett was hailed as the "Brutus of 1844."^5
The Mercury with Stuart at the helm reflected none of Clapp's
past indecision.

The greater battle for slavery was already under

way; only tactical decisions were in dispute.

A Democratic triumph

at the forthcoming election would aid little in the fight, if at all,
Stuart said.

Carolinians could expect no southern convention; they

must resort to "Separate State Action" or prepare for "hopeless sub
mission."
tion.

But Stuart was not wedded to the idea of a state conven

If some other means of state action were possible,

come," the editor said.

"let it

He meant for it to come soon, however.

It

was "full time to be up and doing."
Stuart had made his position quite clear in his manifesto of
August 7.

The South must make the battle appear to be over the tar

iff, not slavery, the Mercury had warned on that day.

The prophetic

25Mercury. Aug. 7, 8, 10, 12, 14, 18, 28, 29, 30, 31, Sept. 5,
6, 12, 14, 16, 27, 30, 1844.
Stuart wrote the editorial of August 7,
in which he identified "Separate State Action" as "the only remedy left
us. . . ." Clapp's "fettered and embarrassed" indecision was evidently
due only to Stuart's absence.
After August 7 there was no major dis
agreement between them and editorials were usually unsigned.
The dec
laration of August 7, however, was made over the initials of "J.A.S."
(ibid. , Aug. 7, Sept. 4, 1844); Elmore to Calhoun, Aug. 26, 1844,
Jameson, e d . , Calhoun Correspondence, 967.
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editorial had admonished Carolinians that "If we wait until aboli
tion brings on the direct issue, it will be too late."
as clear as it was immediate.

The issue was

Convinced as it was of the importance

of its crusade, Stuart's Mercury was undisturbed by the charges of
"disunion" which flew thick and fast.

"Union as the first of con

siderations" was suited only for "serfs in soul and mercenaries of
Yankeedom."

There were few of such folk in South Carolina where

"rights and liberties" meant more than political association.^^
Stuart's new crusade brought forth a divided response from his
rivals of the Charleston press.

If the Patriot received the Courier's

praise for "patriotic and sturdy Unionism," it, nonetheless agreed
with Rhett as to "the magnitude and flagrancy of Southern Wrongs."
The Courier coupled its declamations against "the effort to create
another disturbance . . . with the General Government" with cries
for loyalty to "CALHOUN AND UNION."

This journal of Carolina Unionism

tinged with Whiggery hurled daily abuse at the "Southern demagogue"
and "his brother-in-law and trumpeter of the

M e r c u r y .

"2?

As usual, Stuart more than proved his adequacy in disputa
tion.

He sharply denied any desire to replace Calhoun's leadership

with Rhett's.

The doctrine of state action as preached by Rhett was

^^Mercury, Aug. 7, 13, 23, Sept. 2, ", 11, 13, 16, 20, 23, 1844.
All unsigned editorials will be referred to ^n the text as though they
were written by Stuart.
While it is not certain that this is the case,
it is certain that it was his return that committed the Mercury to the
cause of his brother-in-law.
The new policy, then, was Stuart's, at
least in its origin.
^ ^Patriot, June 28, Aug. 15, 31, Sept. 14, 1844; Courier, June
27, 29,
July 12, 22, 24, 27, 28, Aug. 1, 2, 8, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21,
22, 31,
Sept. 3, 14, 16, 17,1844.
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pure Calhounism, Stuart reminded his readers.

Advocated "without

orders though it [might] be," it had produced a dispute "merely as
to time and in no sort as to principle."

That voice of Carolina

Whiggery, the "great AH! HUM!," of the Charleston Courier disturbed
Stuart not a bit.

Mercury readers agreed with the editor.

One con

tributor called the Courier "a traitor in the camp, while another
praised "that bold thought and utterance which the country expected
to hear" from the Mercury.

Stuart’s boldness of thought defended the

"revolution to restore" against those perpetrating "flagrant abuse of
the Compact."

The "sleepless Sentinel upon the Watch-Tower of the

Constitution" had returned to duty.^S
The sentinel was sleepless, indeed, for it stood guard over a
divided camp.

The "Bluffton Boys" met with opposition not only from

Carolina’s powerless Whiggery but also from the badly split State
Rights party itself.

Charleston Congressman Isaac Holmes fell in

with Rhett to urge "Resistance - combined Southern Resistance, if
you can procure it.

If not, then State Resistance" would do, he said.

Governor Hammond also favored Rhett’s policy but most of the state’s
leaders stood with Calhoun in support of the Polk candidacy.

Cal

houn himself was quietly attempting to localize Rhett’s appeal.

Pro

tests came in from all sections of the country urging that South Caro
lina calm herself lest she jeopardize the much touted Democratic
victory.

Not unnaturally, Calhoun received much of the blame for

^% e r c u r y , July 15, 27, Aug. 12, 13, 22, 24, 27, Sept. 3, 4,
13, 18, 24, 27, 1844.
The Courier’s endorsement of Calhoun’s position ended an era
in Carolina journalism.
There were no significant moves against Cal
houn in the Charleston press after 1844.
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Bhett's agitation.29
The process of localization took many forms.

James J. Hamil

ton, Jr., who had learned the futility of opposing Calhoun some years
before, urged his home district of Colleton to stand with the rest of
the state.

The Polk forces had already capitalized on the earlier

appeals for a southern convention by scheduling a giant rally of Demo
crats from North, South, and West for Nashville on August 15.
houn sent Pickens to represent South Carolina.

Cal

The latter gentleman

took Calhoun’s assurances that nothing would come of Bluffton.

In

return for this he was instructed to secure Polk’s pledge to lower the
tariff; this would, Calhoun hoped, mollify the insurgents in South Caro
lina.

Meanwhile, Franklin H. Elmore organized an assemblage of the

Democracy in Charleston for August 19. The gathering reasserted its
loyalty to Calhoun’s leadership and pledged its support of Polk.

One

prominent casualty of the Bluffton Movement was the Rhett-Elmore in
state alliance; the machine had split.

And neither Rhett nor Holmes

was prepared to denounce the resolve of the assembled Democracy.
Calhoun’s plan was working.^0

^ H e n r y Clay to Stephen Miller, July 1, 1844, Calvin Colton,
ed.. The Works of Henry Clay (10 vols.; New York, 1904), V, 490-91;
Francis P. Blair to Jackson, July 7, 1844, Bassett, ed., Jackson
Correspondence, VI, 299-302; Mercury, July 3, 4, 23, 26, 27, 1844;
White, Rhett, 79; Wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist, 188-89; Merritt,
Hammond, 66-69.
^^Elmore to Calhoun, July 30, 1844, Pickens to Calhoun, Aug. 10,
1844, Francis Wharton to Calhoun, Aug. 21, 1844, Boucher, e d . , Corres
pondence to Calhoun, 242, 243, 245, 246; Elmore to Calhoun, Aug. 27,
1844, Jameson ed., Calhoun Correspondence ; James Hamilton, Jr., to G.
P. Elliott, G. A. Allen, W. W. Wigg (Bluffton Committee), Aug. 8,
1844, Hamilton Papers; R. B. Rhett to Burt, Sept. 9, 11, 1844,
Burt Papers.
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Pickens returned in early September to report that Polk
would not only restore the Compromise of 1833 but would also annex
Texas.

Rhett read the inevitable in these setbacks for his policy and

in mid-September laid down his cudgels to return to Washington.
September 23 the Mercury reluctantly gave up the watch.

On

The editor

was "willing not to press the question now and . . . the more will
ingly inasmuch as we are assured that as soon as certain party ob
jections are out of the way, all our friends of the State Rights
party hold themselves pledged to State resistance.

..."

The Mer

cury's uncharacteristic revolt was ended by an unrepentant and con
ditional disengagement rather than by reconciliation or surrender.
Calhoun, grateful for the returning calm, exhibited an equally un
characteristic reaction; he exacted no retribution from the rebels;
Rhett even returned to the Spectator.

The Secretary did, however,

assure a Northerner that the insurrection was over.

"I had to act

with great delicacy, but at the same time firmness," Calhoun said.^^
Calhoun's assumption was premature.

His old friend Langdon

Cheves, who had long opposed nullification and radicalism generally,
filled several columns of the Mercury with a letter ominous in its
warning for the future.
abolition and secession.

The South, Cheves said, must choose between
Although he abhorred both alternatives,

Cheves preferred the latter to the former.
however, was suicide, he said.

Separate state action,

The South must unite in support of

Polk for the time being while she put her whole energies into a plan

31pickens to Calhoun, Sept. 9, 1844, Calhoun to F. Wharton,
Sept. 17, 1844, Jameson, e d . , Calhoun Correspondence, 616, 968-71;
Mercury. Aug. 29, Sept. 2, 5-20, 23, 26-28, Oct. 11, 1844; Wiltse,
Calhoun Sectionalist, 190-91; White, Rhett, 79.
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for future secession and formation of a southern nation.

As it

revived their cause, Cheves's letter sent an electric thrill through
the "Bluffton Boys."

Rhett praised the letter but reminded Cheves

that the South would never act in concert; Rhett had watched too many
attempts at unity among southern Congressmen fail.

One state must

show the way by her action before others would follow, he said.

Mc

Duffie, who had supported Calhoun's resolve to oppose state action
only with reluctance, added to the reviving din.

Speaking to a

dinner meeting at Edgefield, McDuffie said that Rhett had been right
to call for a convention.

The people, however, should not be in

volved, he thought; the convention should be called by the General
Assembly.

Proclaiming the "final crisis" to be upon them, he ex

horted his constituency with no less fervor than Rhett had roused
his own flock.

Blufftonism had not only revived; it was spreading

to the Upcountry.32
Once again Rhett saw a chance for his proposal to succeed.
Resigning from his post on the Spectator, he suggested that the
delegation in Congress be strengthened by Cheves.

Huger was planning

to retire from the Senate and Rhett proposed Cheves for his replace
ment.

The Mercury hailed this nomination and only dropped its cam

paign for Cheves when he refused to run.

Such enduring traces of

Blufftonism soon brought Calhoun back to South Carolina.

Arriving

in Charleston on September 30, the Secretary spent the day in assur
ing Lowcountry doubters of Polk's "political orthodoxy."

As September

OO

Mercury, Sept. 11, 1844; Chauncey S. Boucher, "The Annexa
tion of Texas and the Bluffton Movement in South Carolina," M V H R , VI
(June, 1919), 22-25; Wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist, 191; White, Rhett,
81.
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ended, Stuart and Holmes returned to the Calhoun camp and the
Mercury opened a campaign for party unity.

Stuart was even persuaded

to stand for election to the General Assembly.

Bhett and McDuffie—

if still unconverted— agreed to remain silent until after the elec
tion.

Governor Hammond— also unconverted— likewise maintained a surly

official silence that masked his plans for decided action.
as calm as the dead Sea," he confided to his diary.
rebellion was quelled.

"We are

This time the

The prodigal Mercury proudly hoisted the

colors of the great Carolinian as of yore.

And still no one had been

disciplined.33
The election results were all the reunited Calhounites could
have wished for.

Not only did their approved ticket triumph locally—

"no avowed Whig" being elected to either state or local office— but the
Democrats also w o n the presidency.

The Mercury's comment on Polk’s

victory, however, was not that of a jubilant supporter.

Although

Stuart put his seal of approval on the Democratic success, he also
conveyed a warning to the victors.

The President-elect was reminded

that only "an honest fulfillment of all the requirements and pledges
of the Democratic Republican Creed" would preserve South Carolina's
allegiance to the administration.

Not even the Courier could smell

rebellion in this remark, for Calhoun had carefully taught the Mercury

33cheves to Rhett, Oct. 16, 1844, Rhett Collection; McDuffie to
Hammond, Dec. 12, 1844, Hammond to McDuffie, Dec. 21, 1844, Hammond
Papers; Calhoun to Thomas Clemson, Oct. 7, 1844, Calhoun to Stuart,
Oct. 21, 1844, Jameson, ed., Calhoun Correspondence, 624, 626; Stuart
to Calhoun, Oct. 25, 1844, Boucher, ed.. Correspondence to Calhoun,
253-54; Hammond Diary, quoted in Merritt, Hammond, 69.
"John Stuart has seen Calhoun and been conquered, not that he
abandoned his principles but believes that Calhoun also adheres to
them," wrote Robert Barnwell (Barnwell to Rhett, Nov. 10, 1844, Rhett
Collection).
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to attach the condition of performance before proffering its allegi
ance.

But then Calhoun had also taught the Mercury to honor nullifica

tion.
Calhoun had quenched the fires of rebellion but Bluffton was
still to have its afterglow.

In spite of his conviction that "So.

Ca. & Mr. Calhoun [had] been left high & dry," the resentful Governor
Hammond had held his peace before the election; he proposed to do so
no longer.

Calhoun expected trouble from this quarter.

In addition

to his awareness of Hammond's discreet support for Bhett's campaign,
Calhoun was alerted by the governor's recent infraction of Carolina
protocol.

Hammond had neither called upon Calhoun during the letter's

visit to South Carolina nor had he responded to Calhoun's request for
a meeting.

As the Secretary returned to Washington, he again passed

through Charleston where he left a message for Hammond.

James Hamil

ton, Jr.,— careful to maintain his reasserted loyalty to the leader—
was commissioned to convey it.

There must be no more excitement, said

Hamilton, lest South Carolina cut herself off from the sympathy of the
rest of the South.
himself.

Hamilton was giving the advice that he had followed

He had sympathized with Bhett's proposal for a convention

but had declined to support the Bluffton Movement.

Hamilton was also

diplomatic with his advice to the governor; he did not reveal its
source.35

5^Mercury. Nov. 13, 14, 19, 1844; Stuart to Bhett, Nov. 11,
1844, Bhett Collection.
Calhoun to Hammond, Sept. 21, 1844, Hammond Papers; Hamilton
to Hammond, Oct. 4, Nov. 12, 17, 1844, Hammond Papers; Wiltse, Cal
houn Sectionalist, 192; Merritt, Hammond, 68-69; Hammond to Burt,
May 18, 1843, Burt Papers.
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Calhoun's fears were not without foundation where Hammond was
concerned.

The unrepentant governor proposed to call upon his legis

lature to summon a convention.

Expecting a fight in the process, per

haps even failure, Hammond confided his bitterness to his diary.
"...

[T]he State will do nothing but what Mr. C. wishes now.

is only one hope.

There

If Mr. Clay is elected President which is highly

probable Calhoun may out of hatred to him attempt at once to make war
on the Fed. Gov. and call up Nullification."
Hammond venomously wrote that Calhoun's ambition to be Presi
dent had "recklessly trampled on every thing [sic] else."

When the

election ended in a Polk victory, neither Hammond's mood nor inten
tions changed.

The Calhounites, he said, "are extremely decided

against state action & most of the

rest are paralysed."

Writing

shortly before he made his proposal to the Assembly, he concluded that
"None— not even Stuart of the Mercury . . . are for action."

The state

was "Wet-blanketed by Calhoun & Co." Hammond's reasons for wanting ac
tion by South Carolina bore an ominous portent for the future.

He was

convinced that separation of the South from the national Union was in
evitable.

"It might now be effected peacefully & properly— A few

years hence it must take place in blood or the South remain in it as
a subjugated region," he

wrote.

^6

^^Hammond Diary, Oct. 25, 1844, quoted in Capers, Calhoun Oppor
tunist, 222; Hammond Diary, Nov. 24, 1844, quoted in Wiltse, Calhoun
Sectionalist, 192; Merritt, Hammond. 68-71.
During the administration of Governor Richardson, South Caro
lina expanded her preparedness program started in 1833 and continued
throughout the decade.
In the event of a clash with the general gov
ernment, the state would need more qualified military leaders than had
been available in 1833.
Richardson, consequently, sponsored the es
tablishment of two military colleges. The Arsenal in Columbia, and
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The governor delivered his message in spite of the odds
against its having the desired effect.
foreboding.

The address was calm in its

Reminding his Assembly of the repeated failures of ef

forts to lower the tariff or to effect the annexation of Texas and
of the rising attacks on slavery, Hammond called upon the body for
activation of the Bluffton Plan.

The tariff, he said, had "never been

checked but by . . . interposition."

Pickens, now a state Senator, im

mediately offered resolutions expressing South Carolina's full faith
in the Polk administration.
tion spoke for Calhoun.

No man present could doubt that his ac

The Senate quickly and unanimously adopted the

Pickens resolutions.^^
The governor's defeat in the House was more involved but just
as complete.

Christopher Memminger, Unionist become Calhounite, suc

ceeded in having Hammond's message referred to the Committee of the
Whole.

Since this amounted to tabling the governor's proposal, the

"Bluffton Boys" were outraged.

Stuart's Mercury— evermore ready to

denounce an old Unionist— hurled invective at Memminger's maneuver.
But Pickens knew that Calhoun had decreed harmony for South Carolina.
Showing that Memminger's action was anathema to the Bluffton remnant,
Pickens insisted that the House adopt his own resolutions instead.
Again Calhoun's magic carried the day.

And Hammond in defeat was at

the Citadel, in Charleston.
In the fall of 1844 Hammond indicated his
concern by seeking to discover "the strong & weak points" of the fed
eral forts in Charleston harbor (John Peyre Thomas, The History of
the South Carolina Military Academy, 1783-1893 [Charleston, 1893], 934; Hammond to Col. R. J. Colcock, Sept. 12, 1844, Hammond Papers).
07

•^'Pickens to Calhoun, Dec. 28, 1844, Jameson, ed., Calhoun
Correspondence, 1015-17; Hammond to Simms, June 15, 1847, Hammond
Papers; Mercury, Dec. 2, 1844; Merritt, Hammond. 70-71; Wiltse, Cal
houn Sectionalist, 192-94; White, Rhett, 82-83.
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least spared the humiliation of seeing his bold call for confrontatation routinely t a b l e d . ^8
The Mercury accepted Pickens's resolutions but without its old
ardor.

Stuart took this occasion to make his readers aware of his own

small regard for Polk's tariff stance.

The Tennessean was sounder,

however, on that matter than was Memminger, the editor said.

That

being the case the Pickens resolutions represented something of "a
gain for the Bluffton boys."^^
In view of all that happened in Columbia, Charleston, and
Washington during the General Assembly’s session. Mercury readers
were hardly surprised by Stuart's frequent references to Bluffton
ism.

Indeed, his persevering reservations about his allegiance to

the national Democracy seemed more and more to be justified.

During

the very time that the Assembly was debating the Pickens resolutions,
word came that the Democratic Congress had repealed the "gag rule."
The Mercury took note of this perfidy; it amounted to a "virtual
assumption by Congress of power over the existence of slavery."
Bitterly inveighing against "their Northern allies" by whom "the
South was conquered," Stuart's paper could not resist the satirical
assertion that the latest setback would "doubtless give comfort to
the souls of our Union loving friends.

. . .

Before the unsettling news from Washington had grown cold.

^ % e r c u r y , Nov. 13, 14, 19, 28, 29, 30, Dec. 2, 3, 5, 18,
19, 1844.
39lbid. , Dec. 3, 1844.
‘^^White, B h ett, 83; Mercury, Dec. 7, 14, 18, 1844; Jan. 8,
1845; see above,
IV.
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even more distressing tidings settled upon Charleston.

On November

28, 1844, the distinguished Massachusetts jurist. Judge Samuel Hoar—
who was also an outspoken Abolitionist— arrived in that city.

He was

commissioned by the Governor of Massachusetts to test the validity of
South Carolina's Negro seaman law.

This measure, dating from 1794,

initially required masters of vessels to report any free Negroes
they brought into the state and to assume responsibility for them.
As modified in 1835, it provided that all transient "free man of
color" should be clapped into jail upon arrival of their vessel.
There they would remain for the duration of their visit.

Hoar in

tended to determine whether any Massachusetts citizen was being held
in such custody.

If the Judge found any such man confined without

criminal charges, he was authorized to bring suit on the prisoner's
behalf and take the case to the Supreme Court.

Judge Hoar informed

Governor Hammond of his mission on the day of his arrival; Hammond
conveyed this information to the already excited A s s e m b l y . 41
The Governor, the Assembly and the Mercury were incensed.

If

the law in question were invalidated by the high court. South Carolina
could expect abolitionist-trained free Negroes to flood the state.
All the outer ramparts erected in defense of slavery would be of
little use in that eventuality.

The Assembly directed Hammond to

expel the "emissary of a foreign government" forthwith.

This "bolt

from the Jupiter of New England has electrified us all . . . and
made old South Carolina one Bluffton.

..."

the Mercury thundered.

41wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist, 195-96; Wikramanayke, "Free
Negro in South Carolina," 201-02, 220; Merritt, Hammond, 63.
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Not surprisingly, Hoar concluded that he was unwelcome in Charleston
and left before Hammond could have him ordered out.^^
The state had hardly repulsed this alarming attack when a
Charleston public meeting invited President-elect Polk to visit the
city "as an exponent of our principles."
Calhoun notwithstanding.

This was too much for Stuart,

In an editorial that verged on outrage, the

Mercury's senior editor reminded his readers that "politically" they
differed "very, very widely" from Polk and his retinue.

A furious

Stuart could see neither dignity nor wisdom in the course advocated
by his fellow citizens.

"In the name of God!" he proclaimed, "if we

are to submit, let it be in silence, if not remonstrating" or "re
sisting . . .

at least not making bondage more vile by singing paeans

and hallelujahs to deluders and oppressors."43

Yet the prodigal

editor presided over a paper considered still to be allied with Cal
houn, defender of the incoming administration.
The explanation for the Mercury's new tone lies in the altered
nature of South Carolina politics.

Formally, in that all South Caro

lina still acknowledged Calhoun's leadership, the political struc
ture was no different from pre-Bluffton days.

In point of actual

fact, however, the acknowledgment was an unwilling one for a large

42John B. Irving to Henry Bailey, Dec. 3, 1844, ChestnutManning-Miller Collection (Bailey was Hammond's Attorney General);
Hammond to Bailey, Dec. 5, 1844, Hammond Papers; Wiltse, Calhoun
Sectionalist, 196; Mercury, Dec. 3, 7, 9, 11, 16, 17, 1844.
Ham
mond’s instructions were that Hoar should be shown every courtesy
but firmly escorted aboard an outbound ship. Prior to the arrival
of Hammond's aide in Charleston, however. Hoar accepted the advice
of local authorities to leave.
Charleston crowds around his hotel
had become unruly, a factor which doubtless affected Ho a r ’s de
cision.
^M e r c u r y , Dec. 30, 1844.
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part of the Calhoun following.

Revolving principally around Rhett

and Hammond, the radical and, to some extent, younger faction did not
understand why Calhoun would not countenance the activation of state
interposition, the doctrine in which he had schooled them.

They did

not agree with their mentor that nullification was a restraining de
vice, a conservative remedy that strengthened the bonds of union.

To

them it provided instead a cogent method of parting from their tor
mentors and building a new nation in which slavery would be free from
attack.

These, the disaffected and disillusioned, were but taking

Calhoun's carefully taught lesson to its logical conclusion; seces
sion was a recurring word in their conversations.^^
The Mercury belonged to the faction of Rhett and Hammond.
Destined to continue its association with Rhett to the end of its days,
the journal that had made so many tortuous turns with Calhoun would
continue to follow him.
footprints of Rhett.

It would tread his path, however, in the

Calhoun knew of the growing dissatisfaction

with his policy and of the Mercury's new and conditional allegiance.
Both Rhett and the Mercury understood that he knew it.
something else as well.

They understood

Calhoun was still too much the master of

South Carolina to be defied; those who longed to oppose him could do
nothing but wait.

If, in the meantime, the incipient opposition con

formed generally to the course laid out by Calhoun, he would regard

44Merritt, Hammond, 68-69; I. E. Holmes to Hammond, July 23,
1844, Hammond Papers; Wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist, 197-98.
The "RhettElmore Machine" was a casualty of the Bluffton Movement. Elmore now
stood firmly with the conservative faction (ibid., Pickens to Cal
houn, Dec. 28, 1844, Jameson, ed., Calhoun Correspondence, 1017).
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their recent aberration with a tolerance hitherto unknown.

The

frustrated Rhett and the impatient prodigal accepted the terms of
the "political father" of them both.

They could do nothing else—

except plan for the day when Calhoun no longer made the signals.
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CHAPTER VI

CROSS-FIRE

The change in the nature of Stuart's allegiance to Calhoun
blinded the editor to an important new lesson in South Carolina
politics; the leader did not mean for his recently displayed toler
ance to be misread for indulgence.
moving to emphasize this point.

By December of 1844 Calhoun was

Concluding that the Mercury must

either rid itself of its recurring symptoms of Blufftonism or cease
to be the spokesman for Orthodoxy, Calhoun's followers made plans to
establish a new paper in Charleston.
Probably urged on by the "Elmore Clique" and Pickens's antiRhett following, the Calhounites identified Stuart as the most direct
source of Mercury Blufftonism.

Well aware that the paper's repu

tation— and subscription list— was heavily dependent upon party sup
port, the leaders of Orthodoxy apparently forced Stuart to step down
as editor.

In return for his retirement, they abandoned their plans

to set up a new journal in the city.^
Stuart's decision to retire may also have been influenced by
the ill health with which he had been plagued for some time.

In any

^Pickens to Burt, Dec. 11, 1844, Burt Papers; Walker to Ham
mond, Sept. 20, 1845, Hammond Papers; Hammond Diary, Feb. 28, 1845,
cited in Prior, "Mercury," 271, n. 2.
Stuart retained a financial
interest— and perhaps financial control— in the Mercury until 1847
(Mercury, Feb. 1, 2, Apr. 5, 1847; J. N. Cardozo, Reminiscences of
Charleston [Charleston, 1866], 33; see below, 222-23.
184
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event there is little evidence to indicate that he was chastened by
the lash of the leader.

On December 30, the retiring editor defiantly

enjoined his readers against any undignified truckling to Polk and his
"oppressors."

And when on January 3, 1845, he published his "Fare

well Address," Stuart spoke in the language of Bluffton.
Pledging the Mercury to maintain its twin loyalties to "the
kindred points of Carolina and Republicanism," the retiring editor
identified "the money power, and the mean and sordid spirit of this
age of steam" as his journal's most dangerous enemies.

Should this

"sordid spirit" take the form of Federal oppression to threaten South
Carolina,

"armed men" must

spring up . . . and defend the honor and avenge the
insulted graves of Marion, Moultrie, Sumter, Rut
ledge— men who knew that freedom's heritage is
care and toil and a perpetual watch and warfare. . . .
The unrepentent Stuart left the Mercury secure in the knowledge that
his successor, John Milton Clapp, would keep the watch.^
Clapp had become "associate" editor of the paper in 1837.
B o m in Ohio, he was graduated from Calhoun's alma mater, Yale Univ
ersity.

He ultimately settled in Beaufort, South Carolina, Stuart's

own home.

It was from there that he accepted Stuart's invitation to

come to the M ercury.

Following in the tradition of Morford, Pinckney,

and Stuart, the Mer c u r y 's fourth editor was an able penman.

One con

temporary lauded Clapp as "a writer of classical taste and culture."
His formal promotion to editor occurred more suddenly than events
would otherwise indicate.

Stuart's bad health had frequently made

for long absences on his part.

As Clapp rose to command, he announced

^Mercury, Dec. 30, 1844; Jan. 3, 1845.
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that he had borne "the whole burden of" the Mercury's "conduct" for
"at least two years."

Therefore, subscribers need fear no change in

policy.
Clapp was as good as his word; there was no change in policy.
If, unlike Stuart, the new editor did not advocate a specific remedy
for the deleterious influence of the northern Democracy and Yankees
generally, he did constantly and insistently remind his subscribers
of that influence:
We will speak, warn, encouiage— fight to the last
for the rights, honor and salvation of the South;
and if the people will not sustain us— if the
Mercury is to go down with the great and glorious
cause for which it has battled for twenty years,
at the mandate of the Dictator at Washington, the
last sheet that is flung from our press, shall have
emblazoned upon the proud epitaph of the entombed
Regicide— "resistance to tyranny is obedience to
God."3
Southerners need look for uo hope in appeals to the North,
Clapp admonished his readers.

There the "spirit of tyranny, of dog

matism, of strife, of usurpation," he said, "moves and governs . . .
on this question of slavery."

Yankees believed "themselves to be the

United States and the South only a territory.

..."

Clapp was as

disgusted as Stuart had been at the repeal of the "Twenty-first rule."
When the governor of Massachusetts cited "State Rights" in defense of
the actions of his agent. Judge Hoar, Clapp's indignation was un
bounded.

"State Rights with us is the right of defence," he blazed,

"with Massachusetts it is the right of vexing and harrassing her

3Ring, Newspaper Press, 151-52; Mercury, Jan. 3, Oct. 27,
1845.
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neighbors.
Clapp maintained his interest in the effect of the slavery dis
pute on national church bodies.

The General Assembly of the Presby

terian Church showed remarkable "discretion and moderation," the Mer
cury said, in its approach to this sensitive question.

But Yankee

Baptists mounted such strong attacks on slavery that their fellow
communicants from the South parted from them to organize a southern
church.

The Methodists had divided earlier; Clapp felt that division

in "the two greatest denominations of Christians in the Union" was
more significant than accommodation among the smaller group of Pres
byterians.

The editor's own position in regard to final political

separation had also advanced.

Only a year before Clapp had referred

to the Methodist schism as "the first dissolution of the Union"; his
tone was one of resignation and perhaps even of regret.

Neither of

these sentiments was present as the Mercury described the same de
velopment in Baptist ranks.

On January 4, 1845, its editor gave thanks

for the wisdom of "the Church which heralds the way to redemption and
safety.

^Mercury. Jan. 7, 13, 14, 17, 20, 21, 23, Feb. 6, Mar. 12-15,
26, Apr. 8, 10, 14, May 21, June 4, July 3, 1845.
On August 27
and September 17, 1845, the Mercury approvingly noted the expulsion
of Cassius Clay from Lexington, Kentucky.
Clay was noted for his
hostility to slavery.
The moving force behind his precipitous de
parture was a mob.
The "twenty-first rule" refers to the gag rule (see above,
III).
^Mercury, May 7, 9, 10, 12, 14, 15, 16, 21, 29, June 4,
1845; see above, 138-39.
Calhoun had also attached a glooity sig
nificance to the Methodist division (Wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist,
187).
The Presbyterian reaction to the sectional dispute was more
moderate; Presbyterians did not divide until May, 1861 (Margaret
Burr Des Champs "Union or Division? South Atlantic Presbyterians
and Southern Nationalism, 1820-1861," JSH, XX, No. 4 [Nov., 1954],
484, 497-98).
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While defending the South from northern assaults on slavery,
Clapp inserted his brief for the peculiar institution itself.

Cal

houn was commended for demonstrating that southern Negroes lived in
circumstances superior to those of many workers elsewhere.

"Every

body that knows anything," Clapp smugly asserted, "knows that slavery
is established by the Jewish law and stands uncondemned by the Chris
tian."

Slavery as practiced in the South was "neither a Moral, So

cial or Political Evil" but ". . . o n the contrary" it was "the most
beneficent form of organized society that has yet existed."

The

editor hailed Hammond's "Free Church Letters" as "the ablest . . .
vindication of our . . . slavery that we have . . . witnessed in any
thing like the same space."

Truly, the Mercury's policy had not

changed.^
Clapp's furious polemic in defense of slavery was more than an
attempt to reassure Mercury subscribers of the paper's continuing ortho
doxy; it was a frantic effort to alert them to the condition of the
South's rapidly eroding defenses.

Through it all the shadow of Robert

Barnwell Rhett fell intermittently over Clapp's shoulder.

Although

Rhett denied that he still had a "pecuniary interest" in the paper and
asserted that Clapp was "a man of independence and ability who would
scorn the idea that he was controlled . . . by me or any other man,"
the Mercury's course leaves little doubt of the Congressman's influence.
Less than a year after Rhett's forceful assertion, Clapp refused even

% e r c u r y , Apr. 1, June 9, July 10, Sept. 16, 1845.
The Mer
cury reprinted Hammond's "Free Church Letter" from the Columbia South
Carolinian. The response was such that crowds besieged Mercury
offices and it was forced to issue 15,000 "extras" (ibid., June 9, 10,
11, 12, 14, 1845; Merritt, Hammond, 73-76).
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to publish the nomination of Elmore to oppose Rhett in a bid for a
seat in the United States Senate.

The letter's influence is also in

dicated by the sometime uncertain nature of the paper's allegiance to
Calhoun.

While neither Rhett nor the Mercury openly broke with South

Carolina's senior statesman, they did from time to time indicate dis
agreement with one or more of his tactics.

The form taken by this

divergence— at least in the Mercury— was usually editorial silence when
Calhoun expected support.

The latter once complained that Clapp some

times published important announcements "without the slightest notice."
While the Mercury occasionally sailed without instructions on an in
dependent tack, it was careful to watch for storm warnings and to
change course when they were clearly visible.

Only once did Clapp

take direct issue with Calhoun and he subsequently repented of this.^
The Mercury had always required agility of its editors; its
demands on Clapp merely added a new dimension to the exaction.

Caught

in an intermittent cross-fire between Rhett and Calhoun, the editorial
voice of South Carolina politics was obliged to steer between the
"Scylla and Charybdis" of their respective influences.

Clapp proved

his seamanship to the general satisfaction, if not to the enthusiasm,
of both parties.

There was no rupture with Calhoun who continued to

use the Mercury for official policy announcements.

Leaders of the

^Rhett to Burt; Sept. 3, 1846, Rhett Collection; Clapp to
Hammond, Feb. 17, 1847, Hammond Papers; Rhett to James Buchanon, Oct.
20, 1845, quoted in White, Rhett, 89; Calhoun to J. R. Mathews, Aug. 18,
1845, quoted in Prior, "Mercury," 459; see below,
203 - 05.
When
the Mercury changed hands again in 1847, Rhett's elder brother, Benjamin,
acted as trustee for Stuart and Clapp referred to the paper as "prop
erty held in trust" (M e r cury, Feb. 1, 2, Apr. 5, 1847; Cardozo, Reminiscenses, 33).
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Calhotin faction even wrote Mercury editorials from time to time.®
Their contributions do not, however, lessen the evidence of Rhett's
influence.

Inconstant as his own loyalty to Calhoun was during this

period, Rhett still did not desert his senior, nor was he banished
from the camp.

After each of his periodic forays into independence

was outflanked by Calhoun influence, Rhett returned to bivouac.

He

was always received as a Calhoun ally though no longer a confidant.
To Clapp and the Mercury— as well as to Rhett— the outcome of
the congressional session of 1844 represented an unqualified defeat
for the South.

The failure of the Democratic-dominated Congress either

to reform the tariff or annex Texas left much of South Carolina with
the same impression.

The state's very interest seemed to be jeopardized

by the existing political situation.

The Bluffton movement, contained

by Calhoun, was the most immediate indication of this feeling.

And

as Mercury editorials would subsequently indicate, the paper's de
cision to follow Orthodoxy in abandoning Bluffton had not restored its
confidence in the future.

The action of the new Congress in repeal

ing Atherton's gag rule strengthened this impression.^
Clapp's gloomy fulminations as the Mercury's editor served to
remind his readers that he saw no relief in sight short of a radical
political adjustment.

His editorial of June 4, 1845, indicated that

he had not fully abandoned hope of so extreme a solution.

As he

O
Pickens to Conner, n.d., 29 May, 1844; Burt to Conner, Jan. 20,
1848, Henry W. Conner Letters, Charleston Library Society, hereinafter
cited as Conner Letters; Ker Boyce to Hammond, Jan. 12, 1848, Hammond
Papers.
^Mercury, May 27, 28, 30, June 2, 4, 5, 1845; see above,
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praised southern churchmen for severing the ties with their Yankee
brethren, thus "herald[ing] the way," the Mercury *s new editor all
but endorsed secession.

He had clearly not forgotten Bluffton.

But

Calhoun would be offended by anything more than allusion to so final
a remedy, so Clapp went no further.
While the Mercury's forebodings grew daily more aggravated,
events at Washington gradually moved to produce another deceptive
calm in the w ar between the sections.

On June 11, 1844, three days

after the Texas treaty was defeated, Senator George McDuffie inaugu
rated Calhoun's alternate annexation policy.

He submitted a joint

l^The Bluffton movement could almost be interpreted to mean
"all things to all men." Most of the rhetoric was directed toward
the calling of a convention and very little was said about what it
should do.
Few doubted, however, that it could, if it wished,
resort to either nullification or secession.
Rhett later said that
he concluded to support disunion in either 1844 or 1845— he some
times gave one date and sometimes the other.
Robert Barnwell Rhett,
J r . , a later Mercury editor, also said that his paper had supported
secession during the Bluffton movement.
Yet Stuart, the Mercury's
contemporary editor, had trusted "in God" that Bluffton would
"rescue liberty, the Constitution and the Union." At the same time
the senior Rhett avowed that his purpose was to "maintain the Con
stitution, and the Union, too." White concludes that secession was
not Rhett's goal in 1844. My own opinion is that both Rhett and
Stuart were attempting to blunt the charges of extremism being hurled
at their heads by their protestations of loyalty to the idea of the
Union.
There was little reason for them to share in Calhoun's emo
tional attachment to that ideal.
Calhoun had been reared by Revo
lutionary veterans and matured at a time when the country gloried
in its nationalism. Rhett's and Stuart's first adult associations,
on the other hand, were with a minority sections' resistance to the
rest of the Union.
All things considered, it appears that Cheves
and Hammond, by making the issue clear, removed the onus of having
first resorted to extremism from Rhett and Stuart and so made it
possible for them to favor an ultimate separation.
Clapp's Mercury
certainly alluded to secession (Mercury, Sept. 3, 1844, June 4, 1845,
Jan. 29, 1863; Rhett to R. M. T. Hunter, Aug. 30, 1844, C. H. Ambler,
e d . , The Correspondence of R. M. T. Hunter [Washington, 1918], II,
70-71; White, Rhett, 76-77; see above, 181-83.
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resolution which proposed that the defeated treaty become effec
tive whenever it was ratified by T e x a s . ^

Although the Democratic

convention, the Bluffton movement, and the general election served
to upstage McDuffie’s proposal during the summer and fall, Secretary
of State Calhoun was oiling the ways for its implementation.
Calhoun's maneuvers were anything but premature.

The British

goal of maintaining Texan independence had taken the form of a con
crete proposal even as the Texas treaty was being defeated.

Her

Majesty’s Government was willing, it told the Texan envoy in London,
to

guarantee the independence of his country in return for her pledge

to

remain out of the American Union. As Cqlhoun

quickly discovered,

the Texas government was disposed to consider the Queen’s offer.
Texas officialdom was obliged to move carefully, however, since popu
lar opinion in that country favored union with the United

States.

12

Calhoun, then, had not only to contend with antislavery forces
in

this country but also with a Texas

American delay and fearful of

Mexican

government disillusioned by
invasion. Through his State De

partment the Secretary negotiated with Britain, Mexico, and Texas
while he instructed his followers in Congress to move in support of
a resolution similar to McDuffie’s.
port of the venture.

Rhett was prominent in his sup

The debates were bitter and the vote disturbingly

sectional in its implications, but on January 25, 1845, a satisfactory

llwiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist, 184, 199; Justin H. Smith, The
Annexation of Texas (New York, 1941), 272, 352.
12wiitse, Calhoun Sectionalist, 199-204; M. P.
houn, Apr. 29, 1844, W. S. Murphy to Calhoun, Apr. 29,
e d . , Calhoun Correspondence, 947-52; Smith, Annexation
413.
France was also involved in the British offer to
independence.

Norton to Cal
1844, Jameson
of Texas, 356guarantee Texas
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resolution passed the House.

One month later the Senate also ap

proved an annexation resolution.

The invisible hand of the Presi

dent-elect probably determined the Senate's decision; Clapp's dis
gruntled Washington correspondent reported that Polk had promised to
exclude Calhoun from his cabinet in return for one crucial affirma
tive vote.

On February 26 the House accepted the Senate's version

of the resolution, and Tyler signed the resulting bill on March 1.^^
Reinforced by unofficial representatives of Polk and the
ubiquitous Commodore R. F. Stockton, Calhoun's charge in Texas played
on popular feeling to force the reluctant Texan government into ac
cepting Washington's latest offer.

Lest the Mexicans take umbrage

at this trespass. Commodore Stockton's fleet stood into Texan waters
and Colonel Zachary Taylor was instructed to encamp along the Sabine.
Pressured thus from within and without, Texas elected to approve the
American offer on July 4, 1845.
Throughout the uncertain travail of the congressional struggle
over Texas, the Charleston Mercury offered little reassurance for its
readers.

Northern Democrats, Clapp's paper reported, had supported

plans to partition Texas so as to exclude slavery from much of the
area.

These Democrats, with whom South Carolina was allied, had,

thereby, again proved their faithlessness.

But for the affirmative

vote of nine southern Whigs, annexation would never have been approved.
Clapp said that his reaction to the narrow victory was a moderate one.

l^Calhoun to Andrew Jackson Donelson, May 23, 1845, Jameson,
ed., Calhoun Correspondence, 658-59; Smith, Annexation of Texas, 32755; Mercury. March 3, 1845; Wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist, 208-14.
^^Wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist, 214-16.
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The South had "triumphed . . .

in spite of foes and traitors" and

would stand "with stern defiance on her brow . . . her yet un
sheathed and dripping sword in her hand."

The editor's "moderation"

had not blunted his pen.^^
The Mercury was not alone in regarding the annexation victory
with reserve.

Three days after the House vote on Texas Armistead

Burt wrote to Hammond:
I confess frankly that I regard the Union as it is
a degrading and ruinous alliance to the South, and
if she have spirit, or self respect, she will not
endure the dishonor and shame of submission.
I
would await the fate of annexation and some of its
consequences before I would determine what it be
comes the South to do.
That she must do something,
he is blind not to see.^^
The Mercury *s despondent view of the political association was
spreading throughout South Carolina though not necessarily as a re
sult of the Charleston paper's efforts.

Doubts about the future h ad

become endemic in the state, especially among her younger leaders.
The incipient panic was no respector of persons.

Armistead Burt was

not only the Congressman from Calhoun's district but also was married
to the Secretary's niece.

In Charleston, however,

the gloom was tem

porarily dispelled when Texas ratified the annexation resolution.
Decking h er streets with flags, the city rang h er church bells to
signal the glad event.

Even the Mercury improved its mood as it

l% e r c u r y , Jan. 3, 8, 11, 18, 20, 21, 23, 28, 29, Feb. 4, 8,
11, 12, 14, 17, 20, March 2, 28, Apr. 14, June 2, 1845.
l^Burt to Hammond, Jan. 28, 1845, quoted in Wiltse, Calhoun
Sectionalist, 211.
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hailed the firing of a one hundred gun salute to signal the addition
of a new slaveholding state.
Soon after the election of 1844 Calhoun’s friend A. B. Longstreet wrote the President-elect.
Longstreet minced no words.

Acting by direction as he was,

"If you mean to take a decided stand

against the tariff," he advised Polk, "retain Mr. Calhoun" in the
cabinet but "if you do not, by all means dismiss him."

On Febru

ary 26, 1845, Calhoun learned officially that he would not be re
tained.

It was not clear, however, that this action inferred either

a cavalier attitude on the part of the administration toward tariff
reform or an unfriendly feeling toward South Carolina.

Calhoun was on

several occasions offered the Ministry to the Court of St. James but
refused it each time.

Elmore also received a chance to decline this

appointment and so did Francis Pickens.

Even Rhett was apparently

considered for the post.
So many favors to South Carolinians could be interpreted as
an effort of the incoming administration to prove its reliability.
Unfortunately for Polk, South Carolina did not adopt this view.

Still,

Calhoun maintained his resolve to cooperate with the new President.
His determination endured even after he heard Polk's inaugural ad
dress in which Polk declared for a reduced tariff that was still pro
tective in principle.

He notified Great Britain that America's title

to all of Oregon was "clear and unquestionable."

Calhoun was opposed

to both positions; he, nonetheless, restrained his following and

^^Wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist, 59; Mercury, July 7, 8, 1845.
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prevented a rupture with the administration.^^
Then in May of 1845 a number of Calhoun's former campaign
managers met in Charleston where they decided to resort to their
strategy of the preceding autumn.

In return for satisfactory action

from Polk on the tariff, Calhoun had at that time agreed to renounce
any intention of running for President in 1848.

Since the adminis

tration had not redeemed its pledge, the Calhounites now proposed to
remind Polk of the terms of their agreement.

Rhett was present for

the meeting and Calhoun endorsed its conclusions.

Pending some satis

factory action from the administration on the tariff, the former Sena
tor would again become a presidential

candidate.

19

For some time after this meeting nothing was heard from either
Calhoun or Rhett; the former was in temporary retirement while the
latter was out of the country.

The Mercury, however, maintained a

steady barrage aimed at the administration.
spoils system, the Mercury charged.

Polk was reviving the

The "oracular nonsense" of the

President's inaugural was weak on the tariff; his party was divided
on Texas and unsound on the gag rule.

Clapp reserved the greater

1O

Burt to Hammond, Mar. 2, 1845, Hammond Papers; James Buchanon to Calhoun, Apr. 9, 1845, Elmore to Calhoun, Apr. 16, 1845,
Boucher, e d . , Correspondence to Calhoun, 292-93; Richardson, e d . ,
Messages and Papers, 2223-32; Wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist, 218-20.
l^Dixon H. Lewis to Calhoun, May 9, 1845, Boucher, e d . , Corres
pondence to Calhoun, 293-94; Calhoun to Lewis, May 16, 1845, Ambler,
e d . , Hunter Correspondence, 77-79.
The name of the addressee is mis
sing in Calhoun's reply. Wiltse concluded that the second letter was
obviously addressed to Lewis (Wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist, 227, n.
24). Wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist, 218, 227.
Capers, in his treat
ment of Calhoun's plans for running in 1848, ignores the events of the
fall of 1844 to conclude that Calhoun never gave up his intention of
running four years later (Capers, Calhoun Opportunist, 225-29); Walker
to Hammond, Mar. 10, 22, 1845, Hammond Papers.
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part of his invective for the subject of the tariff.
he belabored the administration’s tariff pose.

Almost daily

Without the tariff,

Clapp thundered, Britain’s exchanges for southern cotton and rice
would make for "a commerce richer to her than all h er colonies."

The

island empire would never have sponsored abolition, he said, but for
the tariff.

That obnoxious policy of trade restriction was also be

hind her failure to compromise on

O r e g o n .

20

The iniquitous influence of the tariff on foreign affairs
continued, however, to be less important to the Mercury than its
fateful implication for domestic matters.

Clapp had not forgotten

that the outer wall of the southern citadel was built of an uncom
promising opposition to protection.

With arguments the Mercury had

used before, the editor reminded his readers that the tariff was
directly related to the program for destroying slavery.

Abolition

ists feared that the agricultural interest in America would over
throw industrialism but for the tariff.
slave property less valuable.
even more dangerous, " . . .

Moreover, the tariff made

The principle behind regulation was

for it is a conclusion the most simple

that if the Federal Government is ominpotent in laying taxes, it is
omnipotent over slavery."^1
Since it was impossible to contain the mad ravings of the
abolitionist bombardment, Clapp determined to hold the line on tar
iff reform.

May 27,

This is "the only issue on which we can meet the question

^^Mercury, Jan. 15, Mar. 8, 10, 15, 28,
28, 30, June 2, 5, Oct. 16, 1845.

31, Apr. 1, 2, 11,

Zl lbid.. Jan. 3, 8, 15, Feb. 10, Mar. 8, 10, 15, 20, 28, 31,
Apr.
1, 2, 8, 11, May 14, 15, 19, July 10, Aug.9, 21, 23, Sept.
12,
18, Oct. 2, 3, 6, 7, 11, 17, 22, 24, 27, 28, Nov. 3, Dec. 8, 9, 12,
17, 1845.
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of slavery itself," he said.

The South must "stand immovably on

the principle that Congress shall 'lay taxes for revenue' only"; her
only alternative was destruction.

For its part the Mercury would

support the administration only if it redeemed Polk's tariff pledge.
Implying that this determination transcended both man and events,
the Mercury resolved to
Hold to account the party with which w e act,
and we intend to do it without fear or favor,
confident that in that w ay more than any other,
w e can be of service to the p e o p l e . ^2
In the days since Bluffton, the Mercury had refrained from
launching an undisguised frontal assault on the tariff but with in
creasing reluctance.

Out of respect for Orthodoxy, Clapp called for

nothing "beyond the ordinary action of the Government."

He did re

mind his readers, however, that the Abolitionists would never let
them alone "while the Union lasts."

Then as the anniversary of

Bluffton's famous dinner drew nearer, the Mercury commenced to print
letters which acclaimed the ideas of the late movement.
ton boys have been silenced, not subdued.

"The Bluff-

. ." the correspondent

"Bluffton" wrote on the first anniversary of Rhett's speech in that
picturesque place.

The fire of Bluffton, he said "smoulders" yet

"and will burst forth in another glorious flame.

..."

The bellows

of the Mercury vigorously fanned the embers with an unremitting attack
on the tariff evil.23

^^Ibid., Jan. 15, Mar. 8, 10, 15, May 14, 19, June 5, July 19,
Aug. 9, 21, Sept. 18, Oct. 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 13, 17, 22, 27,
Nov. 3, Dec. 9, 12, 17, 1845.
23lbid., Jan. 15, 27, May 21, June, July, Au g . , Sept.,
1845, p assim. In particular see issues for Aug. 7, 9, Sept. 12,
18, 1845.
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In September 1845, as the Mercury’s rhetoric was rapidly
reaching the blazing point, Rhett returned from a trip to England.
After stopping in Washington to talk to President Polk and Robert J.
Walker, P o l k ’s Secretary of the Treasury, Rhett concluded that their
tariff intentions were unsatisfactory in nature.

As he had done in

the days of the debates on the McKay bill, Rhett wrote to Calhoun for
advice.

The impetuous Congressman’s subsequent conduct was also rem

iniscent of that earlier occasion.

Without nvaiting Calhoun's reply,

Rhett took a strong position on the tariff, a position much stronger
than his experience in such matters should have allowed.

South Caro

lina would, Rhett proclaimed, nullify any tariff measure sponsored by
the administration that did not result in a tariff for revenue only.
Furthermore, Calhoun would be ignored if he stood in the way of such
action.24
Calhoun’s reaction was both swift and tactful.

Identified

as he was with having supported Polk and opposed Bluffton, he made
no direct response to Rhett’s challenge.

Instead, he authorized Mc

Duffie who had supported Bluffton— at least in spirit— to do so.
McDuffie’s timely opportunity presented itself when an unidentified
correspondent, alleging alarm over the Mercury's posture, asked Mc
Duffie his opinion of administration intentions.

McDuffie replied

with a Calhoun-inspired defense of free trade accompanied by the
assurance that Polk would redeem his pledge to produce a revenue

Rhett to Calhoun, Sept. 18, 1845, Richard Cralle to Cal
houn, Sept. 23, 1845, Jameson, ed., Calhoun Correspondence, 1049-54;
M. M. Quaife, e d . , The Diary of James K. Polk during his Presidency
1845r»49 (4 vols., Chicago, 1910), I, 43-44.
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tariff.

The letter ultimately reached Clapp who published it on

October 7.^^
By this time the Mercury was embroiled in a battle with the
Union, Polk's Washington organ.

The Union was castigating the Mercury

for its alleged misrepresentations of Polk's position.

Coincidental

with his publication of McDuffie's letter, Clapp denied that either he
or his Washington correspondent had ever

"intimated that the adminis

tration would not propose 'a reduction of the tariff'.

..."

The

Mercury had only predicted that Polk "would recommend some compro
mise . . . retaining the protective principle, and thus by committing
free trade men to that, put them in a false position.

..."

however, was as far off course as Clapp could afford to go.

That,
Again

both Rhett and the Mercury deferred to Calhoun's wishes; if they were
still not enamored of Polk, they nevertheless ceased either to imply
the desirability of or to agitate for separate state action.
as Hammond said, "So. Ca. belongs to Calhoun.

It was

He will not agitate."26

The resurgence of Blufftonism served as the catalytic agent
to produce Calhoun's decision to return to the Senate.
more fundamental reasons for the move,however.

There were

The international

situation was in need of attention; Polk seemed bent on risking war
with England over Oregon while Mexico was openly threatening hostili
ties over Texas.

Pleas

for Calhoun's return to the upper chamber came

from persons of such divergent persuasions as John S. Barbour of Vir
ginia and Massachusett's famous Daniel Webster.

Too, the free-trade

^^Wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist, 229; Mercury, Oct. 7, 1845.
^^Mercury, Oct. 7, 1845; Hammond to William Gilmore Simms,
July 14, 1845, Hammond Papers.
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ranks in the Senate needed bolstering.

Calhoun was doubtless moti

vated by the thought that his going back to the Senate would improve
chances for tariff reform and thereby retard the growing disaffec
tion in South Carolina.

At any event, October 9, 1845, Calhoun

accepted Senator Daniel Huger's long-standing offer to step aside in
his favor.27
At the same time the meeting of a South-West commercial conven
tion in Memphis afforded another opportunity for strengthening the
chances of tariff reform.

The convention, called for November, pro

posed to discuss agriculture, manufacturing, and transport in the South
and West.

Senator Edward A. Hannegan of Indiana let it be known that

in return for southern support for river and harbor improvements, the
Cumberland road, and a graduated price for public lands, the West would
vote with the South on the tariff.

The Jeffersonian-inspired, Jack-

sonian-strengthened alliance between southern planters and northern
farmers was giving way; the antislavery groups in combination with
rising forces of industrialism were seeing to that.

Hannegan's offer

might well represent the best, if not the only, means of effecting
tariff reform.28
There was strong support in South Carolina for the convention,
especially from the railroad interest.

Calhoun was persuaded to at

tend as one of the state's official delegates.

He was only one of

six hundred delegates from fifteen states and two prospective states,

^^Wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist, 229-32.
28ibid., 234-37; Duff Green to Calhoun, Sept. 24, 1845, James
Gadsden to Calhoun, Oct. 10, 1845, Jameson, ed., Calhoun Correspondence,
1055, 1060-63; Quaife, e d . , Polk Diary, I, 38; Mercury, Oct. 25, 1845.
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Texas and Iowa.

These men wasted no time in electing Calhoun per

manent president of their convention.

Calhoun's days in the War

Office had provided h i m with an enduring vision of a vast country
united by both defensive works and improved transport.
quer space," he had said in those days.
the old dream.

"Let us con

At Memphis he resurrected

Submitting proposals which included fortifications for

the Florida straits along with trans-Mississippi railroads that would
finally link Atlantic with Pacific, he made his bid for western sup
port on the tariff.

Calhoun said, furthermore, that the Mississippi

River should be improved; indeed, it should be connected with the Great
Lakes and the St. Lawrence River.29
With all this the delegates agreed.

But the West wanted

something more— a grand scheme of internal improvements.

It was

clearly beyond the power of the private sector of the economy to un
derwrite so large a program.
projects.

The West wanted federal aid for its

Asserting that this was possible, Calhoun contended that

the steamboat had converted the Mississippi River into an inland sea.
As a result Congress could improve the river with the same power that
it maintained coastal harbors.

This authority could not be used to

finance railroad construction but Congress could help even here.

The

general government could grant alternate sections of the public do
main to burgeoning railroads.

Furthermore, by reducing the duty on

railroad iron. Congress could save construction companies $2,000 per

29j. D. B. DeBow, e d . , DeBow's Review (January, 1846), I, 721; Richard K. Cralle, e d . , The Works of John C. Calhoun (6 vols.;
Charleston, 1851-56), V, 293; Wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist, 237-38;
Calhoun's admonition to "conquer space" actually dates from February,
1817, shortly before he took the War Department, when as a Congress
man, he defended the Bonus bill (Cralle, Calhoun Wo r k s , II, 186-96).
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mile in costs.

Finally, Calhoun advocated, as he had long done, that

the price of public lands be scaled downward, and saving only those
areas required for defense and public buildings, the public domain
itself be ceded to the states.

The convention president's general

recommendations were put into the form of resolutions to be submitted
to the forthcoming session of Congress.

Calhoun was thus prepared to

pay the price of internal improvements in return for western support
of tariff reform.

Prospects for a South-West coalition appeared to

be bright, indeed.^0
South Carolina's response to the Memphis proposals was un
favorable.

Rhett did not accept Calhoun's vision of the "inland sea,"

and this time Clapp endorsed the younger man's dissent.

Bewailing the

surrender of "the old and cherished doctrines of South Carolina," the
Mercury displayed some reluctance, however, to censure Calhoun.

While

Clapp readily attacked the results of the Memphis convention, for
several days he refrained from identifying Calhoun with his target;
when he did so he trod lightly.
tor observed, " . . .

"It is indeed lamentable," the edi

that Mr. Calhoun h ad anything to do with the

Memphis Convention.
Congress convened with two important changes in the Calhoun
camp.

Calhoun himself was back in the Senate; no Carolinian had

^^DeBow, DeBow's Review, I, 7-21; Cralle, e d . , Calhoun W o r k s ,
V, 293.
3lMercury, Oct. 25, Nov. 28, 29, Dec. 5, 1845.
Pickens was a
casualty of South Carolina's reaction to the Memphis convention.
Cal
houn believed h i m to b e the author of a Southern Quarterly Review
article which criticized the Memphis proposals.
Pickens denied the
authorship but admitted to having seen the article before it was pub
lished and to agreeing with its contentions.
This cost h i m his pre
ferred position in the Calhoun camp (Wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist,
242).
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voted against his return, Memphis notwithstanding.

But Holmes in

stead of Rhett was now the Calhoun spokesman in the House.
Congress was destined to sit in significant session.

Again the

War with both

Mexico and Great Britain loomed as a possibility even as the ques
tions of internal improvements and the tariff threatened to aggravate
domestic divisions,

Polk's annual

message to Congress reasserted

America's claim to all of Oregon and endorsed free trade.
ters produced a

q u a r r e l .

Both mat

^2

The President's message to Congress surprised Clapp.
offered more "than we dared hope," said the Mercury.

Polk

When Secretary

Walker submitted his Report during the same month, the Mercury's
skepticism about the administration tariff stance vanished alto
gether.

Clapp's sudden conversion was not unlike an earlier Mercury

shift to the Democracy during Van Buren's time.
was clearly in response to orders.

That move, however,

In those days Stuart had em

ployed a reliable connection with Calhoun by working through Rhett.
But Clapp, a victim of the estrangement between Calhoun and Rhett, was
obliged to pick his course without reference to an approved chart.
Always before h i m was the possibility of foundering on the shoal of
someone's displeasure.

Using perhaps Stuart's earlier maneuver as a

beacon, Clapp indicated that his own conversion to the administration
was neither less complete nor less sudden than had been his predeces
sor's.

Robert J. Walker's Report made it possible for the Mercury to

"Cheerfully and heartily avow" its "adherence to the Administration
on the Tariff question."

Holding the Report to be the ablest and most

^^wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist, 231; White, Rhett, 88.
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thorough examination of "the purposes and limits of the taxing
power . . . from the Executive" since "the foundation of the Gov
ernment," the "Sleepless Sentinel" was as lavish in praise as it had
been free with invective.
The Mercury's current conversion was not an enduring one,
however.

While the Senate debated the situation in Oregon, the House

took up the tariff.

The resulting dispute indicated that the way of

the revenue-only forces was going to be a rough one.

So strong were

the protectionists that some sort of compromise was inevitable.
Chafing at the slow progress of the bill through Congress and at
times losing all hope of its passage, Clapp renewed his attack on
the administration.

Polk's Washington organ, the U nion, retaliated

by reading the inconstant Mercury out of the party.^4
Debate on the tariff was frequently deferred as the news
from Mexico became critical.

The Oregon question also absorbed much

congressional attention, but the nature of import duties persevered
as an issue in war as in peace.

Calhoun's strategy of securing West

ern support for a lower tariff caused h i m to sponsor a compromise
internal improvements bill.

He cooperated to produce a Senate

measure which underwrote the cost of improving navigation on four
western rivers— the Mississippi being among them.

The proposal

passed the Senate but when it reached the House it was shelved for a
general pork-barrel bill, one which funded internal improvements

^% e r c u r y , Dec. 8, 9, 12,

5, 20,

17, 23, 1845.

34lbid., Feb. 20, Apr. 8, 18, 29, May 18, 27, 28, June 3,
23, 24, 26, July 7, 8, 22, 31, Aug. 1, 1846.
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according to the vision of local politicians.

Congressman Rhett

was among those who stood opposed to the whole concept.

Assailing

the House measure as "the murder of the great principle of the Re
publican party," he was rewarded by the Mercury *s salute to the de
fender of the "old and cherished doctrines of South Carolina."

In

ternal improvement projects, Clapp said, threatened "not only the
ruin of the Democratic party, but the Constitution itself."

Neither

Congressman nor journal directly referred to the Memphis convention
but their enduring disapproval of its proposals was there for all to
see.35
Calhoun's strategy was destined to triumph, nonetheless.
On June 26, 1846, the Senator submitted a Report in justification of
the Memphis proposals.
ments.

It was complete with constitutional argu

The legitimate authority for his suggestions, Calhoun said,

lay in the commerce clause of the Constitution.

The Mississippi

River, flowing as it did between the states, could hardly be controlled
by any one state.

Congress alone, he continued, had authority to

regulate the commerce that flowed over this great "inland Sea"; the
same Congress could improve the liquid highway with the authority it
already exerted over coastal harbors and the Great Lakes.

Although

Calhoun voted against the House version of the internal improvements
bill when it reached the Senate, the latter body approved the measure
and the South-West alliance held.36

33ibid. , Mar. 12, 19, Apr. 27, June 20, 1846; Wiltse, Calhoun
Sectionalist, 262-72; White, Rhett, 88.

36wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist, 262-72.
Calhoun was Chairman
of the Senate committee to which the Memphis petition was referred.
His Report was on behalf of that committee.
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Calhoun had given further evidence of his good faith to the
West by sponsoring a land graduation bill which received Senate ap
proval and was sent to the House,
the over-all plan worked.

His exertions were not in vain;

A tariff acceptable to both sides passed

House and Senate by virtue of western support and was signed by Presi
dent Polk on July 30.

Almost obscured by the general excitement over

the tariff, an Independent Treasury was revived in early August.
Southern reaction to both measures was favorable.

The Mercury's res

ervations about the tariff bill were few, and tended to disappear as
Clapp noted a "very cheering despondency" among Whigs and others of
arrant protectionist persuasion.

The editor hailed the restoration

of the sub-treasury system removing as it did the "temptation to in
trigue and corruption" inherent in the practice of pet banks.3?
There now occurred an unexpected end to the internal improve
ment program.

President Polk was displeased with the measure.

He

decided that its huge expenditures for local projects had little to
do with the national interest.

Hence, after the tariff was safely

signed into law, he vetoed the bill.

The House retaliated by tabling

the graduation bill and the South-West alliance died still-born.
While Calhoun denounced the reasoning of the President's veto, the
Mercury— not yet a party to those favoring the alliance— congratulated
Polk for not having forgotten "his own principles" after all.^^
At this point the course of the Mercury veered in the direc
tion of iron^

after it was too late, Clapp endorsed the late

37lbid. ; Mercury, Aug. 1, 3, 6, 7, 29, 1846.
38wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist, 272; Mercury, Aug.

7, 1846.
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successful strategy of his sometime leader, Calhoun.

Pronouncing

the Senator's Report as not only sound but also unanswerable, he re
peated its reasoning for Mercury readers.

Clapp's journal, moreover,

favored "a general, against a partial application of one of the great
powers expressly conferred on Congress":
The thirteen states which share the valley of the
Mississippi, alive with half the commerce of the
whole Union, cannot be excluded from the benefits
of any general provision of the Constitution.
The converted editor admitted his recent waywardness.

He had

"partaken of the surprise and dissatisfaction widely felt on the an
nunciation of" the "opinions" of the Memphis convention.

Now, taking

issue with an article in the Southern Quarterly Review which remained
critical of those "opinions," the Mercury sounded the Calhoun call as
of yore.

Unaware that the opportunity of effecting Calhoun's late

strategy had passed, Clapp endorsed the creation of a South-West alli
ance.

Stuart, in the halcyon days before Bluffton, could have been no

more loyal to the l e a d e r . ^9
Surprisingly enough, Robert Barnwell Rhett followed the
Mercury this time to repent of his heresy.

In October 1846 he pub

lished an article in the Southern Quarterly Review which ratified Cal
houn's strategy of a South-West alliance and asserted that upon its
success depended the future of the Union.

Clapp must have breathed

more easily; Calhoun and Rhett were standing together once more.^^

39Mercury, Oct. 4, 1845; July 10, 14, No. 7, Dec. 4, 19.
1846.
^^White, R h ett, 90; Rhett to Burt, Sept. 3, 1846, Burt
Papers; Rhett to Hammond, Jan. 12, 1847, Hammond Papers.
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During the debates of the recent congressional session.
Southerners of the Calhoun persuasion uncovered a signal flaw in their
defensive strategy of the past thirteen years.

Since 1833 they had

labored to restrict the principle of protectionism, creating through
a low tariff the outer wall of the slavery bastion.

But even as the

Walker Tariff of 1846 crowned their effort with success, they made
the fateful discovery that their vision had been too limited.

Before

the outer work was completed, the Abolitionists, in a surprising move,
succeeded in outflanking it.^l

Calhoun, Bhett, and the Mercury ulti

mately united to understand that the new danger transcended differ
ences in the Calhoun camp; the whole southern fortress now stood in
deadly peril.

So Clapp was relieved of one problem only to be faced

with another more ominous.

The new danger appeared in the form of

the Wilmot Proviso.
On August 8, 1846, the House of Representatives approved
President Po l k ’s request for $2,000,000 to defray the cost of peace
negotiations with Mexico.

Attached to the appropriation bill, however,

was a proposal by David Wilmot, Democrat from Pennsylvania.

It pro

vided that "as an express and fundamental condition to the acquisition
of any territory from the Republic of Mexico," slavery should be for
ever excluded.

The Senate killed this critical proposal— and the

appropriation bill along with it— but Calhoun recognized a disaster

41por a discussion of the Proviso that best indicates the
divisiveness of its effect upon the national Democracy, see Eric
Foner, "The Wilmot Proviso Revisited," J A H , LVI, No. 2 (September,
1969), 262-79.
Foner calls the Proviso "a desperate attempt to re
store the Democratic P a r ty’s traditional role as a placator of
sectional antagonism. . . . "
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in the making.

The vigilant Mercury missed its significance, at

least for the time being.^2
Clapp's sights were trained elsewhere on August 8.

He was pre

occupied with the results of the extended congressional session which
stood in glaring contrast to those of the frustrating Congress that
had produced Bluffton.

The Mercury, gleefully greeting the new tar

iff for revenue only, reflected on the other southern victories as
well.

Sub-treasury had been re-established, war with England averted,

and an Oregon treaty had been ratified.

The hateful proposal to

plunder the public treasury with appropriations for internal improve
ments had gone down in defeat.

Clapp was also following the course

of hostilities with Mexico.
The Mercury's failure to share Calhoun's immediate understand
ing of Wilmot's menacing move stands in curious contrast to its ob
vious rapport with the Senator in matters of foreign policy.

Through

out the late congressional session, as Calhoun consistently opposed
Polk's seemingly uncompromising stand on Oregon, the Mercury echoed
the Senator's opinions.

Calhoun disapproved of Polk's bluff in assert

ing America's "clear and unquestionable title" to all of Oregon.

The

Carolinian held that the United States could not validate its claim
beyond 49°N on the grounds of either settlement or discovery.

Aware

that Polk's resolve to look John Bull "straight in the eye" was only
a diplomatic ploy, Calhoun feared that it would miscarry.

He frowned

upon the President's notice of American intention to terminate the
Anglo-American joint-occupation treaty.

If the President's policy

^ ^Congressional Globe, 29 Cong., 1 Sess., 1211-18; Wiltse,
Calhoun Sectionalist, 289.
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proved to be unsuccessful, tariff reform— dependent as it was upon
British concessions to American grain growers— might also fall.

Even

more to be feared was the risk of war with Great Britain at a time
when American relations with Mexico were becoming daily more unsettled.
In the event of such a conflict, the United States could lose both
Texas and Oregon, Calhoun warned.

But when Polk’s tactic produced, in

the Oregon Treaty, the compromise solution that he had all along in
tended, Calhoun actively supported the President.

Robert Barnwell

Rhett followed suit.^j
The Mercury was effusive throughout in its agreement with Cal
h o u n ’s policy.

The American claim to "fifty-four forty" was absurd,

Clapp said; based as it was on "shallow ignorance," it could be sup
ported neither by discovery nor settlement.

It was little wonder, the

editor continued, that those who advocated so outrageous an extreme
would "listen to no proposal of arbitration."

They knew "better than

to submit such assumptions to the test of any impartial m a n ’s scrutiny."
There was, the Mercury ventured, "not a conscientious man in Christen
dom who would sanction them."

To the Mercury, the forty-ninth parallel

^Richardson, Messages and Papers, 2223-32; Quaife, e d . , Polk
Diary, I, 62-64, 155; Capers, Calhoun Opportunist, 213-34; Wiltse
Calhoun Sectionalist, 247-72; White, Bhett, 88; John Hope Franklin,
"The Southern Expansionists of 1846," J S H , XXV, No. 3 (Aug., 1949),
323-38; Edwin A. Miles, " ’Fifty Four Forty or Fight’— an American
Political Legend," M V H R , XLIV, No. 2 (Sept., 1957), 291-309; Calhoun
never repudiated his preference for a policy of "wise and masterly in
activity" which he believed would bring the United States all of Oreg
on.
To those who charged him with neglecting the interest of the
West in Oregon while he supported those of the South in Texas, Cal
houn replied that time was on the side of the United States in Oregon
whereas in Texas it was not.
So if the West wanted an immediate set
tlement of the Oregon issue it must be a compromise one (Cralle, Cal
houn W o r k s , IV, 286, 288).
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represented "a very fair division" of Oregon.

Echoing Calhoun, the

editor predicted that the westward migration of Americans would ulti
mately acquire the territory for the United States, regardless of any
settlement with Great Britain.
we will have

it,"

"Substantially we

the paper smugly

predicted.

must

have it; and

44

War with Great Britain over this absurd dispute would be dis
astrous, especially for the South, said the Mercury.

Yankee manufac

turers and western grain farmers might profit; the South would only
suffer.

War would furnish a pretext for reviving protection; it would

seal the South's ports to foreign trade and the South would be the
principal battleground.

Then there were the benighted Abolitionists.

They demanded Oregon in return for Texas and rejoiced that war with
Great Britain would "revenge the quarrel of abolition with the South'.'
The editor saw warmongers everywhere : "every element of wickedness and
wrong" seemed bent upon destroying the peace.

The Abolitionists wanted

revenge, the Whigs wanted party advantage, and the Democrats were moved
by Clapp knew "not what irrestible

charm.

"45

Clapp applauded every move for peace and exposed every pro
vocative action.

Polk's Inaugural was wrong when it spoke of a "clear

and unquestionable title" to all Oregon.

The editor was no less dis

pleased by the President's termination of joint-occupation than was
Calhoun.

John Quincy Adams, the vindictive spokesman for the Aboli

tionists, and Edward A, Hannegan, the representative of western greed

Nov. 10,
19, Mar.

4 4Mercury, Feb. 8, Mar. 13, Apr. 28, 29, May 8, July 12, Oct.30,
11, 12, 13, 17, 19, 20, Dec. 10, 16, 1845; Feb. 16, 17, 18,
4, 11, 12, Apr. 9, 28, June 18, 1846.

45ibid., Feb. 8, Mar. 13, Apr. 29, May 2, June 17, July 12,
Oct. 30, Nor. 4, 10-13, 19, 21, Dec.
9, 10, 24, 27, 29, 31, 1845; Jan.
3, 8, 9, 12, 13, 15, 27, 30, Feb. 3,11, 27, Mar. 11, Apr. 3, 6,
9, 20,
25, 28, 1846.
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and Impatience, could both profit by studying the example of those
moderate men who followed Calhoun.
As the spring of 1846 drew nearer, the Mercury developed hopes
for a peaceful resolution of the dispute.

The President’s notice ter

minating the joint-occupation treaty was, after all, conciliatory in
its tone, and Polk's Washington organ, the U nion, was growing steadily
more moderate in its view of the situation.

"Although not a press

that we can remember beside [sic] our own ventured to discuss the title
to Oregon, and even the members of Congress . . . seemed to touch it
with fear and trembling," the Mercury said in April, "truth by degrees
has spread its light."

The editor hailed the final settlement as "pre

cisely what w e have always maintained ought to be the terms of set
tlement."

Senate ratification of the Oregon treaty ended for the

Mercury "the most perplexing and dangerous foreign question of our
day.

..."

It probably determined " . . .

that for a long time to come

the relations of this country with Great Britain shall be those of peace
and friendship."47
The generally parallel course of Calhoun and Rhett and the
Mercury with reference to the war with Mexico is further evidence of
Clapp's attempts to uphold his journal's traditional allegiance.

Al

though the Mercury devoted less space to Mexican relations than it did
to the contemporary dispute with Great Britain over Oregon, when it

4 6ibid., Mar. 25, Apr. 28, May 2, 8, 9, 14, 24, June
July 12, Oct. 30, Nov. 4, 10-13, 17, 19, 20, 21, Dec. 9, 10,
29,1845; Jan. 3, 8, 9, 15, 24, 28-30, Feb. 3, 11, 1846.

10,
16, 25,

4 7lbld., Feb. 18, 24, 27, Mar. 16, 20, 26, Apr. 3, 6, 9,
16, 20, 22, 24, 25, 28, June 15, 16, 17, 18, 22, July 24, 1846.
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did discuss American policy toward Mexico it was in words that Cal
houn himself might have used.

This apparent preoccupation with the

Anglo-American dispute is in itself further evidence of Calhoun's in
fluence.

For without a settlement with Great Britain, there was

little likelihood of one with Mexico.

Consequently, the greater

part of Calhoun's time in the Congress— at least until the ratifica
tion of the Oregon Treaty— was devoted to effecting an accommodation
with Great Britain.
Calhoun was sympathetic to President Polk's expansionist pro
gram but unalterably opposed to its accomplishment at the risk of war.
Upon learning that the President had ordered Zachary Taylor to take
up a position on the Rio Grande, Calhoun urged care lest war result
and the Oregon treaty be jeopardized.

He also feared domestic re

percussions with respect to the peculiar instituion.

Polk told the

Senator that only a show of force was intended, but Calhoun was not
reassured.

When hostilities did result and the President asked Con

gress for authority to prosecute the w a r that had come "by the act
of Mexico herself," Calhoun urged delay.

The President, Calhoun said,

was not empowered to declare war; only Congress could do that.
ert Barnwell Rhett took the same position in the

H o u s e .

Rob

48

Calhoun's call for delay was motivated by the thought that
negotiations, through which w ar could be averted, were still a pos
sibility.

When the Senate did not heed his advice, he declined to

vote at all on the bill which, in approving Polk's course, amounted

48wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist, 273-84; Capers, Calhoun
Opportunist, 231-34; White, Rhett, 88-89.
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to a declaration of war.

Once his country was at war, however, the

Carolinian supported those measures that he deemed necessary for its
prosecution.

Not included therein was President Polk's plan to revive

the rank of lieutenant-general.

Polk did not like General Winfield

Scott, the army's senior officer and, consequently, Polk's most direct
link with the war.

The President, accordingly proposed to elevate

Senator Thomas Hart Benton— w h o m he did like— to the prospective lieutenant-generalcy.

This action would reduce Scott to second-in-command.

Calhoun, who was not overly fond of Benton, vigorously opposed Polk's
intention but for other reasons.
good, the Senator said.

The effect on the army would not be

Career officers were not likely to react

kindly to being suddenly superseded by a civilian.

When the adminis

tration submitted its proposal in the form of a bill to the Senate,
that body tabled the measure.

Benton had previously gone through the

motions of declining the honor but he
President Polk, but
with

was still d i s p l e a s e d . ^9

So was

other matters interceded to preclude an open break

Calhoun on the question.

Calhoun, it should be remembered, had

opposed Polk before.
Rhett, like
wise

Calhoun, held the war to be unnecessary

and the manner of its outbreak to be unconstitutional.

like the Senator, he lent his
its prosecution.

and un
But also

support to those measures necessary for

In December of 1846, by

which time he and Calhoun

were officially reunited, Rhett altered his stance somewhat to become

49pranklin, "Southern Expansionists," J S H , XXV, No. 3, 32338; Capers, Calhoun Opportunist, 232-33; Wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist,
273-86, 290-93; see below, 220-21.
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a strong defender of administration war policy.50

This appears to

have been his only important divergence from Calhoun on the question
of the Mexican War.

Once again the position of Rhett was not without

its effect on the Mercury ; Clapp's first strong defense of administra
tion prosecution of the war coincides generally with Rhett's.
The Mercury's greater attention to the situation in Oregon did
not prevent its disapproving notice of an "appetite for war" with
Mexico during much of 1845.

There was no cause for Mexican resent

ment against the United States, the paper declared, the addition of
Texas to this country being perfectly legitimate.

When Mexico re

called her envoy to Washington and even when she confiscated Ameri
can property in Mexico, the editor saw no reason to fear an attack
by the Mexicans.

It was easy, Clapp said, to suspend diplomatic

relations; it was even economical to do so but "a very different thing"
it was, indeed, "to raise the support armies."

The confident Mercury

said that the only war was likely to be one of "sulks."

As late as

April 1846, Clapp looked to see Mexican-American differences settled
by negotiation.

When the Oregon question was resolved, a satisfactory

settlement with Mexico would probably be forthcoming.^^
When the war came anyway, Clapp still could find no genuine
American grievance against Mexico.

The administration had contributed

to the conflict by its provocative policies.

Clapp saw, in fact.

50white, Rhett, 88-91. White says that Calhoun was not "pla
cated by Rhett's return to the fold in October and implies that this
may be why Rhett endorsed Polk's course on the war (ibid., 91).
5J-Mercury, Mar. 13, 17, Apr. 22, 23, June 9, July 2, 31,
Aug. 4, 13, 14, 20, 21, 23, Sept. 1, 3, 5, 6, 18, Dec. 31, 1845;
Jan. 31, Feb. 6, 26, Mar. 5, 6, 19, 26, Apr. 4, 28, 1846; Mar. 1845Apr. 1846, passim.
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"much in the domestic condition of Mexico that should forbid us to
judge her by the severe forms of law."

Even if foreign powers did

propose to establish a monarchy in Mexico, in accordance with rumors
the Mercury had heard but did not credit, there was no reason for the
United States to become involved.

Clapp felt that "every country has

a right to choose its own Government."

The real motive for the late

American action, his paper alleged, was that some in this country wished
to keep Mexico wea k in order to despoil her.^^
While Clapp approved of the President’s initial move in order
ing Zachary Taylor to Texas, the Mercury reproved the General for
placing himself opposite Metamoras.

"This course," Clapp said, "looks

like a determination to provoke war with Mexico.

But whether this is

the intention or not," he continued in alarm, "most clearly this is the
tendency."

The Mercury had little faith in either the diplomatic ability

or the pacific intent of armies.

If the "Army on the Rio Grande does

not get up a fight with the Mexicans in spite of all pacific instruc
tions," the skeptical paper observed with displeasure, "it will be
little short of a miracle."53
On May 8, 1846, one day before the official despatches reached
Washington, the Mercury published a report of the attack on Taylor’s
array under the heading "War!"

This state of affairs was the result of

nothing but "the blunders of the administration."

"No purpose, but

. . . party expediency could be served" by the "blind fury" with which

53ibid., Jan. 31, Feb. 6, Mar. 5, 6, 19, 26, Apr. 4, 1846.
53lbid., Aug. 4, Sept. 18, 1845; Mar. 20, Apr. 25, May 7,
8, 1846.
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Congress responded to the situation by voting for war.

This "wholly

unnecessary consequence of annexation" would never have occurred, ac
cording to the Mercury, but for the administration.

South Carolina’s

Senator Calhoun was right in proposing to limit armaments to defen
sive purposes until "Congress could decide upon full knowledge and
deliberation whether a war was determined on by Mexico, or was neces
sary to our honor and

s a f e t y .

"^4

The United States were historically opposed to war "as a crime
against liberty, humanity and civilization," Clapp reminded his read
ers, and that included w ar with Mexico.

"Public opinion here warmly

applauds the course of Mr. Calhoun on the war bill," the Mercury as
serted, "and in no sort sympathizes

. . . with those who insisted on

loading the country with the responsibilities and perils of war with
out a single day to examine the merits of the controversy."

Clapp,

in reminding his subscribers that Calhoun urged a delay before the
resort to hostilities, thundered that it "would have been but moderate
deference to humanity, policy and the spirit of the age to have deferred
the decision of so grave a question for a day."

The nation had

. . . trifled . . . most grievously and most foolishly
too.
It is impossible to believe that at this moment
Congress can look back upon its action without self
reproach, if not shame. After treating Mexico as a
mass of imbecility and rottenness, at the first symptom
of actual fight our Government is taken all aback. Con
gress is thrown into spasms, the whole country is sum
moned to arms, and the whole exchequer emptied into the

54lbid., May 8, 9, 12, 14, 15, l8, 19, 20, 21, 1846.
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camp chest.
We are even In too great confusion
to give speciousness to our a c t s . 55
The Mercuiry's effort to preserve the peace did not preclude its sup
porting the w a r once it came.
hostilities.

Still, Clapp hoped for an early end to

With the war less than two weeks old, the arrival of

good news from T aylor’s army inspired the editor to think that nego
tiation might soon be undertaken.

"In a few days," he said, "we con

fidently expect to hear that the Mexicans have been driven pell-mell
across the Rio del Norte, and if Congress were not a little daft, that
might be the end of the war."

If the rumored British efforts to medi

ate proved to be based on fact, the Mercury favored American acceptance
of the offer.
Mexico.

Clapp stood strongly opposed to a broad invasion of

But as summer wore on and turned into autumn, the increas

ingly ephemeral prospects of peace continued to elude the editor.

The

"cut throat mood" of the United States in conjunction with Santa A n n a ’s
rejection of all peace overtures caused the Mercury to despair of an
early ending of the war.

"There remains then nothing but a vigorous

prosecution of hostilities," Clapp dolefully informed his

readers.

56

55 ibid., May 14, 19, 1846.
Franklin says that Calhoun did not
speak for his constituents in his opposition to the Mexican war.
If
this is the case, the M ercury’s preachments are even more indicative
of its attachment to the Calhoun cause.
See Franklin, "Southern Ex
pansionists," J S H , XXV, No. 3, 337-38.
The success of Calhoun’s drive
to impose unity in South Carolina undoubtedly contributed to the ab
sence of any real hostility between newspaper editors on this issue.
In Charleston the Patriot tended to support the Mercury’s view of
the situation w hile the Courier and the recently founded News empha
sized the desirability of a vigorous prosecution of the war.
The in
vective of previous editorial duels was absent, however (Patriot, May
14, 1846; Courier, May 21, 1846; N e w s , May 14, 1846).

56Mercury, May 15, 18, 25, 30, June 5, 23, 26, 27, Aug. 25,
27, 29, 31, Sept. 1, 3, 19, 25, 28, 1846.
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The Mercury’s faded hopes of peace evidently combined with
Robert Barnwell Rhatt's influence to swing Clapp to a conditional
loyalty to the administration in December.

When the President, in "a

very able paper," addressed the convening Congress, Clapp concluded
that Polk deserved "the support of all at least who approved the war."
As for the Merc u r y , it was exasperated by M e x i c o ’s futile resistance
and consistent refusal to countenance peace negotiations.

Expressing

his confidence in the earnestness and ability of President Polk’s ef
forts, Clapp now urged a strong war effort as the only alternative
remaining to the country.

The Mercury, as she abandoned the adminis

tration as a target, commenced anew to heap opprobrium upon the heads
of those Congressmen who having "in hot haste precipitated us into
this war," were "instead of looking to the honor and interests of the
Union" now "looking at home to their popularity."

Clapp was referring

to those who "held up needed appropriations and taxes" when "American
troops" were "deep in hostile territory."

Among those now champion

ing administration requests in support of the wa r effort was Robert
Barnwell Rhett.^?
The Mercury’s current allegiance to the administration did not
obscure its vision where Calhoun was concerned, however.

When Polk

proposed to make a lieutenant-general out of Senator Benton, the Mer
cury roundly denounced the whole scheme.

The move impressed Clapp as

an unworthy effort to "discredit military experience and military ser
vice" and at a time when both had "crowned themselves with a distinction

57lbid. , Nov. 3, Dec. 4, 12, 15, 29, 1845; Jan.
16, 26, 27, 1847; White, Rhett, 91.

7, 12, 14,
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never before enjoyed in this country."

Reflecting perhaps Calhoun's

preference for a professional military force, the Mercury had pre
viously denounced the volunteer system of raising troops as "incom
patible with military discipline."

Politically-appointed officers,

Clapp said, possessed the same drawback.

The Mercury professed to

having no particular objection to Benton but thought he should be
"gratefully remembered for declining the command.
Throughout his turn at the helm of the Mercury, Clapp, the
"writer of classical taste and culture," was repeatedly obliged to
demonstrate his agility by colliding with neither Rhett nor Calhoun.
On the whole the articulate editor stood a successful watch.

If Clapp

did not appreciate the significance of the Wilmot Proviso as early as
he might have— and as early as Calhoun had done— the reason probably
lies in the example of Robert Barnwell Rhett.

Rhett was as jubilant

over the results of the long 1845-1846 Congress as he had been dis
consolate over those of the two preceding sessions.

Whereas in 1844

his discontent had led him to abandon the party for separate state ac
tion, his satisfaction in August of 1846 landed him in the arms of the
administration.

59

As

on previous occasions, he subsequently recon

sidered his impetuosity.
Calhoun went to Fort Hill after Congress adjourned in 1846,
there to brood over the course of the South's future.

In his corres

pondence he referred to the Wilmot Proviso as "an apple of discord"
which would "do much to divide the party."

He cautioned an unidentified

58Mercury, June 11, 13, July 13, Aug. 10, 21, Oct. 12, 24, 1846;
Jan. 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 19, 29, 1847.

59white, Rhett, 88-89.
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associate at the North that the Union would not endure the continuing
assault on slavery.

By early fall Bhett, renouncing all fears "of

the imputation of subserviency to Mr. Calhoun," had come to the same
conclusion.

Although he would rely on Polk for the present— as Cal

houn would do also— the Congressman concluded that a satisfactory
future for the South required a defense more permanent than that
provided by the administration.
of the Wilmot Proviso.

He had belatedly realized the menace

For this reason Rhett compromised "between

theory and expedience" to endorse Calhoun's version of internal im
provements .60
Reasoning that the South must align herself with the West or
give up the Union, Rhett moved to cement relations between the two
sections.

He understood that the Wilmot Proviso had passed the House

with the aid of western votes.

Westerners thereby had exacted their

retribution for the South's opposition to internal improvements.
Rhett determined to see that such a situation did not recur.

Bask

ing in the widespread approval of leaders of the national Democracy
who endorsed his course in the late Congress, Calhoun, meanwhile, was
planning once more to stand for the presidency.

His chances for suc

cess would rotate around a prospective South-West axis.

Robert Barn

well Rhett would help to build that axis— and so would the

M e r c u r y .

61

During the waning months of 1846, a year of southern vic
tories deceptive as to their meaning, the Mercury prepared its

60Calhoun to Lewis S. Coryell, Nov. 7, 1846, Calhoun to
(illegible), Nov. 7, 1846, Jameson, ed., Calhoun Correspondence, 70911; Rhett to Elmore, quoted without date in White, Rhett, 90-91;
White, Rhett, 90-91.
61white, Rhett, 90; Capers, Calhoun Opportunist, 231-34;
Wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist, 272.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

223
support for Calhoun’s last bid to be President.

Editor Clapp's

contribution was destined to be one of preparation only.

For two

years he had navigated the tortuous channel required of those who
would offend neither Calhoun nor Rhett; he would do so no longer.
The Rhett family sold its interest in the Mercury and on February 1,
1847, Clapp put down his pen.

"The . . . paper, as property held in

trust," he said, "involved so much of difficulty and embarrassment that
its sale was in every way

desirable.

"^2

62Mercury, Feb. 1, 1847.
Clapp's deft pen concealed an
apparent bitterness in its allusion to his "difficulty and embar
rassment."
It also did not reveal the abruptness of the editor's
exit from the Mer c u r y . Shortly afterward, Clapp wrote more frankly
to former Governor H ammond, an important business acquaintance who
was also a political rival of Rhett.
". . . A t the very moment of
receiving your letter, it became very dubious whether I should be
the editor of the M ercury, and soon after, very certain I should
not be," Clapp confided (Clapp to Hammond, Feb. 17, 1847, Hammond
Papers).
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CHAPTER VII

THE STATESMAN OF THE AGE

Clapp's successor at the Mercury, John E. Carew, assumed con
trol at a crucial juncture.

By February 1847 the acceleration in

the dispute over slavery was splitting the Democratic party and cast
ing a dark shadow on the future of the Union itself.

Calhoun was

unveiling his latest tactic designed to unite the South for her de
fense.

Success in this venture might yet reward him with the presi

dency.

The war with Mexico showed no prospects of ending.

iff question was far from being finally resolved.

The tar

Within South Caro

lina bitterly disputing factions were arraying themselves for battle
over the issue of the state bank.

Some junior members of the Calhoun

camp increasingly showed an unauthorized disposition to rivalry.

Both

the state and the Mercury would require wise leadership in the uncer
tain months ahead.
The mood in South Carolina fully reflected the precarious
state of the times.

On November 18, 1846, George McDuffie had re

signed his Senate seat.

Surface speculation held that either Frank

lin H. Elmore, Robert Barnwell Rhett, or James H. Hammond would suc
ceed the retiring Senator.

Instead, in a surprisingly quick elec

tion, the General Assembly chose Judge Andrew Pickens Butler to re
place the ailing McDuffie.

Butler was a former Unionist.

The same

legislative session elevated Judge David Johnson, another "Unionist
224
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of other days," to the governorship.

Again it seemed that the deft

hand of Calhoun was moving to maintain state unity.1
Orthodoxy, however, was less than unanimous in its approval of
B u t l e r ’s election.

Prior to the election most observers had assumed

that Elmore would be tapped for the succession.

Although Elmore had

many enemies in South Carolina, the ba n k e r ’s intimacy with Calhoun
evidently prevented any strong opposition to his candidacy.

Even

Hammond, who was not ordinarily given to praise of Calhoun confidants,
t h o u ^ t Elmore "the most suitable of all the candidates likely to be
in the field.

. .

Rhett, "eager" for the office, uncomplainingly

accepted Elmore's advice not to run.

But when Elmore belatedly de

clared his determination to "stay at home and manage his own affairs,"
neither Hammond nor Rhett was prepared for the result.

So evident

was Hammond's bitterness that it elicited a letter from the victori
ous Butler.

"It would be a source of real concern to me," the new

IPaul Quattlebaum to Hammond, Nov. 6, 1846, Hammond to Simms,
Nov. 10, 1846, McDuffie to Hammond, Nov. 11, 1846, Hammond to Simms
Nov. 13, 1846, James J. Wilson to Hammond, Nov. 26, 1846, Hammond
Papers; Rhett to Burt, Sept. 3, 1846, Burt Papers; Rhett to Elmore,
Nov. 19, 1846, Rhett Collection; Wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist, 290-91;
Edwin L. Green, George McDuffie (Columbia, 1936), 226-27.
McDuffie’s resignation, occasioned by his virtual physical
collapse, touched off a wrangle not evident from the General Assembly’s
quick decision to replace him with Butler.
The Assembly action was the
result of only four ballots.
Elmore declined to run— allegedly because
of business affairs— probably because he knew Calhoun preferred other
wise.
Banker Elmore also advised his friend Rhett not to run unless
he was assured of success.
Elmore, "the very man . . . to manage men
for Mr. Calhoun," almost certainly knew that Rhett did not have much
assurance.
Rhett accepted the advice but upon the assumption that
he, Rhett, would succeed to "Mr. Calhoun's seat, when he resigned."
(Quattlebaum to Hammond, Nov. 6, 1846, Hammond Papers; Rhett to Elmore,
Nov. 19, 1846, Rhett Collection; Wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist, 219;
White, Rhett. 91; Green, McDuffie, 226).

p

Hammond to Simms, Nov. 23, 1846, Hammond Papers.
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Senator wrote, "If I could suppose that my nomination to the Senate
..."

has been regarded as "personal opposition to yourself."3

For

his part, Ehett concluded that his current term in the House would be
his last.

"He would serve South Carolina in the Senate or not at all."^

The experience of both Rhett and Hammond in opposing Calhoun reminded
them that an open breach with the leader would result in defeat; it
was apparent, nonetheless, that the divisive seeds sown at Bluffton
were beginning to sprout.^
Carolinians were not fully satisfied with the recent tariff
compromise.

But their recurrent references to a policy of genuine

free trade were lacking in the rancor so characteristic of those
days before the Walker Tariff.

By 1847 Calhoun had finally suc

ceeded in riveting their attention to the antislavery agitation, a
vigorous and clamoring force rapidly turning into a crusade.
new threat was so apparent that it obscured all other issues.

This
The

state was united by apprehension— and a determination to maintain its

% h i t e , Rhett, 91; Butler to Hammond, Dec. 21, 1846, Hammond
Papers.
Hammond's reply to Butler was conciliatory (Hammond to Butler,
Jan. 1, 1847).
Prior to the election Hammond alleged a complete dis
interest in the Senate even saying at one point that "I don't want to
go." Subsequent to the Assembly's choice, however, Hammond's cor
respondence reveals an altogether different sentiment (Hammond to
Simms, Oct. 15, 1846, Hammond Papers.
See also Hammond Papers, Oct.
1846-1847).
^White, Rhett, 91.
Rhett was re-elected to Congress in the
same year.
He was unopposed.
5gee, for example, Hammond Papers, Dec. 1846-1847. Wiltse
emphasizes the success of Calhoun's policy of unification, making
the state thereby into the "sword and buckler of slavery" (Wiltse,
Calhoun Sectionalist, 291).
There is no doubt that Carolinians re
garded unity as a necessary device to fight the antislavery movement.
My own view, however, is that subsurface forces were sufficiently ad
vanced by 1847 to preclude any real agreement on how to meet the
crisis (See below, 227-28).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

227
way of life.6
The terms separation and disunion reappeared in the public
vocabularies of the state's leaders.

Even Calhoun, hitherto the op

ponent of all who advocated the ultimate resort, was heard to speak
of secession as a distinct possibility or even probability.

"I

desire," he said, "above all things to save the whole; but if that
cannot be, to save the portion where Providence has cast ray lot."^
Most ominous of all. South Carolina Orthodoxy was privately
speculating as to how much time was left to Calhoun and who would
succeed him.

Ehett had laid his plans in 1846.

At the same time no

less a figure than Langdon Cheves, himself not far from the grave,
was reputed to be reckoning for the day when Calhoun would no longer
dominate the state. James H. Hammond doubtless read with approval a
letter reminding h i m that "The Caesar of your Commonwealth must by &
bye [sic] number his days as we must.

You are evidently to succeed

him."8
Indeed, Calhoun was no longer young; furthermore, his health
was failing.

The choice of a successor for the "Caesar" was certain

GSee above, VI.
^Calhoun to Anna Calhoun Clemson, Dec. 27, 1846, Jameson,
e d ., Calhoun Correspondence.
®W. E. Hodgson to Hammond, Nov. 20, 1946, Beverly Tucker to
Hammond, Feb. 6, 1847, Hammond Papers.
McDuffie had advised Hammond
that he should await Calhoun's "retirement" before seeking a Senate
seat (McDuffie to Hammond, Nov. 11, 1846, Hammond Papers).
Another
Hammond correspondent forcefully asserted that "South Carolina . . .
would this day be better off it he [Calhoun] had died 10 years ago"
(J. S. Clark to Hammond, Apr. 5, 1847, Hammond Papers).
Simms longed
for "resurrection of independence among our people. . . . His [Cal
houn's] shadow falls heavily upon our young men. . . . " h e said.
(Simms to Hammond, Apr. 2, 1847, Hammond Papers).
For Rhett see
above,
222-23.
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to produce a turmoil.

It would probably determine the future of

South Carolina politics, perhaps of South Carolina itself.
would then plan the strategy for the South?

Who

It was too soon to pre

dict the time, let alone the identity of the succession.

But those

involved were bound to dread or anticipate the day of the old Sena
tor's retirement.
apparent.

That they were planning for a timely reaction is

Thus, at a time when the unity forged by Calhoun in the

aftermath of nullification was critical. South Carolina was already
advanced on the road to division.

New editor Carew, with his paper

representing the voice of the leader, would face as many trials as
had his predecessor, John Milton Clapp.
Carew's credentials qualified him for the challenge he faced.
Reared in Charleston, the incoming editor was educated at Bishop Eng
land Academy, South Carolina College and Norwich Military Academy.
His attendance at South Carolina College and Norwich was an obvious
asset within the state.

Prior to the establishment of The South

Carolina Corps of Cadets, prominent Carolinians went in large num
bers to Norwich.

The editor's father, Edward Carew, was successful

both as a businessman and a planter.

His standing in the community

provided his son with valuable local stability.

The elder Carew had

been born in Ireland, a circumstance that did nothing to dampen the
new editor's impact upon Charleston's large Irish population.^

^M e r c u r y , Oct. 30, 1824; Aug. 4, 1835; Jan. 1, 1846; Apr. 22,
1850; M. Laborde, History of the South Carolina College 1801-57
(Columbia, 1874), 553; G. M. Dodge and W. A. Ellis, Norwich University,
1819-1911; Her History, Her Graduates, Her Roll of Honor (3 vols.,
Montpelier, 1911), III, 553-68, 616, 713-14.
The Norwich geographical
index lists South Carolina names like Sinkler, Deas, Marshall, Ball,
Waring, Gourdin, Capers, Heriot, Horry, Alston, Wragg, Mike11, Marion,
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Editor Carew was a lawyer and was also prominent in Demo
cratic party politics.

A friend of both Rhett and Elmore, he was a

member of the lower house of the General Assembly and a faithful sup
porter of Calhoun.
ton movement.

Significantly enough, Carew had opposed the Bluff

He had some previous acquaintance with the newspaper

world; his father had formerly held a part interest in the City
Gazette.

The "old gentleman" seemingly understood the importance of

the press for he financed his son's purchase of the Mercury.
Carew represented a new influence at the Mercury.

For the first

time in almost twenty years, the Mercury editor was financially inde
pendent of the Ehetts.

And for the first time since Pinckney, the

paper boasted of a politician-editor who could appeal to the "mech
anics" as well as to their betters.

This was no small asset in 1847

Jenkins, Connor,Broughton, DuBose and Gaillard.
One hundred five
Carol Inians attended Norwich between 1823 and 1841; six were enrolled
subsequent to that date.
Governor Thomas Bennett's son was graduated
in 1827.
Carew was enrolled for the year 1826-1827.
He was graduated
from neither South Carolina College nor Norwich (Laborde, History of
South Carolina College, 550, 553; Dodge and Ellis, Norwich, 553, 616,
713-14).
The South Carolina Corps of Cadets consisted o f t h o s e cadets
enrolled at The Arsenal in Columbia and the Citadel in Charleston.
The first session at each school opened on Mar. 20, 1843, Oliver J.
Bond, The Story of the Citadel (Richmond, 1936), 14-19.
Colonel Bond
views Norwich as the model for the South Carolina schools (ibid., 1718).
See above, 178.
B. O'Neall, Biographical Sketches of the Bench and Bar of
South Carolina (2 vols.. Charleston, 1859), II, 606; Mercury, July 25,
Aug. 3, 10, 21, Oct. 17, 1844; Oct. 15, 1846; Oct. 12, 1848; King,
.
Newspaper P r ess. 62; Rhett to Burt, Sept. 3, 1846, Burt Papers, Carew
to Calhoun, Mar. 10, Sept. 20, 1846, Calhoun Collection; Carew to
Hammond, Nov. 18, 1847; Boyce to Hammond, Jan. 12, 1848, Hammond Papers.
The assertion that C a rew's father financed the Mercury venture is based
upon the opinion of contemporaries— not including Carew— who left no
known record of the transaction (in particular see Boyce to Hammond,
Jan. 12, 1848).
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when "a revolution" seemed to be "going on in S. Ca."

One disturbed

planter who was also a Mercury subscriber feared that it "only awaits
an opportunity to develop the catastrophe which shall make us openly
.

. .like the other

States . . .

a mobocracy.

. .

reader, James Henry Hammond, subsequently analyzed

The fearful
South Carolina so

ciety in the following manner:
The planters here are essentially what the nobility
are in other countries.
They stand at the head of
society & politics. Lawyers & professional poli
ticians come next. . . .12
It is not unlikely that those who decided to replace Clapp
used a similar standared in their search for his successor.

They

would have ignored, however, Hammond's further assertion that ".
an Editor . . . ranks with the lowest class . . .

. .

in general & in

this country I scarcely know one who has . . . been able to lift him
self above it."^^

The Mercury's peculiar position as the banner of

Orthodoxy required that the senior editor be socially secure before
assuming his office.

Carew's Irish background was no handicap.

llRammond to Simms, Oct. 15, 1846, Hammond Papers.
Another
Mercury reader was "shocked beyond expression" to l e a m that "an
exceedingly low, drunken, Irish vagabond printer" had challenged and
almost defeated Charleston Congressman Holmes for his seat in the
House (Colonel Pemberton to Hammond, Oct. 27, 1846, Hammond Papers).
During the fall of 1846 Calhoun was obliged to intervene in
order to preserve the traditional compromise between the Lowcountry
and Upcountry over representation.
The actual issue was the manner
of choosing presidential electors.
It was proposed to choose them
by Congressional districts instead of througji the legislature.
This
would have meant an increase in Upcountry influence (Wiltse, Calhoun
Sectionalist, 280-90; Carew to Calhoun, Sept. 22, 1846, Calhoun Papers;
Mercury. Sept. - Nov., 1846).
^^Hammond to Major Hammond, May 19, 1848, Hammond Papers.
13lbid. Hammond used "scarcely . . . one" advisedly.
once edited the Southern Times (Merritt, Hammond, 14).
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"South Carolina aristocracy was never so exclusive as not to receive
into its ranks young men of merit and promise.

. .

Indeed, it was

advisable for the Mercury to appeal to the whole population.

Carew,

this son of a planter who had been b o m in Ireland, politician and
attorney by profession, a man noted for "the chastened elegance of
his pen"^^ was well equipped for the job.
Carew proposed to be independent politically as well as fin
ancially.

He reportedly announced on his first day as editor that the

Mercury was a "Rhett organ" no

longer.

^6

The new editor likewise ob

jected to being stamped with Calhoun's brand.17

Such statements were

neither new nor surprising to Carew's skeptical readers.

Henry Laur

ens Pinckney, the editor who first aligned the Mercury with Calhoun,
made similar protestations of

independence.

18

Almost thirty years had

gone by since Pinckney's protest and wherever the Mercury was read,
it was known to be the Calhoun standard.

Perhaps Carew intended to

change this image and simply found himself unable to do so.

In all

probability, however, his assertions were made merely as a matter of
form.

At any event his course belied his words.

Carew's association

l^Green, McDuffie, 161.
l^King, Newspaper Press, 152.
l^white, Rhett, 99. Rhett's influence was negligible during the
first part of Carew's proprietorship.
This was due, no doubt, to his
semi-estrangement from Calhoun.
ITMercury, Mar. 17, 1847; Feb. 5, 1848.
Carew's paper asser
ted that it was not "Mr. Calhoun's organ." The editor's father alleg
edly insisted that the paper be politically independent as a condition
of his financial backing (Boyce to Hammond, Jan. 12, 1848, Hammond
Papers).
^8

See above, 19-20.
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with Calhoun was the most direct of any editor's since Pinckney.
During Carew's turn at the helm, the Mercury maintained its position as
the voice of Calhoun, the official spokesman of the State Rights party.
Indeed under Carew's direction— and after Senator Calhoun's death— the
paper acquired an even more partisan title, "the political textbook
of the South."19
It was a disconsolate Calhoun who led the Carolina congres
sional delegation to Washington in 1847.

The senior Senator was pre

occupied with that "apple of discord," the Wilmot Proviso.

Less than

a month after the Congress convened, the antislavery group opened its
attack.

On January 4, 1846, Preston King, Democratic Congressman

from New York, reintroduced the proposal to bar slavery from all terri
tory acquired as a result of the Mexican War.

Conceding that Con

gress had no power to abolish slavery existing within a state, he pro
claimed that never again would a slave state enter the Union.

King

was suspected of speaking for a large segment of the northern Democ
racy, not excluding former President Van Buren.

The party of Polk,

Hannegan, Woodbury, and Calhoun was splitting apart.

20

During the same month another disruptive measure was brought to
the attention of the House.

It proposed that the antislavery provisions

of the Ordinance of 1787 be extended to the developing territory of
Oregon.

Calhoun informed Congressman Armistead Burt of the course

to be taken.

Speaking for South Carolina in the House, Burt offered

his support for the bill if it were amended to include the phrase

^^Mercury, Aug. 1, 1850.
The title was bestowed by a corres
pondent of the Baltimore Sun and reprinted in the Mercury.
20wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist, 293.
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"inasmuch as . . . said territory lies north of . . . the line of
the Missouri Compromise."

The amendment was rejected on the next day.

Upon the rebuff of South Carolina's proffered compromise, Robert Barn
well Rhett was recognized.
inspired accommodation.

His speech signalled the end of Carolina-

91

The Congress, Rhett reminded his bickering colleagues, had no
right to ban slavery from any territory.

The territories were the

common property of states held to be sovereign.

That being the case,

no state could be excluded from full enjoyment of property held in
common by all the states.

The majority was unmoved by Rhett's argu

ment; on January 16 the House organized the Oregon territory with
slavery excluded.

22

Burt's speech had been authorized; Rhett's apparently was
not.

It was, nonetheless, clear to Burt, Rhett, and Calhoun— and to

many other Southerners as well— that the antislavery forces meant to
do as they said— to exclude any new slave states.

For a time this

produced an apparent unity among the southern representatives; Whigs
and Democrats acted in concert.

Meanwhile, the tone of the debate in

Congress became increasingly bitter.

Well might President Polk de

nounce the "mischevious and wicked agitation" of the slavery issue;
it was preventing any consideration of bills in support of the war
effort.23

21Cong. Globe, 29th, 2nd, 178-80; 187-99, Appendix, 116-19;
244-47; Cralle, ed., Calhoun W o rks, IV, 347; Mercury, Jan. 16, 21,
Feb. 5, 10, 1847.
22çong. Globe, 29th, 2nd, 187, 188, Appendix, 244-47.
23Quaife, ed., Polk Diary, II, 308-09, 334-35; Mercury, Jan.
16, 21, Feb. 5, 10, 1847; Paul Murray, The Whig Party in Georgia
(Chapel Hill, 1948), 127-38.
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Polk was more fortunate in the Senate, at least for a time.
Here administration supporters introduced legislation to enlarge the
army.

But Calhoun led the Senate into a discussion of war policy.

He

wished the objective clarified before the Senate acted to strengthen
the forces of the Commander-in-Chief.

Calhoun feared that a continued

offensive strategy on the part of the United States would result in
conquest and annexation of all Mexico, "the forbidden fruit."

This

in turn would intensify the festering issue of slavery in the terri
tories.

As an alternative to that dread prospect, the Carolinian pro

posed a cessation of offensive hostilities.

American forces should

adopt a defensive posture intended to hold the area north of the Rio
Grande in Texas.

They should also maintain control north of the line

of 30°N., from its junction with the Rio Grande westward to the Pacific.
Since the United States was already in possession of the area here
described and since this represented her pre-war objective, there was
no need for further fighting.

The Americans could simply hold what

they had until Mexico should sue for peace.

Polk was outraged; the

President reacted by having Calhoun read out of the party— again.24

24con%. Globe, 29th, 2nd, 204, 218, 346-349, 356-59, 376-77,
Appendix, 323-27, 366-67, 406-17; Cralle, ed., Calhoun W o rks, IV, 30327; Quaife, ed., Polk D i a r y , II, 283-84, 371-73, 375-79; Mercury,
Feb. 22, 1847.
The initial dispute arose over the administration spon
sored "Ten Regiment Bill." This proposal would authorize ten more regi
ments for the army and empower the President to appoint commissioned
officers during congressional recesses.
Calhoun’s following held the
second provision to be unconstitutional and— after some delay— forced
a compromise on Polk.
Congress was also considering the appropriation
of $300,000,000 to underwrite the cost of a peace mission to Mexico.
Calhoun was read out of the party on February 8, during the "Ten Regi
ment Bill" dispute.
This was far from the end of the matter.
The
President spoke through the medium of Thomas Ritchie, editor of the
Washington U n i o n . When the Wilmot dispute reached the Senate, Ritchie
accused Calhoun of damaging the war effort with his harangues over
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Banishment notwithstanding, Calhoun would not be silent.

The

House adopted the Wilmot Proviso for the second time on February 15,
1847.

Included as an amendment to the bill was P o l k ’s request for

$3,000,000 to

finance peace negotiations.

again rose to

address the Senate.

of Bhett.

Four days later Calhoun

This time he

spoke in the language

The issue posed by W i l m o t ’s hateful measure was neither war

nor peace, he

said, but the safety of the slaveholding states.

harassed states would accept neither this

Those

bill, designed as it was to

ensure their permanent inequality within the Union, nor any more com
promises.

The issue must be settled— finally and justly— or the South

must seek redress elsewhere.^5
Calhoun had not abandoned the Union, however.

To assure that

neither he nor his section would do so, he submitted a set of resolu
tions designed to guarantee southern equality within the nation.

As

serting that the Missouri Compromise could not be justified under the
Constitution, Calhoun informed his hearers that the South would, never
theless, accept an extension of the line of 36°30’N to the Pacific.
Thus would the issue of the western territory be settled in an equit
able manner.

The South would accept nothing less.^^

Congressman Burt had spoken, Calhoun continued, at the Sena
t o r ’s behest.

The House had not heeded his words.

If the Senate

slavery.
This touched off a general melee which ended with Calhoun’s
patriotism unblemished and Ritchie’s expulsion from his special seat
on the Senate floor (Wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist, 296-302).
25cong. Globe, 29th, 2nd, 454-55; Cralle, ed., Calhoun W orks,
IV, 339-49; Wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist, 307.
2&Cong. Globe, 29th, 2nd, 454-55; Cralle, ed., Calhoun W o rks,
IV, 339-49; Wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist, 307.
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elected to follow the same course. Southerners would look to their
own devices.

Speaking for "that section of the Union" where were his

"family," his "connections," and all his "hopes," the Senator charted
his own Rubicon.

"I would rather meet any extremity . . . than give

up one inch of our equality," he said.^?
Slaveholder Polk was unimpressed.

The administration, vigor

ously supported by slaveholders Benton and Houston, denounced Cal
houn's resolutions.

Then, in what for the Senate was a rapid se

quence, Calhoun's resolutions were tabled, the $3,000,000 appropri
ation requested by the President was approved, the Wilmot Proviso was
rejected and the Oregon territorial bill tabled.
voted for Polk's appropriation.

The "Calhoun clique"

Calhoun had made his point; the South

would not vote money for the war unless she shared in the spoils.

With

the session ending, the Carolinian left Washington, his spirits much
improved.

He had not renounced compromise after all.^B

The Mercury supported the Carolina delegation on every issue.
As the session progressed, Carew's readers received increasing evidence
that the paper had regained the confidence of the leader.

On January 13

an alert editor rejoiced at the news that Calhoun's call for southern
unity was falling on willing ears :
The recent movements of the . . . Congress to ostra
cize the slave-holding states and deprive them by
law, of all share in the territory acquired by the

^^Cong. Globe, 29th, 2nd 454-55; Cralle, Ed., Calhoun W o r k s ,
IV, 339-49; Wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist, 307.
2&Wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist, 307.
The Senate Judiciary Com
mittee had deleted the House-inserted slavery restriction from the
Oregon bill.
Northern votes tabled the measure when it reached the
floor (Wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist, 307).
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war . . . have been met on the part of the
Southern members with a firmness deserving of
the grateful appreciation of their constitu
ents, and with a harmony of sentiment . . .
that augurs well for the cause.
The union of
the South in this emergency will save the
Federal Union from a great danger.
Those "craving and time-serving politicians" who catered to the balance
of power at the North would "tremble" at the results of such Unity.

No

longer would they bow before the Abolitionists; in the face of a united
South the thin ranks of antislavery would be inadequate to determine
the outcome of an election.

The paper understood the issue no less

than its leader.^9
The Mercury published Burt’s speech on the Oregon bill even
as it endorsed Burt's sentiments.
Abolitionists was behind
spirit
progress.

The "canting hypocrisy" of the

the Wilmot Proviso; "the evidence of a

. . . redolent of evil," it would "carry desolation in its
..."

Khett's speech was published and commended.

The

editor dared the Abolitionists to exclude slavery from the western
territories.

It was "high time," he said, "that the Southern press

should speak out and cause itself to be heard on this subject."

Cal

houn's speech on the "Three Million Bill" was reproduced and endorsed.
House passage of the Wilmot Proviso brought forth another call for
southern unity ; "it is no longer a question," the Mercury warned, "of
how far the North is to be trusted when either their interests or their
inclinations come in conflict with pledges and plighted faith."^0

^^Mercury, Jan. 13, 14, 1847; Burt to Conner, Feb. 1, 3,
1847; Jan. 20, 1848. Conner Letters.
^°Mercury, Jan. 19, Feb. 5, 6, 9, 12, 15, 30, 1847.
There
was no apparent change in tone when Carew relieved Clapp on Feb
ruary 1 (see above, VI).
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Carew*s paper published Calhoun's resolutions on the terri
torial settlement along with his remarks in their defense.
South

"That the

is able to protect herself there can be no question;

is willing to do so, it would be
quoted the approving M ercury.

a stigma on her character

that she
todoubt,"

And again the editor alerted his read

ers as to the exact nature of the danger they faced in the Wilmot Pro
viso:
It is a proclamation
the South are not deemed
. . . an aspersion and a
and debase the people of

to the world that we of
worthy of . . . equality
blot . . . to stigmatize
the Slave States.

"No man should b e silent now," concluded the Mercury.

"THE REPUBLIC IS

IN DANGER."31
When Thomas Ritchie, speaking for Polk's administration,
attacked Calhoun for agitating the slavery issue, the Mercury was
outraged.

How could a Virginian take so absurd a stand?

"The Philis

tines are upon us and this Delilah would lull us to sleep that our
locks might be shaven"! the editor thundered.
"miserable abandonment of the South."

Ritchie's stand was a

And the Mercury noted a sig

nificant agreement between Ritchie's Union and the abolitionist Na
tional E r a .32
The correspondent "Lang Syne" thought the time was ripe for
another experiment in state rights; secession was the course he rec
ommended.

Most of the March 4 issue was devoted to Calhoun's reply to

3lMercury, Feb. 23, 24, 1847.
32lbid., Feb. 25, 1847.
The anti-slavery National Era, a
weekly edited by Gamaliel Bailey, was established at Washington early
in 1847 (Wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist, 342).
Ritchie, editor of the
administration U n i o n , was from Richmond.
See below, 305, n. 2.
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Senator Benton.

It was a "triumphant vindication" of the Carolini

a n ’s course, the Mercury said.

Noting that the Senate had finally ap

proved the "Three Million Bill" without the Wilmot Proviso, the Mercury
approvingly reckoned that the House would now concur with the upper
chamber.

"If the bill will aid in the settlement of the war, let it

become a law," the paper had earlier advised.
The Wilmington packet, with Calhoun aboard, landed at Charles
ton on Saturday, March 6, two days after the Senator’s departure from
Washington.

Although it was six A.M., the c i t y ’s greeting was indica

tive of the importance of both the man and his mission.

The Carolinian

debarked to be met by a large contingent of his Lowcountry liege men
headed by the Mayor,

This delegation escorted Calhoun to his hotel

where h e and Mrs. Calhoun were to be guests of the city.
ception was planned in the City Hall.

A formal re

On the ninth. Senator Calhoun

would make an important public address.
Noting his "warm and enthusiastic" welcome, Calhoun could only
have been further encouraged by the packed house that awaited his
speech.
outside.

Hundreds, turned away from the hall itself, filled the street
This eager crowd thundered its approval when the great Caro

linian appeared on the platform.

It was with some difficulty that

John E. Carew, presiding, was able to contain their enthusiasm and

3% e r c u r y , Feb. 10, Mar. 1, 4, 5, 1847.
34Mercury, Mar. 5, 8, 10, 1847; Wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist,
308.
Calhoun was suffering from a severe cold which caused the re
ception to be cancelled.
His address, originally scheduled for the
eighth, was postponed until the ninth for the same reason (Wiltse,
Calhoun Sectionalist, 308).
Coit gives the seventh as the date of
Calhoun's arrival (Coit, Calhoun, 467).
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restore order.
The assembly listened to Calhoun's solemn address with rapt
attention.

It heard him say that the greater part of the northern wings

of both parties were committed to the Wilmot Proviso and that they comrmanded enough votes to secure its passage.

That the resulting exclu

sion of the South from thousands of miles of the national domain was
unlawful, would not restrain them, Calhoun said.

The South, then,

must provide another restraint.
Fourteen years before, on November 22, 1833, Calhoun had stood
before a similar audience in Charleston.

His purpose on that occasion

was to identify— for the first time— the Abolitionists as the South's
main enemy.

He had warned his hearers then that only a course which

resulted in southern unity would resolve the situation to their satis
faction.

The South must put aside her domestic divisions, he had pro

claimed, and stand united in the face of an aggressive, uncompromising
enemy.

A southern convention could best accomplish this purpose, Cal

houn said in 1 8 3 3 .3?
Neither the enemy nor the proposed strategy had changed during
the intervening years.

The Abolitionists counted for only about five

per cent of the northern vote, the Senator told his 1847 audience.
But that vote was so well organized that in combination with the nearly

Wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist, 308-09; Coit, Calhoun, 467;
Mercury, Feb. 1, Mar. 5, 8, 10, 1847; Calhoun to Thomas Clemson, Mar.
12, 1847, Jameson, e d . , Calhoun Correspondence, 720. Wiltse says that
the meeting was thought to be among the largest ever held in Charleston.
^^Cralle, ed., Calhoun W o r k s , IV, 382-96; Wiltse, Calhoun Sec
tionalist , 309; Coit, Calhoun, 467.
37gee above, 79.
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even division of parties at the North, it could swing elections.
Northern politicians were obliged to take it into consideration.
In self-defense, the South must put aside party division and stand
together in one southern party.

Such a stand would counter the ab

olitionist bloc and convince northern politicians that if they won
abolitionist votes they would lose southern ones.38
Calhoun would go one step further the hushed audience learned.
The convention system of nominating presidential candidates militated
against the South, he said.

With its greater numbers the North could

always dominate in convention.

According to the Constitution, how

ever, the Electoral College was meant to choose the President; the
South should insist that the constitutional procedure be followed
and that nominating conventions be eliminated.

By acting together

Southern Democrats and Whigs could yet preserve their equality within
the Union, saving thereby the Union itself.

But this solution could

only be effected by "taking an early and decided stand, while politi
cal ties" were "still strong.

..."

The optimism with which Calhoun

had left Washington showed itself in his conclusion, "I have never
knovm truth . . . fail . . .

in the end."

Registering its exhil

arated agreement, the crowd responded with an ovation.39

38cralle, e d . , Calhoun W o r k s , IV, 382-96.
3^Cralle, e d . , Calhoun W orks, IV, 382-96; Coit, Calhoun,
407-08; Wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist, 309-11; Capers, Calhoun Op
portunist, 236-37; Chaplin Morrison, Democratic Politics and Sec
tionalism the Wilmot Proviso Controversy (Chapel Hill, 1967), 44,
hereinafter cited as Morrison, Democratic Politics.
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The political relationship between Editor Carew and South Caro
lina's Senator antedated the recently ended Congressional session.

As

early as August 9, 1846, Carew had written to Calhoun on behalf of the
"Young Mens

[sic] Democratic Association of Charleston."

In this letter

he affirmed the group's allegiance to Calhoun;
It is perhaps, Sir, not out of place to inform you
that [we regard] our . . . motto, 'Free Trade, Low
duties— no debt— separation from Banks, Economy—
retrenchment— and a strict adherence to the Consti
tution . . . as the condensed text of your political
life . . . which if triumphant, must preserve Liberty
and the Union, and carry your already honored name down
to . . . posterity.
The Association "respectfully" requested Calhoun to "indicate the course
which in your judgment" would be "Expedient for the Democratic party of
South Carolina to pursue in reference to the great questions now be
fore the people."40
Calhoun's answer was sufficiently developed by early 1847 for
the Mercury to refer to a basic similarity between southern Democrats
and Whigs.41

In writing to Calhoun on February 7, James Hamilton, Jr.,

noted the wisdom of southerners "rallying on
not yet discussed by the Mercury.

yo u r s e l f ,

"42 a possibility

(Some critics charged that "the

frenzy" of Calhoun's "fixed idea concerning the presidency" was at
work again.)

By March John Heart, a Washington-based Calhoun editor,

was reporting to the Senator on Charleston's favorable reaction to the

4®Carew to Calhoun, Aug. 9, 1846, Calhoun Papers.
4lMercury, Jan. 16, 21, Feb. 5, 10, 1847.
4 % a m i l t o n to Calhoun, Feb. 7, 1847, Calhoun Papers.
Hamilton
pledged to urge upon "your devoted friends in the Legislature" of
Louisiana a program of support for Calhoun from the South and West.
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developing plans.

Urging Calhoun to enlarge upon his "remedy" Heart

informed h i m that from "the tone of the Southern press . . . the present
moment is especially opportune for the exposition."

In the meantime

Heart was advising the Charleston press on p r o c e d u r e . 43
South Carolina’s reaction to the Charleston address was char
acteristic of the emerging division within the state.
forthright opposition to the Senator's proposals.
face, however, criticism flew thick and fast.

There was no

Beneath the sur

On April 1 Hammond pri

vately ”perceive[d]" that "Mr. Calhoun's Charleston Speech" revealed
"his true motives for splitting off from the administration.

..."

The "demented" Senator must believe that "his election to the Presi
dency is so essential to the existence of the Republic that no sacrifices
for its accomplishment can be to [sic] great."

Although the former gov-

e m o t wished Calhoun well, he expected disaster as usual.

William

Gilmore Simms heartily agreed:
And to think that we, who have been taught for
20 years that the president's election was of
no importance to us are now to be taught that
it is of the first importance . . . to which

43iucker to Hammond, Feb. 6, Mar. 13, 1847, Hammond to Simms,
Feb. 23, 1847, Hammond Papers; Heart to Calhoun, Mar. 10, 1847, Cal
houn Pape r s .
Hammond and Tucker were unsympathetic in their comments.
Tuck
er referred to Calhoun's "willing ambition to vault at the Presidency"
while Hammond pouted at the Senator for "setting his hawk at me for
doubting Polk" two years before.
Hammond had predicted at that time
that "they would all have to wheel to the right about in six months &
w e should be called upon to denounce Polk through all our borders."
Nothing that "the prophecy failed as to time but is verified to the
letter,"Hammond cautioned that "it does not become . . . the rejected
to speak above a whisper." He would "lie still & see what So Ca
other leaders . . . do" (Hammond to Simms, Feb. 23, 1847).
Heart was referring to Calhoun's Charleston address.
The
Senator left the city shortly after making his speech.
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tariff, free trade. Int. Imp. & all things
must give place.
South

Carolina, doomed as she was to follow Calhoun would spend the

"next

two years at least . . . where she has really been for 20— no

w here— fighting like Ishmael— battling the air,— losing position, dig
nity & all the advantages that might accrew from . . . connection with
the Federal Union."

Simms agreed that Calhoun "would make one of the

Mightiest" of presidents; he also shared Hammond's conviction that
he would fail of election.

"...

cide"? Simms rhetorically asked.

Has he not always committed sui
But Simms endorsed Hammond's injunc

tion to be silent:
But what is to be done? You see where S. C. is
destined to be hurried.
The Mercury [sic] declares
her course or rather on declaring Mr. C's silences
every other man in this state . . . Were you to speak
aloud, it would organize against you all . .. who now,
not caring for Mr. C. would yet be glad to find a topic
upon which to . . . impair your i n f l u e n c e . 44
Calhoun's secret critics were at least partially misguided in
their caustic observations.

The Senator undoubtedly considered that a

policy of southern unity might make him president.

His primary con

cern, however, was that it assure the election of someone acceptable
to the South.

By late spring he thought that Zachary Taylor would be

next chief executive.
"our views."
planter."

The General, Calhoun said, might incline to

He was "a slave holder, a Southern man [and] a cotton

". . . as little as we are inclined to military chieftains,"

44Hammond to Simms, Apr. 1, 1847, Simms to Hammond, Apr. 2,
1847, Hammond Papers.
See above,
%%%
. "Nothing," wrote Simms,
"could be more fatal than that the South should . . . organize a party
on the slavery question." The free states would merely do the same
thing (Simms to Hammond May 1, 1847).
Joshua Giddings, an Ohio Ab
olitionist, proposed just such a course to the free states shortly
afterward (Wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist, 311-12).
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the Carolinian observed, it might be well to support him.

Calhoun—

and thus South Carolina— would watch and wait "for the present,"
h o w e v e r .

45

Meanwhile, there were other matters requiring his atten

tion.
The cause of southern unity, Calhoun felt, would be furthered
by a pro-slavery paper issued from Washington.

By springtime 1847

Franklin H. Elmore was acting as chairman of a committee to raise
$50,000 for this purpose.
the South.

His committee sought support throughout

It could point to new attacks on the bastions of

s l a v e r y . 46

During March the Pennsylvania legislature had effectively
nullified federal regulations designed to ensure the return of fugi
tive slaves.

Slaveholders in Maryland and Virginia were affected

most immediately by their neighbor's action but the whole South was
the ultimate target.

If other northern states should follow suit,

slave property everywhere would be jeopardized.

The Maryland-based

Baltimore and Ohio Railroad reacted by altering its advancing course

4^Calhoun to H. W. Conner, May 14, 1847, Calhoun Letters.
Washington was alive with rumors that Calhoun would decline to stand
for the presidency in order to swing southern support to Taylor.
Polk
thought so himself and denounced the prospective move to his diary as
well as in Ritchie's Union (Quaife, ed., Polk D iary, II, 470-71,
Wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist, 319). Wiltse indicates that Calhoun's
presidential ambitions for 1848 were incidental to his proposal for
southern unity.
Coit agrees, saying however, that Calhoun "was will
ing to take advantage of an existing situation to further his presi
dential chances." Even Capers— who narrowly views Calhoun's career
as one long effort to reach the presidency— does not attribute this
motive to the Senator's call for southern unity.
The Mercury's atti
tude likewise indicates that the presidency was not Calhoun’s primary
motivation (Wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist, 310-11; Coit, Calhoun, 468;
Capers, Calhoun Opportunist, 236-37; Mercury, see below, 278).
46wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist, 313; Calhoun to Conner, May 14,
1847, Calhoun Letters.
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to the West.

The railway would join the Ohio River at Wheeling—

safely inside Virginia— instead of Pittsburgh.^7
"...

Step by step," the Mercury responsively lamented, "lead

ing northern men are yielding . . .
one by one the ties that united us."

to Abolition, and thereby cutting
The Yankee invasion of the

South's political rights was now reinforced with strikes against soci
ety; southern churches were already excommunicated, "trade and comr
merce" now were to feel the attack of the abolition phalanx.

The

"conflict," Calhoun wrote, "is every day becoming more pointed.
Then in mid-summer the North countered Calhoun's thwarted ef
fort to unite the South and West during the preceding year at Memphis.
At a Chicago internal improvement convention, delegates from the North
and Northwest worked to facilitate the development of rapid transport

Prigg V . Pennsylvania (1842) held that Congressional power
over fugitive slaves excluded state action in their defense.
It also
stated, however, that state agents were not bound to assist in the en
forcement of federal laws and could in fact be forbidden to do so by
action of their state legislature.
Armed with this "triumph of free
dom" as Justice Story called the decision, several northern states
passed personal liberty laws which forbade state agents to assist in
enforcing the Fugitive Slave Act.
Vermont was the first to do so in
1842; Pennsylvania in 1847 was fifth and the first state outside New
England to adopt such a law (Wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist, 313; Dwight
L . Dumond, Antislavery Origins of the Civil War in the United States
[Ann Arbor, 1939], 64-65; Dwight L. Dumond, Antislavery; The Crusade
for Freedom in America [Ann Arbor, 1961], 307, 406).
For the response of the railroad see Wiltse, Calhoun Sectiona
l i s t , 313 and Edward Hungerford, The Story of the Baltimore and Ohio
Railroad 1827-1927 (New York, 1928), 285-95.
Hungerford who is pri
marily an economic historian, does not allude to the Pennsylvania ac
tion.
The obvious conclusion that the southern line's decision to
avoid Pennsylvania soil for the reason stated above is Wiltse's.
^^Mercury, July 27, 1847; Calhoun to Clemson, July 24, 1847,
Jameson, e d . , Calhoun Correspondence, 735-36.
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between those two sections.

Abraham Lincoln was there as a delegate.

His future Attorney General, Edward Bates of Missouri, was president
of the body.

The press was there in the persons of Thurlow Weed and

Horace Greeley of New York.

This convention received letters endor

sing its efforts from Silas Wright, Democrat of New York, Thomas Hart
Benton, Democrat of Missouri, and those two champions of old line
Whiggery, Daniel Webster and Henry Clay.

Carolinians thus received

another impetus in their drive for southern unity.
By August Charleston was reporting "the most promising pros
pects of success" for the newspaper project.
scriptions have been prompt,"

South Carolina "sub

wrote Henry Conner.

state is concerned there is no doubt."
the response of the South as a whole.

"So far as this

He was equally optimistic of
"We include all the slave hold

ing States in our design & are in communication with most of them al
ready," Conner reported.

There was a disappointing response from

some of those states, "but we hope to overcome it," he said.

It was

"indispensible to the great object however," to form "An organiza
tion . . .

of the whole South."

To Conner Washington seemed the most

satisfactory base for such a group.
Unfortunately for the cause, Conner's optimism was pre
mature.

The committee reasoned that $50,000 would be necessary to

get a paper going.

South Carolina alone pledged $20,000 but

^^DeBow's Review, IV, 122-27, 219-96; Wiltse, Calhoun Sectiona
list, 311-12.
Lewis Cass also wrote a letter to the convention in
which he omitted to state his stand on internal improvements (Wiltse,
ibid., 312). He was a contender for the forthcoming Democratic nomi
nation and could not afford to alienate the South.
^^Conner to Burt, Aug. 4, 1847, Burt Papers.
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subscriptions from outside the state never exceed half the Caro
lina total.

As a result, by late autumn another of Calhoun's projects

had aborted.
The Mercury supported the unification drive with all the vigor
at its command.

The issue of March 10 reported an enthusiastic re

ception of Calhoun's speech on the preceding evening.

The Mercury *s

reporter took "copious notes" of the address but "deemed" it "ad
visable not to publish them until they have the benefit of his
houn's] revision.

..."

[Cal

For the rest of the month the editor de

voted his columns to a denunciation of the Wilmot Proviso.

Warning

that the issue could not be avoided, Carew asserted that "boldness,
at the present moment is prudence."

His meaning was clear; the North

must be convinced that the South meant to stand united in defense of
her equality.52
In an editorial entitled "The Duty of the South," the paper
reminded its readers that the behavior of northern congressmen com
bined with the tone of the northern press to "satisfy us that the war
upon us and our institutions . . ." is to be continued.

Only a united

Slwiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist, 315.
There was also the pre
dictable opposition from within the state.
Denouncing "the clique and
all connected with it," Hammond recounted how he had contributed to
such "a Calhoun organ" in 1843 when he "got no thanks from anybody"
(Hammond to Simms, Apr. 5, 1847, Hammond Papers).
To I. W. Hayne's
early request that he "enter zealously into the matter" of promoting
the project, Hammond would "shudder at the idea of joining issue with
the abolitionists . . . at the Seat of Government" as he did also
"at the proposal of organizing a Southern Presidential Party" (I. W.
Hayne to Hammond, Mar. 31, May 29, 1847; Hammond to Simms, Nov. 1,
1847, Hammond Papers).
Hammond's friends contacted him for advice
on how they should respond to the committee's proposals (A. P. Aidrich to Hammond, Aug. 2, 1847).
^^white, Rhett, 92; Mercury, Mar. 10, 13, 1847.
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South could see to her proper defense.

The Mercury assailed P o l k ’s

Washington organ, the U n i on, "as great a foe to the South as Joshua
Giddings . . .

or John Quincy Adams.

..."

Ritchie’s paper was in

different to the "assaults of the enemy," said the Mercury, but was
quick to characterize southern efforts in self defense as "agita
tion" damaging to the party.^3
The "organ of Calhoun" published the Senator’s Charleston
speech in the same issue in which it reviled Ritchie for having charged
that Calhoun h a d presidential ambitions.

Contemptuously reminding

Ritchie that the defense of southern rights was infinitely more im
portant than the presidency, Carew’s Mercury reminded its readers
that an anti-slavery man in the White House could be fatal to their
interests.

Only a united South w ould be certain of averting this

dangerous prospect.^4
Toward the middle of April, Carew wrote to Calhoun.

Noting

that the Mercury h ad "added nothing" to Ritchie’s comfort, Carew said
with some satisfaction that "He is very restive under our questions
and Says that he will not have his devotion to the South called in
question by the Mercury."^5

Ritchie was a favorite target for the

Mercury ; speaking as he did for Polk, the Washington editor merited
careful attention.
Ritchie also received attention from the p a p e r ’s readers.
Alabama Democrat" defended Calhoun against political hacks "who

^^Mercury, Mr. 17, 1847.
54lbid., Mar. 23, 1847.
55carew to Calhoun, Apr. 14, 1847, Calhoun Papers.
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understand nothing of the independence that leads great minds to
break through the restraints . . .

of party organization.

..."

Ritchie, the Mercury knew, would get little comfort from that asser
tion.

Senator Benton was no better than Ritchie; this Southern de

serter spent too much time casting aspersions on Calhoun.
But the Wilmot Proviso remained uppermost in the editor's mind.
Encouraged by the growing southern reaction to this threat, he saw
"daily indications

of a firm and settled determination . . .

South to present an undivided front.

..."

It was "cheering" Carew

said, that this unity transcended party labels.
also received his attention .

of the

Northern party labels

On June 24 the Mercury printed extracts

of speeches by northern Democrats, the governors of Maine and New Hamp
shire, to indicate that Abolitionism extended into the northern Democ
racy.

Wilmot, the Mercury reminded its readers, was also "a professing

Democrat."

Ten northern legislatures had"almost unanimously insulted

the South" by adopting the "degrading declaration" by Wilmot.
The Mercury *s faith in the success of Calhoun's call for
southern unity grew as the summer progressed.
"The Whigs of the South.”

It did not "doubt"

Mercury readers heard again:

Party ties must be swept as cobwebs when the exis
tence of our institutions, and the honor and
equality of the Slave States is assailed.
This
is now the case. . . .
The paper was pleased to print extracts from Georgia indicating that
that state was lining up with South Carolina.

Virginia, Mississippi,

and Alabama showed promise of doing the same thing.

^^Mercury, Mar. 24, 26, Apr. 12, 21, 24, May 3, 19, 1847.
5 ?Ibid., May 31, June 21, 24, 26, 1847.
SSibid., June 26, 29, July 2, 1847.
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On August 2 the Charleston committee charged with respon
sibility for the establishment of a pro-slavery paper in Washington
mailed its requests for subscriptions.

These appeals were addressed

to prospective supporters throughout the slaveholding states.

Ac

companying each request was a circular tracing in detail the history
of the antislavery agitation.

One week later, on August 9, the Mercury

loosed an avalanche of editorials doubtless designed to support the cam
paign.

Almost daily during August and September, the paper reminded

its readers "that for years past the Southern Social System has been
the subject of bitter denunciation and ceaseless attack . . . but
within the last few months the crusade against it has evinced an en
ergy . . . and purpose, never before possessed . . .
the Atlantic."

on this side of

Northern politicians rushed to join the cause, "clam

orous to be considered its champions.
"the Firebrand hurled into the temple.

..."

The Wilmot Proviso was

..."

This sort of develop

ment, the Mercury explained, "proves the great danger of concession in
a question of constitutional right."

Thus, the Missouri Compromise,

"once regarded as the basis of perpetual peace," furnished "preg
nant evidence that concession may delay but will never disperse the
storm."
aways.

Northern states were by legislation encouraging slave run
Pennsylvania's recent action was further proof that the

fugitive slave law of 1793 had not worked.

The time had come to avoid

compromise; the matter must be settled once and for all.^^

^^Wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist, 314; Hammond Papers; Mercury,
Aug. 9, 10, 11, 1847. It seems likely that the Mercury was read widely
outside the borders of South Carolina.
The paper appointed collecting
agents for both Carolines, Georgia, Alabama, Tennessee, Iowa, Wiscon
sin, Baltimore, Philadelphia, and New York (Mercury, Mar. 23, 1827,
Mar. 27, 1848).
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The Wilmot Proviso was patently unconstitutional; the "Ruin
and Injustice of its Operation" would ruin the South.

"What shall

be done?" the Mercury asked:
It is not for any man or set of men to determine
this.
The response to this question must come
from the united consultation of the slaveholding
States.
Answering its own question the Mercury said, "Whatever we do
must be done with perfect concord and unanimity."

The editor was as

constant in his denunciation of the Wilmot Proviso as he was in his
call for southern unity.

He was careful, however, not to become too

specific in proposals for the latter project.

The Calhoun position

dictated that South Carolina should not lead in the southern unifica
tion movement.

The state's reputation for extremism might frighten

prospective adherents elsewhere.

So when the correspondent "Bluff-

ton" stated that the Mercury was pleading for a southern convention,
the paper took issue with him.

The Mercury had not taken a position

on the manner in which the much desired southern unity could best be
accomplished, "Bluffton" was reminded.

It had, to be sure, published

articles proposing a convention of the sort mentioned by "Bluffton."
But those articles were reprints from papers in North Carolina, Ala
bama, Florida, and elsewhere in South Carolina.

The Mercury's cau

tious policy was to wait for a sign from elsewhere:
While we are most anxious to cooperate in any measures
that may be deemed essential to the thorough awakening
of the South to the flagrant outrages contemplated upon
her rights we have thought it best that the initiative
for the attainment of this great object should be taken
by others.GO

GOMercury. Aug. 12, 14, 16, 17, 21, 23, 24, 25, 27, Sept. 4,
7, 10, 28, 30, 1847.
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Throughout the autumn Carew’s columns repeated the charge to
resist the insulting Wilmot Proviso.
pleased to note some results.

By late September the editor was

The disposition of Democrats to shelve

the Proviso in favor of the principles of the Missouri Compromise, in
combination with the Whig opposition to any territorial accessions
seemed
. . . the best evidence of the propriety of the
course advocated in our columns, and of persev
ering in it until such a union and organization
of the Slave States is effected as will enable
them to resist . . . any invasion of their rights.
The impending presidential election would determine the accuracy of
his analysis.
Coincidentally with their concern for the approaching elec
tion. both South Carolina and Washington were apprehensively viewing
the course of the war with Mexico.

Victory followed victory for the

Americans during 1847 but "no signs of peace . . . followed on vic
tory."

With unrelieved foreboding,

Calhoun saw P o l k ’s administration

as "still full of the idea of conquering a peace."

Rhett, apparently

acting as a contact with the President, informed Calhoun that the
notion would "not be dispelled until the City of Mexico is taken."
Nor would "anything," he wrote, "be done by the Whigs" to secure an
early peace.

Gllbid., Sept. 30, Oct. 11, 12, 14, 18, 21, 22, 28, 29,
Nov. 8, 24, Dec. 4, 1847.
Correspondents like "Turnbull" and "A
Waking Man" contributed freely during the same period.
^^Ehett to Calhoun, May 20, June 21, Sept. 8, 1847, Calhoun
Papers.
The Congressman wrote Calhonn that he had "very little com
munication with the Cabinet Ministers: but . . . friendly relations
. . . with the President himself. . . ."(Rhett to Calhoun, June 21,
1847, Calhoun Papers).
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Calhoun was convinced that the ubiquitous issue of slavery in
the territories would prevail in the forthcoming Congress even as it
had dominated the preceding session.

There were reports from the

North, however, that a firm stand on the part of a united South could
persuade northern politicians to drop the Wilmot Proviso.

Thus it was

imperative to the Carolinian that "the union and firmness of the South"
be achieved.
dicted.

". . . I f she wavers or divides she is lost," he pre

Pronouncing that "the acts of the next Congress will b e of

the last importance" to the South, the Mercury loyally echoed Calhoun:
It is from the [anti-slavery] organization that we
are made to see that our safety in the Slaveholding
States consists alone in . . . U N I O N AMONG O U R S E L V E S

. 6 3

For reasons of his own Polk also concluded that it would be
well to resolve the matter of territorial institutions.

Zachary Taylor

had been mentioned as a presidential possibility since early in the war.
After his victory at Buena Vista, however, his candidacy became a dis
tinct probability.

Due largely to the General's reputation as a rugged

and unpretentious Democrat— which made him a favorite with his men—
he was "personally popular" with those at the North among whom the
war was very unpopular indeed.

Virginian by birth, Taylor was the

master of a Louisiana plantation.

His southern supporters were legion,

a matter of great irritation to President P o l k 0
Polk's discomfiture was increased by the posthumous publica
tion of a letter from Silas Wright which endorsed the principle of the

G^Calhoun to Duff Green, Nov. 9, 1847, Jameson, ed., Calhoun
Correspondence, 740; Conner to Calhoun, Oct. 6, 1847, Jameson, ed., Cal
h o un Correspondence, II 402-04 ; Fisher t Calhoun, Dec. 4, 1847, cited
in Wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist, 316; Mercury, Dec. 4, 1847
6 % i l t s e , Calhoun Sectionalist, 316-17.
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Wilmot Proviso.

Wright had been the favorite candidate of northern

Democrats prior to his sudden death in the late summer of 1847.

The

President, who preferred James Buchanan for his successor, concluded
that the administration must settle the matter of the western terri
tories once and for all; the manner of settlement would have to be
Calhoun's.

Obviously speaking for Polk, Buchanan proposed that the

Missouri Compromise line be extended to the Pacific.

The adminis

tration organ, the U n i o n , was urging the same thing.
In September, less than a month after Wright's death, the New
York Democracy met to determine a course for the state elections coming
up in November.

Almost a week of bitter debate followed before the

state patty split over the Wilmot Proviso.

Administration forces who

had succeeded in nominating their candidates watched the defeated
faction secede from the party.
nominate their own candidate.

On October 26 these rebels met to
Van Buren was implicated in the move;

David Wilmot was invited by the splinter group to be its principal
speaker.

There were those who saw in this a drive to make Van Buren

president.66
Whig gains in the mid-term November elections added to Polk's
worries.

So close was the resulting division in the new House that

the Speakership would be determined by either Calhoun's southern fac
tion or a small body of "militant abolitionists."

Stephen Douglas,

Democrat, and Abraham Lincoln, Whig, were among the new members who

Ibid., 320-22.
The Union began to advocate the Missouri
Compromise at the end of August.
Action of this sort encouraged the
Mercury as noted above, 254.
Rhett to Calhoun, Sept. 8, 1847, Cal
houn P apers.
^6wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist,

322-23.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

256
witnessed the wrangle in which the Whigs finally triumphed.
had good reason for his concern.

Polk

The quarrel over organization

augured ill for the prospects of a harmonious session.^7
The President must have prepared his address to this divided
Congress with some misgiving.

He submitted his speech to leaders in

both houses for their comment before transmitting it.

Polk asked

this new Congress for funds necessary to shatter Mexico's now feeble
fighting forces.

He also called for the territorial organization of

New Mexico and California now securely in American possession.
President made no mention of slavery.

The

Daniel S. Dickinson spoke for

the administration on this subject when h e subsequently proposed that
those settling the area decide the character of their institutions for
themselves.68

Polk had modified his course once again; the fragile

structure of the Democratic Party could not afford championing the
Missouri Compromise line.
Calhoun indicated his displeasure with Dickinson's resolu
tion.

In consequence the New Yorker agreed to defer consideration

of his proposals so that the Senate could hear Calhoun.

Dickinson's

courteous move saved the administration from what appeared to be an
all-out assault from the Carolinians.

As the senior Senator from

South Carolina rose to speak in opposition he disavowed any purpose
to embarrass Polk's administration.

But he reminded his colleagues

of his own steady position on the administration's war.

He had long

since prophesied the turmoil produced by this conflict.

In addition

to the uncertainties of the military situation and the increasing

6 7ibid.. 323-25.
GBibid., 325-26.
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bitterness in the slavery agitation, Calhoun declared that the nation
was faced with a deteriorating economy.

Only by ending the war could

the United States hope to solve its own problems.

The administration's

plans to force peace upon a conquered Mexico had failed, Calhoun said,
as he had predicted.

Appealing then to both Whigs and Democrats, the

Senator from South Carolina urged that they insist upon withdrawal of
United States forces from central Mexico.

Calhoun asked that they

support his plan for a defensive American position as outlined in the
preceding Congress.

The national response to his speech was favor

able.
The President's response, somewhat different in character,
was to prosecute the war despite rising opposition.

In addition to a

defeated enemy who refused to make peace, a recalcitrant Congress,
and a divided party, Polk was confronted with three belligerent gen
eral officers whose charges against each other sometimes exceeded
their disposition to fight the eneny.

Furthermore, the President's

own special envoy appointed to draft the elusive peace with Mexico,
Nicholas Trist, had bungled the job.
subordination.

Trist was also guilty of in

When Polk, despairing of any constructive results

from Trist's mission, ordered him home, the plenipotentiary refused
to come.

Having finally found a Mexican government willing to nego

tiate, he determined that his mission was not yet discharged.^®

^^Ibid., 326-28; Calhoun to Clemson, Feb. 4, 1848, Jameson,
ed., Calhoun Correspondence, 742-43; Conner to Burt, Jan. 26, 1848,
Burt Papers.
^®Quaife, ed., Polk Diary, III, 266 ff.; Wiltse, Calhoun Sec
tionalist , 328-29.
General Pillow, Polk's former law partner, pre
ferred charges against General Scott who in turn was reflecting un
favorably on General Worth.
While the command fell to General William
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When the Senate finally considered Dickinson's resolutions,
it was only to table them along with counter proposals to guarantee
slavery and others to substitute the Wilmot Proviso.

The festering

question of slavery in the territories showed no inclination to be
resolved.

To add to Polk's woes, Senator Benton— a Polk ally of long

standing— had parted company with the President.

Truly, the adminis

tration and the party were in trouble.71
Most ironically, it was the disobedient Trist who at least
partially resolved the President's dilemma.

The hapless Mexican

government finally agreed to the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo and Trist
forwarded the document to his disapproving superior.
it on February 19.

Polk received

Launching another rapid sequence of events, the

President reluctantly submitted the treaty to his cabinet for con
sideration.

When the cabinet recommended that the pact be accepted,

Polk submitted it to the Senate.
March 10, 1848.

That body approved the treaty on

Calhoun, pleased with the cessation of hostilities,
70

strongly supported ratification.

The war— at least with Mexico—

was over.
The Mercury was no less constant in its support of Calhoun's
course in Congress than it had been during the summer adjournment.
Reminding its readers that "The South and the Slaveholding States
will look with interest at the course which may be adopted in

0. Butler, a Democrat, Polk called a court of inquiry.
71wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist, 328-29.
Benton was aliena
ted because his son-in-law, John C. Fremont, was being charged by
courtmartial with insubordination.
72wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist, 329-31; Smith, War with
M e x i c o , II, 234-46.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

259
reference to . . . Slavery," the editor titillated that interest
with his reports.

He was displeased to note that Charleston Con

gressman Isaac E. Holmes had failed to vote in the speakership con
test, thereby making possible the election of "Mr. Winthrop," a Whig
and a "violent Anti-slavery" man, indeed, a supporter of the Wilmot
Proviso.

The Mercury was anxious to learn the motive behind Holmes's

curious action.
Holmes.73

This sharp inquiry brought a quick response from

Normally associated with the "Calhoun clique," Holmes was

probably astonished to find his conduct questioned by the party organ.
Explaining that Winthrop was the only candidate, not an Ab
olitionist, who had a chance to be elected. Holmes huffily informed
the Mercury that his actions conformed with his duty to the South.
Carew was not reassured.

Winthrop, the associate of "known abol

itionists," was a man whose own anti-slavery inclinations were ob
vious, the Mercury editorialized.

Had southern Congressmen stood

together without reference to party, they could have secured a suit
able speaker.

"We do not approve of the conduct of Mr. Holmes," the

editor asserted.

The Mercury's instructions called for southern unity

and held southern representatives responsible when they failed to
achieve it.74
The Mercury disapproved even more heartily of Dickinson's
resolutions.

"Slavery does not now exist in any department of

Mexico," the paper said; thus the area involved was currently free
territory.

The resolutions did not admit the right of Congress to

protect slavery if it were ever established there.

This was but

73Mercury, Dec. 4, 28, 29, 1847.
74ibid., Dec. 28, 29, 1847; Jan. 11, 12, 24, 27, 1848.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

260
another example of the denial of the equal rights of the South.
was also further evidence of the need for southern unity.

It

The lead

ing presidential candidates from the North, Cass and Buchanan, were
as unsound on this matter as was Dickinson.

Their stands were

equivocal at best.75
The South was faced with the prospect of slavery being for
bidden by the laws of Mexico.

"Can the Territories Control the

States?" the Mercury demanded.
If the people
the power, so
to any of the
hands is, and

of the Territory do actually exercise
that its exercise becomes offensive
States comprising the Union, in whose
in what consists, the redress?

The territories were the property of "the Sovereign States of this
Union," all of them.
cumstance.

Dickinson would do well to remember this cir

The Mercury noted with satisfaction that other southern

papers were taking up this issue with their readers.^6
Carew recounted the damage done the New York Democracy by
the Wilmot Proviso.

The South would receive little comfort from this

split between "Barnburners and . . . Hunkers," however.

The Van

Buren faction, the Barnburners, actually endorsed the Wilmot Proviso
while the Hunkers supported Dickinson's equally dangerous "squatter
sovereignty."

If

are more adroit,"

the Barnburners are "more manly . .

. the Hunkers

the Mercury declared. The policy of Dickinson

no less antislavery than that of Wilmot.^7

75lbid., Dec. 31, 1847; Jan. 5, 1848.
7G lbid., Jan. 14, 17, 22, Feb. 2, 9, 1848.
77lbid., Feb. 15, Mar. 1, 1848.
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Carew's course on the war conformed with Calhoun's even as
Clapp's had done.

Like his senior Senator, the editor was opposed to

large acquisitions from Mexico.

The Mercury viewed an early peace as

the best assurance against such a likelihood.

But as the war continued,

the paper saw the annexation of all Mexico as a distinct possibility.
The Mercury repeated its earlier admonition that the United States
would find it difficult to absorb Mexico's mixed population.

The

stresses of such a venture would damage American political institu
tions; the country could turn into a military republic, or even a
monarchy.

The United States should content itself with territory

enough to indemnify it for the

w a r .

78

Calhoun's speech of January 4, 1848, reasserted that the United
States should stand on a defensive line.
the country with ample territorial gains.

Such a strategy would provide
Polk should heed the ad

vice of Carolina's senior Senator to whom the Mercury now paid its
highest tribute.

Calhoun, was "the STATESMAN OF THE

A G E !

"7^

When the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo virtually enacted Cal
houn's proposed accession of territory, the Mercury endorsed its terms
as "creditable to our national character and advantageous to the
interests of the country."
accept it.

The editor hoped that President Polk would

Supporting ratification with a fervor equal to Calhoun’s,

the Mercury held that it would improve the chances for a general po
litical settlement within the United States.

When the Senate did

78lbid., Dec. 30, 1847; Jan. 10, 11, 15, 21, 28, 29, 1848;
see above, 257.
79Mercury, Jan. 28, 1847; Jan. 10, 11, 15, 1848.
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ratify the treaty, the Mercury saw "better and more prosperous
times" ahead.

It would not do to become too optimistic, however.

"The slave question will now come up & be the subject of deep agi
tation," Calhoun had told a correspondent in February, 1848.
South will be in the crisis of its fate.
be

lost."80

"The

If it yields now, all will

The Mercury *s campaign for southern unity was more im

portant than ever.

BOlbid., Feb. 24, Mar. 1, 3, 7, 14, June 3, 6, 9, 1848.
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CHAPTER V I I I

THE REVOLUTION OF 1848

In the midst of the campaign for southern unity, the Revo
lution of 1848 broke over Europe.

Two weeks before Calhoun read of

the first outbreaks in France, he wrote to his daughter:
I am not surprised that the powers of Europe . . .
dread changes.
They are right; because what are
called reforms, will lead to anarchy, revolution
and finally to a worse state of things than now
exists, through the most erroneous opinions now
entertained both in Europe and this country by
the . . . popular party.1
The Senator had not always felt this way.

Calhoun the young nationa

list of 1812 had been fully committed to the optimistic American faith
in progress.

When others had predicted disaster during the first

sectional squabble in 1820, Secretary of W ar Calhoun remained a firm
nationalist, certain of united America's bright future.

As the dec

ade of the 1 8 2 0 's wore on, however, both Calhoun and South Carolina
decided that the slaveholding South was threatened by America's con
fident democracy.

The state reacted to this new awareness with nulli

fication; Calhoun, renouncing his past role, became her champion.
new champion knew that South Carolina could not stand alone.

The

Her only

hope lay in alerting slaveholders throughout the South to their rising
danger.

Calhoun undertook this task and was soon recognized as chief

^Calhoun to Anna Calhoun Clemson, Mar. 7, 1848, Jameson, ed.,
Calhoun Correspondence, 744-45.
263
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spokesman for the whole section.

His was not an easy job.

It re

quired that he contradict a basic American faith in democratic prog
ress and renounce the popular belief in the equality of man.
Little more than half a century before, Thomas Jefferson,
another slaveholder, had proclaimed to the world that all men were
created equal.

Although Jefferson lived long enough to disavow some

aspects of this egalitarian code, his countrymen adopted it as their
ideal.

A utopian call for equality, its endurance strengthened by

its challenge, this message redeemed the old Puritan vow to light a
beacon in the new world.

As Americans demonstrated their faith in

democracy through their performance, the old world would be enlight
ened.
The fervor of the Revolution briefly obscured slavery’s role
as the most blatant inconsistency in the idealistic armor.

Northern

states purged thmselves by abolishing the institution within their
own borders; yet they sanctioned the more lucrative slave trade.
also consented to a political union with slaveholders.

They

Jefferson's

Virginians regretted the necessity for slavery and made feeble efforts
to transport the Negro from both bondage and the country.

Carolinians

merely regretted the necessity for the institqtion; while they ques
tioned the foundation of their society, they neither wished nor hoped
to change it.
As the fluid society of frontiersman and rising industrialists
combined with eighteenth century theory, it compounded the nation's
dilemma.

The slaveholder found that in a world where the theoretical

equality of both man and opportunity was fast becoming a gospel, he
was obsolete at best and evil at worst.

John Randolph of Roanoke,
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among the first to identify this threat to the South's feudal-oriented agrarianism, also pioneered in building a defense against it.
The South could entertain no thought of emancipation, Randolph en
joined; she could not even discuss this institution of which she was
both master and slave.

Insisting that fanatics inevitably rose to

command in such debates, Randolph did not have to remind neighbors of
the terrors resulting from experiments in abolition.
tually next door.

Haiti was vir

Although Randolph did not endorse the principle

of slavery, he did condone the fact of slaveholding.

And as he did

so, this cousin of Jefferson provided fellow Southerners with what
must be their new philosophy.
dolph.

"I love liberty.

"I a m an aristocrat!" declared Ran

I hate equality.

Randolph's injunction to stand firm and remain silent on the
question of slavery went partially unheeded.

As the nineteenth cen

tury advanced, northern consciences rediscovered Jefferson's youthful
ideal of the equality of mankind, elevated it to a messianic faith
and translated it into an assault on slaveholding.

By 1848 the South

had responded in a manner equally vocal and determined.

Ceasing to

regard slavery as an unfortunate necessity. Southerners now main
tained that the institution was a positive good.

Thus, while they

ignored Randolph's admonition to abjure debate. Southerners obeyed his
warning to stand firm.

Calhoun, adopting Randolph's philosophic de

fense of his section, succeeded the Virginian as its spokesman.
The Declaration of Independence was a troublesome reminder of
the Southerner's dilemma.

As long as slavery was kept out of the

^Quoted in Russell Kirk, The Conservative Mind from Burke to
Santayana (Chicago, 1953), 130.
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picture, none was prouder of the American past as it related to
present and future than the South.

Calhoun, whose enduring devo

tion to the Union stemmed partially from his having grown up in the
shadow of the Revolutionary legend, was both an example of and ex
ception to this curious predicament.

Perceiving the basic contra

diction in the Southerner’s plight, this champion of slavery for
mulated a theory of society rooted

firmly

The average slaveholder did not go so far.

in the class structure.
He did reject the ideal

of the Declaration as it applied to his own peculiar situation, and
he replaced it with a precept sanctioned by a source superior to
patriotism.

For centuries his forebears had interceded with the

Almighty "for all sorts and conditions of men"; recognizing, thereby,
the basic inequalities of this world.3

Thus, the Southerner followed

Calhoun’s rejection of the democratic ideal only so far as it af
fected slavery.

Arid he justified his action with religion.

For this

reason, perhaps, his response to Calhoun’s call for unity came too
late.
The Thirtieth Congress of the United States briefly inter
rupted its debate on the Mexican War and slavery in the territories
to pass resolutions on behalf of the Revolution of 1848.
Calhoun was adamant in his opposition to the move.

Senator

With increasing

misgivings he had watched the people’s revolt spread through France,

3see Francis Butler Simkins, The Everlasting South (Baton
Rouge, 1964), 29.
The phrase "all sorts and conditions of men," is
from "A Prayer for all Conditions of Men," found in The Book of Com
mon Prayer (New York, 1953), 18, 32.
See also Richard Hofstadter,
The American Political Tradition (New York, 1948), 68-92, and Wiltse,
Calhoun Sectionalist, 332-44.
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Austria, Germany, and Italy.

"...

Progress in political science,"

Calhoun had written earlier, "falls far short of progress in that,
which relates to matter,

and which may lead to convulsions and revo

lutions ."4
Only in Germany did Calhoun see a chance for the revolution
to succeed.

The new government there took the form of a federation

which allowed for local restraint on national power.

France, on the

other hand, established a strong central government, based on a nu
merical majority.

"No one can say where it will stop," Calhoun wrote.

"France is not prepared to become a R e p u b l i c k . T h e Mercury agreed.
Denouncing the socialist inspired national workshops as "a seminary
of plots and a gulf of expense," the editor predicted that France
was "not as yet . . .

or ever will be, ripe for thoroughgoing Re

publicanism."&
The majority of Calhoun's senatorial colleagues did not share
his pessimism.

The American ideal required that this movement in

Europe be vindicated as a triumph for the popular cause.

Ohio's

William Allen, a champion of popular revolts in the United States,
introduced a joint resolution congratulating the French people upon
their wisdom.

Abolitionist Senator John P. Hale of New Hampshire

next submitted an amendment which added congratulations for the

^Calhoun to Anna Calhoun Clemson, Nov. 21, 1846, Jameson,
ed., Calhoun Correspondence, 712.
^Calhoun to Thomas Clemson, March 22, 1846, Jameson, ed.,
Calhoun Correspondence, 746-47.
^Mercury, May 19, June 5, 7, July 17, 21, 1848; Nov. 20, 1849.
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revolution’s having abolished slavery in France’s colonies.
pleading for delay, moved to table both proposals.

Calhoun,

"Whether the re

sult shall prove to be a blessing or a curse in France and the world
depends upon what is coming, rather than upon what has been already
done," he warned.^
In a move that transcended both party and section, the Senate
overwhelmingly voted down Calhoun’s objection.

Thirty-four year old

Stephen Douglas of Illinois, then serving his first term in the Senate,
best expressed the mood of the hour.
world have their
their model.

"All republicans throughout the

eyes fixed on us," he told the Senate. "Here

Our success is the foundation of all their hopes.

is
. . .

Shall we cast a damper on their hopes by expressing a doubt of their
success?"®
Douglas spoke in the bright language of opportunity that
Americans understood as he expressed the sentiment of the Senate and
the country.

It

was for obstructionists like Calhoun to

think it

sad delusion" to

suppose that "all people are capable of

self

7cong. Globe, 30th, 1st, 549, 568-79.
In 1841 the "people" of
Rhode Island had assembled in constitutional convention.
They intended
to replace Rhode Island’s colonial charter— which restricted the suf
frage to a small body of freeholders— with a more democratic docu
ment.
The state government opposed their action.
Defying the duly
constituted state authorities, the "rebels" adopted a "Peoples Con
stitution" and proposed to validate it by force.
They elected a
slate of officers to replace the existing state government, with
Thomas Dorr heading it as governor.
Only Tyler’s intervention at
the request of the legal government prevented a rebellion.
"Dorrism" was widely approved in the Democratic party, especially in New
York.
William Allen of Ohio was but one of the many who favored the
movement elsewhere; so was Andrew Jackson, who congratulated the
Dorrists.
To Calhoun their action was anathema (Wiltse, Calhoun
Sectionalist, 92-94).
®Cong. G l obe, 30th, 1st, 569-570.
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government."

Calhoun expressed his view to a correspondent:

None but a people advanced to a high state of moral
and intellectual excellence are capable in a civilized
condition, of forming and maintaining free govern
ments: and among these, few indeed have the good for
tunes to form constitutions capable of endurance.9
Again Calhoun's colleagues disregarded his advice.

Although

Hale's amendment was defeated, Allen's resolutions passed both Houses
on April 10.

That evening a torchlight

procession wound its way

through Washington— in tribute to a new republic.

Two cabinet

sec

retaries marched with the jubilant Jeffersonians and President Polk
greeted them from an upper window of the White House.

While the Mer

cury shared Calhoun's doubts of French republicanism, it still en
dorsed the spreading revolution; and the editor's spirit was present
among the marchers.
threat to slavery.

Carew understood Calhoun when he spoke of the
The Mercury could report "The Effects of Philan

thropy" (emancipation) upon Jamaica and the Cape Colony Hottentots
with proper indignation.

But Carew was still an American who thrilled

to "the voice of many nations, in unison demanding liberty, and with
a fierce earnestness dictating terms at the gates of king and em
perors.

..."

They were sounds "grand beyond all . . . that have

yet reached the ear of the earthly listener."

But for slavery, the

Mercury might have agreed with Lincoln's subsequent assertion that
America was the "last best hope of e a r t h . I t

^Calhoun to Anna Calhoun Clemson, Mar.
e d . , Calhoun Correspondence, 744-45.

was little wonder that

7, 1848, Jameson,

^^Mercury, Apr. 14, Oct. 21, 1848; Jan. 12, 1849 (The Mercury
did share Calhoun's lack of confidence in French republicanism, see
above, 267); Roy P. Easier, ed.. The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln
(8 vols.; New Brunswick, 1955), V, 537; Wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist,
340-41.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

270
Southern unity remained an elusive goal.
Once the Mexican war ended, the Thirtieth Congress became
occupied with the issue of slavery in the territories.
1848, the Senate again attempted to organize Oregon.

On June 23,
The measure

before the upper house included an amendment authored by Senator Hale
to bar slavery from the area.

President Polk, who remembered Dickin

son's ill-fated attempt to resolve this question through territorial
self determination, consented to the organization of Oregon with
slavery excluded.

In return for this concession, the President would

exact an agreement to remove the issue from politics.
be those of 1820.

The terms would

Serving as Polk's spokesman, Indiana's Senator

Jesse D. Bright moved that the Senate prohibit slavery throughout
that part of the West lying north of 36°30'N.^^
Calhoun objected on his usual constitutional grounds.
gress had no authority for such a move, he said.

Con

The Ordinance of

1787, often cited to justify governmental regulation of territorial
institutions, was an intersectional compact outside the bounds of the
Constitution.

Moreover, it was no longer binding; in return for the

exclusion of slavery from the Old Northwest, the North had promised
to return escaped slaves.

And she had not kept her word.

Thus the

South was relieved of her obligation to respect the agreement. Quot
ing Jefferson on the Missouri Compromise, Calhoun submitted that it
was "a reprieve only" and could not provide a final settlement.

Dick

inson's efforts to substitute "squatter sovereignty" were deserving

Wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist, 345-46.
Bright's proposed
amendment provided for the return of fugitive slaves.
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of even less notice.

The wildest visionary could not sanction "the

first half-dozen squatters" determining institutions for half a na
tion.

Only the sovereign states could resolve this dilemma.

Calhoun proclaimed, should take no action at all.

Congress,

Trusting in the Con

stitution, the states should respect the institutions of each other and
extend that respect to their emerging sisters in che west.

If this

policy were followed, the line between slaveholding and free states
would be somewhere around 36°30'N.

In that way both the Constitution

and sectional balance would be preserved.

To the North, Calhoun said,

"All we demand is to stand on the same level with yourselves and to
participate equally in what belongs to all."

To the South he issued

another warning:
The time is at hand . . . when the South must rise up,
and bravely defend herself, or sink down into base and
acknowledged inferiority; and it is because I clearly
perceive that this period is favorable for settling it,
if it is ever to be settled, that I am in favor of
pressing the question now to a decision. . . .1%
Polk must have fumed as he read these words of the South Caro
lina "obstructionist."

He undoubtedly remembered that Calhoun himself

had proposed to set the limits of slavery at the Missouri Compromise line
during the preceding Congress.

The Carolinian had warned at that time,

however, that rejection of his proposal would cause the South to look
elsewhere for future protection.

She was now doing so; the Constitu

tion— undiluted by compromise— would furnish that protection.

l^Cong. Globe, 30th, 1st, Appendix, 868-73.
11

Calhoun had insisted in 1847 that the Missouri Compromise was
unconstitutional.
He was prepared to accept it only in the interest of
harmony.
See above, 235.
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By July, after Mexico had ratified the Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo, Polk was intensifying his drive in the Senate.

Anxious for

a settlement before election time, the President urged "concession,
conciliation, and compromise" upon the wrangling Congress.

Polk also

asked for a quick establishment of representative government in the
new territories.

Senator John Middleton Clayton, Whig of Delaware,

responded by suggesting a committee, equally balanced between sec
tions and parties, to resolve the perplexing issue.

The Senate ad

opted his proposal, despite some strong opposition, especially from
New England.14
There were four Whigs and four Democrats on the committee.
Two Whigs w e r e Southerners and two were Northerners; the same was true
of the Democrats, Calhoun being among their number.
chairman.

Clayton was made

This "Compromise Committee" reported the results of its

lengthy deliberations on July 18.

Chairman Clayton praised his com

mittee members for their patience and spirit of compromise as he sub
mitted their recommendations to the Senate.

Oregon, Clayton said,

should be organized immediately without reference to slavery.

In

terim governments should be established in California and New Mexico,
likewise without reference to slavery.

Oregon was intended to be

free territory; if the question of slavery arose in California or New
Mexico, it should be resolved by appeal to the Federal courts.
houn supported the measure; so did the Mercury.

Cal

"We do not propose

to go into this question now," Carew's paper said, "but there is this
much to be said in favor of the proposition:

l^wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist, 348-49.
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. . . its acceptance involves no sacrifice of
principle; and . . . is not liable to the ob
jections which have been so justly and forcibly
urged against compromises.
It does not yield
an acknowledged right— it does not give up a
part to retain the rest— it does not presume
the sovereignty of one portion of the states
over another.
It involves no insult and
probably no injury to the S o u t h . 15
Carew understood the issue perfectly; Calhoun, himself, could not
have put it more clearly.
Despite strong opposition from the Barnburners and assorted
other antislavery men, the "Clayton Compromise" passed the Senate
on July 27.16
House.

But it was summarily discarded in the Whig-controlled

Alexander H. Stephens, Georgia Whig, who alleged that the

bill betrayed the interests of his section, broke the ranks of
southern unity to propose tabling the measure.

The House approved

his motion without debate, eight southern Whigs voting with the
majority.

They were the only Southerners to do so.l?

l^ Ibid., 348-51; Mercury, July 22, 1848.
Clayton, a strong
advocate of compromise, had helped to resolve the Crisis of 1833.
He regarded Calhoun's committee approach as conciliatory.
Dickinson
was also on the committee.
l^The vote, 33 to 22, was largely sectional and partisan.
Twenty-six Democrats and seven Whigs supported the measure, 23 of
them being Southerners.
Fourteen Whigs and eight Democrats voted
in the negative.
Thus, out of a total of 33 affirmative votes, all
but 10 were Southerners.
Northerners accounted for 19 of the 22
total negative votes.
^^Wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist, 353; Murray, Whig Party in
Georgia, 133-34.
The House vote was equally sectional and partisan
in its make-up.
Only 21 northern Democrats voted against tabling.
House Whigs contended that Taylor would lose the North to
the emerging anti-slavery party if the Clayton Compromise passed.
They could reject the measure, however, without damage to the
General's chances in the South.
For this reason eight southern
Whigs voted to table (Morrison, Democratic Politics, 165-66; see
below, 280).
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The House then approved another bill to organize Oregon.
This measure extended the provisions of the Ordinance of 1787 to
Oregon and made no mention of fugitive slaves.

The southern ranks

stood firm in opposition but the bill passed with bipartisan support
from northern Congressmen.

And as an outraged Clayton berated his

fellow Whigs in the lower house for putting presidential politics
above patriotism, the Senate referred the new measure to its Com
mittee on Territories.
set for the fourteenth.

It was by now August 3 and adjournment was
As a result subsequent deliberations were

both accelerated and abbreviated.^®
Douglas, chairman of the Committee on Territories, adopted
Congressman Bur t ’s proposal of the preceding session, to amend the
House bill.

The Ordinance of 1787 should apply to Oregon since that

region lay north of the Missouri Compromise line.
would no longer accept the Burt formula.

Calhoun, however,

The antislavery forces had

become too aggressive; Douglas’s bill left California and New Mexico
open to their grasp while it closed Oregon to the South's.

"Where

the stronger party refuses to be explicit . . . the weaker . . . will
in the end be deceived and defrauded," the Carolinian said.

He would,

in the interest of conciliation, however, accept the Missouri Compro
mise principle as an amendment— if a northern Senator would make the
motion.

Even so, he would vote against the whole bill.^^
Calhoun retraced for his colleagues the rise of the anti

slavery movement and its entrance into politics.

The argument was

l®Wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist, 354-55.
l^Cralle, e d . , Calhoun Works, IV, 513-35.
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much the same as that heard by the Charleston audience almost a
year earlier.

As he spoke, a new antislavery party was forming in

Buffalo, proving the accuracy of another of Calhoun's doleful pre
dictions.

The Senator was not troubled by those who answered his

logic by questioning his devotion to the Union.

For almost forty

years he had served the Union as best he might.

"It is not for us

who are assailed, but for those who assail us, to count the value of
the Union," the Carolinian

s a i d .

20

Douglas, as anxious to compromise as Clay, Clayton, or
Calhoun had ever been, deferred to the Carolinian's wishes.

After

having arranged the defeat of his original proposal, Douglas moved to
substitute the amendment requested by Calhoun.

Calhoun and his friends

voted for the new Douglas amendment and then against the final bill.
The measure passed, nonetheless, only to be rejected by the House one
day later.

The intransigent Whigs in that body would have Oregon and

antislavery or no bill at all.

So on the thirteenth, with adjourn

ment only hours away, the Senate simply accepted the House's original
measure.

In the bitter debate that preceded this action the anti-

Calhoun Western duo, Benton and Houston, hurled invective at Calhoun
and his cause.

The senior Senator from South Carolina responded with

another warning:
Gentlemen may do with this bill as they please.
If
they will not give now what the South asks as a com
promise, she will at the next session, demand all, and
will not be satisfied with anything less.21

20lb i d . The speech is incorrectly dated Aug. 12.
spoke on Aug. 10.

Calhoun

21Cong. G l obe, 1074-78.
Wiltse says that many of those on
the Washington scene in 1848 felt that this was the last time when
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The Mercury resounded with the same tocsin.

When the New

York Globe decried southern determination to open the West to slavery,
Carew reminded his readers that this was the opinion of "a large and
influential portion of the Democracy of the non-slaveholding States,
while it is openly avowed by the entire Whig party in the North and
West."

The agitated editor lamented those Southerners who would still

"trust everything to party."

"The first great requirement is union

among ourselves," said the Mercury :
Aggressive and fanatic as is the North on the subject
of slavery, it is not impossible to bring home the
question to their interests.
They know very well,
though ignorant in other respects of the effect of
the Federal Government, in what way and to what ex
tent it ministers to their advantage in a pecuniary
point of view.
The North would drop "antislavery fanaticism" the very minute the
South resolved to sever commercial connections.

The South should

"speak in a manner not to be misunderstood, and present such a front
as must command . . . respect.

. . ."22

Carew devoted two approving editions to Calhoun's speech on
the Senate's first Oregon bill.

The Clayton committee accounted for

much space in the July Mercury.

The editor commented favorably on

Ritchie's analysis of Clayton's proposed compromise.

". . . I t pro

vides simply for carrying out the provisions of the Constitution as
contended for by Mr. Calhoun, Mr. Rhett, and others for the South."
Although there was "very little of compromise about it," since it
merely accorded with the Constitution, Carew held that "the South

a settlement might be made (Calhoun Sectionalist, 538, n. 22).
22Mercury, Apr. 3, July 8, 1848.
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cannot object to this course."

The bill asked "men of all sections

to stand by the Constitution, and suffer to settle the difference by
its own tranquil operation."
would never have been

But for southern unity the measure

proposed.

23

The Mercury was aware that the action of Congress would af
fect the forthcoming presidential election.

But Calhoun had not yet

resolved upon a course relative to the contest so the Mercury held
itself "aloof to the presidential question."
Watch."

The word was "Wait and

Prudent counsel required that the matter at hand be settled

before South Carolina gave her allegiance to aspirants for the presi
dency.

The Clayton bill provided a sufficient means for settlement.

Echoing Calhoun, the editor explained that the Missouri Compromise
might have been accepted but would have simply furnished "another
mischievous precedent for the unconstitutional . . . action of Con
gress on a subject where their . . . action is always bad.

..."

A "usurpation," Congressional restriction of slavery was also "prompted
by the worse passions, for the accomplishment of the worst conceiv
able objects."24
Carew had no illusions about the difficulties faced by Clay
ton's bill.

"Abolitionists will oppose vigorously," he conjectured,

"fearing their loss of influence & . . . the firmness of parties will
yet be put to a severe trial before the seal can be set to this meas
ure."

Concerned as he was with the "danger that must follow its

23ibid., July 17, 18, 22, 24, 1848.
Surprisingly enough the
Mercury indicated its continued willingness to accept the Missouri
Compromise as a settlement.
24ibid., July 24, 25, 1848.
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defeat," the editor could not yet "think of the mere question of the
Presidency as worthy of consideration.

..."

The Mercury was dis

mayed by reports that House Whigs would oppose the measure lest it
destroy their presidential prospects.

Northern Whigs feared that it

would cost them the antislavery vote while the party's southern mem
bers thought that closing the question would weaken slaveholding
support for Taylor.

The Mercury's hopes that the Clayton measure

would withdraw slavery as an issue from the presidential contest were
being betrayed by "Taylor's friends" who combined "to defeat the
South."25
The Mercury's readers read the news of Senate passage of
Clayton's bill with the gloomy warning that it would meet defeat in
the House.

The Whigs, north and south, were determined to kill the

measure on craven grounds of political expediency.

In its outrage

over Whiggish perfidy, Carew's paper came perilously close to vio
lating its own maxim by endorsing a presidential candidate;
. . . And if the Friends of Gen. Cass, North and
South, should prove true to the last, and be out
voted by the combination of Whigs and Hambur g e r s ,
why, we suppose, then the South, would be urged and
warned on the ground of the imminent danger of the
slave question, to vote against Gen. Cass, because
he is not a slaveholder.
"General Taylor would be judged by the conduct of his friends.
the

Mercury thundered!

Beyond this outburst,

go;

the command was still "Wait and Watch.

..."

the Mercury dared not

25lbid.. July 28, 1848.
ZGjbld., July 28, 31, 1848.
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Carew followed his announcement of the b i l l ’s defeat at the
hands of the House with a furious attack on southern Whigs.

Prom

ising to present a detailed analysis of the vote, the Mercury con
demned southern Whigs in both House and Senate.

They had destroyed

"the moral power of the very Southern union" which could have set
tled the disruptive issue once and for all.

After 'such proof of

what the Southern Whigs can do," the editor demanded, "with what
assurance do they ask the South to vote for . . .

a Southern Whig?"^?

On August 5 the Mercury published a statistical analysis of
the House vote to table Clayton's bill.

It pointed with care to the

fact that every southern Democrat and a majority of northern ones
had voted against tabling.

The

all but one northern Whig voted

monstrous Whig record showed
to table.

that

Yet they were only able

to

carry the day because eight southern Whigs voted with them.

"Thus

upon the paramount question the

shows a

development in this instance

majority of the friends of Cass with the South, and a majority of
the friends of Taylor with the North," the Mercury concluded.

Still,

there was reason for caution; Southerners should watch for further de
velopments .
The Senate's attempt to substitute the Missouri Compromise
for the defeated Clayton measure received approving notice in the
Mercury.
case.

Southern Whigs recorded their votes for the South in this

The paper predicted, however, that the House would also block

this second Senate attempt to settle the issue.

When the prediction

27lbid., Aug. 1, 2, 1848.
28ibid., Aug. 5, 1848.
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proved to be an accurate one, the Mercury gloomily gave up its hopes
in the Congress with another Calhoun-inspired prophesy:
. . . It must . . . be evident . . . even to
those . . . most sanguine in the hope of a differ
ent result, that this question cannot be settled
by Congress except on conditions disgraceful and
degrading to the South and that the period is ap
proaching whe n the Southern States will have to
make their election between a determined resist
ance . . . and unconditional surrender . . . be
tween maintaining their position as States in the
Confederacy or sinking into a condition of vassal
provinces. . . .^9
"The

Defeat of the

South" described the enactment of the

final Oregon

bill. Benton

and Houston betrayed the South by support

ing the measure.

The vote was disturbingly sectional, said the Mer

cur y , on the part of Democrats as well as Whigs.

The South must unite.

"Our only reliance is upon ourselves, upon the determination of the
Southern States to merge all other questions in the one great ab
sorbing and paramount issue JUSTICE AND EQUALITY TO THE SOUTH."
Neither party could be trusted with the section's imperilled in
terest.

Her

only hope lay

in unity and a faithful adherence to the

Constitution.
On August 31 the Mercury devoted considerable space to two
Georgia Whigs, Senator John M. Berrien and Congressman Alexander H.
Stephens.

In a speech that was widely regarded as an able defense

of southern rights, Berrien had followed Calhoun's lead in support
ing the Clayton compromise.

Carew reproduced Berrien's address and

praised it for its soundness.

Stephen's speech defending his House

29lbid. , Aug. 14, 15, 1848.
30lbid., Aug. 17, 1848.
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motion to lay the "Compromise Bill" on the table, was also repro
duced.

The editor condemned it in full measure.

Stephen's paramount

allegiance was to his party, not his section; for such perfidy there
was no defense.
Oregon bill.

Even Polk understood the danger contained in the

The Mercury paid Polk a rare compliment when he criti

cized the provision excluding slavery from the new territory.

A Presi

dential veto would have furnished greater proof of Polk's awareness of
the South's peril.31
The Mercury's feigned disinterest in the presidential elec
tion ended with congressional adjournment.

Southern rights in the

territories had not been guaranteed and would loom large as an issue
in the forthcoming election.
bility since early 1847.
Senator's plan.

Calhoun had been considering this possi

For a time Zachary Taylor figured in the

Rhett, inching his way back into Calhoun's confi

dence, was commissioned to contact close associates of Taylor for
their analysis of the General's views.

By June of 1847 the South

Carolina Congressman could report that Taylor was "as sound on the
Tariff Question as you [Calhoun] are."
"said to be opposed to the U. S. Bank."

The planter-general was also
(His views on slavery were

considered sound simply because he was a slaveholder.)
ever, was not enthusiastic about a Taylor candidacy.

Rhett, how
He thought that

South Carolina might "be driven to support Taylor: but for the Whigs,"

3^Ibid., Aug. 19, 28, 29, 31, 1848.
Stephen's action in
opposing the Clayton compromise stimulated bitter criticism from
Georgians, Whig and Democrat.
He was denounced as— among other
things— a "Traitor to the South." The Congressman maintained the
regard of his constituents, however.
He assured them that he opposed
Clayton's measure because it did not guarantee the right to carry
slaves into the Southwest (Murray, Whig Party in Georgia, 134-77).
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who would "make it impossible by nominating him."

During the early

fall Rhett, having "nothing distinct as to his opinions," virtually
dismissed General Taylor as a prospective Democratic n o m i n e e . 3%
Supreme Court Justice Levi Woodbury would be chosen by the
Democrats, Rhett thought.

Buchanan's "career as Secy, of State" and

"affinity" for the tariff would prevent his being selected.
lacked "the confidence of the South."

Cass

No less aware than Calhoun of

the need to settle the slavery question prior to the election, Rhett
wrote that "the administration is doing all it can to settle the
matter on the Missouri Compromise line.

But if the war and the

slavery question are not settled during the next . . . Congress,"
Rhett predicted, "the Democratic Party will be defeated and new . . .
parties will arise."^3
Charleston banker Henry Conner corroborated much of what
Rhett said.

"Next to Mr. Calhoun," Conner held, "Genl Taylor" to

be "the strongest man in So Carolina & Genl Cass the weakest."
While Woodbury was sound, he inspired "no enthusiasm," would be
beaten by Taylor "& in doing so split the Democratic Party here &
for the first time in her history, give South Carolina to the op
posite party."

The state grew impatient as winter came and Calhoun

still had not endorsed a prospective candidate.

Reporting this rest

lessness, Conner urged that the Senator either commit himself or

33phett to Calhoun, May 20, 22, Sept. 8, 1847, Calhoun
Papers.
The information on Taylor's views came from General Jeffer
son Davis of the Mississippi Militia.
Davis's first wife, Sarah
Knox Taylor, was Taylor's daughter.
33Rhett to Calhoun, Sept. 8, 1847, Calhoun Papers.
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explain his reasons for not doing so.
With the assurance that at a proper time So. Ca.
is to wheel into her place . . . the people will
consent to wait for the proper developments be
fore taking ground in favor of any particular
candidate at least I think so.34
Conner meant no disrespect, however.

Assuring Armistead Burt,

Calhoun's kinsman and new liaison, that "In the meantime, we will all
here conform to Mr. Calhoun's policy.

..."

Conner acknowledged

Burt's "communications" to the Mercury, suggested that they be sent
more frequently and assured Burt that the paper would "act promptly
& boldly . . . discreetly & wisely"— in accordance with— instruc
tions .35
By March 1848 it was clear that— for the first time— both
parties would have strong antislavery delegations present in their
nominating conventions.

Calhoun had predicted the likelihood of

this development in his Charleston speech of the previous year.
situation would become more dangerous in future conventions.

The

In

creasing delegations from newly admitted free states would be ad
mitted to the national gatherings.

By uniting with the growing anti

slavery groups in the North, these men could determine convention
policy.

Perceiving this to be the ultimate result, Calhoun laid down

his course.

In line with his recommendations outlined in the Charles

ton speech, neither he nor his state would go to the Democratic con
vention.

Burt was instructed to convey the message to the faithful

W. Conner to Armistead Burt, Jan. 26, Feb. 11, 1848,
Burt Papers.
33conner to Burt, Feb. 11, 1848, Burt Papers.
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in South Carolina.

He did so on March 29,^6 writing to high priest

Conner.
It was immediately obvious that the congregation did not
understand the latest recommended tactic.

On April 3 a stunned Conner

replied to Burt, "I had a little rather no body but Mr Calhoun & your
self Saw this letter but don't care much— who sees it.

It is well

intended," Conner wrote.
What is the Mercury to Say when attacked as it will
be by all the world if we do not go into convention—
we are willing & will be glad to fight under our true
banner— one that Mr Calhoun will
furnish but let us
know our order of battle our place in line & the
message we are to u s e . 37
While the Senator's astonished followers pondered his latest
directive, Calhoun acted to clarify

its meaning.

"friends" throughout the state that

such a move was necessary

the South on alert to her danger.

He informed his
to put

The Carolina boycott would also

warn the North; that region's politicians must contain antislavery
or see themselves divested of southern support.

As the "order of

battle" went out, the Mercury found her predictable "place in line."
It was to rouse the faithful.
Carew devoted most of May to this new task.

The Mercury

minced no words in declaring the forthcoming convention out of
bounds.

Carolinians could not "go to the Convention without full

assurance that they must either quarrel with it, or be bullied by
it.

. . neither by the one proceeding nor the other can they gain

^^Burt to Conner, Mar. 29, 30, 1848, cited in Wiltse, Cal
houn, Sectionalist, 359.
^^Conner to Burt, Apr. 3, 1848, Burt Papers.
quoted in full.

The letter is
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any desirable object."

When a Georgetown group chose a delegate

to the forbidden convention in defiance of Calhoun’s policy, the
Mercury thought it "a pity to disturb the State w i t h a matter . . .
not to its taste."

"South Carolina," said the editor, " . . .

holds

off from the Convention," but "on to the Constitution— to the prin
ciples of Democracy, to the great principles of Southern Equality,
Southern Rights and Southern Safety.

..."

More than half the

twenty-eight states to be represented at Baltimore had officially de
clared their support of the Wilmot Proviso.

South Carolina would

have no part in the nomination of "some . . . Barnburner" to bear
a standard tainted "with Abolition on its

folds.

When the Democrats assembled at Baltimore, the Mercury
roundly condemned Georgetown delegate J. M. Commander, the lone Caro
linian present.

Elected as he was by eight to ten of his neighbors,

Commander could not claim to represent the whole state.

The dis

loyal delegate's intention to cast South Carolina's entire slate of
nine votes was mere "humbuggery."

The Mercury jousted with the

Milledgeville (Georgia) Federal Union in defense of South Carolina's
absence from the Baltimore convention.

Rejection of Barnburners and

Abolitionists, devotion to the South, obedience to the Constitution,
these were the reasons South Carolina boycotted the convention.

The

irreverent Federal U n ion, a regular Democratic sheet, had suggested
that South Carolina was pouting because Polk failed to retain Calhoun
as Secretary of State.39

3% e r c u r y , May 5, 20, 1848; Burt to Conner, Mar. 28, 29, 30,
Apr. 8, 1848, Calhoun to Conner, Apr. 4, 6, May 23, 1848, Conner
Letters.
39Ibid., May 20, 24, 26, 27, 1848; see below, 286, n. 40.
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Carew reported the convention proceedings, if only to de
nounce them.

Berating those who fraternized with Abolitionists and

"a very large body of avowed Wilmot Proviso Men," the editor recounted
how such behavior subverted "the provisions of the Constitution for
the election of the Chief Magistrate."

It was the "adroit wire pullers

and unscrupulous intriguers" at Baltimore who substituted their in
terests "for the voice of the people."

The whole process was "de

structive of all individual independence of opinion . . . and danger
ous to the Slaveholding States, whose vigilance should never sleep.
..."

Carew was possessed by the "affrontery" of Commander, that

"imposter and pretender" whose "preposterous assumption of authority"
had "misrepresented" South Carolina's "position before her sister
States.

..."

"And," the Mercury raged, "a body thus constituted

proposes to make a President.

. .!

What a commentary . . . "

yet

nothing better could be expected from the forthcoming Whig assembly.
The Mercury's initial reaction to the nomination of Cass was
restrained.

Carew deemed "it advisable to await the final action of

the Convention, before . . . further comment.

..."

His indecision

abruptly vanished on the next day, however, as the Mercury roundly
denounced this advocate of popular sovereignty:
With regard to the nomination of Gen. Cass, we
need scarcely say that it is unsatisfactory; and
indeed of all names before that body, his was the
least acceptable to the Democracy of South Carolina.

40lbid., May 30, 1848. Wiltse says that Commander was chosen
"at a local meeting . . . by a handful of voters. . . ."(Wiltse,
Calhoun Sectionalist, 362).
Orthodoxy was incensed at this action.
In response to Burt's request, Conner promised that Commander would
"be duly noticed in the Mercury" (Burt to Conner, May 21, 1848,
Conner Letters; Conner to Burt, May 25, 1848, Burt Papers).
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Finding "other portions of the . . . Convention . . .

as distaste

ful as the nomination," the editor concluded, nonetheless, to "re
serve" any further "remarkes to another occasion."

He was waiting

for further installments of the message.
But Calhoun was having difficulty in formulating the message.
With Congress still in session and the territorial question unre
solved, he was not ready to endorse a candidate.

If adjournment

came without a settlement, the Senator proposed to measure both
Whigs and Democrats by their position on slavery in the territories.
Calhoun's own "restless" state, however, was growing impatient for a
decision.

Despite his recent declaration that he was a Whig, General

Taylor remained South Carolina's first choice.

No less a figure

than Henry Conner wished to support Taylor on an independent ticket.
"I shall certainly go Taylor nyself. Whig and all," wrote Ker Boyce,
another Calhoun lieutenant.42
By early summer the Carolina restlessness was taking the form
of a mutiny.

Having "not consulted Mr. Calhoun about anything" during

4lMercury, May 29, 30, 1848.
42conner to Burt, May 25, 1848, Ker Boyce to Burt May 31,
1848, Burt Papers; Conner to Hammond, Nov. 2, 1848, Hammond Papers.
On April 22 Taylor had written to his brother-in-law. Cap
tain John S. Allison.
In this letter the General declared himself
to be a Whig but said that as President he would "administer the gov
ernment untrammelled by party schemes." Refusing to make political
pledges, Taylor wrote that "One who cannot be trusted without pledges
cannot be confided in merely on account of them." If elected, Tay
lor promised to defer to the wisdom of the electorate on the tariff,
currency, and internal improvements.
He would veto no measure that
did not clearly violate the Constitution.
The object of his letter
was obviously to please the maximum number of Whigs while alienating
the fewest possible Democrats (Wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist, 359-60;
Morrison, Democratic Politics, 146).
Taylor was the first choice
of northern as well as southern extremists.
The Barnburners wanted
to make him their candidate (Morrison, Democratic Politics, 146).
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the Congressional session, Rhett maintained his independent position
by refusing to endorse the leader's boycott of the Democratic con
vention.

The Congressman assured Woodbury's friends that South Caro

lina would be in convention, Calhoun's opposition notwithstanding.
Rhett did not fulfill his promise, however, and was evidently not
connected with the miniature revolt at Georgetown.
"General Commander['s]" brave if futile act of defiance
prompted a massive and indignant response from the advocates of
Orthodoxy.

Their reaction— out of all proportion to the tiny re

bellion— was probably prompted by the uncertainty of their political
condition.

With Calhoun still uncommitted and the Taylor movement

growing daily stronger, the emergence of a strong Democratic can
didate would divide South Carolina for the first time since nulli
fication.

Even Calhoun might be unable to impose unity.43

The Democratic convention was plagued by the same sectional
quarrel that divided Congress.

After having spent much time in a

futile attempt to reunite the New York wing of the party, the con
vention did succeed in resurrecting the alliance between South and
West.

This alignment was not based, however, on the formula pre

scribed by Calhoun at Memphis.

Balancing the nomination of Michi

gan's Cass with a Kentucky slaveholder. General William 0. Butler,
for Vice President, the party ignored Calhoun's report on internal
improvements.

The platform provisions on slavery were repeats of

the Democratic declarations of 1840 and 1844,

4^Calhoun to Conner, Apr. 4, 6, May 23, July 8, 9, 1848,
Burt to Conner, Feb. 4, Mar. 12, 24, 28, 29, 30, Apr. 8, May 21,
23, 1848, Conner Letters; Mercury, May 26, 30, 1848; see above,
286, n. 40.
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That Congress has no power under the Constitution
to interfere with or control the domestic insti
tutions of the . . . States, and that such States
are the sole and proper judges of everything ap
pertaining to their own affairs, not prohibited by
the Constitution; that all efforts of the abolition
ists or others made to induce Congress to interfere
with slavery, or to take incipient steps in rela
tion thereto, are calculated to lead to the most
alarming and dangerous consequences, and that all
such efforts have an inevitable tendency to diminish
the happiness of the people, and endanger the sta
bility and permanency of the Union, and ought not
to be countenanced by any friend of our political
institutions.44
Southerners were assured that this declaration was meant to repudi
ate the Wilmot Proviso.

They agreed that it would be inexpedient

to become more specific.
Neither northern nor southern extremists were satisfied with
the convention, however.

The Barnburners, unhappy with Cass and

furious at the convention's handling of their fight with the Hunk
ers, returned home confirmed in revolt.

Alabama's William Lowndes

Yancey— a onetime Carolinian and one of Calhoun's "friends"— at
tempted to secure an outright repudiation of the Wilmot Proviso.
When he was unsuccessful in this effort, he voted against the platform.
Yancey was joined only by the Florida delegation and one other Alabama
delegate.

He was not discouraged, however, and left the convention

determined to organize a southern revolt.45
Returning home by way of Charleston, Yancey stopped to ad
dress a meeting of the outraged Carolina Orthodoxy.

Convinced from

44quoted in Morrison, Democratic Politics, 140.
burners were willing to accept this resolution.

The Barn

45Morrison, Democratic Politics. 141-44, 157-61; Wiltse,
Calhoun Sectionalist, 363-65.
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the beginning that no good would come from the recent convention,
Carolina’s fury was intensified by the accuracy of her foreboding.
Calhoun h a d tried unsuccessfully to have this meeting postponed un
til after the Whig Convention.

The Whigs might not nominate Taylor.

In that case Calhoun hoped that southern Whigs and Democrats would
sever party ties to unite behind the General.

But Calhoun cautioned

the Charleston meeting against endorsing Taylor.

If the Whigs did

nominate the General, he could not serve the cause of southern unity.
Yancey and the Charlestonians heeded his warning.

The Ala

bama insurgent told his audience, however, that they must plan their
campaign; "let us," he said, "call upon the South to rally as one man—
to meet in primary assemblies— to meet in Southern Convention— to
consult and agree upon a ticket for President and Vice President which
should be acceptable to all by reason of its devotion to the Consti
tution."

Pleased by the Charleston reaction to his speech, Yancey

went on to Alabama there to find "nearly all ready to award praise"
for his course but none "bold enough to face the storm."

While

South Carolina waited for news of the W h i g s , Alabama concluded to
support the national ticket.
The Whigs met in Philadelphia on June 7 where, tormented by
their own version of sectional animosity,
last time.

they rejected Clay for the

Calhoun also suffered a setback when they nominated

General Taylor.

Southern Whigs rejoiced at the selection of a

Louisiana slaveholder.

Although some Northerners of the "Conscience"

^^Morrison, Democratic Politics, 157; Wiltse, Calhoun Sec
tionalist, 364.
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persuasion bolted the party rather than swallow this symbolic re
pudiation of antislavery, most northern Whigs confidently expected
to re-work Taylor into their image.47
Events moved rapidly that summer.

Two weeks after the Whigs

met, the Barnburners assembled in Utica, New York.

Still smarting

over their failure to destroy the Hunkers at Baltimore, the New York
rebels had concluded to nominate their own slate.

While the Senate

debated the future of Oregon and Polk brooded over the Barnburners'
treacherous threat "to the Union," an Ohio antislavery convention
met at Columbus.

This assembly spoke with the voice of the future.

It called upon all those who favored free soil to unite and meet in
national convention, there to select a candidate for President.4®
The Liberty Party had already nominated John P. Hale.
mon P. Chase, one of their number, persuaded them, however,
their cause with the greater force of antislavery.
too, agreed to attend this latest convention.

Sal

to merge

The Barnburners,

On August 9, 1848,

"Conscience" Whigs, Liberty party men, and Barnburners met together
at Buffalo in the Free-Soil Convention.
Buren for the presidency.

They nominated Martin Van

Charles Francis Adams, the son of John

Quincy Adams, accepted second place o n this ticket with his father's
old enemy.
isted.

The new party vowed to leave slavery alone where it ex

But the Free-Soilers would not consent to see it advance

into another American territory.

This determined group endorsed

47Mercury, June 12, 1848; Yancey to Calhoun, June 14, 1848,
Correspondence to Calhoun, 441; Morrison, Democratic Politics, 157-63.

4®Wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist, 365-66; Morrison, Democratic
Politics , 145-47.
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the Wilmot Proviso and denounced the Clayton Compromise.

It also

approved economy in government, free land for western settlers, in
ternal improvements, and a high tariff.

Here was the making of an

alliance between North and West, the prelude to Ripon.

Hailing the

advent of emancipation, William Lloyd Garrison predicted that the
Free-Soilers were preparing the way for the party of abolition.
Rumors flew thick and fast in South Carolina during that
summer.

Boyce would "go for Taylor . . . Whig and all."

clined toward Taylor.

Although Hammond despised the General"s "damned

rascally set of friends out of S.C.
Taylor.

Conner in

. .," he, too, would support

Hammond favored an independent ticket composed of Taylor

and Woodbury; it would be approved throughout South Carolina and
would "urge on Calhoun" into the Taylor camp.
ington and was thought to favor "holding back."

Elmore visited Wash
John Heart, now on

the staff of the M ercury, also made a significant trip to the capital.
As observers waited for the message he would bring back, they labelled
the Mercury irretreviably "committed . . . against Cass."^^
"The rumour in the Mercury office" was that— excepting
Holmes— South Carolina’s entire congressional delegation would sup
port Cass.

Rhett was said to be a "watch and wait man," regarded

as "synonymous with opposition to Taylor."

Yet the Congressman had

/Û

Wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist, 367-69; Morrison,Democratic
Politics, 151-56.
The Barnburners attended the Free-Soil Conven
tion with the understanding that Van Buren would be nominated for
the presidency.
^^Hammond to Simms, May 29, June 20, 1848, Simms to Hammond
July 20, 1848; Hammond to Major Hammond, June 12, Aug. 18, 1848,
Hammond Papers.
"Perhaps," Hammond wrote, "it would be best to
elect Van Buren & bring on the crisis at once."
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greeted Cass's nomination with a vigorous condemnation of the can
didate for his espousal of popular sovereignty.

Some readers also

noticed that on June 8 the Mercury asked for "opinions relative to
the best choice for President.
The "Town Meeting," held a few days later, exposed the
opinions of many.

The "assembly was large and the Resolutions passed

with great unanimity" as the "Democratic friends of Genl. Taylor in
Charleston" nominated h im for the presidency.
the Democratic candidate for Vice President.

They endorsed Butler,
James Gadsden, Chair

man of the Corresponding Committee set about canvassing the state
for Taylor.

But Calhoun had not expressed his opinion.

Watch," cautioned the

M e r c u r y

"Wait and

.52

When the congressional session ended, Calhoun, accompanied
by Senator Butler and Congressman Burt, again came home by way of
Charleston.

There, on August 19, he advised his audience to boy

cott the election even as it had boycotted the convention.

Van

Buren's candidacy, Calhoun said, proved northern determination "to
rally" on the "great question of sectional supremacy."

The future

of slavery and the South was thus directly threatened.

Neither the

Whigs nor the Democrats could be trusted in this emergency.

In a

situation so grave, the South could save herself only by renouncing
the national parties.

Calhoun summoned his hearers to promote his

call for the whole South to assemble in convention; they would

^^Lewis M. Ayer to Hammond, July 16,
to Hammond, July 21, 1848, Hammond Papers.

July

1949, James M. Walker

^^Gadsden to Hammond, July 28, 1848, Hammond
28, 1848, Hammond Papers; Mercury. July 28, 31,

to Simms,
1848.
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thereby accomplish the organization of a southern party.
fight sectionalism with sectionalism.

He would

The call for southern unity

was becoming more particularist.53
Calhoun spoke on Saturday; the Mercury devoted three columns
of its Monday issue to a report of the Senator's address.
of course, praised Calhoun's sentiments.
had no faith in national parties.
dorsed Cass for the

presidency.

The editor,

Like Calhoun, the Mercury

But in the same issue Carew en

54

Whether by accident or design, Calhoun spoke too late to
convince his audience.

For some time the Senator had been aware of

the charged political atmosphere within South Carolina.

Rhett's in

dependent course throughout the Congress of 1848 strongly suggested
the probability of trouble ahead.

In the four years since Calhoun

suppressed the Bluffton revolt much had changed in the state.

As

younger politicians grew more ambitious, the senior Senator had
grown older.

His health became a matter of concern to both himself

and his friends.

The bank war had broken out; "still raging" it

pitted Calhoun intimates like Conner and Elmore against each other
and threatened to destroy state u n i t y . T o

^% e r c u r y ,

complicate matters

Aug. 21, 1848; Wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist, 369.

54Mercury, Aug. 21, 1848; John Heart to Calhoun, Aug. 22,
1848, Calhoun Papers.
55Burt to Conner, July 4, 1848, cited in White, Rhett, 97.
Burt wrote that Rhett did not consult Calhoun about anything during
the session.
Elmore was president of the state-backed Bank of the State
of South Carolina.
The bank's charter was up for renewal in 1852.
Conner was president of the Bank of South Carolina, a private in
stitution.
In an attempt to kill "Elmore's Bank," Hammond, Conner,
and others undertook a campaign to prevent its being rechartered.
The Mercury published "communications" from both sides but was
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further, the peril to the South had Increased.
The unity that Calhoun once held desirable for the protection
of his section was now a matter of grave necessity.

Without a firm

base in South Carolina, he could never hope for general southern
unification.

His own approach to the presidential election could

disrupt the order so carefully imposed upon the state during the
past two decades.

Resolving that he must first preserve order at

home, Calhoun decided to sit out the election.

The stance of the

candidates was not without influence, but South Carolina’s reaction
to his choosing between the two was uppermost in the Senator's mind.
Robert Barnwell Rhett figured prominently in Calhoun’s cal
culations.

Although Rhett had wanted South Carolina to attend the

Democratic convention, he did nothing to challenge Calhoun's ruling
to the contrary.

When the convention selected Cass, Rhett categori

cally renounced any intention of supporting the nominee.
houn, however,

Rhett did not endorse Taylor.

Like Cal

South Carolina assumed

that the Congressman was following Calhoun’s lead and that an endorse
ment— of Calhoun’s choosing— would ultimately be made.^^
Antislavery’s exit from the Democratic party combined with
House rejection of the Clayton compromise to alter Rhett's course
abruptly.

The

South

should support the purified Democratic party.

generally thought to favor Elmore.
The issue was bitterly disputed
during 1847 and 1848 and remained a source of discord until the pro
bank men w o n in 1852 (Hammond Papers, 1847-1852; Mercury, 1847-1848;
White, Rhett, 100; Smith, Economic Readjustment, 193-96).
Charles
to n ’s Taylor Democrats were "mostly against the [Elmore’s] bank."
(Simms to Hammond, Nov. 11, 1848, Hammond Papers).

See above,

James M. Walker to Hammond, July 21, 1848, Hammond Papers.
287, 292-93.
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he concluded, southern Whigs having proved their duplicity beyond
all doubt.

Rhett, consequently, announced for Cass.

Most of the

South Carolina House delegation followed suit.^^
When Congress adjourned, Rhett also went to Charleston.

He

proposed to persuade the city’s Democratic executive committee that
it should endorse Cass.

On August 20, while Calhoun was still in

the city, Rhett succeeded in his mission.

The committee decided to

announce its decision at a public meeting scheduled for the next day.
While Calhoun advised against this course, he did net forbid it.
Neither did he stay for the meeting.
If Calhoun expected trouble from this action of the Charles
ton Democracy, he was not mistaken.

"The Democratic meeting last

evening," wrote John Heart," was for a great portion of the time a
scene of perfect tumult."
At length, while Mr. Hayne was speaking a glass lamp
was thrown on the stage, and the indignant and with
ering rebuke with which h e met the outrage seemed to
recal [sic] the voters to a sense of propriety, and
the proceedings went on to their termination without
interruption.
T a y l o r ’s Democratic supporters also denounced the "degree of rowdism,"
but they noted that the "meeting was held against the advice of Mr.
Calhoun."59

The campaign would be bitterly fought in South Caro

lina.
Taylor men attributed the sudden strength of the Cass move
ment to Rhett.

"There is no doubt that Rhett is at the bottom of

5^White, Rhett, 96-97; Morrison, Democratic Politics, 166.
^^White, Rhett, 97; Morrison, Democratic Politics, 166.
S9

Heart to Calhoun, Aug. 22, 1848, Calhoun Papers; Walker to
Hammond, Aug. 22, 1848, Hammond Papers.
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the Cass movement In this State.

.

wrote William Gilmore Simms:

The game played by the Mercury was necessary to con
vince Cass that Gen Commander's nomination went for
nothing.
He was as accordingly denounced & Cass de
nounced & the convention denounced all very bitterly.
Elmore at this time goes to Washington, Rhett paves
the way to reconciliation in a speech in favour of
Polk, which takes the South by surprise.
Hart [sic]
(of the Mercury office)goes to Washington just after
the meeting in June & shortly after the Mercury pro
ceeds to smooth the way by apologetic articles for
Cass, & articles against Taylor. . . .60
Simms's analysis was essentially c o r r e c t . H e went on to report that
Calhoun, Butler, and Burt really "incline to Taylor & go against Cass."
Calhoun, however,

decreed neutrality for himself, his colleague in

the Senate, and his liaison.

"Strange," said Simms, "that at the

moment when it is important that he should speak he should be silent.
Is it possible that he fails to see that a complete division of the
State is fatal to his ascendancy?"^^
Calhoun obviously did not agree.

There were no longer any

anti-Calhoun politicians in South Carolina.

Sometime office-holders

who retained political ambitions— like Simm's friend, Hammond— were
careful to restrict their criticism of the Senator to private chan
nels.

Lest they forfeit future prospects, their public statements

must be pro-Calhoun.

One could be passively or actively for the

Senator; it was not practicable, however, to be a politician and ag
ainst him.

Calhoun was doubtless aware of this situation.

It had

much influence upon his decision to remain silent on the subject of

^^Simms to Hammond,

Aug. 29, 1849, Hammond Papers.

^^Mercury, May 20 -

Aug. 21, 1848, see above, 285-88,

62simms to Hammond,

Aug. 29, 1849, Hammond Papers.
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the election.

Both the Cass and Taylor camps included passives and

actives among their adherents.

Calhoun also knew that he was not

strong enough to decree a policy for the election.

He could prob

ably secure a majority for one or the other of the candidates; but
only by scattering, not crushing, the opposition.

Such an action

would destroy the political climate of his own creation.

So, in

this revolution of 1848, Calhoun discreetly chose to remain silent.
He preserved his "ascendency," thereby; in the aftermath of the cam
paign, Calhoun reasserted his will and unity returned to South Caro
lina.
The Mercury followed Bhett to support Cass.

It must be

assumed that Calhoun neither forbade this move nor even expressed
any real displeasure with it.

Throughout the fall the Mercury was

as solicitous as ever of "Mr. Calhoun's" opinions.

John Heart, con

scious of the "imperfections," in his coverage of Calhoun's "remarks"
at the Charleston meeting, urged the Senator to send a complete copy
of the speech.

The Mercury would "publish it with great pleasure.

"The Presidency— Our Position," explained the Mercury's shift
to Cass.

Taylor surrendered his claim to independence, the editor

said, when he accepted the Whig nomination.

Furthermore, the General

had declared himself on only one issue, opposition to presidential
vetoes.

This position alone was reason enough for the South to oppose

him; internal improvements, another bank, a higher tariff,and the
Wilmot Proviso would become law under such a Whig president.

Carew

G^On July 20 Simms complained that "The Mercury is in the
hands of the eneny.
Rhett has too prevailing an influence" (Simms
to Hammond, July 20, 1848, Hammond Papers). Heart to Calhoun,
Apr. 22, 1848, Calhoun Papers.
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had not forgotten the Whig rejection of the Clayton compromise.
That compromise was a Democratic attempt to settle the slavery issue
on terms "not dishonorable to the South."

Taylor's virtues were

limited to his southern birth and the fact of his being a slave
holder.^^
When forced "to a choice between the nominees of the Whig
party and the nominees of the Democratic party, we declare our paper
for the latter," said the Mercury.

The "nomination of General Taylor

in their midst and the organization of a party to advance his elec
tion" threatened Carolinians with the triumph of old line Whiggery.
". . . A position of neutrality in such circumstances would be a
position of imbecility.

. .

Brave and confident though he sounded, the editor had trouble
justifying his position.
pro-Cass.

The Mercury remained more anti-Taylor than

Admitting the Democratic candidate to be "very exception

able," Carew maintained that he was still better than a Whig, hence
the Mercury's support.

Lest Calhoun take umbrage in his "position

of neutrality," Carew explained that he, personally, preferred a
timely neutrality, while awaiting developments.
"friends," however, he had joined the Cass party.

In deference to his
The editor longed

for the end of the presidential contest, when South Carolina would
put division aside and reunite in defense of the South.
During the first week of the Mercury's campaign it gave over
its columns to "communications," news reports, and editorials on the

6 % e r c u r y , Aug. 21, 1848.

65ibid.
66lbid., Sept. 17, 1848.
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contest.

Yielding to the "pressure of friends," Carew reconsidered

his decision to close Mercury columns to the Taylor men.

The "un

usual circumstances of the division within the Charleston Democrats"
established the wisdom of this policy.

Carew's "friends" were right.

Many regular subscribers to the Mercury were Taylor Democrats, Henry
Conner being one of them.

In return for his concession, Carew would

require "temperance" of its political correspondents.
limit the number of such communications "in order . . .

He would also
to devote"

his "paper principally to higher and more enduring interests.

..."

Five days later "Cato" assailed Cass; but regardless of C a rew's dec
laration, the Mercury published few communications in favor of Taylor.
"Rank and File" wondered if the Independent Taylor Democrats
had thrown in permanently with the Whigs.
Calhoun opposed Taylor.
same opinion.

"Sumter" was certain that

Many of the Mercury's readers were of the

On September 5 they discovered that the Senator was no

less opposed to Cass.

In writing to Carew, Calhoun reasserted that

he stood "on independent grounds . . .
little to approve in either candidate."

I see much to condemn and
The Mercury published Cal

houn's letter in full and approved his opinion as "the one of all others
which w e prefer to see him occupy."

"Common Sense" was quite right in

assuring Carolinians that Calhoun had never meant to endorse Taylor.

G Tfbid., Aug. 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, 29, Sept. 1, 2, 4,
5, 1848.
^^Ibid., Aug. 28, Sept. 4, 5, 14, 1848.
Calhoun's letter
was written on Sept. 1 and published on the fifth.
In it the Senator
approved of Heart's coverage of his "remarks" delivered earlier in
Charleston.
Hammond was "startled" by Calhoun's letter and believed
him to be "furiously opposed to Cass." When Burt endorsed Cass
Hammond changed his mind (Hammond to Simms, Sept. 12, 1848, Hammond
to Major Hammond, Sept. 12, 1848, Hammond Papers).
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The Mercury's September Issues repeatedly detailed Taylor's
drawbacks.

Carew observed that South Carolina was the only state in

the Union with a party of Democrats for Taylor.

"Excommunicated and

forgotten" by the Whigs, "that select body" named "Taylor Democrats,
or some such rigamarole," abides, the editor teased, "in the flesh
and about the City of Charleston."

The Mercury urged that local can

didates committed to Cass be supported.

Christopher Memminger was such

a candidate for the General Assembly; so was Carew.
W ith Calhoun out of the campaign, the Mercury looked to
Rhett, "a true man of the South," for leadership.

Readers were re

minded that on September 21 Rhett would address a meeting of Cass
Democrats in Hibernian Hall.

The crowd was "the largest . . . held

since the organization of the . . . parties in the present political
contest," said the Mercury on the next day.
enthusiastic."

It was also the "most

The editor applauded Rhett for having emphasized

the true interests of the South above the presidency.

Calhoun

might wel l have said the same thing.
When Rhett spoke again on the twenty-third, the Mercury re
ported the results with enthusiasm.

This speech would do much to

weaken the Taylor Democrats, said the editor.

Touching as it did

"upon nearly all the leading questions," Carew determined to pub
lish the speech in its entirety.

Rhett had cautioned all voters

against trusting to "a vague, delusive hope, founded upon the per
sonal popularity and . . . birth-place of the Whig candidate.

^^Mercury, Sept. 15, 16, 18, 19, 1848.
70 l bid., Sept. 21, 22, 1848.
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More Importantlyj the Congressman exposed "the utter hopelessness
of uniting the South for . . . resistance and defence, under the
administration of a Southern Whig President."

Carolinians should

remember this and support Cass.
"Communications," reports of meetings, and more editorials
carried the message into October.

As Charleston voters went to

the polls on October 9, the Mercury reminded them that "the presi
dential issue is the leading issue."

Since the General Assembly

chose South Carolina’s presidential electors. Charleston voters
must send only Cass men to Columbia.

Cass, they should remember, did

not believe that Congress could interfere with slavery.
exercised sole jurisdiction of this institution.
posed to the Wilmot Proviso.

The states

And he was op

Taylor, on the other hand, had

shrugged off his Democratic supporters.

Avowing himself to be a

genuine Whig, the General had expressed his pleasure at sharing the
ticket with Millard Fillmore, an antislavery man.

Three significant

Carolinians, A. P. Butler, Armistead Burt, and Franklin H. Elmore,
now agreed with the Mercury’s position.

The optimistic paper ex

pected the Democrats to carry South Carolina.

Taylor, Carew pre

dicted, would receive no more than 30 votes in the legislature.
With some satisfaction the Mercury soon recorded the vote; South
Carolina went for Cass 129 to 27.

Carew, having been reelected,

was among those voting for Cass.?^

71lbid., Sept. 23, 25, 29, 1848.
72lbid., Sept. 6, 7, 8, 9, 13, 20, Oct. 5, 6, 10, 11, 12,
14, 21, 23, Nov. 7, 1848; Wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist, 370. Tay
l o r ’s declaration came in a second letter to Captain Allison,
dated Sept. 4, 1848 (Hammond to Major Hammond, Sept. 10, 12, 1848,
Hammond Papers).
Carew ran for Speaker in the new House.
Unable to muster
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The Mercury could not forecast the same result outside
South Carolina; nationally, the trend was to Taylor.

On November

13 the editor conceded the certainty of a Taylor victory.

Carew

admired the General personally but feared h i m as the representative
of the Whig party.

Despite the fact that Taylor was himself a

slaveholder, northern Whigs had repeatedly asserted their confidence
in him as an antislavery candidate.

His support was heavily north

ern; still, it was hard to believe that Taylor would betray the
South.

By failing to cooperate with antislavery, however. General

Taylor would destroy his party:
. . . Thus . . . if Gen Taylor shall fulfill the hopes
of his Southern friends, it seems almost inevitable
that his administration will witness the division of
the United States into two great sectional parties,
animated against each other by a feeling that threatens
nothing less than the dissolution of the Union.
If, on
the other hand, he shall fulfill the hopes . . . of his
Northern supporters . . . with anti-slavery as its guiding
spirit, and prostration and ruin of the South as its ob
ject . . . the administration . . . presents a subject
of speculation full of perplexity, and one cannot look
forward to it but as a theatre of great events and
possibly of a fatal catastrophe.
The Mercury's venture into clairvoyance concluded with an admo
nition.

"In such an exigency . . . the safety of our country de

mands that we shall judge . . . the coming Administration, not by
preconceived opinions, but by its acts, its fruits."

Calhoun could

not have asked for more; it was still "Wait and Watch."73
The editor's subsequent comments belied his awesome appeal
for cautious detachment.

Alternating briefly between optimism and

sufficient support, he withdrew from the contest at the end of the
third ballot.
7% e r c u r y , Nov. 13, 1848.
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pessimism, the Mercury speculated that Taylor’s victory did not
depict true W hig strength.

The General was personally popular but

his platform h a d been vague.

Consequently, many Taylor supporters

had not made a party commitment.

Then, too, the Senate would be

controlled by Democrats who could resist Whig measures.

The Whigs,

on the other hand, were confidently united while the Democrats were
despondent, divided, and

defeated.

^4

There w ere many dangers inherent in all this.

"The real

basis, substance, and life of the Whig party" was a "system of
taxation by duties on imports.

..."

High tariff advocates had

concluded in 1833 that either the South must be subjugated or the
tariff abandoned, hence the attack on slavery.

". . . If',' said

the Mercury, "tomorrow the South would submit to be the humble de
pendent of New England, through the instrumentaliity of a high
Protective Tariff, abolition would be struck dumb by the patent
magic of gold."

Meanwhile, northern Whigs were threatening to

block all government appropriations until protection was re-estab
lished .
In addition to the prospect of tariff revision, Carew
feared possible Whig control of the Senate by 1850.
Proviso would then become law and " . . .
...

be met by sectional resistance.

The Wilmot

sectional oppression

..."

Had Cass only been

elected, the Democrats would have extended the Missouri Compromise
line.

Instead, many northern Democrats had been irritated by the

74 i bid., Nov. 23, 24, 1848.
75ibid., Dec. 4, 5, 1848.
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defection of their southern associates to Taylor.

As a result,

much of the northern Democracy would vote with the Whigs to force
the issue in "unequivocal form."

Since General Taylor would not

veto the Proviso, ". . . conflict between the free and slave States,"
the Mercury warned, "cannot be evaded."

Things could not remain as

they w e r e .
The Mercury’s preoccupation with the issue of slavery in the
territories was shared by both Calhoun and Rhett.

During the late

summer. Senator and Congressmen each outlined a program designed to
secure equality for the South.

Calhoun called as before for southern

unity, the goal to be achieved through a southwide convention.
had no faith in this method.

Rhett

In the event of slavery's exclusion

from the territories, he proposed that South Carolina's delegation
withdraw from Congress.

The state could thus "force every State in

the Union to take sides, for or against her" and establish finally
"that the rights of the South be respected or the Union be dis
solved."77
Carew, wholly convinced of the need for southern unity and
prepared to welcome its accomplishment by whatever means, inclined
toward Rhett's plan:
. . . We are in favor of any form of action that can
secure our object.
If a Southern Convention can be
assembled, we approve of that: if not, then of any
other expedient.
We will support the first, the
second, the last— any and every form of action that
promises deliverance and security to the South— and

76ibid., Dec. 7, 8, 1848.
^^Ibid., Sept. 21, 29, 1848.
Their respective proposals
were outlined in their Charleston speeches and reported in the Mercury.
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will support them singly or all together.

. . .

The Mercury reported the "almost entire unanimity of sentiment that
pervades the press as to the propriety . . .

of action.

..."

Pro

ceeding with care, it predicted "that when the time comes for action,
there will be a

corresponding unanimity on the part of the

Stat e . "^8

The editor's distrust of southern Whigs, reflective of Rhett's
reduced his hopes for a southern convention.

Even if Taylor approved

the Wilmot Proviso, the Mercury saw little chance of his southern
supporters cooperating with a sectional convention.

The parties

were "almost balanced" in Virginia, Alabama, and Mississippi.
Arkansas, Texas, and Missouri there were "powerful

In

[Whig] minorities"

w h ich migjit "swell to majorities by any new issue that secures to
them the support of all who shrink from a bold measure."

There

was no hope "of gaining the support of these States for a prop
osition that will be denounced as tending to revolution or dis
union."

But "South Carolina could" act,"and act effectually in

forcing all the States to take into consideration the value of
the Union, and weigh it against abolition.

..."

The Mercury

commended Taylor Democrats for their willingness to cooperate.

79

When the question of promoting southern unity came before

7Glbid., Feb. 22, Apr. 20, Aug. 12, 21, Sept. 5, 26, 29,
Oct. 23, 25, 26, 30, Nov. 2, 9, 16, 17, 21, 30, Dec. 11, 1848.
The editor cited reports favoring southern union from the Columbia
South Carolinian and Palmetto State Banner and Telegraph, the
Chareleston Evening N e w s , the Georgetown Observer, Pendleton Mess
e n g e r , Camden Journal, and Hamburg Republican. Most of the pppers
favored Calhoun's plan.
79M ercury. Nov. 2, Dec. 11, 14, 1848.
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the General Assembly, Calhoun’s prudent approach to the presidential
election paid handsome dividends.

Taylor Democrats and Cass Demo

crats were equally devoted to the principle of southern rights.
had only quarrelled over how best to reach their goal.

They

And through

his neutrality, Calhoun still chief among the orthodox, had assured
that the breach should be only temporary?

^

In December the Senator moved tb heal it.

Urging his friends

in the General Assembly to declare for a southern convention, Calhoun
again warned against separate state action.

With the exception of

the recent presidential election, Rhett’s following had never been
strong outside his congressional district.

So, as Taylor men united

with Cass men to honor Calhoun's wishes, the revolution of 1848 came
to an end.

There were no reprisals this time.

Time was running out

for the South, and her cause needed all those who were well disposed,
separate state actionists among them.

Rhett and the Mercury followed

the state in bowing to the wishes of its leader.
did not repent of his initial preference.

Carew, however,

He was still "decidedly

favorable to the action of" South Carolina "alone if no other" state
could "be brought to cooperate."

B^wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist, 374-75; White, Rhett, 99;
Gadsden to Hammond, Aug. 19, 1848, Conner to Hammond, Nov. 2,
1848, Hammond Papers; Carew to Calhoun, Jan. 2, 1849, Calhoun
Papers.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

CHAPTER IX

A GREAT CONSERVATIVE MOVEMENT

Free-Soil leadership viewed the results of the election of
1848 with extreme satisfaction.
to reunite

On November 30, as Calhoun was moving

the ranks of his South Carolina followers, Francis Pres

ton Blair wrote to Van Buren.

"Our forlorn hope has accomplished

all that was wished & more than we had any right to expect.
Blair asserted.

..."

Every Taylor and Cass man in the North had been

forced to endorse "the principle of no new Territory to be annexed
to our Africa."

Politicians who might equivocate "in giving effect

to this absolute interdict" would soon be shaken from their lofty
pedestals.

..."

Determined to contain slavery within its present

limits, Free-Soilers would tolerate none whose "hollow professions"
might blunt the force of their drive.^
Van Buren's reply would have chilled the heart of the most
hopeful southern Union-lover.

Of the 121,000 votes that Free-Soil

received in New York, "more than 100,000 were those of . . . in
corruptible Radical Democrats, who

[could] neither be bought, forced

or driven by any power on e a r t h . C a l h o u n had spoken with the voice

^Blair to Van Buren, Nov. 30, 1848, quoted in Avery Craven,
The Coming of the Civil War (New York, 1942), 240.
^Van Buren to Blair, Dec. 11, 1848, quoted in ibid.
Blair, Van Buren and Thomas Hart Benton had all gravitated
toward Free-Soil as a result of Polk's nomination in 1844.
Aware
308
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of a prophet.

Northerners were re-deploying their political parties

on sectional lines.

Ttic South must do likewise.

The second session of the Thirtieth Congress supported the
Blair-Calhoun-Van Buren analysis.

Less than two weeks after the

legislators convened. Congress plunged into an especially bitter dis
pute over slavery in the territories.

Hinging on the organization of

California, this quarrel clearly demonstrated the rising intransig
ence of both North and South.
Following the discovery of gold in California, the popula
tion of the region had greatly increased.

As a result. Congress

viewed statehood for the area as both inevitable and desirable.

The

question of whether the new state should be organized with or without
slavery, however, set off a dispute that threatened not only the

of the rising antislavery feeling at the North, these three charter
members of Jackson's retinue viewed the selection of Polk over Van
Buren as a triumph for slavery and a setback for the Democratic party.
Their suspicions were strengthened when Polk took Rhett's advice to
replace Blair as editorial spokesman for the party.
Thomas Ritchie
was brought up from Richmond and installed as editor of the newly
founded Union which became the administrative organ.
Blair, Van Buren, and Benton united to blame Calhoun for their
estrangement from the Democracy.
Charging that Calhoun had designed
the strategy. Van Buren joined Blair in believing that Polk's nomina
tion was part and parcel of the "war waged for the acknowledged . . .
purpose of extending or perpetuating slavery." As Senator from a bor
der state, Benton angered his constituents when he deserted "the sage
politicians and statesmen, Calhoun, Walker, Polk, and Ritchie." De
nounced for his unnatural alliance with Van Buren, Benton learned
that he would "not be permitted to stand in the way of the onward and
upward march of [the] country. . . . "
By 1849 his prospects for reelection were unpromising.
Smarting under the charge that he was
motivated by a "contemptible jealousy of Calhoun," Benton accused
"Every Calhoun man and . . . newspaper in the State and in the United
States" of working for his defeat.
"Calhoun started it all," he de
clared.
Awaiting the "day of reckoning. . . when all such apostates
and traitors" would be remembered with "detestation and execration,"
the Mercury lent substance to Benton's charge (Cong. Globe, 28th, 1st,
Appx. 568,607; Thomas Hart Benton, Thirty Years View [2 vols.; New
York, 1854-56], II, 614-15, 647; Craven, Coming of the Civil W a r , 20110; Mercury, June 27,28, July 17, 18, 1849.
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future of California but also of the Union itself.
Throughout this contest the increasing strength of Free-Soil
became daily more apparent.

When on December 21 the House actually

adopted the proposal of Daniel Gott, Whig of New York, to abolish
slave trading in the District of Columbia, one slaveholding Con
gressman decided to retaliate.

Repenting, perhaps, of his recent sup

port for Zachary Taylor, Charleston Representative Isaac Holmes in
vited southern members of the House to follow him as he withdrew from
the chamber.
Meanwhile, Senators from ten of the fifteen slave states had
already caucused.

Alarmed by the proceedings in the lower house, the

caucus named a committee of five and directed it to determine who
among the southern members of Congress would unite to oppose the
Wilmot Proviso.

Three Democrats and two Whigs made up the committee.^

The thrust of Free-Soil was aiding Calhoun's campaign for southern
unity.
Prodded by this committee, sixty-nine Senators and Representa
tives— Whigs and Democrats— from every southern state except Delaware
met together on December 22.

Upon the motion of Georgia Whig Alex

ander H. Stephens, this assembly appointed another committee and
charged it with drafting an "address to the People of the Southern
States."

The address "should be

[as] temperate [and] mild [as it

was] decided," said Calhoun, and should underscore the need for im
mediate action.

Once it was circulated among the electorate, the

% i l t s e , Calhoun Sectionalist, 378-79; Murray, Whig Party in
Georgia, 140, Ambler, e d . , Hunter Correspondence, II, 104.
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South would be bound by the reaction it provoked.^
Consisting of one member from every slaveholding state— nine
Democrats and six Whigs— the new committee met on the next day.
phens was made chairman and Calhoun was among the members.

Ste

His long-

sought goal of southern unity seemingly within reach, the Carolinian
was appointed to write the proposed address.

He had it ready for

committee approval by January 10, 1849.5
The Charleston Mercury followed developments at the capital
with a growing impatience.

Ridding itself of all moderation, the

editor’s tone increased in sharpness, at times becoming almost per
emptory.
tive.

Carew was weary of antislavery’s constant stream of invec

Evincing less and less of a disposition to assert his love for

the Union, he thundered that the South must act, immediately and de
cisively.

The Mercury was absorbed in the sectional battle; local

news accounted for less of the agitated journal’s attention.

And

every report of national affairs seemed to bear in some way on the
growing hostility between North and South.^
In a long editorial on December 14 Carew presented his sum
mation of the S outh’s plight.

He still felt that South Carolina could

act alone to relieve the rising peril; indeed, she could "effectu
ally" force "all the States to take into consideration the value of
the Union."

The patriot’s love of the Union must be weighed "against

^Wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist, 379-80; Murray, Whig Party in
Georgia, 140; Craven, Coming of the Civil W a r . 243; Mercury, Dec. 20,
1848.
^Wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist, 480-82; Murray, % i g Party in
Georgia, 140; White, R h e t t , 99.
^Mer c u r y , Dec. 1848 - Feb. 1849, passim.
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abolition," Carew advised.

With the object of averting abolition

and restoring domestic peace ever before her, South Carolina must
overcome her fears that she lay
tion to the Union."

. . under suspicion of disaffec

The South would either kill abolition or be

killed by it; the Yankee crusade would not die a natural death.
Northern Democrats and others among the South's friends at the North
had repeatedly asserted that abolition endangered the Union.

Yet

their courageous efforts were rewarded with no more than "the en
tire passiveness of the Southern States.

..."

The South owed strong support to her northern allies ; acting
with conviction, any one southern state could convince "the Northern
people" of "the moral certainty that they" would "be compelled to
choose" between the Union and abolition.

"...

The Northern pa

triot" could "then plead with sincerity and power for the Union . . .
and denounce with some hope of effect, the fanatic traitors who are
harrying it to destruction."

Because southern response to the "in

solent and ruinous aggressions" of abolitionism had so far been lim
ited to strong language, the northern electorate had simply dis
missed this indignant southern "bluster."
warning;

". . . it will

Calhoun ended with a grim

[now] require stronger measures than might

formerly have sufficed" to resolve the crisis.
"Of all others" South Carolina was "the very State . . .
that should throw down the gauntlet of resistance."

If the true

and Constitutional "Union" were "not already corrupted and dis
jointed beyond all hope of restoration, then it" would "be pre
served."

And if abolition had "already waxed too strong in Con

gress, and among the Northern people, for the issue of the Union
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itself to suppress it, this will b e proof conclusive that it" could
not "be arrested at all in the Union.

..."

The Mercury had no patience at all with those who said that
other states were jealous of South Carolina and would not follow her
into resistance.

South Carolina was regarded by the southern people

as "the natural leader on this question."
was appointed to lead the lower South.

As "a border state" she

White men could not survive

as tillers of the soil in regions south of Virginia and North Caro
lina.

Only the African could stand the broiling sun of the Deep

South; there it was "slavery or depopulation."

If the politicians

would only cooperate, nine-tenths of the southern people would applaud
a resistance led by South Carolina.
Carew neglected no argument in his appeal for action.

Even

if the South did not follow and his state were left to stand alone,
there would still be nothing to fear; South Carolina could not be
coerced.

"...

Does any man believe," asked the Mercury, "that a

Northern army can march through Virginia and North Carolina, on the
errand of forcing South Carolina to submit to the measures of abol
itionism?"

Such an arny could not be raised.

If the abolitionists

succeeded in abolishing slavery in the District, restricting the
interstate slave trade, or applying the Wilmot Proviso anywhere
in the West, South Carolina's delegation at Washington should im
mediately return home.

The governor could then call the General

Assembly into session where it could adopt ". . . such other meas
ures as will lead to the complete protection of the South from
the machinations and aggressions" of her "enemies."

The state's

seats in the national Congress, eloquent in their emptiness, would
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serve as an impressive and final appeal to those who loved the Union
more than abolition.

This course ” , . . is the true course, and

the

only one that we think will be effectual," insisted the Mercury.

As

he had said before, however, editor Carew was willing to support any
move designed to bring about southern unity:
But in the love of our Country, and all that we
hold dear, let us no longer trifle with this great
question.
Let us no longer amuse each other with
the emulation of fine professions while the con
suming fire is eating out the foundations of our
social institutions./
On the the second day of the new year, Carew wrote to "Mr.
Calhoun."

The Mercury approved the "meeting of southern members of

Congress" and the editor thanked Calhoun for his present account of
that meeting.

Carew had, predictably, published Calhoun’s "Communi

cation" in the Mercury.

The editor hoped that Calhoun's "expecta

tions of a happy result" from the movement might be realized.

With

"such a man as Stephens at the head of the Committee," however, Carew
was constrained to doubt the outcome of its deliberations.

Still, he

"conceived it prudent for the present, when Virginia and N Carolina"
were "exhibiting symptoms of vitality on this Subject, that the Mer
cury should be comparatively quiet."

And he still favored action by

South Carolina alone if "no other" state could "be brought to cooperate"
with her.

But, as usual, the Mercury still acted at Calhoun’s command.

Carew "would esteem it a great favor" if the Senator would transmit
his "views on all questions bearing on the . . . all important issue"
to the Mercury.

In consequence, the paper "might render efficient

^Mercury, Dec. 14, 1848.
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g

service to the South."
On the evening of January 10, the Committee of Fifteen met
to consider Calhoun's address; Carew's reservations concerning the
outcome of this venture proved to have been well advised.

During

the nineteen-day interval, Calhoun wrote, the capital pondered, and
Congress did virtually nothing.

That morning the House again took

up Gott's resolution to abolish the slave trade in the District.

A

freshman Whig member from Illinois named Abraham Lincoln moved to
amend the motion before the House with a more practical version of
an earlier proposal.

Lincoln would also abolish slavery in the

capital, but over a period of years and only if a majority of the
white males resident there approved.

He also suggested a strong

provision for the return of escaped slaves.

As the House voted by a

decided majority to reconsider Gott's motion, southern Congressmen
reacted with characteristic and voluble indignation.

The chamber

followed its vote, however, with immediate adjournment.

Thus

Gott's motion had been approved but not drafted as a bill while
Lincoln's proposal was not even called up.

Southerners interpreted

this move as a victory for their side; it was an avoiding action
brought on by the South's concerted

r e s i s t a n c e . ^

Curiously enough, this apparent victory combined with the
everyday pressures of politics to undermine further resistance.
With the immediate danger past, southern Whigs resolved to reassert

^Ibid., Dec. 1848, Carew to Calhoun, Jan. 2, 1849, Calhoun
Papers.
^Wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist, 381-82.
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their party distinctness; in so doing they would protect the interest
of incoming President Taylor.

Polk, for his part, recovering from

the apparent surprise with which he had regarded the strength of the
southern movement, directed administration Democrats to do what they
could to stall its drive.

So when Calhoun confronted the Committee

of Fifteen with his finished product, he found their willingness to
act together already partially defused.
On the tenth the address was read to the committee and dis
cussed at length.

The body decided to defer a decision on its suita

bility until a second meeting scheduled for the thirteenth.
date the Whigs were clearly settled upon their new tack.

By that

The com

mittee entertained the motion of John G. Chapman, Whig of Maryland,
to postpone indefinitely any address at all.

It was rejected eight

to seven, all six Whig members and Democrat Thomas J. Rusk of Texas
voting in the affirmative.

Two days later, on January 15, eighty-

eight southern members of Congress reassembled to consider the
address as approved by close vote of the Committee of Fifteen.
Calhoun's address was both an appeal to the past and a warn
ing for the future.

It faithfully adhered to his initial advice to

that first meeting of uneasy Southerners and was "temperate, mild
and decided."

The aging South Carolinian recounted the problems

faced by slaveholders since the Revoultion.

Slavery was a divisive

issue at the Constitutional Convention, he said, but this first con
frontation was resolved by compromise.

Without such a compromise,

the South would never have ratified the Constitution.

^°Ibid.. 382-83.
ll l bid.; Murray, Whig Party in Georgia, 141.
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The North, Calhoun contended, had broken virtually every
pledge made in the Constitutional Convention.

The Constitution's

provision for the security of slaveholding states was now "almost
perfectly nugatory."

The fugitive slave law was little more than a

dead letter; indeed, organized northern groups now enticed slaves to
flee their masters.

Constant agitation of the slavery question was

designed to ensure manumission at the South.

The issue of slavery in

the territories furnished an even more graphic example of northern
faithlessness.
Compromise.

The North had almost unanimously supported the Missouri

But the annexation of Texas and the Mexican Cession had

caused that section to repudiate the solemn agreement of 1820.

Char

ging unjustly that the South was bent upon extending the peculiar in
stitution, Northerners had chosen to violate their word.

Calhoun

pointedly denounced their reasoning as he challenged their decision:
What . . .we do insist on, is, not to extend slavery,
but that we shall not be prohibited from migrating
with our property, into the Territories of the United
States, because we are slaveholders.
Recent deliberations in the House indicated that— under current
conditions— emancipation would soon take place.

Slavery could not sur^

vive in a society where the provision of asylum for runaways was made
a condition of one's liberality.

The Abolitionists already controlled

the House, Calhoun said; their intended course was laid out for even
the blindest of optimists to see.

Undeterred by the object lessons

lying off the Gulf coast of the United States, these righteous and
determined men proposed to inflict emancipation upon half of the
country.
The massacre in St. Dominique, a product of alien idealism.
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still preyed upon the South Carolina mind.

Jamaica, Antigua, Bar-

badoes, and St. Kitts, once rich lands closely associated with
colonial South Carolina, now lay prostrate because of emancipation.
The abolition of slavery in a plantation society
doomed white men either to flight or extinction.

automatically
Finally, the

vigilant South Carolinian reissued his oft repeated call for southern
u nity:
If you become united, and prove yourselves in earnest,
the North will be brought to a pause, and to a cal
culation of consequences; and that may lead to a
change of measures and . . . may quietly terminate
this long conflict between the sections. If it should
not, nothing would remain for you but to stand up
immovably in defense of your rights, involving your
all. . . .
We hope, if you should unite with any
thing like unanindty, it may of itself apply a remedy
to this deep-seated and dangerous disease; but, if
such should not be the case the time will then have
come for you to decide what course to a d o p t .
The eighty-eight Democrats and Whigs listened closely as
Congressman Abraham W. Venable, Democrat
Calhoun's address.

of North Carolina, read

In the debate that followed, a Whig motion to

defer any action at all was defeated.

Senator Berrien succeeded,

however, in having the speech remanded to committee for modification.
Calhoun agreed to any alteration that did not materially alter the
content of his address and with several important changes in mem
bership, the Committee of Fifteen was reconstituted.
who resigned, was replaced by Berrien.)

(Stephens,

Like its predecessor, the

iZCralle, e d . , Calhoun W o r k s , VI, 290-313; Wiltse, Calhoun
Sectionalist, 383-85.
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new committee had eight Democrats and seven Whig members.
As the outcome of this Whig ploy, two speeches were sub
mitted to the last general meeting of Southerners on January 22.
Berrien had drafted an address intended to displace Calhoun's but
the committee skirted a decision by submitting both proposals to
the greater committee of the whole.
stitute to the meeting.

Berrien read his projected sub

Calhoun's address was not read since those

present had already heard it.

Stephens's followed Berrien's per

formance with a motion to issue no address at all; it was tabled,
fifty-nine to eighteen.

In a closer vote, Berrien's offering was

then rejected and Calhoun's address— as modified by the Committee
of Fifteen was ratified.

After those present at the meeting had

sufficient time to reflect upon its contents, the Carolinian would
offer them the opportunity of signing the document.
Forty-eight of the slavocracy's one hundred twenty-one rep
resentatives at Washington signed Calhoun's address.

If the chief

advocate of southern unity was not pleased by this result, he was
satisfied.

More than half of the southern Democracy had signed, in

spite of administration opposition.

Should the Whigs be able to

assure h i m that Taylor's administration would adopt a State Rights
stance, Calhoun offered to support the General.
expect southern Whigs to sign his address.

In return he would

The Whigs did not give

l^Wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist, 385-86.
Coit says only eighty
were present for the meeting (Coit, Calhoun, 476).
^^Wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist, 386-87; Murray, Whig Party in
Georgia, 141.
There were no important alterations in Calhoun's ad
dress other than a change of title; it became "An Address to the
People of the United Scates" rather than to the South alone.
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the necessary assurance and they did not sign the address.

Instead,

Robert Toombs, Whig Comgressman of Georgia, exulted in the revolt:
We have . . . foiled Calhoun in his miserable attempt
to form a southern party. . . .
1 told h im that the
Union of the South was neither possible nor desirable
until w e were ready to dissolve the Union. . . .15
Whigs like Toombs "did not intend to advise the people . . .
to look anywhere else than their own government for the prevention
of anticipated evils.
ministration which

..."

Moreover, they "did not expect an ad

[they] . . . had brought into power" to commit

"any act or permit any act to be done [as a result of which] it would
become necessary for [the South's] safety to rebel at. . . . "
Finally, the Whigs "intended to stand by the government until it
committed an overt act of aggression upon [southern] rights.
On the day after his address was signed, Calhoun called upon
President Polk.

The Senator found Polk "distinctly" opposed to

sectional addresses, inclined as they were to "inflame the country."
Congress, said the President, was the place to settle national prob
lems but without southern cooperation no settlement was possible.
Calhoun was not only preventing a resolution of the sectional issue,
he did not "desire that Congress

. . . settle the question.

In a sense Polk was right.

The Senator from South Carolina

l^Toombs to John J. Crittenden, Sept. 27, 1848, January 22,
1849, in Ulrich Bonnell Phillips, e d . , The Correspondence of Robert
Toombs, Alexander H. Stephens and Howell Cobb. Annual Report of the
American Historical Association (Washington, 1911), 11, 127-28, 141,
hereinafter referred to as Phillips, e d . , Toombs, Stephens, Cobb,
Correspondence; Capers, Calhoun Opportunist, 239-41.
^^Phillips, e d . , Toombs, Stephens, Cobb, Correspondence,
127-28, 141.
l^Quaife, e d . , Polk Di a r y , IV, 285-92.
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certainly felt that "no Congressional settlement was possible" In
the current political atmosphere.^®

The North, Inflamed by the Puri

tan zealot's appeal to contain and destroy Iniquity, and possessed of
all mankind's disposition to discern evil most easily In others,
would not permit it.

Crusaders did not respect evil pacts, however

solemn their drafting; the northern reformer would upst any new ac
commodation with the same ease that he had renounced the Missouri
Compromise.

Calhoun's only hope for continuing the Union lay In

thoroughly arousing the South to this fact.

In the face of southern

firmness, the North might discipline antislavery and permit a settle
ment.
The remaining proceedings of the congressional session bore
out Calhoun's analysis.
pute ended In failure.

All efforts to resolve the territorial dis
As usual, the Senate was willing to settle

the question on the basis of the Missouri Compromise but the House
remained committed to the Ordinance of 1787.

For a time. It appeared

that this disreputable performance might deprive the government of
operating funds for the coming year.
begun— In a frenzy of acrimony.

The session ended as It had

When Congress adjourned In early

March, California was still under military government.
The Mercury dealt harshly with those Involved In the con
gressional drama.

Denouncing those Southerners who bowed supinely

before antislavery's potent drive, Carew warned of the "alarming

^®Coit, Calhoun, 477.
^^Wlltse, Calhoun Sectionalist, 388-93.
After the inaugu
ration of Taylor, the Senate met In a brief extra session In order
to act on presidential appointments (Ibid., 395-96).
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progress" being made by the merciless Abolitionists.

In a long edi

torial entitled "The Southern Movement," the Mercury reasserted its
admiration for the goal of southern unity.

The editor remained con

vinced, however, that it could only be realized by separate action
of the states.

Daily reports from the Mercury's correspondent at

Washington indicated that southern members of Congress were still
motivated primarily by party ties.

This circumstance went far to

explain the "deplorable and not less discreditable" results of the
present move for unity.
If the Southern people see this conclusion as w e do
they will be forced to give up all hope of selfdefence, either as a thing impossible to effect, or
not worth the cost; or to fix their attention upon
the action of the States as affording the only solid
foundation . . . whereon to commence a resistance to
this mischievous warfare upon their dignity, . . .
peace and . . . prosperity.
Carew's outlook was more encouraged when, two days later, he
reported the ratification of Calhoun's address.

As he eagerly awaited

his copy of the speech, Carew commended Calhoun's opinion to the
southern people.

The editor's faint optimism blossomed when he re

membered that the Virginia legislature had denounced the Wilmot Pro
viso and determined to meet in special session should it be passed.
In line with his pledge to encourage "symptoms of vitality" outside
South Carolina, Carew hailed "with enthusiasm this unfolded banner
of the Old Dominion.
worthy of her cause."

..."

In Virginia, the South had "a champion

The editor joined with "the Southern people"

to "welcome their leader as truly the gift of God in the day of

^^Mercury, Jan. 22, 1849,
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their necessity.
Standing "in noble and brilliant contrast with the abortive
tempest at Washington," Virginia’s move had given "new spirit to the
Southern people."

A similar action on the part of the Florida legis

lature bore out the editor’s assertion and also reinforced his be
lief in the virtue of separate state action.
Calhoun's"Address" on January 31.

The Mercury published

Calling it ". . . one of the most

important documents that has ever appeared in our columns," Carew
praised its "power . . . dignity, and appeals to the Southern people
on questions that touch not only their independence as Sovereign
states, but their safety as organized communities."

The editor noted

that the National Whig had also endorsed Calhoun’s address; he wished
that all Whigs were wise enough to share the journal's o p i n i o n . ^2
Carew continued to condemn southern politicians for sac
rificing their sectional independence to party rivalry.

The Mer

cury listed the names of those Southerners at Washington who had
signed Calhoun’s address.

The list was too short, said Carew; it

indicated a disturbing want of sectional loyalty on the part of too
many Southerners.

There were still those in the ranks of slaveholders

who sought prominence through the Speakership, committee chairman
ships, and the patronage.

The South could no longer allow her rep

resentatives to place personal and party advantage in front of the
defense of their section.
into their own hands.

The Southern people must take matters

They must sound assembly and turn the recreants

Zl l bid., Jan. 24, 25, 1849.
22lbid.. Jan. 27, 31, Feb. 2, 1849.
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out:
Let them . . . close hands one with another, and
standing up for their institutions, present such
a front as corrupt and truckling politicians will
cower under, and flee from with fear and trembling.
Let them do this, and our enemies, throughout the
length and breadth of the Free States, will feel and
know that the spell of party and the fear of con
sequences no longer paralyze the South in her . . .
determination to enforce her own protection . . . .
With such manifestation of their will, there is no
power on earth that can prevent that will from
proving omnipotent.23
Shortly after the inauguration Calhoun called upon President
Taylor.

Finding the new Chief Executive "well disposed to settle"

the dispute over slavery in the territories, Calhoun assured Taylor
of his

own willingness to cooperate. The Senator could not agree,

however, to compromise the interests

of the South in the process.

The visit was a friendly one but convinced Calhoun that there was
little chance for agreement between his section and this Whig adminis
tration.

Pulled between northern Free-Soilers and southern slave

holders, Whiggery had no common policy on the

territories.

24

Calhoun doubtless reflected upon the probable challenges
ahead as in late March he left Washington for Fort Hill.

Taylor’s

experience as a "militairy chieftain" had done little to prepare him
for the responsibilities of the presidency.

Already there were in

dications that the General had fallen under the pervading influence
of William H. Seward, a Free-Soil Senator from New York whose com
mitment to cause was not exceeded by Calhoun's own.

While the Demo

crats would still control the Senate in the next session of Congress,
their margin would be slimmer than before.

Brighter Free-Soil

23ibid.. Feb. 6, 7, 1849.
24wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist, 396.
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prospects in the House completed the national picture.

As viewed

by Calhoun and his growing band of followers, it was a bleak scene,
indeed.25
The precarious State of Calhoun’s health was also probably
preying upon the Senator's mind.

He had collapsed on three separate

occasions during the recent session; for a time he was actually con
fined to his room.

To the public— and to his family— Calhoun main

tained that he suffered from only a temporary indisposition.

Robert

Barnwell Rhett, however, was privileged to hear the Senator speak
with greater frankness.

"Ah! Mr. Shett, my career is nearly done,"

Calhoun sigjhed as he recovered from one bit of faintness.
battle must be fought by you younger men."

"The great

When Rhett responded that

it must not be so, that never had Calhoun's "counsels been more needed
for the guidance and salvation of the South," the weary Senator agreed.
"...
South!"

There indeed is my only regret at going— the South— the poor
And the Senator's eyes, said Rhett, "filled with tears."

Behind this moving scene lay another urgent reason to press on with
the drive for southern unity.

Both Calhoun and his followers now

tended to regard the movement and the Senator as, like Siamese twins,
bound irretrievably together; thus the faltering one would kill
the other.26

^5i b i d ., 395-36.
Calhoun had remained in Washington for
the extra session of the Senate.
26calhoun to Anna Calhoun Clemson, Jan. 24, 1829, Jameson,
ed., Calhoun Correspondence, 761; J. P. Thomas, ed.. The Carolina Trib
ute to Calhoun (Columbia, 1857), 369, hereinafter referred to as
Thomas, ed.,Carolina Tribute; Coit, Calhoun, 477-78; Wiltse, Calhoun
Sectionalist, 386-87; Capers, Calhoun Opportunist, 240, 248.
Capers
assumes that upon "occasion both his [Calhoun's] emotions and the
clarity of his thinking were affected by his illness (ibid., 241).
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And for once it seemed that the South was responding to Cal
houn's importuning.

South Carolinians had begun to assemble in lo

cal planning meetings almost as soon as the Southern Address became
public.

These assemblies approved the Address, denounced the Wilmot

Proviso, denied the power of Congress to regulate slavery, condemned
the North's failure to enforce the fugitive slave law, and offered
to cooperate with other slaveholding states in the interests of selfdefense.

Committees of "Vigilance and Safety" sprang up throughout

South Carolina.

Plans for a statewide convention were well advanced

before Calhoun reached Fort Hill; on May 1 former Nullifiers and
Unionists united in just such a convention at

C o l u m b i a .

^7

And as

other states moved in a direction very like that of South Carolina's
those "corrupt and truckling politicians" cited by the Mercury did
indeed begin to reconsider their course.
The Mercury had vigorously applauded the meetings of the
local assemblies to consider the Address.
be," it said.

"This is as it should

"Let the-people take into their own hands the main

tenance of their rights; and politicians will soon cease to trade
upon them as so much capital, to be used for their own selfish ends
and purposes."

The editor indignantly rejectee the charges of dis

union being leveled by northern papers at South Carolina.

Invoking

the Revolutionary legend, Carew compared the Yankee journalists to
the "croaking of the Tories" who denounced patriots tor combining
to resist British aggression.

"...

Their descendants of the

South woula be unworthy of their inheritance if they did not maintain

^^Wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist, 398.
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at every hazard, the guarantees of the Constitution."
guarantees there would be no Union.

"...

Without the

These guarantees "which

"originated the Union," now "constitute the Union," Carew declared.
"It is the Constitution," rather than some mystic concept of the
Union, "which is

s a c r e d . "^8

The Mercury’s concern for southern unity did not preclude its
defending the institution that made unity so desirable.

Weary of

the "trash" whose banal cries against slaveholders haunted every Con
gress, Carew charged his tormenters with carping hypocrisy:
Slavery is not half so much an evil taking their own
account of it, as poverty or distress, or a thousand
other things that stalk abroad unrelieved, under the
very noses of those puling sentimentalists, yet we
hear no crusade got up for the benefit of the sufferers.
The correspondent "Sumter" agreed with the editor.

The Union was

meaningless without the equality for which it was formed, "Sumter"
wrote.

And Abolitionists who constantly promoted discord with

their insults, were ill-equipped to give instruction on the ties
that held the Union together.^9
The broad base of the May 1849 convention emphasizes the
acute concern with which South Carolina viewed her future.

Tradi

tional Calhoun allies Elmore, Gadsden, and Huger sat as delegates

^M e r c u r y . Feb. 10, 17, 20, 21, 26, 27, 28, Mar. 2, 8, 10,
12, 16, 17, 20, 22, 26, Apr. 10, 11, 13, 14, May 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 11,
1849.
The Mercury reported the proceedings of meetings being held
throughout South Carolina.
Calhoun confidant Franklin H. Elmore,
was appointed Chairman of the Charleston's meeting's Committee on
Resolutions.
Editor Carew served on Elmore's Committee; it adopted
resolutions urging resistance "at all hazards" as the only alterna
tive to "abject submission" (ibid., Feb. 28, 1849).
^^Me r cury, Feb. 20, 27, 1849.
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with Unionist R. F. W. Allston.
h o u n ’s camp was also there.

Richardson, a late comer to Cal

Wade Hampton, friend of South Carolina’s

last national Whig office-holder, William Campbell Preston, and bitter
enemy of James H. Hammond was present along with D. J. McCord, Ham
m o n d ’s friend.

Pickens emerged from Calhoun-decreed disfavor to

attend the convention.

Even Benjamin F. Perry of Greenville, prince

of South Carolina Unionists,
At the suggestion of

attended as a

delegate.

Calhoun, the convention appointed a stand

ing State Executive Committee, which in cooperation with the Committee
of Twenty-one planned South Carolina’s response to the pressure of
abolition.

Elmore, Hampton, McCord, Gadsden, and Pickens made up

the standing committee; Elmore, Richardson, Allston, and Perry were
among those serving on the Committee of Twenty-one.

Indicating Cal

h o u n ’s controlling influence, Elmore served as chairman of both
groups.
Although Calhoun did
its guiding force.

not attend the Columbia meeting, he was

When asked for his "opinion as to the course the

Meeting should take," the Senator solemnly replied:
. . . I deem it due to candour and the occasion to
State, that I am of the impression that the time is
near at hand when the South will have to choose be
tween disunion, and submission. . . .
I see little
prospect of arresting the aggression of the North.
[But] If anything can do it, it would be for the
South to present an unbroken front to the North
the alternative of dissolving the partnership or

30wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist, 398-99.
delegate (Mercury, May 7, 1849).

Carew was also a

31wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist, 399.
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ceasing on their part to violate our rights and
to disregard the stipulations of the Constitution
in our favour; and that without delay.
Calhoun recommended a southern convention as the method most likely
to convince the North of the depth of the present crisis.

He advised

the Columbia "Meeting" "to adopt measures to prepare the way" for a
general southern convention.

Even so, Calhoun feared that "the

alienation between the two sections [had] . . . already gone too far
to save the Union.

. .

The delegates at Columbia proceeded in essential conformity
with Calhoun's wishes; they adopted a set of resolutions similar to
those already emblazoned on "the unfolded banner of" Virginia.

Gov

ernor Seabrook was enjoined to summon the General Assembly in the
event that Congress should pass the Wilmot Proviso, abolish slavery
in the District of Columbia, or do away with the slave trade in the
District.

Seabrook had already begun a correspondence with other

southern governors on this subject; the standing committee followed
his example to communicate with similar committees in other slaveholding states.

The drive for southern unity was gaining momentum.

The beginnings of an organized southern defense against the
thrust of Free-Soil first appeared outside South Carolina.

In the

hope that a state not directly associated with nullification and
Blufftonism would lead the way, CaJhoun had delayed the action of
his own state.

The Senator's strategy produced its greatest dividend

32lbid. ; Calhoun to J. H. Means, Apr. 13, Jameson, ed.,
Calhoun Correspondence, 764-66.
33wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist, 400; Mercury, Jan. 24, 25,
1849; see also Mercury, May 14, 15, 16, 1849.
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when, in December, 1848, the governor of Virginia took an uncompro
mising stand against the Wilmot Proviso.

In his address to the Gen

eral Assembly, he predicted that passage of this antislavery measure
would end "the day of compromise" and render "the dissolution of our
great and glorious union" both "necessary and inevitable."

The

Assembly reacted by authorizing the governor to call it into special
session if Congress should pass the

proviso.

^4

The legislatures of Florida, Missouri, and North Carolina
followed Virginia's lead and passed resolutions asserting their de
fiance of the Wilmot Proviso.

In Alabama and Tennessee, the pro

ceedings of meetings pointed to the likelihood of a similar course
for these states.

Even in Georgia, where the Whigs were hostile to

Calhoun and the Democrats held themselves at a distance from him,
there was good news.

The Whigs lost control of the legislature;

indeed, many of their number moved with the repentant Democrats to
support Calhoun's call for a southern

convention.

^5

Support for the Calhoun-Carew strategy appeared even in the
western South.

As part of its anti-proviso resolution, the Missouri

legislature had instructed the state's senators to vote with the
pro-slavery bloc at Washington.

Benton ignored the legislative in

junction and by late spring of 1849 was back in Missouri to defend

34craven,
Mercury, Jan. 24,
Virginia's action

Coming of the Civil W a r , 243; Coit, Calhoun, 491;
25, 1849; see above,
322.
The Mercury hailed
as "the gift of God in the day of necessity."

^^Craven, Coming of the Civil W a r , 243; Coit, Calhoun, 481;
Murray, Whig Party in Georgia, 141-44. Murray emphasizes that both
Democrats and Whigs in Georgia were basically Unionists; that the
state's Democrats ultimately defended Calhoun's plan as a Unionsaving measure.
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his course.

Cautioning his constituents that they were falling into

a Calhoun-inspired trap, Benton predicted that disunion would be the
result.

The electorate in this southern salient did not seem to be

convinced.

It was obvious that most Missouri voters approved of

Calhoun's views.

Benton began to worry that his own seat might be

in danger.36
President Taylor, however, seemed heedless of the churning
anger in the South.

In his effort to resolve the territorial di

lemma, Taylor cooperated to set up the machinery for a state govern
ment in California and to organize New Mexico as a territory.

The

fact that slavery was to be excluded from both areas implied that
the President himself was adopting the tenets of F r e e - S o i l . 3?
Soon the South had additional evidence of slaveholder Tay
lor's apostasy.

In August the President forbade Narciso Lopez, a

Cuban exile, to seek recruits in the United States for an army de
signed to "liberate" his homeland.

Southerners, sensitive to the

36wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist, 400-04.
Benton’s perform
ance in Missouri received national attention and provoked a reply
from Calhoun.
Editor James Gordon Bennet of the New York Herald
published Calhoun's reply in full and commended the Carolinian for
his efforts in behalf of the Union.
(Bennet had begun his journal
istic career on the staff of the Charleston Courier.) When Benton
came up for re-election in 1850, he was defeated.
Indicating a
growing Free-Soil presence in Missouri, however, the District of
St. Louis immediately sent Benton to the House of Representatives
(Benjamin F. Perry, Reminiscences of Public Men with Speeches and
Addresses [Greenville, 1889], 20).
37wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist, 405.
Sufficient evidence of
a southern revolt against national parties had developed by May to
cause James Gordon Bennett to send a reporter to cover the scene at
the South.
The reporter, Joseph A. Scoville, had covered Calhoun's
campaign in 1844.
He admired Calhoun and spent much time at Fort
Hill during the summer of 1849.
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winds of emancipation that had already swept across most of the West
Indies, ha d a special interest in Cuba.

Spanish power was rapidly

declining in the Caribbean; if the abolition-minded British managed—
as seemed likely— to displace the Spanish in Cuba, the American slaveocracy would b e confronted by still another aggressive enemy.

Lopez

promised the alternative of an independent, slaveholding Cuba.

Now

Taylor had dashed that hope.38
Then in September the Free-Soilers executed a move that ranked
wit h Calhoun’s earlier triumph in Virginia,

Putting aside their local

differences. Barnburners and Hunkers agreed to reunite the Democracy
of New York state.

In the vigilant eye of the slaveholder, this de

velopment served notice that the northeastern Democrat could no longer
be trusted.

Northern Whigs having already surrendered to Free-Soil,

the South had no allies left in those parts.39
At this juncture Mississippi decided she would have to act
in self-defense.

The state’s Whigs and Democrats jointly supported

a call for representative Mississippians to assemble in October con
vention.

Throughout the summer bi-partisan groups worked to prepare

a plan for the convention to act upon.

When state leaders sought the

views of the great Carolinian, his predictable response was direct and
to the point.

"There is but one thing that holds out the promise of

38lbid., 405-06.
Lopez was convinced that the South would
back his venture; Calhoun, Jefferson Davis, and Mississippi Senator
Henry S. Foote did express their sympathy for Cuban independence.
39 ibid., 405.
Folk’s death during the early summer deprived
the Hunkers of a powerful party ally and helped pave the way for
reunion of the Democracy within New York.
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saving both ourselves and the Union; and that is a Southern Conven
tion.

..."

said Calhoun.

He felt that every southern state "ought

to be organized" in the interest of looking to that result."

The

South should b e asked to meet in a general convention:
The call should be addressed to all those who are
desirous to save the Union and our institutions,
and who, in the alternative . . . of submission or
dissolving the partnership, would prefer the latter.
Calhoun expected that when presented with such a choice, the South,
in "a great conservative movement," would have to respond.
The Mississippi convention, when it met, spoke with a strong
voice.

Reasserting Mississippi’s "devoted and cherished attachment

to the Union," the convention also affirmed its absolute belief in
state sovereignty.

In the event that Congress should pass the Wilmot

Proviso or provide for either emancipation or abolition of the slave
trade in the District of Columbia, Mississippi would be required to
assert that sovereignty.

The legislature was requested to instruct

the governor that his response to any such move on the part of Con
gress should be the calling of another state convention.
This body, if it assembled, would be the sovereign will of
the state; just as a previous convention had provided for the state's
allegiance to the federal compact, another convention could revoke
that allegiance.

The final step might have to be taken.

As a last

^^Calhoun to Collins S. Tarpley, July 9, 1849, in Cong. Globe,
32nd, 1st, Appendix 52. Foote read this letter into the record in De
cember of 1851.
By that time Foote had split with Calhoun’s follow
ers and was trying to establish that Calhoun was a secessionist
(Wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist, 545).
^^Wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist, 406-08; Coit, Calhoun, 48082.
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action, the Mississippi Convention asked representatives from all the
slaveholding states to meet In convention at Nashville.

The date set

for this General Convention of the South, the first Monday of June,
1850, would follow the first session of the Thirty-first

Congress.

The wisdom of Calhoun’s strategy was proving Itself.

^2

In def

erence to the Senator's wishes. South Carolina had restrained her
eagerness to lead a southern response to the rising pressure of abo
lition.

Those who would have charged extremism had South Carolina

led, were disarmed when Virginia led off the opposition to the Wilmot
Proviso and was followed by Georgia, Alabama, and North Carolina.
Encouraged by the broad southern response to his convention
plan, Calhoun agreed that South Carolina no longer hold back her en
thusiasm.

Governor Seabrook accordingly commended the Nashville Con

vention to his General Assembly.

He also requested authority to sum

mon the Assembly Into special session In accordance with the circum
stances outlined by Virginia, Mississippi, and other southern states.
The legislature complied with his request and— as It had done In 1832
and 1844— It also voted to strengthen the state's military defenses.
Finally, It chose four delegates-at-large to represent South Carolina
at the Nashville Convention: Langdon Cheves, Franklin H. Elmore, Robert

42wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist, 406-08; Colt, Calhoun, 48082.
^^Calhoun to J. R. Mathews, Oct. 20, 1849, quoted In Wiltse,
Calhoun Sectionalist, 408.
The letter Is erroneously dated June 20,
1849, says Wiltse.
Explaining that Calhoun was doubtless preoccupied
with the "June next" date of the Nashville Convention, Wiltse assigns
October 20 as the true date.
The convention Is one subject covered
by the letter (Wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist, 545).
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W. Barnwell, and James H. Hammond.

They all favored a general

southern response over separate state action.
Langdon Cheves, once President of the United States Bank,
headed the delegation in distinction.

Like his friend Calhoun, Cheves

had started political life as a confident young Upcountry nationalist.
Subsequently removing to Charleston, Cheves had preceded Calhoun in
giving up his hopes for the Union.

In the wake of the Bluffton move

ment, Cheves asserted that the South must choose between secession and
abolition.

He was not enthusiastic about either alternative but of the

two, Cheves preferred secession.

Abjuring the folly of separate state

action, Cheves had called for Southerners to unite and plan for a
separate nation.

He was an ideal

selection.

^5

Franklin H. Elmore, whose Federalist father had been de
feated by Calhoun in the future "Caesar's" very first campaign for
national office, was also a disillusioned nationalist.

Notwith

standing his close friendship with Robert Barnwell Rhett, Elmore fol
lowed Calhoun to renounce separate state action in favor of a united
southern resistance.

Along with Henry Conner, Elmore was Calhoun's

most trusted Charleston associate; he could be relied upon to carry
the orthodox message to Nashville.
Robert W. Barnwell's selection as a delegate brought him
back into everyday politics for the first time since nullification.
The veteran of one term in the General Assembly, two terms in the
national House of Representatives and the Nullification Convention,

^^Wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist, 409.
45see above,

173-74.
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Barnwell was a graduate of Harvard College and a Beaufort rice planter.
In 1835 he had succeeded Thomas Cooper as President of South Caro
lina College.

Barnwell's term in this office was singularly success

ful; college enrollment increased from twenty to two hundred, the
faculty was improved, appropriations increased, and an ambitious
program launched.

The college was both an object of concern and a

source of pride to South Carolina politicians; Barnwell's success as
her chief administrator was not without effect on his political future.
A southern nationalist, Barnwell was also opposed to separate state
action.
Despite his private carpings aimed at Calhoun, James Henry
Hammond agreed with the Senator on the subject of a southern con
vention; "it is my favourite measure.

..."

said Hammond.

Calhoun

urged Hammond to add his "influence to induce the members of our
Legislature to appoint delegates" to Nashville.
much" to "induce [Georgia]
Calhoun wrote.

...

Hammond could "do

to be represented at Nashville,"

"Without flatter[ing]" the ex-governor, Calhoun

knew "no one better informed than [Hammond]

...

on the great sub

ject that now agitates the country, or more capable of deciding what
should be done.

..."

Hammond's impatience to seek action, once

46Daniel Walker Hollis, "Robert W. Barnwell," SCHM, LVI, No. 3,
(July, 1955), 131-34.
Barnwell was a classmate and lifelong friend of
Ralph Waldo Emerson.
The South Carolinian was also valedictorian of
his class at Harvard.
In the early years of the century South Carolina College was
intended to superimpose the cultural ideals of Charleston upon the
unpolished Upcountry.
With the onslaught of the abolitionists, how
ever, the College became a haven for young Carolinians in search of
an education free from the antislaver]' slant.
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an obstacle in the path of southern unity, had become a virtue.

His

selection as a delegate to the Nashville Convention would strengthen
the hand of those who agreed with Calhoun.

4 ^Hammond to Major Hammond, Nov. 16, 1849, Calhoun to Hammond,
Han. 4, Feb. 16, 1850, Hammond Papers.
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CHAPTER X

BADGE OF ORTHODOXY

The cherished goal of southern unity now in sight, Calhoun
could view the progress of his design with some satisfaction.

Al

though the northern press was already dismissing southern moves as
mere bluff, even it could not charge the actors in this tragic drama
with Carolina-inspired extremism.

The originator of the "great con

servative movement" had not been "extremist" and "caste-ridden"
South Carolina.

To all appearances the call for the South to assemble

in convention had come from a newer state lying almost a thousand
miles to the west of Fort Hill.

Boasting an expanding econony,

possessing a fluid social order and having a growing population
spiced with northern settlers and two political parties that pro
ceeded independently of Calhoun’s "wishes," Mississippi exhibited
all the attributes of an American-styled democracy.

Her action

could not expose the movement to charges of extremism.

But lest she

be accused, Mississippi had incorporated a delay into her call for
the convention.

She did not ask Southerners to meet together until

the forthcoming Congress had been given one more chance to prove
itself a national rather than a sectional body.

Calhoun wishfully

saw some indications of a proper Congressional response to this
gesture.

". . . I t may still be hoped that the Union will be saved,
338
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he wrote.^
Ridding itself of former doubts, the Mercury emerged to play
an important role in the tactical deployment of Calhoun’s forces.
During the spring of ]849, Carew’s earlier preference for a resist
ance movement led by South Carolina disappeared from the pages of
his paper.

By May, when resolute Carolinians met in their convention

at Columbia, the Mercury gave no sign of having once endorsed sepa
rate state action.

Instead, it asserted its own firm support of Cal

h o u n ’s plan for the South to set in concert.

This partial reversal

in position was the product of one of those political thunderstorms
that only Robert Barnwell Rhett could cause in South Carolina.
During the fall of 1848 Rhett had openly challenged Calhoun
for the first time since the failure of the Bluffton Movement.

In

the absence of any strong remonstrance from other southern states,
this Congressman had urged the General Assembly to inaugurate an in
dependent South Carolina revolt.

If anything would induce the South

to resist abolitionist pillage, it was separate state action, Rhett
contended.

He expected that other southern states, encouraged by

the action of South Carolina, would follow in her footsteps.

Their

enterprise might be delayed but South Carolina could stand alone for
the moment.

In time, at least the lower South would join her, either

to impose a reformation upon the Union or to organize a new, southern

^Calhoun to J. R. Mathews, Oct. 20, 1849, quoted in Coit,
Calhoun, 481; see above, 322-33.
Coit says that Foote actually thought he had originated the
idea of a southern convention.
Others were not so gullible.
Sam
Houston, an unfriendly critic of the movement, later observed that
if "South Carolina had never existed, Mississippi would never have
t h o u ^ t of it (Coit, Calhoun, 480-81).
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Confederacy.
The Mercury urged support for Rhett's proposal.

Senator Cal

houn, insisted, however, upon his own twenty-year old plan for a
cooperative, southwide resistance.

As usual, the Assembly deferred

to Calhoun's "wishes" and confronted by the unpromising alternative
of open revolt, both Rhett and the Mercury proceeded to do likewise.
Along with Congressman Rhett, Editor Carew remained pessi
mistic as to the chances of success from Calhoun's policy.

In the

early weeks of the Thirtieth Congress, Carew did not conceal his
doubts from either the Senator or the public.

Nevertheless, the

editor urged support for any move designed to bring about southern
unity.

The action of Virginia in damning the Wilmot Proviso brought

about the first signs of a change in Carew's thinking.

By early Janu

ary he was echoing Calhoun in feeling that South Carolina would do
well to be "comparatively quiet."

The "exhibiti[ons] of symptoms

of vitality" elsewhere had inspired the Mercury to look upon Cal
houn's plan with less skepticism.2
Surprised by the swift and promising reaction to the
Southern Address, Carew apparently shed his remaining doubts of Cal
houn's program in the months that followed.

The process of the

editor's conversion may have been influenced by the course of Rhett.
The Congressman's term in the House of Representatives expired with
the end of the Thirtieth Congress.

In line with his previously stated

resolve, Rhett declined to seek re-election.

The champion of the

separate state actionists had already met with defeat in pursuing

2

Carew to Calhoun, Jan. 2, 1849, Calhoun Papers; see above,

322.
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his version of the cause of southern resistance.

Deprived now of a

political lectern, he was unlikely to revive his campaign.
Rhett did not intend to remain permanently in this position.
Throughout 1849 he explored the uncertainties developing in South
Carolina politics.

Surprised, like Carew, with the mounting response

to Calhoun's call for southern unity, Rhett supported this develop
ment whenever the opportunity presented itself.

His role in the

movement was generally that of a friendly but skeptical spectator;
while he hoped for its success he still doubted the soundness of its
prospects.

The former Congressman did not believe the South to be

sufficiently aware of her danger.^
Without abandoning his own position, Rhett maintained
friendly

relations with Calhoun and continued to acknowledge the

Senator's primacy.

As he congratulated Calhoun for having vanquished

the "traitor" Benton, Rhett's skepticism glared in contrast to the
Senator's hopes for the forthcoming Congress.

That Congress, said

Rhett, without ceasing its "anti-slavery aggressions" would approve
neither the Wilmot Proviso nor the abolition of slavery in the Dis
trict of Columbia.

In prophetic language— unusually strong for this

devout churchman— Rhett wrote:
I would to God, they would do both, and let us have
the contest . . . at once.
It would then accomplish
our emancipation, instead of that of our slaves.
But
the Northern Statesmen will commit I am satisfied no
such blunder.
We are put off to another and more for
midable contest.4
For some time Rhett had aspired to serve South Carolina in

% h i t e , Rhett, 99-103.
^Rhett to Calhoun, July 19, 1849, Calhoun Papers
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the United States Senate.

Because of Calhoun, Shett's two attempts

at realizing this ambition h ad both ended in failure.^

His future

prospects would also be influenced by the senior Senator.

It was

apparent by 1849 that Calhoun’s health was rapidly failing; an
opinion common among Carolinians held that but for the South’s im
periled position, Calhoun would already have resigned his seat in
the Senate.

Even the Senator’s resolute will to protect his section

could not long postpone just such a development.

For three years

Rhett had shared this conviction; during the critical summer of 1849
he moved to strengthen his chances for the succession.

Franklin H.

Elmore, R h e t t ’s friend, and James H. Hammond figured prominently in

g
the maneuvers that ensued.
Aging and in declining health, Elmore neither desired nor
sought service in the Senate.

Hammond’s intentions, obscured by

his self-imposed isolation and professed disinterest in public ser
vice, were unknown to Rhett.

In a probable attempt to uncover Ham

m o n d ’s position, Rhett wrote to a friend of the enigmatic planter.
The letter was passed to A. P. Aldrich, Hammond’s political lieut
enant, w h o quickly alerted the subject of the inquiry:

Calhoun had resigned from the Senate in 1842 so as to free
himself to campaign for the presidency.
He intended that Rhett suc
ceed to the resulting vacancy.
The Assembly misinterpreted Calhoun’s
move as a Rhett-inspired means of gratifying the Congressman's am
bition.
As a result, it selected Huger rather than Rhett to replace
Calhoun (White, Rhett, 57).
Rhett’s second opportunity occurred in
1846 when McDuffie resigned due to ill health.
By this time Calhoun
no longer trusted Rhett sufficiently to support him for the post.
^Elmore and Hammond were the two most likely rivals for the
forthcoming vacancy.
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Mr. Shett writes that it is . . . rumored in . . .
Charleston, Mr. Calhoun will, at the opening of the
next . . . Legislature, send in his letter of resig
nation in consequence of ill health, and asks what
is the probability of his receiving the support of
the Barnwell delegation.
Aldrich had already advised "Owens," the recipient of Shett's message,
to answer in noncommital terms.

Deriding Shett*s "impatient" am

bition, Aldrich advised Hammond to maintain his current detachment.
The former governor had not yet been damaged by the charges of "Tay
lorism" then being hurled about in South Carolina.

But it would be

unwise for the state's most important Taylor Democrat to invite at
tack.

^

The advice accorded with Hammond's own view and he remained

silent.
Shett was not misled by this artful performance.

The subtlety

of the former governor's position had been no less pronounced during
the Senatorial campaign of 1846.

Although defeated in that attempt

to succeed McDuffie, Hammond had come closer to success than had
Shett.

In an attempt to assess their comparative strength, Shett

probably explored the reasons for Hammond's defeat.

Weighing the

planter's prospects against his own, Shett considered that they both
had organized enemies in South Carolina.

Pursued by the implacable

hostility of his powerful brother-in-law, Wade Hampton, Hammond could
attribute much political misfortune to that source.

Shett, for his

part, was saddled with the reputation of being "a rash and ultra man
in . . . politics, excitable,

. . . unstable and intolerant.

..."

He was considered arrogant by the "great majority" of Charleston

^Aldrich to Hammond, Sept. 24, 1849, Hammond Papers.
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political leaders, men whose opinions were shared elsewhere in the
state.8
In the process of comparing his own political drawbacks with
those of Hammond, Rhett could dismiss some of these charges as mere
political verbiage.

If through his firm and aggressive stands he had

incurred the wrath— and, perhaps, the envy— of many Carolinians, Ham
mond had not profited thereby.

Moreover, the sometime governor had

led the assault on the state's bank.

Hammond, himself, viewed this

performance as a political liability; from his splendid isolation on
the banks of the Savannah River, he had attempted to conceal his role
in the bank war.^
As with everything else in South Carolina politics, however,
Calhoun's opinion would be the critical factor in the selection of
the state's new Senator.

Although both Hammond and Rhett had records

of insubordination, their past performance would not sway Calhoun.
His principal concern was the defense of the South.

The section's

rapidly deteriorating position in the Union did not allow for per
sonal vendettas; Calhoun banished only those who willfully opposed
his strategic approach to the cause of southern unity.

With the im

patience of younger men who did not understand the dichotomy of
their Senator's love for both the South and the Union, Hammond and
Rhett had sometimes acted in a manner not countenanced by Orthodoxy.
They always responded positively, however,

t-Uf» time fn-r Hphate

g

H. W. Conner to Calhoun, May 7, 1847, quoted in White,
Rhett, 101; Robert C. Tucker, "James Henry Hammond South Carolinian,"
Ph.D. Dissertation, University of North Carolina, 1958, 424, 425.
^Hammond Papers, 1847-1849, passim.
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ended and Calhoun's "wishes" became policy.

It was safe to predict

that some day the "Old Senator" would choose one of them for his suc
cessor; the choice would depend upon who could best serve the South.
Despite his retirement from Congress, Rhett maintained an ac
tive enlistment in the southern service.

During the summer of 1848

his influence had reappeared at the M ercury.

Rhett probably regarded

the reconciliation as a move which would aid his prospective campaign
for the Senate.

In any event, the Mercury was instrumental in making

Rhett's views known during the time that h e was out of Congress, no
little asset to this politician without portfolio.
Evidently possessed of an acute political acumen,

Editor

Carew preserved the reputation of his paper with both Calhoun and
Rhett.

For some time Calhoun's "friends" had contributed editori

als to the Mercury.

Carew's assertions of independence, notwith

standing; by mid-summer 1849 Rhett was included in this array of
authors.

The printed page combined with the determined Lowcountry-

man's ambition for a seat in the Senate to produce a sense of dis
cretion uncharacteristic of Rhett; when his views ran counter to the
course approved by Calhoun, they did not appear in the Mercury.

In

the unanimity of the editorial page Carew's subscribers could once
again read the undisputed signals of Orthodoxy.

As in days gone by.

^^Henry Conner reminded Calhoun of the letter's political im
portance when, in 1847, he wrote, "i disLcuSt Mr. Rhett's friendship
to yourself, not but that I believe he respects and admires you
greatly, but his ambition is of so exceedingly selfish a character
. . . that he would without hesitation sacrifice you . . . if in
the least way to his own advancement" (Conner to Calhoun, May 7,
1847, quoted in White, Rhett, 100-01).
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the Mercury proudly waved Calhoun's banner.
Another Calhoun associate of long standing joined the Mercury
staff In September; on the first, John Heart became joint editor with
Carew.

Born In Philadelphia, Heart had first risen in the world of

journalism as a printer.
tator,
year.

By 1844 he was co-proprietor of the Spec

Calhoun's organ founded for the presidential campaign of that
When the Spectator was replaced by the Constitution, Heart also

served as "one of the gentlemanly . . . proprietors and editors" of
that sheet.

During 1847 he removed to Charleston, presumably for the

purpose of joining forces with Carew; before the year ended Heart be
came an Influential member of the orthodox coterie who determined Mer
cury policy.
Although Heart was still known primarily for his mastery of the
mechanics of printing a paper, his activities at the Mercury Included
news gathering and editorial writing.

The new editor took an "honest

pride" In his ability "to enter any department . . . and discharge
any duty from writing an editorial to filling a paste pot."

As the

customary Mercury editor was likely to know more about politics than
journalism. Heart's technical proficiency as a newsgatherer made quite
an Impression on the Charleston press.

Since Ca~ew, an especially ac

tive politician, was frequently away from his editorial office, the
Mercury doubtless benefited from Heart's on-the-scene management.
John Milton Clapp also returned to the Mercury payroll In
1849.

Including the proprietors, the anonymous editorialists of

Orthodoxy and ex-edltor Clapp, the new firm of Carew and Heart was
well-equipped to Interpret Calhoun's latest moves.

Subscribers
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might wonder at the authorship of a given editorial but they would
not question its sentiments
Fortified by its restored faith in the wisdom of the leader,
the Mercury applauded the delegations which assembled at Columbia
on May 14, 1849.

In an editorial remarkable for its moderation,

Carew^Z praised the politic awareness of South Carolinians ;
. . . We are united as to the grievances and the
danger of the South; the people need neither to be
enlightened nor aroused on the subject.
They know
full well that a vast power, sleepless in activity
and remorseless in purpose, is organized and moving
against them.
They know that the time has come when
they must defend their country, or betray it, and
that to defend it successfully, they must be reso
lute, united and active.
Carolinians knew that they could betray their country "by devoting
themselves to that moderation which never finds a time for action,
as

[readily as] by joining the ranks of the enemy.

..."

Clapp to Hammond, Feb. 17, 1847, Hammond to Simms, Apr. 1,
1847, Carew to Hammond, Nov. 18, 1847, Heart to Hammond, Dec. 9, 1847.
Ker Boyce to Hammond, Jan. 12, 1848, S. W. Trotti to Hammond, June
12, July 15, 1848, Hammond to Simms, July 8, 1848, Simms to Hammond,
July 20, 1848, Hammond Papers; Conner to Armistead Burt, Apr. 3,
1848, Burt Collection; Rhett to Calhoun, July 19, 1848, Calhoun
Papers; King, Newspaper P r e s s , 152; A. S. Salley, Jr., "A Century
of the Courier," Centenniel Edition of the News and Courier [Charles
ton, 1904), 7. The practice of editorials being written by other
than members of the M e r cury's staff antedated Carew’s term as edi
tor (see above 190-91).
William Gilmore Simms replaced Clapp as editor of the
Southern Quarterly Review (Simms to George F. Holmes, Feb. 19, 1849,
cited in Prior, "Mercury," 449).
1O

Except in rare cases the practice of signing editorials
was discontinued by the Mercury before Carew became editor.
Thus,
it is no longer possible to identify positively the editorial writer.
In general,
I have automatically assigned the authorship to the
editor; as the official policy-maker for the paper, he must be
presumed at least to have endorsed the contents of Mercury editorials.
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Explaining the relative absence of editorials on this sub
ject, the editor noted that these "things" were "generally under
stood and appreciated by the people of South Carolina."

He "felt

that anything approaching to a blind fury" would not only be unworthy
of the "character" of the state; it would also "be mischievious to
the cause.

..."

As a result, the Mercury had "forborne the dis

cussion of the question."

The "real problem to be solved," was not

the "nature and designs of abolition, or what the consequences of
its triumph," but the "effective means of repelling its aggressions,
and saving the South.

..."

Carew was following Calhoun's plan; by

adopting an unaccustomed reserve, the Mercury would not frighten away
prospective allies in other southern states.
The editor understood that the Columbia meeting was only"the
first step towards securing a union that shall have a definite prac
tical object to accomplish."

The object could neither be "fully

shaped" or "agreed upon" without "a wider consultation, and a
maturer comparison of the thoughts of all the best men of the South.
..."

In time, such a process would develop and produce a "clearly-

defined course.

. .

The Mercury, keeping a close eye on developments, vowed to
recount them to its subscribers.
thing "approaching . . .

True to his resolve to avoid any

a blind fury," the editor wrote quiet re

ports of the proceedings at Columbia.

The paper merely outlined the

resolutions adopted by the convention and expressed its approval.

^ % e r c u r y . May 14, 1849.
l^ibid., May 15, 16, 17, 1849; see above,

326,
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The vigilant editor also detailed every advance of the FreeSoilers.

Reminding his readers of a speech that William H. Seward had

made

almost a year earlier,

tion

by

the South.

Carew underscored the need for

The New

united ac

Yorker had declared that those provisions

of the Constitution that protected southern rights were in violation
of "Divine Law."

Here was further proof that there could be ". . .

no middle ground on this question," said the Mercury.

When the har

assed Benton hurled "calumnies" at Calhoun, the Mercury longed for the
day that ’’all such apostates and traitors" would be gibbeted and their
memories execrated.

Extolling Calhoun as the defender of the South,

Carew devoted a large part of two issues to Calhoun’s speech made
in reply to Benton.
"Old Musket," a correspondent worried by the decreasing num
ber of slaveholders in the country, did not observe Carew’s declara
tion of restraint.

"The battle must be fought" and now, said "Old

Musket."
The South is now as strong, the North as weak as
they will ever be. Whether the Union be dissolved
or not, let the Southern States take possession of
their territory, "peaceably if they can, forcibly
if they must."
The Mercury shared this concern for the territories.

Its editor was

encouraged by a letter from Cass, lately the Democratic candidate for
President, which proved him to be sound on the subject of the Wilmot

l% e r c u r y . May 17, June 27, 28, July 17, 18, 1849.
Rhett
wrote the principal editorial in defense of Calhoun’s reply to Ben
ton (Rhett to.Calhoun, July 19, 1849).
The Mercury also published
Senator Foote’s Washington speech which was a defense of Calhoun
against B enton’s attack.
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Proviso.

The Mercury confessed to having had reservations about his

reliability.

But Cass's letter furnished further proof that the

Democracy was still sounder on the territorial Issue than were the
Whigs.

Southerners, then, ought to vote only for Democrats.
In what was probably a reflection of the Influence of Robert

Barnwell Rhett, the Mercury eloquently declaimed against Whlggery all
summer; there were virtually no questions on which the Whigs were
sound.

The Republic, Washington organ of the new administration,

dally gave evidence of Taylor's shortcomings.

Local Democrats who

had held office under the previous administration could attest to
the vindictive purges being launched by Taylor.

The spoils seeking

Whigs were bent upon depriving every Democrat of a government job.
This reprehensible practice extended even Into International af
fairs .

"A Democrat" attributed the removal of the American Consul In

Tuscany to the fact that he was the husband of the granddaughter of
General Sumter, who had been a Democrat.

While Free-Soll agents—

In collusion with the administration— moved through California and
New Mexico, the Mercury urged southern Whigs to unite with Democrats
to fight "these base conspirators against the peace and safety of
the Union.

. .

1 ^Mercury, July 12, 26, 1849.
Since 1848 the Mercury had re
ported on the settlement of California.
It described the ships that
left Charleston for the developing country and painted an exciting
picture of life there (Ibid., Dec. 13, 16, 18, 22, 1848; Jan. 1849 Jan. 1840, passim.
The gold mines of California were "among the sub
jects of greatest Interest at the moment," said the editor).
l ^ I M d , , June 18, 20, 21, July 2, 28, Aug. 9, 1949.
Clapp
was one of those purged by the Whigs ; he was removed as an Inspector
for the port of Charleston.
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Carew's pledge of restraint did not apply to the subject of
Whiggery.
Mercury

In an editorial entitled "Who has betrayed the South?" the
condemned Whigs for advancing the cause of abolitionism. In

spite of this odious record, southern Democrats in

Louisiana, Georgia,

Tennessee, and Florida had carried their states for Taylor.

The

South could not permit such behavior; her very survival was at stake.
"The North is united against her: SHE MUST BE UNITED AGAINST THE NORTH,"
the editor proclaimed.

Since southern Whigs were a weak minority who

could never hope to control their party, the South must make her
stand in Democratic ranks.
In line with their "ancient principles," southern Democrats
had always maintained their loyalty to the South.

Their resolute

defense of her institutions yielded nothing to party:
. . . If it deserts its principles, they act for
themselves, irrespective of party.
They have never,
in a single instance, been driven by their Northern
associates from their principles; nor have
they
yielded one jot of the rights of the South to any
party influences.
Those "few unfaithful in their ranks, like Benton . . . are soon
lopped off" only to be "taken up by the W h i g s , who support and vin
dicate them," Carew concluded.

The South "will only be safe when

she has but one party in her limits and will send to the Councils
of the Union Representatives who will fear nothing and dare every
thing in defense of her rights and interests.
The Mercury longed for a Democratic majority in the next
House of Representatives.

With this in mind the editor regularly

IBlbid., July 16, 1849.
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reported out-of-state election returns.

He followed the Virginia

election with especial interest and by May 5 could rejoice at the
"overwhelming" Democratic victory in that state; fourteen of Vir
ginia's fifteen Congressmen would be Democrats.

The lesson was hot

lost on the lone Whig victor in the Old Dominion; he took pains to
describe himself as an "Independent."
Subsequent returns from Alabama, North Carolina, Indiana,
Tennessee, and Kentucky indicated that further Democratic gains could
be expected.

The Mercury denounced Judge Edward Y. Hill, Whig can

didate for governor of Georgia, who claimed to be a "friend" of Cal
houn.

He could not b e Calhoun's friend because h e was supported by

Toombs and Stephens, said the Mercury ; all the faithful knew that
Toombs and Stephens had voted against the Southern Address.
Carew greeted the victory of George Washington Bonaparte
Towns, the Democratic candidate, as a great triumph for those southern
Democrats who had maintained their loyalty to the South.

Since

Georgia h ad supported Taylor for president, this election should be
taken as a rebuke

to the administration, said the
of reserve w h e n

Mercury.

Despite

an occasional loss

discussing Whig

gery, the firm

of Carew and Heart

carefully maintained itscomposure

on the subject

of w h o should lead

in organizing a

southern defense.

l^ I b i d ., May 5, Aug. 10, 13, 14, 18, Sept. 1, 8, 15, Oct. 5,
1849.
The Mercury's comments on the Georgia election stirred quite
a response from Whig papers in that state.
Accusing the Charleston
paper of "interference" they received only ridicule in return for
their charge.
The Whigs had only themselves to blame, said the
M e r c u r y . They had deserted the cause of state rights and abandoned
principle for party.
Lest h e alienate Georgia Whigs by angering
them, however, Carew did promise to make no more remarks about the
Georgia election.
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In November, the editor took the Columbia South Carolinian to task
for adopting a position which verged on rashness.

The Mercury had not

planned to discuss the subject "for the present."

"Hardly indiffer

ent" to the issue and in line with approved policy, Carew preferred
to let others take the lead.

He could best serve the cause with

quiet support for their stand.

The Mercury desired this to be the

position of all South Carolina; indeed, it believed that this cau
tious approach represented the true sentiments of her people.
Carolinians had too often been " . . .

accused of a love of

agitation, of disaffection to the Union, qf restless ambition, of
the desire to lead a new Confederacy."

Warning the Columbia paper,

which had itself once spoken for Calhoun, the Mercury insisted;
It is sufficient to say that the conviction that
she was an object of distrust to her sister States
and that any movement in which she stood conspicuous,
was liable to be misrepresented and denounced as
mischievous agitation, has been forced upon South
Carolina, and has convinced the body of her people
that even for the sake of the cause to which she is
devoted, her position henceforth must be that of a
faithful and zealous follower under the leadership
of other States. . . .20
The South Carolinian was marching too far forward in the
southern rank.

Believing that South Carolina should take a "promi

nent part" in the movement, the Columbia paper proposed to make the
actions of the southern convention a subject of popular discussion.
It also urged that Southerners unite to form a Presidential party.
The forthcoming convention could then nominate a candidate for Presi
dent; and the obvious choice would be Calhoun.
Carew or Heart or Rhett or whoever among the faithful answered

ZO l b i d ., Nov. 14, 1849.
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the Carolinian agreed that Calhoun would make the best candidate for
President.

But it would be unwise to insert the issue of presiden

tial politics into the unification movement.

The Mississippi Con

vention owed its harmony to the exclusion of that subject.

Neither

was there any reason to engage in too much preliminary discussion of
the convention agenda.

Tending to rouse the passion of popular par

ties, such action could lead only to discord and confusion.

And the

South Carolinian must understand that its state was not to lead the
movement =
South Carolina had "no need to advance; she" was already "on
the ground, ready to join, heart and hand, the otLer States."

To

assert her primacy would simply revive "all the old clamor of her
ambition, restlessness and disaffection to the Union, and to awaken
the suspicions and jealousies that have heretofore deprived the South
of strength by an everlasting sense of discord within herself."21

As

the South Carolinian should have known, the firm of Carew and Heart
understood the course required of the orthodox.
Faithfully adhering to its own advice, the Mercury editorially
applauded the advance on unity being made by other southern states.
This course met with approval from outside South Carolina; a letter
from Mecklenburg, Tennessee, commended the editor for his attitude.
The Mercury noted other dividends from the policy when Georgia and
Alabama both endorsed the "Mississippi Movement."

Their action en

couraged the editor once more to emphasize the urgency of the situation

Ib i d ., Nov. 15, 1849.
Calhoun regretted the "course of the
Carolinian" and would not accept the office "if tendered . . . under
existing circumstances (Calhoun to Hammond, Dec. 17, 1849, Hammond
Papers).
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in which the South found herself.

Exposing the designs of abol

itionism on an almost daily basis, he saw in them urgent and en
during proof that only by standing together could the southern states
protect themselves.

22

With editorial contributions from so many of the faithful,
it is hardly surprising that the Mercury made not a single misstep
in representing Calhoun's view of the legislative session of 1849.
Expressing its "hearty concurrence" with Governor Seabrook's message
to the General Assembly, the Mercury proceeded to commend the Caro
lina representatives for their response.

Although Calhoun ruled out

any role of leadership for South Carolina, he favored a prompt
endorsement of Mississippi's convention proposals

Other states

must not mistake South Carolina caution for reticence lest they be
"backward to move;"

"The Movement is critical," wrote Calhoun.

Editor-Assemblyman Carew agreed and voted for quick approval of
the "Mississippi Movement.
Assured by the situation in South Carolina and encouraged at
the overall southern response to his plan, Calhoun returned to Wash
ington on November 30, 1849, three days before Congress convened.
Determined upon one more attempt to bring about an acceptable Con
gressional settlement of the war between the sections, Calhoun knew
that this move, too, would be "critical."

Should the Thirty-First

Congress follow the example of its recent predecessors and commit
itself to antislavery, the South would have exhausted all means of

^^Mercury, Nov. 26, 27, 1849.
23lbid., Nov. 29, Dec. 1, 5, 6, 1849; Calhoun to Hammond,
Dec. 7, 1849, Hammond Papers.
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redress available within the Union.
The Mercury *s hopes for the fall elections were only par
tially realized.

Although the Democrats gained seats in the House,

the Whigs held their majority.

The reverse was true of the Senate

where Democratic control was maintained by a smaller margin.

The situ

ation in the lower chamber remained uppermost in southern minds.

Due

to the growth of antislavery in the northern wings of both parties,
the near-even division of the new House would throw the balance of
power to Free-Soilers.

As both parties caucused on December first,

southern hopes for the Congress began to fade.
The Democrats, strongly opposed by Calhoun's followers,
agreed to support Howell Cobb of Georgia as their candidate for
Spea k e r .

ever.

24

The Whigs fell into an almost immediate dispute, how

Aware of a rising anger among their constituents, Toombs and

Stephens urged that the party oppose the Wilmot Proviso and renounce
any intention of interfering with slavery in the District of Columbia.
Northern Whigs accompanied their prompt rejection of the Georgia
proposal, with a declaration that no more slaveholders would be ap
pointed to federal office.

Toombs and Stephens, now fully aroused,

reacted by withdrawing from the caucus.

Several other Southerners

24

Howell Cobb, leader of Georgia Democrats in the House, had
refused to sign Calhoun's Southern Address. He emphasized that
northern Democrats had consistently proved their friendship to the
South and looked forward to the day when "our Heavenly Father [would]
. . . take [both] Calhoun and Benton home. . . . "
Along with Berrien
Cobb had issued a minority address to his constituents.
Cobb's course
was popular in his District.
To Calhoun, Cobb was the most unreliable
of southern Democrats present in Washington. (Murray, Whig Party in
Georgia, 140-42; Cobb to Mrs. Cobb, Feb. 8, 1849, quoted in Craven,
Coming of the Civil W a r , 244, Wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist, 452).
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joined the Georgian walkout and those who remained refused to support
the northern candidate for s p e a k e r . 25
Inspired by the intransigence of their northern associates and
the example of the furious Georgians, most other southern Whigs soon
combined with Toombs and Stephens to threaten the party with a major
bolt.

The Whigs were polarizing; as both sides stood firm, this party

was unable to agree upon a candidate for Speaker.

On December 3 the

Senate and the House convened; in accordance with custom, however,
the former soon adjourned to await the organization of the latter.
Tlie lower chamber took seventeen bitter days and sixty-seven ballots
to accomplish this task.

Northern Congressmen seemed determined that

the new Speaker should defer to the Wilmot Proviso; southern Represen
tatives, equally adamant, asserted that he should not.

In the acrid

days that preceded a choice, charges and counter charges flew across
the chamber.

Members accompanied their invective with hateful glares

indicative of a new intensity in political hostility.

Upon the oc

casion of a New Yorker's calling a Virginian a disunionist and a
liar, the Virginian, bent upon combat, lunged toward his verbal
assassin.

As friends interceded to prevent yet another stain upon

the House record, "Indescribable confusion followed— threats, violent
gesticulations,

calls to order, and demands for adjournment . . .

mingled together."

When the "heaving billow subsided," Robert Toombs

seized the floor.
Less than a year before, Toombs had led in blocking Whig sup
port of Calhoun's address.

Repenting of the faith he had placed in

2 % u r r a y , Whig Party in Georgia, 148.
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Taylor, he now bluntly warned his northern colleagues in language
reminiscent of the Mercury.

Railing at the "discreditable trick" by

which Free-Soilers intended to elect a Speaker who would assure their
control of critical committees, the Georgian proclaimed that he would
not permit it.

The purse strings of the Union should not be used to

defraud his constituents, Toombs raged.

Avowing his strong "attach

ment to the Union . . . under the Constitution," Toombs proceeded to
define this qualification of his allegiance.

". . . If by your legis

lation you seek to drive us from the territories

. . . purchased by

the common blood and treasure . . . and to abolish slavery in the
District . . . I am for disunion!" he thundered.

The outraged Con

gressman would have no part of a scheme "to fix a national degrada
tion upon half the States of this Confederacy.

..."

Toombs did

not go unanswered; another week of virulence followed his polemic.
By this time fifty-nine separate futile ballots bore elo
quent witness to the uncompromising stance being adopted by both
northern and southern Congressmen; as a result the House was unable
to organize itself.

In an attempt to break the deadlock, both par

ties retired to caucus.

This move resulted in the appointment of a

joint committee which was directed to solve the chamber's dilemma.
The committee suggested that three more votes be taken; in the event
that a majority could not be obtained on the third vote, the House
would elect its Speaker by plurality.

The suggestion was adopted,

2Gcong. Globe, 31st, 1st, 27-28; Craven, Coming of the Civil
W a r , 247-48; Wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist, 449-51.
Toombs was es
pecially antagonized by the Free-Soil attempt to secure control of
the Committees on Territories, the Judiciary, and the District of
Columbia.
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and Howell Cobb was elected by plurality on the sixty-third ballot.
Cobb’s victory ended a battle that had done more to unify the South
than all of Calhoun's speeches since 1832.27
President laylor’s annual message contributed nothing to
allay the growing unease among southerners, Whig and Democrat.

The

President not only endorsed protection but also recommended that the
tariff be increased.

He questioned the sub-treasury system and

called for a broad program of internal improvements.

Intending,

perhaps, to blunt southern objections to the latter proposal, Taylor
urged the Congress to provide aid to agriculturists.
California, said the President, should become a state with
out delay; New Mexico was deserving of similar status as soon as her
people followed the example of Californians in drafting a constitu
tion.

Taylor deprecated any further discussion of slavery and vowed

to maintain the integrity of the Union "to the full extent of the
[constitutional] obligations imposed and the powers conferred" upon
OQ

him.

Northern Whigs and southern Democrats at last had something

on which they could agree; the message was "a good Whig document."29
Noting his "dishonest obfuscation" of the California question,
the Mercury reproduced Taylor's "unexpectedly . . . short" message.
The editor objected to the President's concealment of the fact that

27wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist, 451-52.

2^Richardson, ed.. Messages and Papers, 2547-62; Wiltse,
Calhoun Sectionalist, 453.
29Daniel Webster to F. Haven, Dec. 25, 1849, quoted in
Wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist, 453; Mercury, Dec. 27, 28, 1849.
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executive agents had been responsible for the organization of Calif
ornia.

Carew was no less displeased by the message’s support of

greater protection and internal improvements.

Finally, the Presi

den t ’s opposition to sub-treasury combined with his misuse of exec
utive power to remind the Mercury of how Taylor Democrats had mis
placed their loyalties in the late election.

"Truly,

’he is a Whig

but not an ultra W h i g ’" said the satirical editor.
Carew and Heart had little time to waste upon the message
of the apostate Taylor, however.

Doubting that the General had

even written the annual address, the Mercury was more concerned by
immediate dangers posed by extravagant, professional Whig politicians.
"A Merchant" reminded subscribers that the real danger to the South
lay neither in

the Wilmot Proviso nor

the moves against slavery in

the District.

The true danger lay in

the pending admission of Calif

ornia to the Union; her constitution had been drafted by Whig-appointed
antislavery agents.

Duping Taylor in the process, these clever men

had taken care to spread California’s boundaries over territory that
could have sustained slaveholding institutions.

Armed with such a

precedent, the Abolitionists would find new strength with which to
fight the South.
The editor
uled for river

was horrified at the list of appropriations sched

and harbor improvement

by the Whig House of

lOMercury, Dec. 27, 28, 1849; Jan. 23, 25, 1840; Prior to his
nomination by the Whigs, Taylor had identified himself as "a Whig
but not an ultra Whig." This move was designed to secure maximum
support from southern Democrats (Morrison, Democratic Politics, 146;
Wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist, 360).
^iMercury, Dec. 24, 27, 28, 29, 1849.
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Representatives.

Three-fourths of the government monies would be

channelled by this list into the North, he said.

Mercury readers

were alerted to expect a fleecing if the current northern drive to
organize the House should succeed.

Urging southern Congressmen not

to yield before the Yankee pressure, Carew asserted that the rights
and safety of the South could not survive northern control of the
appropriations.
This economic threat reinvigorated the Mercury *s attack on
Whiggery.

Noting that southern Whig politicians were now admitting

the treachery of their party, the editor explained that they had
little choice; their constituents had discovered the matter.

Geor

gia, long a Whig stronghold, was demonstrating a growing awareness
of the need for Southerners to discard party labels and stand to
gether.

The Richmond W h i g , a "vehement party paper," had belatedly

recognized the danger inherent in antislavery and now called for
determined resistance to it.

The position of the Whig was, indeed,

indicative of a healthy reaction among southern Whigs :
It is one of the most striking proofs that the times
have produced, of the strength and all pervading
character of the conviction among the Southern people
that they cannot, without utter disregard of their
safety and honor, allow the aggression to go farther—
that the necessity has come upon them and they must
act decisively and together or sink into hopeless
subjection.
Carew had not forgotten the Whig's earlier blasts at his
paper; the Mercury had been accused of agitating when there was
no danger.
however.

This was no time to remind one's allies of past errors,
Other than to commend the wisdom of meeting any danger "in

its inception . . . "

the editor did not press this subject.
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W e have no complaint, and in the presence of the union of all South
ern men for the defense and security of their country, w e put for
ward no claim . . .

to the distinction of superior patriotism," he

said.
As Calhoun wished the Mercury spared no energy in its pro
motion of southern unity— a drive designed primarily to save the
Union, but, failing in that, to save the South.
Let us only do what now presses upon us with resist
less necessity— if we would save ourselves, if we
would save the Union. . . .
For we revere the Union
and as long as the South can stand by it without dis
honor, let its bonds be sacred.
His section had suffered economic losses from the Union, said the
editor.

"She would have been far richer without it."

work of our fathers— it is our common inheritance.
tinued.

"...

But as "the

. . . " he con

While their work is not defaced w e hold it in

reverence."32
Throughout January 1850 the Congress thrashed in hopeless
dispute over

the admission of California in particular and thein

stitution of

slavery in general.

Hostilities over the peculiar in

stitution seemed to touch upon every issue that arose.

Attempts at

compromise served only to irritate the rawness of members' feelings.
"The Southern members," said Calhoun, "are more determined and bold
than I ever saw them."

Even those who were not avowing "themselves

to be disunionists" could see "little hope of any remedy short of it."
Salmon P. Chase's subsequent remark confirmed a similar intransigency
for the forces of antislavery.

". . . No menace of disunion . . .[or]

32lbid., Dec. 21, 24, 1849, Jan. 17, 1850.
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intimations of the probability of disunion, in any form, will move
us from the path.

. . . " h e declared.

During session after session Calhoun had warned his col
leagues of the inevitability of just such a confrontation.

To the

northern representatives he had directed an appeal that they retreat
from the abolition-inspired onslaught; to the southern ones he had
extolled the virtues of unity as the means most certain to effect a
northern retreat.

With the South now finally responding, the Nash

ville Convention daily loomed more important.
failure of the Convention . . .

"I would regard the

to meet from want of endorsement by

the other Southern States, to be a great if not fatal misfortune,"
Calhoun had written in December:
It would be difficult to make another effort to
rally, and the North would consider it conclu
sive evidence of our . . . indifference to our
fate.
The movement is critical.
"Events may now be controlled; but it will be difficult, if not im
possible to control their course, hereafter," he concluded.
By early January the Senator thought that "the Convention at
Nashville will be well attended."

Confidently expecting Virginia,

North Carolina, Alabama, Florida, Arkansas, and Tennessee to "be
represented," Calhoun was uninformed about the reaction of Louisi
ana and Missouri.

If the others responded as he expected, however.

33calhoun to Andrew Pickens Calhoun, Jan. 12, 1859, Jameson,
ed., Calhoun Correspondence, II, 780; Cong. Globe, 31st, 2nd, 133.

34calhoun to Hammond, Dec.

7, 1849, Hammond Papers.
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it was "not improbable" that Louisiana and Missouri would be moved to
do likewise.

"Even Maryland begins to wake up," he wrote.

By early 1850 Henry Clay had come to share Calhoun's fears
for the future of their country.

The bitterness of the sectional

array exceeded that caused either by nullification or the entrance
of Missouri into the Union.

But upon each of those occasions a con

gressional compromise had reconciled the warring parties to the fact
of their common nationality; Clay determined to try for a like re
sult in 1850.
On January 21, against the grim background of a harshly
divided Congress, Clay called upon Daniel Webster.

The Kentuckian

and the New Englander had their differences but they shared a love
for the Union common to their generation; both men recognized, fur
thermore, that the Union was faced by a mortal crisis.

Clay laid

his proposal for easing the situation before Webster and the latter
agreed to support it.^G
Eight days later the Kentuckian outlined his plan to the
Senate.

Despite the extra-legal manner in which California had been

organized, she had, nonetheless, become a state, said Clay.

He pro

posed that Congress formally recognize the fait accompli and thus re
move the matter from contention.

The rest of the Mexican Cession

should be organized without reference to slavery.

Climate and

geography in the Southwest were hostile to the institution and

35calhoun to Hammond, Jan. 4, 1850, Hammond Papers.
^^Wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist, 454-55; Craven, Coming of
the Civil War, 250-51.
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would doubtless prevent its establishment there without any assist
ance from Congress.

This natural prohibition should satisfy North

and South; as antislavery consciences were eased by the action of
their ally, nature. Southerners could also accept the design of the
Creator.

The result would be identical with that envisioned by the

Wilmot Proviso but without the congressional censure of southern
society.

And again the issue would be removed from politics.
Even the boundary between Texas and New Mexico had become a

matter for sectional contention; slaveholders staunchly supported the
Texan claim while Free-Soilers just as firmly maintained the preten
sions of New Mexico.

With several million acres at stake. Clay

quickly disposed of the case of Texas; the disputed territory should
go to New Mexico, he declared.

Texans would be compensated by the

general government's assuming the outstanding state debt, a hold
over from the late Republic of Texas.
Where the seat of government was concerned. Clay called for
concessions from both sides.

Congress should bind itself to re

spect slavery in the District unless the voters there and in the ad
joining state of Maryland should declare for emancipation, said Clay.
On the other hand, the slave trade could be banished forthwith from
the capital.

Finally, the Senator from Kentucky called upon Con

gress to enact a stringent fugitive slave law and to declare the in
ability of the national legislature to interfere with the slave

trade.

37Cong. Globe, 31st, 1st, 244-52.
Wiltse, Calhoun Sectional
i s t , 455.
Clay's Congressional pledge on slavery in the District of
Columbia included the assurance that slaveholders would be compen
sated in the event of emancipation.
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The senior Senator from South Carolina was present neither
for Clay's speeches on February 5 and 6 nor for the debate that both
preceded and followed them.

On January 18 Calhoun had come down with

pneumonia, a disease often if not usually fatal in 1850.

His recovery

was seemingly assured as January ended, however, and on February 18
the Carolinian resumed his seat in the Senate.
During Calhoun's absence a number of southern Senators had
indicated their willingness to support much of Clay's proposal.

In

return for concessions from the North, they were even prepared to
abolish the slave trade in the District of Columbia.

But Clay's plan

offered no such concessions ; it only called upon the South to compro
mise, they said.

Even so, it promised a long-awaited political set

tlement to the dispute over slavery.

If the South could maintain her

current unity, perhaps the North, by muzzling the Free-Soilers, would
also consent to compromise.
Although Calhoun had yet to be heard on the subject of Clay's
resolutions, those who followed Mercury editorials doubtless knew his
position.

The paper's initial remarks on the proposed compromise

were limited to a description of proposals and a report on the sena
torial debate that followed their introduction.^9

The editor de

clined to commit himself until he saw "an authentic statement" of

3&Wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist, 455-58.
Salmon P. Chase
viewed Clay's measures from exactly the opposite slant, "sentiment
for the North substance for the south— just like the Missouri Com
promise. . . ."(quoted in ibid., 551, n. 12).
39Clay introduced his resolutions into the Senate on January
thirtieth and did not speak in their defense until February fifth
and sixth (Mercury, Jan. 31, Feb. 11, 1850).
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Clay's propositions.

When the Kentuckian first addressed the Senate

on this subject, the Mercury's position began to unfold.

The editor

pronounced Cla y ’s position on the fugitive slave law and the inter
state slave trade ". . . i n all respects excellent, and such as might
be expected from a wise and patriotic Southern Senator.”

However,

Carew was less pleased by Clay’s willingness to permit congressional
regulation of slavery in the District.

The editor was not inclined

to grant either to Congress or the people of the District the right
to rob southerners of their property in "servant[s]
The Mercury paid homage to Clay's long career in the service
of his country.

Taking note of the "age and feebleness" "of the

great Kentuckian [of] . . . his renown . . . [and] isolation from
the party which he had so long ruled with the authority of a King,
his supposed relinquishment of all hope of the glittering honor which
had been the alluring and deceitful mirage of his life's journey,"
the Mercury praised "this effort, probably his last, to play a
master part in the affairs of men.

Add the imposing greatness and

imminent danger of the questions involved . . . and surely no man
could ever hope for a grander occasion . . .

of meeting and master

ing it," said the editor.
"Mr. Clay," however, had "not equalled his opportunity,
much less overpowered the difficulties of his subject."

The Senator

did"not fasten deeply upon the vitals of the question itself, but"
evaded "the facts" or gave "merely a specious array of such as suited
his purpose.

..."

The Mercury dealt harshly with Clay's "absurd"

^^Mercury, Jan. 31, Feb. 2, 11, 1850.
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and "cheap" assertions that he had spent much time in prayer as he
surveyed the wrath of his countryman; the Senator’s lifelong habits
would not bear out such a statement, said the editor.

Clay's dis

avowal of personal motives in making this speech impressed Carew
even less; the Kentuckian was still ambitious for the presidency,
the Mercury suggested.
Having run the spectrum of analysis from sympathetic praise
to vicious ridicule, the editor proceeded to dispose of Clay’s Cal
ifornia proposition.

The Senator argued for the admission of Cal

ifornia with "suitable boundaries" without saying what they should be,
said the M ercury.

His assertion that the people of California wished

to exclude slavery palpably ignored the facts of the case.

The free-

state constitution of California had not been drafted by the "people"
of the territory, according to the Mercury ; this illegal document
was the product of unwarranted action by ". . . a quasi-civil com
munity."

Organized without authority of law by an army officer and

cajoled into submission by "executive agents," this group had pre
sumed to act in place of the people of the "community."
Clay’s argument on New Mexico made even less sense to the
editor.

Although the Senator proposed that Congress organize the

territory without reference to slavery, he maintained, nonetheless,
that the national government was entitled either to establish or ban
the institution there.

Congress was a landholder, said Clay.

Pos

sessing the power to dispose of public lands to the best advantage
and knowing that slavery would affect the value of those lands, the
general government could obviously rule on the status of the institu
tion.
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The Mercury did not deal lengthily with this statement ger
mane as it was to the old argument over broad and strict construc
tion.

Carew was more interested in the Kentuckian’s declaration that

the United States had also inherited the right to regulate slavery
in the Southwest, the power having been transferred along with the
territory from Mexico.

This being the case, the United States might

well acquire some territory from Russia, said the Mercury.

Since the

Czar was empowered to banish political offenders to Siberia, the
President would automatically gain the right to exile certain Taylor
and Fillmore men to the North Pole.
Throughout his speech "Mr. Cray" exhibited a most cavalier
disregard for the Constitution, said the editor.
Why the very essence of the whole dispute, is the
Constitutional power of Congress to legislate on
the question of slavery.
And on this seems to hang
the decision of . . . whether the Mexican law ab
rogating slavery is of any force now.
In that "all laws in a ceded district, which" go "beyond the

com

petency of the government taking the cession,

be con

to enact, must

sidered abrogated by the very fact of cession," the situation was crys
tal clear to the Mercury.

"Mr. Clay," however, "elude[d]" any men

tion of this point."41
Finally, Clay’s proposal

"to dismember a State of this Con

federacy" appealed not at all to the editor.The outcome of

the war

with Mexico having clearly established the boundaries of Texas, the
Senator's arguments were not only absurd but also presaged a scheme
to rob the South.

The paper's sentiments evoked approval from its

41lbid., Feb. 12, 18, 1850.
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correspondents.

Criticizing the "various mongrel propositions,"

"A Southern Man" associated them with three disloyal representatives
of his section, Clay, Benton, and Houston.

Another writer, "Rice

Planter," abjuring "those prophets who cry peace! peace! when there
is no peace," damned the moves of the odious threesome.
The ephemeral "communications" served to enlighten liege
men in search of the truth; they spoke in the language of the leader.
From his sickbed Calhoun commended the "increasing disposition to re
sist all compromise . . . and to agree to nothing, that will not
settle the entire issue . . .

on the grounds for which we contend."

Approaching climax, the drive for unity ruled that southern solid
arity must take precedence over ambition, personal rivalries, party
allegiance and even old fashioned unionism.

"The tone of the South

ern Senators, with the exception of Clay, Benton, Houston and a few
others is high," wrote Calhoun.
Calhoun's apparent recovery proved to be an illusion.

He had

returned to the Senate chamber on February 18, but two days later he
suffered a relapse and was once again confined to his rooms.

As the

rising sectional tension persistently shadowed Clay's effort for a
compromise settlement, Calhoun defined his position in letters, con
versations with colleagues and— through the efforts of the anonymous
faithful— in the press.
The South cannot with safety remain in the Union as
things now stand & there is little or no prospect of
any change for the better. . . . The impression is

^^Ibid., Feb. 13, 26, 1850.
^^Calhoun to Hammond, Feb. 16, 1850, Hammond Papers.
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now very general, & is on the increase, that
disunion is the only alternative that is left
to u s . 44
Senator Calhoun had not become a disunionist.

His anxiety

for the "stability of the Union," no less pronounced than Clay's,
drove the Carolinian in a final effort to save the work of his
fathers, this product of the Revolution.

Where the Carolina slave

holder differed from the Kentuckian was in the concept of the Union.
For Calhoun, the nation was created to preserve the peace
and tranquility even as it allowed for the progress of its citizens.
During the early years of nationality the Federal Compact served this
purpose.

But as geography in combination with economy and religion

produced a dichotomy within the nation, the South discovered her
distinctness.

This disclosure brought along a parallel awareness

that southern society could not conform to the rules of majoritybased democracy; the former was, therefore, threatened by the latter.
Caught by a complex heritage of being both southerner and
American, Calhoun led in trying to reconcile the implied conflict
between the two.

In the event that this, the central theme of his

political career, proved impossible of accomplishment, the Caro
linian's primary allegiance to the South would assert itself.
His birthplace, occupation, and home, notwithstanding, Henry
Clay escaped Calhoun's dilemma.

Clay remained first a national

politician who believed in a strong central government.

While that

government could afford to be magnanimous to a section under siege.

4 4 i b i d .

; Wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist, 458-59.
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it could not surrender its prerogative to be otherwise.

The Mercury

clearly understood and strongly condemned this position:
Mr. Clay announces that he owes no allegiance to
the South, but only to the Union.
If he owes mere
justice and fair dealing to the South he owes more
than he pays.4^"
So while one slaveholder sought sectional peace through com
promise, the other extolled southern intransigence as the only means
of achieveing harmony from within the Union.

They moved against a

steadily tumultous background that ranged in intensity from simple
commotion to rage and frenzy.

By late February North and South ap

peared bound for collision.
As Southerners openly threatened secession, northerners im
plied the improbability of peaceful separation.

Noting the ex

changes, Whig Congressman and one-time Unionist Alexander H. Stephens
advised his legislator brother to offer bills "for reorganizing the
[Georgia] militia, for the establishment of military schools,

. . .

the formation of volunteer companies, the creation of arsenals, of
an armory, and an establishment for making gunpowder.
mind is made up," said he.
back me."

..."

"My

"I am for the fight, if the country will

This reaction from a Georgia Whig must have strengthened

Calhoun's steady faith in southern unity.

"Never before has the South

been placed in so trying a situation, nor can it ever be placed in one
more so," Calhoun wrote.

"Her all is at stake.

^ ^Mercury, Feb. 19, 1850.
^^Stephens to Linton Stephens, Jan. 21, 1850, quoted in Murray,
Whig Party in Georgia, 148; Calhoun to Hammond, Feb. 16, 1850, Hammond
Papers.
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Mounting evidence of the worsening situation appeared regu
larly in Mercury reports.

Holding "the causes that produced the Revo

lution" to be "trifling in comparison" with the present crisis, the
editor warned :
. . . We can live with the North contented, if they
will allow us the benefit of the compact of the Union.
We can live perfectly well without them, whenever they
resolve to turn that compact into an instrument of
tyranny.
The governor of Vermont was doubtless among those considered by Carew
to be subverting the "compact."

He had recently sent copies of the

antislavery resolutions adopted by his legislature to the southern
states.

Noting with approval the dignified action of Maryland, Vir

ginia, and Georgia when they rejected and returned the intruding Yankee
instruments, the Mercury advised other southern assemblies to behave
accordingly.47
Whig Congressman Thomas L. Clingman, representing a North
Carolina mountain district, earned Mercury plaudits for warning the
North against trifling with southern loyalty to the Union.

Clingman,

who had often resisted Calhoun’s drive to weld the South into a single
political unit, now stood firmly with the Carolinian.

The South "re

vered" the Union, said Clingman, but would not countenance the use of
its bonds to forge a revolution within southern borders.

Reminding

readers that the Congressman represented a district where there were,
perhaps, fewer slaves than anywhere else in North Carolina, the Mercury
cited proof of "how baseless

[were] the calculations of those who

suppose only the large slaveholders care to resist aggressions of

4 7Mercury, Jan. 28, Feb. 1, 20, 1850.
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the Abolitionists."
The editor also complimented Clingman for having demonstrated
the great strength of southern unionism.
for the

Southerners had a respect

Union that stemmed from the example set by their ancestors,

and they would defer to none in devotion to that example.

Both

Carew and Clingman were speaking of the Union as ordained by the
Constitution.

Their allegiance would not survive a change in the

nature of the Federal Compact:
. . . This sentiment of love and reverence for the
Union as an inheritance from our fathers, is daily
weakening and fading before the wicked assaults of
those who are bent on compelling us to think of it
only as an engine with which they can insult and
inj ure u s .
Flinging his warning in the face of the North, the agitated editor
asked, "How long do they suppose a mere idolatry of the past can make
us callous to 'the whips and scorns' of the present.

. .?"48

February issues indicated an increasing awareness on the
part of the North that the nation was endangered.

Northern voters

assembling in public meetings declared their loyalty to the Union
and denounced the debilitating influence of radical antislavery men.
The Mercury reported that one such meeting of Tammany Hall "friends
of the Union" was broken up by abolitionist "ruffians"; irritated by
the assembly's opposition to the Wilmot Proviso.

Subscribers need

not be surprised at this development; such behavior was commonplace
at the North, said the editor.49

48ibid. , Feb. 6, 1850.
49%bid., Feb. 20, 23, 1850.
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The Mercury still feared that "no large portion of the North"
was "sensible of the danger in which they" had "involved the Union."
Carew was unimpressed by an article in the Democratic Review which
tried to blame the nation’s troubles on the desire of Great Britain
to encourage free trade areas.

He agreed, nevertheless, that dis

union would result in great loss to northern commerce.
ets, conversely, would gain thereby.

Southern mark

The editor’s own attitude re

flected the bitterness of the times; "If it were only a question of
gain to the South, and great gain, we should desire [disunion],
he declared.

. . ."

"As it is, we only expect it."

Occasional reports drifting in from the North suggested that
disunion would result in war.

Stating that "the South is nearly

equal in numbers to the North, and vastly stronger in position," the
Mercury attempted to explain to the Yankees "with what scorn the
threats of subjugating us by force are received."

A "hostile hand"

put upon the South would affect "the vital interests of England,
France and Germany.

...

No people could shut us up without coming

into collision with the whole weight of modern civilization," said
the editor.50
There were among Mercury readers those who did not share the
editor’s confidence.

Shortly before this editorial was published.

Charleston politician James M. Walker wrote to Hammond. ". . . War
must follow disunion," Walker predicted:
. . . Keep in mind, that the persons having command
of the sea, will if not prevented secure our ports

SOlbid., Feb. 21, 22, 1850.
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. . . cutting off our cotton trade . . . [and]
leaving us at the mercy of any
foreign nation
from whom . . . we might hope to gain relief.
Remembering President Taylor's recent message to the Congress, Walker
assumed

"that Taylor will not suck his

that the convention meets
& k e y ."^^

thumbs.In his place,

I would have

the day

Every Southern port, under lock

Little more than a decade later, Carolinians would have

reason to remember Walker's keen

understanding.

52

Calhoun's second siege of illness kept h i m only from physical
involvement in the Congressional battle and the parallel southern re
action to the "Mississippi Movement."

Keeping abreast of matters from

his sickbed, he relied on letters, newspapers, and accounts from his
colleagues.

Orders continued to go out to the faithful; and the Mer

cury, now the very badge and ensign of Orthodoxy, trumpeted the steady
course of his movement for southern unity.
During February James J. Hamilton, Jr., leader of the last
great effort for separate state action, came to Washington where he
remained for six weeks.

His daily visits with Calhoun produced long

and learned conversations on the future of the South; they also
assisted in keeping Calhoun posted on current events.

Toward the

end of February, the Senator apparently decided that he would not
recover in time to speak on Clay's resolutions still pending before
the Senate.

Consequently, another one-time Carolinian, James Gordon

Bennett, now a New York publisher,

requested to send his veteran

51walker to Hammond, Feb. 13, 1850, Hammond Papers.
52paul Quattlebaum to Hammond, Dec. 18, 1849, Beverly Tucker
to Hammond, Jan. 27, 1850, Hammond to Simms, Feb. 13, 1850, Hammond
Papers.
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reporter Joseph Scoville to see the Senator.

Scoville had served

before in the cause of Calhoun, most recently during the preceding
summer.

He arrived on February 26 and consented to Calhoun's request

that he act as his secretary.
Senate debates— present or not.

The Carolinian would be heard in the
Calhoun dictated to Scoville what

many in Washington predicted would be his last s p e e c h . ^ 3

3 % i l t s e , Calhoun Sectionalist, 459; Glenn, "James Hamilton,
J r . ,"399-400, Calhoun to Hammond, Feb. 16, 1850, Hammond Papers.
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CHAPTER XI

THE VOICE OF THE LEADER

While Scoville recorded the Carolinian's valedictory, "South
Carolina's other Senator" made arrangements for it to be heard in the
Senate.

As Calhoun had feared, he remained too weak to deliver the

speech himself.

So with the "hearty concurrence" of his colleagues,

Andrew P. Butler arranged for the young Virginian, James M. Mason,
to read the address.

Butler, who would normally have read for his

fellow Carolinian, pled that his eyes were too weak for the task.^
Shortly after noon on the fourth day of March 1850, Senator
John C. Calhoun leaned on the arm of General James J. Hamilton, Jr.,
and moved slowly into the Senate chamber.

Although the body would

not be called to order for almost an hour, "the galleries and even
the floor of the Senate" were already crowded with "a brilliant and
expectant audience."

Americans of Calhoun's day regularly turned out

to observe the drama often characteristic of proceedings in the upper
house.

Present in this solemn audience of March 4 w ere some who re

membered a young and optimistic Calhoun deliver his very first speech
in Congress.

They had come to watch— in

biographer— "the final effort

the language of Calhoun's

of a dying man to serve his country."

^Wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist, 459.
378
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For many the view of this fateful scene was blurred b y tears.
When the appointed hour sounded, the chamber came to order
and "Mr. Calhoun" was recognized.

Thanking his colleagues for "the

courteous way" in which they were permitting hi m to be heard through
the voice of another Senator, the Carolinian passed his speech to
Mason.

As he sank into his seat next to Jefferson Davis, Calhoun

doubtless reflected upon the forty-year struggle that had led to
this moment.^
"I have. Senators, believed from the first that the agita
tion of the subject of slavery would," if not contained, "end i n
disunion . . .," read Mason.

That dire eventuality now loomed

nearer; "every portion of the North entertains views and feelings
more or less hostile to [slavery]."

Proclaiming the Union to be in

jeopardy, Calhoun’s address urged the Congress to disarm the anti
slavery arsenal— once and for all, otherwise, the South must form
a separate nation.
This somber speech traced the process by which the bonds of
nationality had been steadily weakened.

From the beginning the gov

ernment had worked to exclude plantation agriculture from the terri
tories.

The Ordinance of 1787 and the Missouri Compromise laid the

foundation upon which the Wilmot Proviso had been built.

A selfish

sectionalism on the part of industrialists had fastened the pro
tective tariff upon the country.

Confronted thus by an attack both

ideological and economic, the South had suffered a steady series of

^New York Tribune, quoted in Coit, Calhoun, 490; Wiltse,
Calhoun Sectionalist, 460-61; Glenn, "James J. Hamilton, Jr.,"
399.
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reverses as the price of her devotion to the Union.
During the third decade of the nineteenth century the char
acter of the government had changed, Calhoun contended.

With the

triumph of the principle of popular democracy the Union was trans
formed from a confederation of sovereign states into a centralized
nation dominated by the general government.

This government was

limited only by the will of a numerical majority; it could virtually
determine its own powers.

As a result, the interest of the minority

plantation section had been repeatedly sacrificed.
Calhoun cited the growth of the abolition movement and its
entrance into politics as the most direct threat to national unity.
Repeating that the antislavery movement would ultimately destroy
the Union, he reminded his colleagues that "Disunion" would be "the
work of time."

"It is a great mistake to suppose that [disunion]

. . . can be effected at a single blow.

The cords which bound these

states together, are . . . too numerous and powerful for that."
But the process of separation was already well advanced, Calhoun
warned.
way.

The churches were splitting even as party ties were giving

In the absence of political, spiritual, and social bonds, "the

only means by which the" Union could be held together would be to
tie the weaker to "the stronger portion" with "force."

The South

would never accept such naked "subjugation," said Calhoun.
It was apparent to the Carolinian, then, that the solution
could not lie in another compromise.

Transient in nature as they

were, political compromises lent themselves to distortion by the
stronger power, the North, to the disadvantage of the weaker, the
South.

If the Union were to be saved, Calhoun asserted, the
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equilibrium which prevailed between the sections in 1789 must be
restored.

This balance between North and South could not be re

constituted so long as a numerical majority determined government
policy.

The South was already outnumbered in the House, and the

admission of California would produce a like situation in the Sen
ate.

Since the North was the dominant force in the government, her

consent would be necessary for any change in the system.

Calhoun’s

logical conclusion was that only the North could decide the future
of the Union.
Declaring that it was time for "an open and manly avowal oh
all sides," the Senator became specific.
agitate the slavery issue.

The North must cease to

She must also consent to amend the Con

stitution in such a way that the South would have the means of pro
tecting herself; Calhoun proposed to substitute a concurrent major
ity for the prevailing numerical one.

Only in this manner could

the balance between the sections be restored.
Should the North be unwilling to assent to these changes in
principle and practice, the South would leave the Union, Calhoun
warned.

Even in the event of separation, however, the course of

the future must still be determined by the North.
willing [that] we should part in peace,

If she is "un

[she should] tell us so,

and we shall know what to do"; the question was now reduced "to
submission or resistance."
Unless there was a declaration to the contrary from the
North, the South must assume that the stronger section intended to
maintain her present policy, the Carolinian continued.
case, California would become "the test question."

In that

Her admission
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would "infer" that the South would be excluded "from the whole of
the acquired territories" and the "equilibrium between the two sec
tions" would be destroyed irretreviably.

"We would," the address

ominously concluded, "be blind not to perceive . . . that your real
objects are power and aggrandizement, and infatuated not to act ac
cordingly.
The Senate had listened with rapt attention to Calhoun’s
foreboding farewell.

There were nr replies to his declaration, but

when Mason sat down Webster took the floor to voice his pleasure at
seeing "the honorable member from Carolina able to be in his place
today.

..."

After agreeing that Webster should speak on March 7,

the Senate adjourned.

And as Calhoun was assisted from the chamber,

the entire assembly— Senators and spectators— rose in tribute.^
Upon returning to his rooms at Hill's boarding house, Cal
houn wrote to Henry Conner;
My speech . . . was read today . . . .
Lfy friends
think it among my most successful. . . .
I have
[defined] the issue between North and South.
If we
flinch, we are gone; but if we stand fast . . . we
shall triumph. . . .
If not overly optimistic of a favorable reaction from the North, the
Carolinian was confident, indeed, of the healthy state of southern
unity.

The "triumph" he envisioned would result from either "com

pelling the North to yield to our terms, or declaring our Indepen
dence of them."

Once more, however, his confidence in the ability

of his section to maintain a united front had been

misplaced.^

^Cong. Globe, 31st, 1st, 451-55.
^Coit, Calhoun, 495.
^Calhoun to Conner, Mar. 4, 1850, quoted in Coit, Calhoun, 497.
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While Washington digested the speeches of Clay and Calhoun
and awaited the forthcoming effort of Webster, the influence of per
sonal ambition merged with the pressure of politics to produce yet
another gap in southern ranks.

On March 5 Henry Foote of Mississippi

announced to the Senate that Calhoun's view of current conditions was
not representative of southern thinking.

Calhoun had magnified the

menace of antislavery; it was not necessary to amend the Constitution
in order to save the Union, said Foote.

In addition, Foote accused

the Carolinian of maligning the North with his charges that that sec
tion stood opposed to southern institutions.

In the bitter exchange

that followed this assertion, even Calhoun's enemy, Benton, objected
to Foote's manner of challenging the dying Carolinian.

And although

the capital remained preoccupied with its anticipation of the speech
of the third member of the passing triumvirate, the significance of
this quarrel was clearly apparent. "[Ejmaciated to the last degree,
his eyes burning with fever," the spiritual father and guiding force
of the Mississippi Movement had clased with its titular head.

Once

again the goal of southern unity would not be reached,^
The packed house which heard Webster's Address of the Seventh

Coit, Calhoun, 497; Wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist, 466-67;
Craven, Coming of the Civil W a r , 258; Varina Howell Davis, Jeffer
son Davis Ex-President of the Confederate States (2 vols.. New York,
1890), I, 458.
While the motive behind Foote's revolt has never been
clearly established, it is clear that the Mississippian was not sat
isfied with his place in the Calhoun camp.
Craven implies that Foote's
conduct was affected by an old quarrel with Jefferson Davis.
Coit,
in turn, says that by this time Calhoun had picked Davis to be his
successor.
Foote, remembering his early prominence in the Mississippi
Movement, may well have been influenced by the intimacy between Davis
and Calhoun (Craven, Coming of the Civil W a r , 258; Coit, Calhoun,
488).
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of March was the epitome of a nation in the grip of crisis.

This

excited audience knew that Henry Clay had proposed to ease the rising
tension with another quick compromise.
Calhoun reject Clay's overture.

Many of those present had heard

The Carolinian had presented the

country with an ultimatum— barring a final solution to the issue of
antislavery within the Union, the South would seek one outside it.
Webster, seeking to avoid the disruption of the nationality that he
shared and loved with both Clay and Calhoun, offered a third alterna
tive.

Reminding his countrymen of their proud past, he called for

their patriotism to sustain them in the present crisis.

In this way

they could maintain the Union through a policy of gradual negoti
ation.
The South must accept the fact that the North despised
slavery, Webster continued.

In turn, the North must agree that the

institution existed, was guaranteed by the Constitution, and must be
protected.

Holding the Wilmot Proviso to be unnecessary, Webster

agreed that it was designed as a calculated insult to plantation in
stitutions.

It should be repudiated, he maintained; California end

New Mexico would become free states without its aid.
The South could be reinforced by new slave states carved from
that part of Texas lying south of 36°30'N., Webster asserted re
assuringly.

Southerners should remember, however, that the North

was not without justification in her determination to rid the land
of slavery.

When the Union was formed, both sections had viewed

slavery as an evil and flying institution, he said.
understand,

The South must

furthermore, that the Union was meant to be permanent and

could only be broken by revolution.

Webster insisted that this dread
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prospect could be avoided through a policy of responsible negoti
ation between the sections.^
The remainder of the session did little to justify Webster's
hope for a statesmanlike reaction from all sides.

Maintaining his

gloomy view of the situation, Calhoun heard and scorned William H.
Seward's dictum that a "higher power" than the Constitution pro
hibited the entrance of any more slaveholding states into the Ameri
can Union.

Two days later, on the thirteenth, the Senator from

South Carolina made his last appearance in the chamber of the Senate.
As he entered the hall, Calhoun heard himself referred to as a "dis
unionist" by Foote.

Another heated exchange followed this encounter,

and the cause of southern unity was damaged further in the process.&
In a condition bordering dangerously on collapse, Calhoun re
tired from this affray to spend the last two weeks of his life in
Hill's boarding house.

Watched over by his son. Dr. John Caldwell

Calhoun, Jr., and attended by a steady stream of visitors, the Sena
tor read and talked, prophesied, and reminisced.

Beverly Tucker

heard the Carolinian interpret the future with "Dark forebodings."
"The Union is doomed to dissolution . . . within twelve years,"
Mason was informed.

"The probability is that it will explode in a

presidential e l e c t i o n . A n d as the unfavorable reaction to Webster's
speech began to pour in from the North, Calhoun wrote a final letter

^Cong. Globe, 31st, 1st, 476-83.
&Coit, Calhoun, 501-02; Wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist, 47172.
^Calhoun to Conner, Mar. 18, 1850, Conner Letters.
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to Henry Conner;
Can anything more clearly evince the utter hope
lessness of looking to the North for support, when
their strongest man finds himself incapable of main
taining himself on the smallest amount possible of
concession to the South— and on points too clear to
admit of Constitutional doubts?!"
As James Gordon Sennet's paper, the New York Herald, kept a
mournful watch on "the sad news concerning Mr. Calhoun's health,"
Richard Cralle and Joseph Scoville joined Mr. and Mrs. Duff Green to
assist the doctor in attending his father.

On March 17 the Herald

concluded that Calhoun's hours were "numbered."

The Carolinian b e 

gan a steady decline on the twenty-second and on April 1 The Charles
ton Mercury appeared with heavy black borders between all its columns.
"Mr. Calhoun [had] expired" on Sunday, March 31 "at 15 minutes past
7 o'clock."!!
Most Mercury readers were probably unprepared for this start
ling development,

In striking contrast to the course followed by the

Herald, the Mercury had hardly mentioned the subject of Calhoun's
health.

A recent Mercury dispatch, moreover, had quoted the Wash

ington correspondent of the Columbia Telegraph to the effect that
the Senator was improving:
He now attends the Senate regularly and seems to be
regaining his vigor of body rapidly. . . . All
apprehensions in relation to his malady, may . . .
now be allayed for . . . his restoration cannot be
doubted.

!^Calhoun to Conner, March 18, 1850, Conner Letters.
Ü W i l t s e , Calhoun Sectionalist, 474-75; Herald, quoted in
Coit, Calhoun, 503, 505; Mercury, Apr. 1, 1850.
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The absence of any subsequent reports to the contrary could hardly
have prepared Carew's subscribers for the tolling bells to which they
had awakened on that Sunday.

This curious silence on a subject with

which all South Carolina was concerned must b e presumed to have been
an official stance.

Orthodoxy-in-Council, uncertain itself of Cal

houn's condition and troubled over who should succeed him, had apparently ruled out any discussion of the Senator's prospects.

11

It is certain that the Mercury's failure to comment regu
larly on Calhoun's illness did not reflect a decline in its loyalty
either to the Carolinian himself or to his long term political goal.
Throughout the last month of the leader's life, Carew's paper worked
ceaselessly to preserve the drive and force of the twenty-year-old
"great cause," southern unity.

Taking note of the congressional ex

citement over the question of California, the editor cautioned his
readers to expect violence before the issue was settled.

He warned

them of the futility of hoping for another compromise peace.

Abol

itionists would violate any agreement designed to protect southern
interests!

thundered "South."

Voicing his hearty agreement with this

communication, Carew asked " . . .

What thanks do they get for" ef

forts at compromise?
The North replies to every offer, by assenting
to so much as is favorable to itself. We would

^% e r c u r y , Liar. 14, 1850; Wiltse, Calhoun Sectionalist, 475;
Thomas, Carolina Tribute, 65.
Charleston received the news of Cal
houn's death by telegraph on Sunday, March 31.
^^Calhoun himself forbade that his family be notified.
Joseph
Scoville says that the Senator "had no idea of dying from his sickness
unless it was after he became speechless" (Coit, Calhoun, 507-08;
Scoville to Hammond, Apr. 18, 1850, Hammond Papers).
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[not] risk a dollar, that the North would regard
as binding any compromise that might be assented
to by its Representatives.
Let them offer com
promises then.
They profess to love the Union
above all things--let them reach forth a hand to
save it.14
A thoroughly aroused Mercury charged that "As yet the only
mode of keeping the States together which has received any interest
. . . among them is the employment of the Array and Navy to put down
disunion."

The "communications" agreed, asserting that "Declamation

and disquisition have had their day," "NAKED TRUTH" proclaimed that
"the argument is exhausted" and urged that the South send her best
1c

men to Nashville.
The editor reported that Calhoun was in his seat on March 4
and devoted most of one news page to the Senator's address. " . . .
[It] was listened to with the deepest attention," said the Mercury.
"Mr. Calhoun has probed the question to its depths," and analyzed the
character of existing politics with a truthfulness and power of which
he alone seems capable."1^
The Mercury had no patience with those who accused Calhoun of
trying to modify the Constitution.

The Senator wanted only to amend

the document in such a way as to give explicit form to some of its
provisions, to place them "beyond cavil and evasion."

That "debate

of interesting character" which "sprang up" around F oote’s charge
that Calhoun believed all the people of the North to be hostile to

^^Me r c u r y , Mar. 1, 2, 4, 1850.
ISlbid.. Mar. 4, 6, 1850.
IGlbid., Mar. 5, 7, 9, 1850.
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southern institutions vindicated Calhoun's penetrating insight.

Re

proving the Mississippian for straying into independence, Carew ob
served:
. . . M r . Foote seems to have made up his mind that
there is some radical impropriety in agreeing with
Mr. Calhoun. . . .
We are sorry that so sensible a
ma n should be infected with so unphilosophical a
notion.17
The editor would not condemn all northern leaders, however.
He trusted Woodbury, Dallas, Cass, and Buchanan.

The Mercury even

exonerated Van Buren of any "feeling of hostility" toward Souther
ners.

But all northern politicians were prisoners of their con

stituents, Carew warned.

His subscribers need only consult any

school book to uncover the Yankee "prejudice" against slavery.
Finally, there was little comfort to be derived from the knowledge
that the northern attack was directed at slavery rather than the
southern people.

18

"Mr. Webster's speech . . . noble in language, generous and
conciliatory in tone, and . . . having one general, broad and power
ful tendency towards the peaceable and honorable adjustment of the
existing controversy," brought a new tone of optimism into the edi
torial column.

Carew greeted Webster's "discussion of a great ques

tion . . . with . . . admiration and delight."

Even though the

Mercury "might disagree" with Webster's interpretation of the Con
stitution, the paper could still endorse his loyalty to the docu
ment:

1 7lbid., Mar. 9, 1850.

ISibid.
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. . . With such a spirit as Mr. Webster has shown,
it no longer seems impossible to bring this sec
tional contest to a close, and we feel now, for the
first time since Congress met, a hope that it may
be so adjusted.
The Mercury *s extravagant praise of Webster’s speech was de
signed to emphasize the continuing need for southern unity.

No such

speech could have been made "until the question of Union" was boldly
raised & joined in the "consideration of public men," said the edi
tor.
spect.

Webster could "speak with hope of being listened to with re
. ." only because "Massachusetts, so dependent for prosperity

on the Union must give heed."

Predicting that the New Englander

would still "be denounced by factionists and abolitionists," Carew
endorsed the "solid ground for his propositions."
The orthodox editor did not lose sight of the fact that
Webster had conferred with Calhoun in the process of drafting his
address.

"These last speeches of Mr. Calhoun and Mr. Webster, are

destined to a great fame, and to produce lasting effects," he said.
In what was virtually his only allusion to the seriousness of Cal
houn's illness, Carew concluded:
Perhaps they are, either of them, the greatest effort
of its author, and if they were to be the last they
would each form a fitting keystone to the arch of a
fame w o n by forty years of distinguished public ser
vice.
It is noble to think that such minds should so
preserve their powers that at a time when they had
almost reached the term of human life, they can meet
an exigency more trying than they have ever yet en
countered, and make it the scene of their most tri
umphant intellectual display.
The occasion is not
greater than the men who have coped with it.
If evil
spirits do not mar their work, we may yet look to them
as having given a new vitality to the Union.

l^Ibid., Mar. 11, 1850.
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Those "evil spirits" reminded the Mercury of one critical
area in which W e b ster’s support for the Constitution transcended his
understanding of the instrument.

The Massachusetts Senator had roundly

declared that the Union could not be dissolved.
roared in disagreement.

"Cannot!" the Mercury

"It only requires that the Government and

the Northern People keep doing a little longer what they have been
doing, and it cannot be saved from dissolution."

The steadiness of

the northern course must be apparent even to the most optimistic of
southern Union-lovers.

William H. Seward's speech, citing a higher

authority than the Constitution as the source of his inspiration to
wage w ar on slavery, furnished eloquent evidence of this alarming
situation.20
The Nashville Convention remained uppermost in Carew's mind
throughout the progress of the congressional debate.

Designed as

the crowning glory of Calhoun's effort to solidify the South, the
convention took precedence over all else in the Mercury.

The "Spirit

of the Southern Press" reproduced periodic extracts from other re
gional journals to prove "that the movement of the people
resolutely onward."

[was]

The governor of Louisiana received Mercury

plaudits for his proclamation that "Submission to incipient oppres
sion prepares men for the yoke, and compromises on this question are
nothing less than antislavery victories."

Cheered by the appoint

ment of George M. Troup to represent Georgia at the forthcoming con
vention, the Mercury chided Clay for his charge that all those sup
porters of southern unity were "ultraists" who marched in advance of

ZOlbid.. Mar. 14, 22, 1850.
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their constituents.21
Precisely the reverse was true, said the Mercury ; many
southern leaders were actually trying to catch up with their elec
torate.

Clay's analysis of the motive behind the movement to unify

the South was also wrong, the editor continued.

Far from having dis

union as the object of her convention, the South was seeking only "jus
tice and the Constitytion."

And once more Carew reminded his readers

that South Carolina was not leading the journey to Nashville.

The

Palmetto State only followed the lead of "another and distant State"
and supported the convention because of her desire to "save the Union
if possible" and if not, "to save the South."

22

Thus it was with genuine alarm that the Mercury had reported
on the clash between Calhoun and Foote.

Deprecating all symptoms of

division among southern Senators, Carew dismissed Foote's objections
to Calhoun's proposals as nothing more than the faulty product of a
growing jealousy.

The Mississippian wished to replace Calhoun as the

philosopher of southern unity, the editor charged.
Mississippian was also guilty of impertinence.

This ambitious

Foote's alleged auth

orship of the "Mississippi Movement” hardly authorized h im to require
that Calhoun call "a council" before deciding "what opinions he is to

Zllbid., Feb.

19, 25, Mar. 5, 9, 10, 29, 1850.

22lbid.. Feb. 19, 25, 28, Mar. 1, 6, 16, 21, 25, 1850.
The
Mercury was encouraged by Texas's decision to send delegates to Nash
ville. How different was the scene in Austin, said the editor, from
the one in Washington where Sam Houston betrayed the South with "the
gales from the White House fanning his cheeks" (ibid., Mar. 6, 1850).
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avow."

The Mercury tartly reminded Foote that "Mr. Calhoun" was

not accustomed to operating in such a manner.
But Carew was disturbed most of all by Foote's misplaced faith
in the possibility of another compromise.

The dangers in following

the path of political adjustment as blazed by Clay were legion, and
could result in spreading confusion within southern ranks.

By the

end of March, however, the Mercury was confident that this danger had
been averted.

"The Southern resistance, which had begun to relax,

again rises in tone and strength," Carew wrote reassuringly.^^
Three days later, the editor coupled his announcement of Cal
houn's death with a comforting eulogy of the fallen leader.

"...

[His] presence only is gone— the mortal only . . . dead," was the
theme for the Mercury's message to the faithful.

"Not only . . .

his fame . . . but his thoughts live, and will flourish and spread
with an ever increasing authority through ages to come."

The move

ment to unify Calhoun's South would triumph as "The people of South
Carolina gathered spontaneously around the goal of her illustrious
son.

. . ."24
While the Mercury printed "funeral obsequies" between its

black-bordered columns, a public meeting was called to render Charles
ton's tribute to the lost leader.

The reverent audience heard Frank

lin H. Elmore speak of the "irreparable misfortune" that had befallen
South Carolina.

Calhoun had given "the unlimited devotion of his

M e r c u r y , Mar. 14, 29, 1850.
Prior to Calhoun's speech of
March fourth the Mercury had agreed with Foote's proposal to form
a compromise committee (ibid., Mar. 1, 1850).
^^Mercury. Apr. 1, 1850.
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pure heart" to the state, Elmore asserted.

In response, the assembly

petitioned Governor Whitmarsh B. Seabrook to appoint a committee-ofTwenty-Five "to proceed to Washington to receive and bring home the
mortal remains of the Hon. J. C. Calhoun."

At the same time the City

Council, convening in special session, requested of both the governor
and the Calhoun family that Charleston be accorded "the distinction of
being selected as the final resting place of the illustrious CALHOUN."
Quickly acceding to the request of the meeting. Governor Sea
brook faithfully followed the Calhoun formula in selecting members
for the committee.

Orthodox Nullifiers John E. Carew and Henry W.

Conner were appointed to sit with former Unionist Christopher Memminger.

(Prominent by his absence from this committee was Robert

Barnwell Ehett.)

Both the family and the governor also agreed that

Calhoun should be buried in Charleston.

As part of its preparation

for a proper reception of the body in the city, the Council ap
pointed a committee of its own.

Again the membership consisted of

both Nullifiers and Unionists; included among the latter was no less
a figure than James L. Petigru, archpriest of South Carolina Union
ism.

Even in death Calhoun would maintain his emphasis on the need

for unity within the state.
Calhoun was buried with all the solemnity reserved at that
time for the death of a ruler of a country.

In Washington memorial

services were held in both the Senate and House chambers.

Then his

body was placed on board the crepe-draped steamer Baltimore for a
last journey South.

As the vessel warped her way into the stream—

^^Ibid., Apr. 2, 5, 6, 10; Thomas, Carolina Tribute to
Calhoun, 39-72.
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away from the dock and its silent crowd— the muted notes of martial
music mingled with the sound of Washington’s tolling church bells.
Accompanied by the Committee-of-Twenty-Five and a committee of six
Senators appointed for the same purpose, "the mortal remains" of
South Carolina's greatest son began its water-borne passage past
Alexandria and Mount Vernon to Acquia Creek.

There the "remains

were landed on the shores of Virginia," for the trip by rail to Fred
ericksburg, Richmond, Petersburg, and Wilmington.
Flags ;:lew at half mast, business was suspended, guns boomed
and church bells tolled while the body of the late Senator was "re
ceived with honors" at each place.

In a solemn procession the gov

ernor of Virginia escorted Calhoun’s body through Richmond streets
before it lay in state in Jefferson’s capitol.

Another procession

led the bier through Petersburg for a memorial service in St. Paul’s
church.

Forty miles from Wilmington the Calhoun party was met by a

delegation which conducted it into that city for further honors.
After the citizens of Wilmington had registered "their respect to the
memory of the dead," the body was put on board the steamer Nina for
the final leg of its return to Charleston.
The progress to the South ended at twelve o ’clock noon on
April 25 when the Nina docked at the foot of Boundary Street.

This

thoroughfare, soon to be renamed in Calhoun’s honor, was crowded with
mourners, many of whom had come by way of the free passage given on
the Washington and Wilmington Railroad.

Silent but for her tolling

bells, the city wore heavy mourning as twelve ex-governors and the
lieutenant governor met Calhoun's body and escorted it to the Citadel
Square.
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There the governor waited with the General Assembly and the
officials, clergy, students, and fraternal organization of the city.
Behind the governor stood the heavily-draped battlements of the Cita
del, a fortress erected when Calhoun was a young Secretary of War.
After Governor Seabrook had received the body from James M. Mason,
Chairman of the Senate Committee of Escort, and the solemn ceremony
of another memorial service, the "precious remains" were committed
to the care of the Mayor.
south into King Street.

The procession then reformed and moved
It wound its way past draped and closed

houses, stores and churches, down King Street into Hassel, on to
Meeting and finally by way of South and East Battery to Broad Street.
The cortege stopped at the City Hall where the Guard of Honor was
posted and the body lay in state for the rest of the day.
At ten o'clock on April 26, a final procession was formed.
Carried by the Guard of Honor, the dead leader moved again through
Charleston's streets, this time to St. Phillip's church.

"After an

anthem sung by a full choir," the Right Reverend Christopher Gads
den, Bishop of South Carolina, read the Order for the Burial of the
Dead.

"[A]n eloquent funeral discourse" followed this rite, and the

body was removed to the west churchyard.

There the last prayers were

said and— under the watchful eyes of the Guard of Honor— "Mr. Calhoun"
was buried.

In thus surrendering his charge, the Mayor noticed that

"Nearby pendent from the tall spar that supported it, drooped the
flag of the Union, its folds mournfully sweeping the verge of the
tomb."
The Mercury had suspended publication for the day.

But on

the following day, April 27, it recorded the event in words that
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revealed the emotions of its staff, and their special sense of loss :
Our city has passed through a scene that will never be
forgotten by those who witnessed it . . . it absorbed the
whole thought; and soul and presence of the city.
All
shared in it and Charleston was one house of mourning.

25Thomas, Carolina Tribute to Calhoun, 1-16; 24-91; Mercury
Apr. 2, 3, 5, 6, 10, 16, 22, 24, 25, 27, 1850.
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